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1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="no"?>
2 <!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.2//EN"
3 "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.2/docbookx.dtd" [
4
5 <!ENTITY % aptent SYSTEM "apt.ent">
6 %aptent;
7
8 ]>
9
10 <refentry>
11 &apt-docinfo;
12
13 <refmeta>
14 <refentrytitle>apt-secure</refentrytitle>
15 <manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
16 <refmiscinfo class="manual">APT</refmiscinfo>
17 </refmeta>
18
19 <!-- NOTE: This manpage has been written based on the
20 Securing Debian Manual ("Debian Security
21 Infrastructure" chapter) and on documentation
22 available at the following sites:
23 http://wiki.debian.net/?apt06
24 http://www.syntaxpolice.org/apt-secure/
25 http://www.enyo.de/fw/software/apt-secure/
26 -->
27 <!-- TODO: write a more verbose example of how it works with
28 a sample similar to
29 http://www.debian-administration.org/articles/174
30 ?
31 -->
32
33
34 <!-- Man page title -->
35 <refnamediv>
36 <refname>apt-secure</refname>
37 <refpurpose>Archive authentication support for APT</refpurpose>
38 </refnamediv>
39
40 <refsect1><title>Description</title>
41 <para>
42 Starting with version 0.6, <command>apt</command> contains code
43 that does signature checking of the Release file for all
44 archives. This ensures that packages in the archive can't be
45 modified by people who have no access to the Release file signing
46 key.
47 </para>
48
49 <para>
50 If a package comes from a archive without a signature or with a
51 signature that apt does not have a key for that package is
52 considered untrusted and installing it will result in a big
53 warning. <command>apt-get</command> will currently only warn
54 for unsigned archives, future releases might force all sources
55 to be verified before downloading packages from them.
56 </para>
57
58 <para>
59 The package frontends &apt-get;, &aptitude; and &synaptic; support this new
60 authentication feature.
61 </para>
62 </refsect1>
63
64 <refsect1><title>Trusted archives</title>
65
66 <para>
67 The chain of trust from an apt archive to the end user is made up of
68 different steps. <command>apt-secure</command> is the last step in
69 this chain, trusting an archive does not mean that the packages
70 that you trust it do not contain malicious code but means that you
71 trust the archive maintainer. It's the archive maintainer
72 responsibility to ensure that the archive integrity is correct.
73 </para>
74
75 <para>apt-secure does not review signatures at a
76 package level. If you require tools to do this you should look at
77 <command>debsig-verify</command> and
78 <command>debsign</command> (provided in the debsig-verify and
79 devscripts packages respectively).</para>
80
81 <para>
82 The chain of trust in Debian starts when a maintainer uploads a new
83 package or a new version of a package to the Debian archive. This
84 upload in order to become effective needs to be signed by a key of
85 a maintainer within the Debian maintainer's keyring (available in
86 the debian-keyring package). Maintainer's keys are signed by
87 other maintainers following pre-established procedures to
88 ensure the identity of the key holder.
89 </para>
90
91 <para>
92 Once the uploaded package is verified and included in the archive,
93 the maintainer signature is stripped off, an MD5 sum of the package
94 is computed and put in the Packages file. The MD5 sum of all of the
95 packages files are then computed and put into the Release file. The
96 Release file is then signed by the archive key (which is created
97 once a year) and distributed through the FTP server. This key is
98 also on the Debian keyring.
99 </para>
100
101 <para>
102 Any end user can check the signature of the Release file, extract the MD5
103 sum of a package from it and compare it with the MD5 sum of the
104 package he downloaded. Prior to version 0.6 only the MD5 sum of the
105 downloaded Debian package was checked. Now both the MD5 sum and the
106 signature of the Release file are checked.
107 </para>
108
109 <para>Notice that this is distinct from checking signatures on a
110 per package basis. It is designed to prevent two possible attacks:
111 </para>
112
113 <itemizedlist>
114 <listitem><para><literal>Network "man in the middle"
115 attacks</literal>. Without signature checking, a malicious
116 agent can introduce himself in the package download process and
117 provide malicious software either by controlling a network
118 element (router, switch, etc.) or by redirecting traffic to a
119 rogue server (through arp or DNS spoofing
120 attacks).</para></listitem>
121
122 <listitem><para><literal>Mirror network compromise</literal>.
123 Without signature checking, a malicious agent can compromise a
124 mirror host and modify the files in it to propagate malicious
125 software to all users downloading packages from that
126 host.</para></listitem>
127 </itemizedlist>
128
129 <para>However, it does not defend against a compromise of the
130 Debian master server itself (which signs the packages) or against a
131 compromise of the key used to sign the Release files. In any case,
132 this mechanism can complement a per-package signature.</para>
133 </refsect1>
134
135 <refsect1><title>User configuration</title>
136 <para>
137 <command>apt-key</command> is the program that manages the list
138 of keys used by apt. It can be used to add or remove keys although
139 an installation of this release will automatically provide the
140 default Debian archive signing keys used in the Debian package
141 repositories.
142 </para>
143 <para>
144 In order to add a new key you need to first download it
145 (you should make sure you are using a trusted communication channel
146 when retrieving it), add it with <command>apt-key</command> and
147 then run <command>apt-get update</command> so that apt can download
148 and verify the <filename>Release.gpg</filename> files from the archives you
149 have configured.
150 </para>
151 </refsect1>
152
153 <refsect1><title>Archive configuration</title>
154 <para>
155 If you want to provide archive signatures in an archive under your
156 maintenance you have to:
157 </para>
158
159 <itemizedlist>
160 <listitem><para><emphasis>Create a toplevel Release
161 file</emphasis>, if it does not exist already. You can do this
162 by running <command>apt-ftparchive release</command>
163 (provided in apt-utils).</para></listitem>
164
165 <listitem><para><emphasis>Sign it</emphasis>. You can do this by running
166 <command>gpg -abs -o Release.gpg Release</command>.</para></listitem>
167
168 <listitem><para><emphasis>Publish the key fingerprint</emphasis>,
169 that way your users will know what key they need to import in
170 order to authenticate the files in the
171 archive.</para></listitem>
172
173 </itemizedlist>
174
175 <para>Whenever the contents of the archive changes (new packages
176 are added or removed) the archive maintainer has to follow the
177 first two steps previously outlined.</para>
178
179 </refsect1>
180
181 <refsect1><title>See Also</title>
182 <para>
183 &apt-conf;, &apt-get;, &sources-list;, &apt-key;, &apt-ftparchive;,
184 &debsign; &debsig-verify;, &gpg;
185 </para>
186
187 <para>For more background information you might want to review the
188 <ulink
189 url="http://www.debian.org/doc/manuals/securing-debian-howto/ch7.en.html">Debian
190 Security Infrastructure</ulink> chapter of the Securing Debian Manual
191 (available also in the harden-doc package) and the
192 <ulink url="http://www.cryptnet.net/fdp/crypto/strong_distro.html"
193 >Strong Distribution HOWTO</ulink> by V. Alex Brennen. </para>
194
195 </refsect1>
196
197 &manbugs;
198 &manauthor;
199
200 <refsect1><title>Manpage Authors</title>
201
202 <para>This man-page is based on the work of Javier Fernández-Sanguino
203 Peña, Isaac Jones, Colin Walters, Florian Weimer and Michael Vogt.
204 </para>
205
206 </refsect1>
207
208
209 </refentry>
210