utils/Install/packzip/nt.c

   1 /*
   2
   3   Copyright (c) 1996  Scott Field
   4
   5   Module Name:
   6
   7     nt.c
   8
   9   Abstract:
  10
  11     This module implements WinNT security descriptor operations for the
  12     Win32 Info-ZIP project.  Operation such as setting file security,
  13     using/querying local and remote privileges, and queuing of operations
  14     is performed here.  The contents of this module are only relevant
  15     when the code is running on Windows NT, and the target volume supports
  16     persistent Acl storage.
  17
  18     User privileges that allow accessing certain privileged aspects of the
  19     security descriptor (such as the Sacl) are only used if the user specified
  20     to do so.
  21
  22   Author:
  23
  24     Scott Field (sfield@microsoft.com)
  25
  26   Last revised:  18 Jan 97
  27
  28  */
  29
  30 #define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN
  31 #define UNZIP_INTERNAL
  32 #include "unzip.h"
  33 #include <windows.h>
  34 #ifdef __RSXNT__
  35 #  include "rsxntwin.h"
  36 #endif
  37 #include "nt.h"
  38
  39
  40 #ifdef NTSD_EAS         /* This file is only needed for NTSD handling */
  41
  42 /* Borland C++ does not define FILE_SHARE_DELETE. Others also? */
  43 #ifndef FILE_SHARE_DELETE
  44 #  define FILE_SHARE_DELETE 0x00000004
  45 #endif
  46
  47
  48 /* private prototypes */
  49
  50 static BOOL Initialize(VOID);
  51 #if 0   /* currently unused */
  52 static BOOL Shutdown(VOID);
  53 #endif
  54 static BOOL DeferSet(char *resource, PVOLUMECAPS VolumeCaps, uch *buffer);
  55 static VOID GetRemotePrivilegesSet(CHAR *FileName, PDWORD dwRemotePrivileges);
  56 static VOID InitLocalPrivileges(VOID);
  57
  58
  59 BOOL bInitialized = FALSE;  /* module level stuff initialized? */
  60 HANDLE hInitMutex = NULL;   /* prevent multiple initialization */
  61
  62 BOOL g_bRestorePrivilege = FALSE;   /* for local set file security override */
  63 BOOL g_bSaclPrivilege = FALSE;      /* for local set sacl operations, only when
  64                                        restore privilege not present */
  65
  66 /* our single cached volume capabilities structure that describes the last
  67    volume root we encountered.  A single entry like this works well in the
  68    zip/unzip scenario for a number of reasons:
  69    1. typically one extraction path during unzip.
  70    2. typically process one volume at a time during zip, and then move
  71       on to the next.
  72    3. no cleanup code required and no memory leaks.
  73    4. simple code.
  74
  75    This approach should be reworked to a linked list approach if we expect to
  76    be called by many threads which are processing a variety of input/output
  77    volumes, since lock contention and stale data may become a bottleneck. */
  78
  79 VOLUMECAPS g_VolumeCaps;
  80 CRITICAL_SECTION VolumeCapsLock;
  81
  82
  83 /* our deferred set structure linked list element, used for making a copy
  84    of input data which is used at a later time to process the original input
  85    at a time when it makes more sense. eg, applying security to newly created
  86    directories, after all files have been placed in such directories. */
  87
  88 CRITICAL_SECTION SetDeferLock;
  89
  90 typedef struct _DEFERRED_SET {
  91     struct _DEFERRED_SET *Next;
  92     uch *buffer;                /* must point to DWORD aligned block */
  93     PVOLUMECAPS VolumeCaps;
  94     char *resource;
  95 } DEFERRED_SET, *PDEFERRED_SET, *LPDEFERRED_SET;
  96
  97 PDEFERRED_SET pSetHead = NULL;
  98 PDEFERRED_SET pSetTail;
  99
 100 static BOOL Initialize(VOID)
 101 {
 102     HANDLE hMutex;
 103     HANDLE hOldMutex;
 104
 105     if(bInitialized) return TRUE;
 106
 107     hMutex = CreateMutex(NULL, TRUE, NULL);
 108     if(hMutex == NULL) return FALSE;
 109
 110     hOldMutex = (HANDLE)InterlockedExchange((LPLONG)&hInitMutex, (LONG)hMutex);
 111
 112     if(hOldMutex != NULL) {
 113         /* somebody setup the mutex already */
 114         InterlockedExchange((LPLONG)&hInitMutex, (LONG)hOldMutex);
 115
 116         CloseHandle(hMutex); /* close new, un-needed mutex */
 117
 118         /* wait for initialization to complete and return status */
 119         WaitForSingleObject(hOldMutex, INFINITE);
 120         ReleaseMutex(hOldMutex);
 121
 122         return bInitialized;
 123     }
 124
 125     /* initialize module level resources */
 126
 127     InitializeCriticalSection( &SetDeferLock );
 128
 129     InitializeCriticalSection( &VolumeCapsLock );
 130     memset(&g_VolumeCaps, 0, sizeof(VOLUMECAPS));
 131
 132     InitLocalPrivileges();
 133
 134     bInitialized = TRUE;
 135
 136     ReleaseMutex(hMutex); /* release correct mutex */
 137
 138     return TRUE;
 139 }
 140
 141 #if 0   /* currently not used ! */
 142 static BOOL Shutdown(VOID)
 143 {
 144     /* really need to free critical sections, disable enabled privilges, etc,
 145        but doing so brings up possibility of race conditions if those resources
 146        are about to be used.  The easiest way to handle this is let these
 147        resources be freed when the process terminates... */
 148
 149     return TRUE;
 150 }
 151 #endif /* never */
 152
 153
 154 static BOOL DeferSet(char *resource, PVOLUMECAPS VolumeCaps, uch *buffer)
 155 {
 156     PDEFERRED_SET psd;
 157     DWORD cbDeferSet;
 158     DWORD cbResource;
 159     DWORD cbBuffer;
 160
 161     if(!bInitialized) if(!Initialize()) return FALSE;
 162
 163     cbResource = lstrlenA(resource) + 1;
 164     cbBuffer = GetSecurityDescriptorLength((PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR)buffer);
 165     cbDeferSet = sizeof(DEFERRED_SET) + cbBuffer + sizeof(VOLUMECAPS) +
 166       cbResource;
 167
 168     psd = (PDEFERRED_SET)HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), 0, cbDeferSet);
 169     if(psd == NULL) return FALSE;
 170
 171     psd->Next = NULL;
 172     psd->buffer = (uch *)(psd+1);
 173     psd->VolumeCaps = (PVOLUMECAPS)((char *)psd->buffer + cbBuffer);
 174     psd->resource = (char *)((char *)psd->VolumeCaps + sizeof(VOLUMECAPS));
 175
 176     memcpy(psd->buffer, buffer, cbBuffer);
 177     memcpy(psd->VolumeCaps, VolumeCaps, sizeof(VOLUMECAPS));
 178     psd->VolumeCaps->bProcessDefer = TRUE;
 179     memcpy(psd->resource, resource, cbResource);
 180
 181     /* take defer lock */
 182     EnterCriticalSection( &SetDeferLock );
 183
 184     /* add element at tail of list */
 185
 186     if(pSetHead == NULL) {
 187         pSetHead = psd;
 188     } else {
 189         pSetTail->Next = psd;
 190     }
 191
 192     pSetTail = psd;
 193
 194     /* release defer lock */
 195     LeaveCriticalSection( &SetDeferLock );
 196
 197     return TRUE;
 198 }
 199
 200 BOOL ProcessDefer(PDWORD dwDirectoryCount, PDWORD dwBytesProcessed,
 201                   PDWORD dwDirectoryFail, PDWORD dwBytesFail)
 202 {
 203     PDEFERRED_SET This;
 204     PDEFERRED_SET Next;
 205
 206     *dwDirectoryCount = 0;
 207     *dwBytesProcessed = 0;
 208
 209     *dwDirectoryFail = 0;
 210     *dwBytesFail = 0;
 211
 212     if(!bInitialized) return TRUE; /* nothing to do */
 213
 214     EnterCriticalSection( &SetDeferLock );
 215
 216     This = pSetHead;
 217
 218     while(This) {
 219
 220         if(SecuritySet(This->resource, This->VolumeCaps, This->buffer)) {
 221             (*dwDirectoryCount)++;
 222             *dwBytesProcessed +=
 223               GetSecurityDescriptorLength((PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR)This->buffer);
 224         } else {
 225             (*dwDirectoryFail)++;
 226             *dwBytesFail +=
 227               GetSecurityDescriptorLength((PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR)This->buffer);
 228         }
 229
 230         Next = This->Next;
 231         HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, This);
 232         This = Next;
 233     }
 234
 235     pSetHead = NULL;
 236
 237     LeaveCriticalSection( &SetDeferLock );
 238
 239     return TRUE;
 240 }
 241
 242 BOOL ValidateSecurity(uch *securitydata)
 243 {
 244     PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR sd = (PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR)securitydata;
 245     PACL pAcl;
 246     PSID pSid;
 247     BOOL bAclPresent;
 248     BOOL bDefaulted;
 249
 250     if(!IsWinNT()) return TRUE; /* don't do anything if not on WinNT */
 251
 252     if(!IsValidSecurityDescriptor(sd)) return FALSE;
 253
 254     /* verify Dacl integrity */
 255
 256     if(!GetSecurityDescriptorDacl(sd, &bAclPresent, &pAcl, &bDefaulted))
 257         return FALSE;
 258
 259     if(bAclPresent) {
 260         if(!IsValidAcl(pAcl)) return FALSE;
 261     }
 262
 263     /* verify Sacl integrity */
 264
 265     if(!GetSecurityDescriptorSacl(sd, &bAclPresent, &pAcl, &bDefaulted))
 266         return FALSE;
 267
 268     if(bAclPresent) {
 269         if(!IsValidAcl(pAcl)) return FALSE;
 270     }
 271
 272     /* verify owner integrity */
 273
 274     if(!GetSecurityDescriptorOwner(sd, &pSid, &bDefaulted))
 275         return FALSE;
 276
 277     if(pSid != NULL) {
 278         if(!IsValidSid(pSid)) return FALSE;
 279     }
 280
 281     /* verify group integrity */
 282
 283     if(!GetSecurityDescriptorGroup(sd, &pSid, &bDefaulted))
 284         return FALSE;
 285
 286     if(pSid != NULL) {
 287         if(!IsValidSid(pSid)) return FALSE;
 288     }
 289
 290     return TRUE;
 291 }
 292
 293 static VOID GetRemotePrivilegesSet(char *FileName, PDWORD dwRemotePrivileges)
 294 {
 295     HANDLE hFile;
 296
 297     *dwRemotePrivileges = 0;
 298
 299     /* see if we have the SeRestorePrivilege */
 300
 301     hFile = CreateFileA(
 302         FileName,
 303         ACCESS_SYSTEM_SECURITY | WRITE_DAC | WRITE_OWNER | READ_CONTROL,
 304         FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_DELETE, /* no sd updating allowed here */
 305         NULL,
 306         OPEN_EXISTING,
 307         FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS,
 308         NULL
 309         );
 310
 311     if(hFile != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
 312         /* no remote way to determine SeRestorePrivilege -- just try a
 313            read/write to simulate it */
 314         SECURITY_INFORMATION si = DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION |
 315           SACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION | OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION |
 316           GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION;
 317         PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR sd;
 318         DWORD cbBuf = 0;
 319
 320         GetKernelObjectSecurity(hFile, si, NULL, cbBuf, &cbBuf);
 321
 322         if(ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER == GetLastError()) {
 323             if((sd = HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), 0, cbBuf)) != NULL) {
 324                 if(GetKernelObjectSecurity(hFile, si, sd, cbBuf, &cbBuf)) {
 325                     if(SetKernelObjectSecurity(hFile, si, sd))
 326                         *dwRemotePrivileges |= OVERRIDE_RESTORE;
 327                 }
 328                 HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, sd);
 329             }
 330         }
 331
 332         CloseHandle(hFile);
 333     } else {
 334
 335         /* see if we have the SeSecurityPrivilege */
 336         /* note we don't need this if we have SeRestorePrivilege */
 337
 338         hFile = CreateFileA(
 339             FileName,
 340             ACCESS_SYSTEM_SECURITY,
 341             FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE, /* max */
 342             NULL,
 343             OPEN_EXISTING,
 344             0,
 345             NULL
 346             );
 347
 348         if(hFile != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
 349             CloseHandle(hFile);
 350             *dwRemotePrivileges |= OVERRIDE_SACL;
 351         }
 352     }
 353 }
 354
 355
 356 BOOL GetVolumeCaps(
 357     char *rootpath,         /* filepath, or NULL */
 358     char *name,             /* filename associated with rootpath */
 359     PVOLUMECAPS VolumeCaps  /* result structure describing capabilities */
 360     )
 361 {
 362     char TempRootPath[MAX_PATH + 1];
 363     DWORD cchTempRootPath = 0;
 364     BOOL bSuccess = TRUE;   /* assume success until told otherwise */
 365
 366     if(!bInitialized) if(!Initialize()) return FALSE;
 367
 368     /* process the input path to produce a consistent path suitable for
 369        compare operations and also suitable for certain picky Win32 API
 370        that don't like forward slashes */
 371
 372     if(rootpath != NULL && rootpath[0] != '\0') {
 373         DWORD i;
 374
 375         cchTempRootPath = lstrlen(rootpath);
 376         if(cchTempRootPath > MAX_PATH) return FALSE;
 377
 378         /* copy input, converting forward slashes to back slashes as we go */
 379
 380         for(i = 0 ; i <= cchTempRootPath ; i++) {
 381             if(rootpath[i] == '/') TempRootPath[i] = '\\';
 382             else TempRootPath[i] = rootpath[i];
 383         }
 384
 385         /* check for UNC and Null terminate or append trailing \ as
 386            appropriate */
 387
 388         /* possible valid UNCs we are passed follow:
 389            \\machine\foo\bar (path is \\machine\foo\)
 390            \\machine\foo     (path is \\machine\foo\)
 391            \\machine\foo\
 392            \\.\c$\     (FIXFIX: Win32API doesn't like this - GetComputerName())
 393            LATERLATER: handling mounted DFS drives in the future will require
 394                        slightly different logic which isn't available today.
 395                        This is required because directories can point at
 396                        different servers which have differing capabilities.
 397          */
 398
 399         if(TempRootPath[0] == '\\' && TempRootPath[1] == '\\') {
 400             DWORD slash = 0;
 401
 402             for(i = 2 ; i < cchTempRootPath ; i++) {
 403                 if(TempRootPath[i] == '\\') {
 404                     slash++;
 405
 406                     if(slash == 2) {
 407                         i++;
 408                         TempRootPath[i] = '\0';
 409                         cchTempRootPath = i;
 410                         break;
 411                     }
 412                 }
 413             }
 414
 415             /* if there was only one slash found, just tack another onto the
 416                end */
 417
 418             if(slash == 1 && TempRootPath[cchTempRootPath] != '\\') {
 419                 TempRootPath[cchTempRootPath] = TempRootPath[0]; /* '\' */
 420                 TempRootPath[cchTempRootPath+1] = '\0';
 421                 cchTempRootPath++;
 422             }
 423
 424         } else {
 425
 426             if(TempRootPath[1] == ':') {
 427
 428                 /* drive letter specified, truncate to root */
 429                 TempRootPath[2] = '\\';
 430                 TempRootPath[3] = '\0';
 431                 cchTempRootPath = 3;
 432             } else {
 433
 434                 /* must be file on current drive */
 435                 TempRootPath[0] = '\0';
 436                 cchTempRootPath = 0;
 437             }
 438
 439         }
 440
 441     } /* if path != NULL */
 442
 443     /* grab lock protecting cached entry */
 444     EnterCriticalSection( &VolumeCapsLock );
 445
 446     if(!g_VolumeCaps.bValid ||
 447        lstrcmpi(g_VolumeCaps.RootPath, TempRootPath) != 0)
 448     {
 449
 450         /* no match found, build up new entry */
 451
 452         DWORD dwFileSystemFlags;
 453         DWORD dwRemotePrivileges = 0;
 454         BOOL bRemote = FALSE;
 455
 456         /* release lock during expensive operations */
 457         LeaveCriticalSection( &VolumeCapsLock );
 458
 459         bSuccess = GetVolumeInformation(
 460             (TempRootPath[0] == '\0') ? NULL : TempRootPath,
 461             NULL, 0,
 462             NULL, NULL,
 463             &dwFileSystemFlags,
 464             NULL, 0);
 465
 466
 467         /* only if target volume supports Acls, and we were told to use
 468            privileges do we need to go out and test for the remote case */
 469
 470         if(bSuccess && (dwFileSystemFlags & FS_PERSISTENT_ACLS) &&
 471            VolumeCaps->bUsePrivileges)
 472         {
 473             if(GetDriveType( (TempRootPath[0] == '\0') ? NULL : TempRootPath )
 474                == DRIVE_REMOTE)
 475             {
 476                 bRemote = TRUE;
 477
 478                 /* make a determination about our remote capabilities */
 479
 480                 GetRemotePrivilegesSet(name, &dwRemotePrivileges);
 481             }
 482         }
 483
 484         /* always take the lock again, since we release it below */
 485         EnterCriticalSection( &VolumeCapsLock );
 486
 487         /* replace the existing data if successful */
 488         if(bSuccess) {
 489
 490             lstrcpynA(g_VolumeCaps.RootPath, TempRootPath, cchTempRootPath+1);
 491             g_VolumeCaps.bProcessDefer = FALSE;
 492             g_VolumeCaps.dwFileSystemFlags = dwFileSystemFlags;
 493             g_VolumeCaps.bRemote = bRemote;
 494             g_VolumeCaps.dwRemotePrivileges = dwRemotePrivileges;
 495             g_VolumeCaps.bValid = TRUE;
 496         }
 497     }
 498
 499     if(bSuccess) {
 500         /* copy input elements */
 501         g_VolumeCaps.bUsePrivileges = VolumeCaps->bUsePrivileges;
 502         g_VolumeCaps.dwFileAttributes = VolumeCaps->dwFileAttributes;
 503
 504         /* give caller results */
 505         memcpy(VolumeCaps, &g_VolumeCaps, sizeof(VOLUMECAPS));
 506     } else {
 507         g_VolumeCaps.bValid = FALSE;
 508     }
 509
 510     LeaveCriticalSection( &VolumeCapsLock ); /* release lock */
 511
 512     return bSuccess;
 513 }
 514
 515
 516 BOOL SecuritySet(char *resource, PVOLUMECAPS VolumeCaps, uch *securitydata)
 517 {
 518     HANDLE hFile;
 519     DWORD dwDesiredAccess = 0;
 520     DWORD dwFlags = 0;
 521     PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR sd = (PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR)securitydata;
 522     SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_CONTROL sdc;
 523     SECURITY_INFORMATION RequestedInfo = 0;
 524     DWORD dwRev;
 525     BOOL bRestorePrivilege = FALSE;
 526     BOOL bSaclPrivilege = FALSE;
 527     BOOL bSuccess;
 528
 529     if(!bInitialized) if(!Initialize()) return FALSE;
 530
 531     /* defer directory processing */
 532
 533     if(VolumeCaps->dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) {
 534         if(!VolumeCaps->bProcessDefer) {
 535             return DeferSet(resource, VolumeCaps, securitydata);
 536         } else {
 537             /* opening a directory requires FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS */
 538             dwFlags |= FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS;
 539         }
 540     }
 541
 542     /* evaluate the input security desriptor and act accordingly */
 543
 544     if(!IsValidSecurityDescriptor(sd))
 545         return FALSE;
 546
 547     if(!GetSecurityDescriptorControl(sd, &sdc, &dwRev))
 548         return FALSE;
 549
 550     /* setup privilege usage based on if told we can use privileges, and if so,
 551        what privileges we have */
 552
 553     if(VolumeCaps->bUsePrivileges) {
 554         if(VolumeCaps->bRemote) {
 555             /* use remotely determined privileges */
 556             if(VolumeCaps->dwRemotePrivileges & OVERRIDE_RESTORE)
 557                 bRestorePrivilege = TRUE;
 558
 559             if(VolumeCaps->dwRemotePrivileges & OVERRIDE_SACL)
 560                 bSaclPrivilege = TRUE;
 561
 562         } else {
 563             /* use local privileges */
 564             bRestorePrivilege = g_bRestorePrivilege;
 565             bSaclPrivilege = g_bSaclPrivilege;
 566         }
 567     }
 568
 569
 570     /* if a Dacl is present write Dacl out */
 571     /* if we have SeRestorePrivilege, write owner and group info out */
 572
 573     if(sdc & SE_DACL_PRESENT) {
 574         dwDesiredAccess |= WRITE_DAC;
 575         RequestedInfo |= DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION;
 576
 577         if(bRestorePrivilege) {
 578             dwDesiredAccess |= WRITE_OWNER;
 579             RequestedInfo |= (OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION |
 580               GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION);
 581         }
 582     }
 583
 584     /* if a Sacl is present and we have either SeRestorePrivilege or
 585        SeSystemSecurityPrivilege try to write Sacl out */
 586
 587     if((sdc & SE_SACL_PRESENT) && (bRestorePrivilege || bSaclPrivilege)) {
 588         dwDesiredAccess |= ACCESS_SYSTEM_SECURITY;
 589         RequestedInfo |= SACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION;
 590     }
 591
 592     if(RequestedInfo == 0)  /* nothing to do */
 593         return FALSE;
 594
 595     if(bRestorePrivilege)
 596         dwFlags |= FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS;
 597
 598     hFile = CreateFileA(
 599         resource,
 600         dwDesiredAccess,
 601         FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE,/* max sharing */
 602         NULL,
 603         OPEN_EXISTING,
 604         dwFlags,
 605         NULL
 606         );
 607
 608     if(hFile == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
 609         return FALSE;
 610
 611     bSuccess = SetKernelObjectSecurity(hFile, RequestedInfo, sd);
 612
 613     CloseHandle(hFile);
 614
 615     return bSuccess;
 616 }
 617
 618 static VOID InitLocalPrivileges(VOID)
 619 {
 620     HANDLE hToken;
 621     TOKEN_PRIVILEGES tp;
 622
 623     /* try to enable some interesting privileges that give us the ability
 624        to get some security information that we normally cannot.
 625
 626        note that enabling privileges is only relevant on the local machine;
 627        when accessing files that are on a remote machine, any privileges
 628        that are present on the remote machine get enabled by default. */
 629
 630     if(!OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(),
 631         TOKEN_QUERY | TOKEN_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES, &hToken))
 632         return;
 633
 634     tp.PrivilegeCount = 1;
 635     tp.Privileges[0].Attributes = SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED;
 636
 637     if(LookupPrivilegeValue(NULL, SE_RESTORE_NAME, &tp.Privileges[0].Luid)) {
 638
 639         /* try to enable SeRestorePrivilege; if this succeeds, we can write
 640            all aspects of the security descriptor */
 641
 642         if(AdjustTokenPrivileges(hToken, FALSE, &tp, 0, NULL, NULL) &&
 643            GetLastError() == ERROR_SUCCESS) g_bRestorePrivilege = TRUE;
 644
 645     }
 646
 647     /* try to enable SeSystemSecurityPrivilege, if SeRestorePrivilege not
 648        present; if this succeeds, we can write the Sacl */
 649
 650     if(!g_bRestorePrivilege &&
 651         LookupPrivilegeValue(NULL, SE_SECURITY_NAME, &tp.Privileges[0].Luid)) {
 652
 653         if(AdjustTokenPrivileges(hToken, FALSE, &tp, 0, NULL, NULL) &&
 654            GetLastError() == ERROR_SUCCESS) g_bSaclPrivilege = TRUE;
 655     }
 656
 657     CloseHandle(hToken);
 658 }
 659 #endif /* NTSD_EAS */