forbid insecure repositories by default expect in apt-get

With this commit all APT-based clients default to refusing to work with
unsigned or otherwise insufficently secured repositories. In terms of
apt and apt-get this changes nothing, but it effects all tools using
libapt like aptitude, synaptic or packagekit.

The exception remains apt-get for stretch for now as this might break
too many scripts/usecases too quickly.

The documentation is updated and extended to reflect how to opt out or
in on this behaviour change.

Closes: 808367

diff --git a/apt-pkg/init.cc b/apt-pkg/init.cc
index a41d604d31d74e8854720e8a7915db67f0bccd8d..c77e8e2feddead88a9fcd8ae6c2a948048e7ea9b 100644 (file)
--- a/apt-pkg/init.cc
+++ b/apt-pkg/init.cc
@@ -86,10 +86,7 @@ bool pkgInitConfig(Configuration &Cnf)
    Cnf.Set("Dir::Ignore-Files-Silently::", "\\.distUpgrade$");
 
    // Repository security
    Cnf.Set("Dir::Ignore-Files-Silently::", "\\.distUpgrade$");
 
    // Repository security

-   // FIXME: this is set to "true" for backward compatibility, once
-   //        jessie is out we want to change this to "false" to
-   //        improve security
-   Cnf.CndSet("Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories", true);
+   Cnf.CndSet("Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories", false);

    Cnf.CndSet("Acquire::AllowDowngradeToInsecureRepositories", false);
 
    // Default cdrom mount point
    Cnf.CndSet("Acquire::AllowDowngradeToInsecureRepositories", false);
 
    // Default cdrom mount point

diff --git a/apt-private/private-cmndline.cc b/apt-private/private-cmndline.cc
index ba64c5b4621d1f046f7fb7ab7cf8cb989f087b77..481c23c942f9a9acfc3659022e78f5fdfcd76896 100644 (file)
--- a/apt-private/private-cmndline.cc
+++ b/apt-private/private-cmndline.cc
@@ -372,7 +372,6 @@ std::vector<CommandLine::Args> getCommandArgs(APT_CMD const Program, char const
    return Args;
 }
                                                                        /*}}}*/
    return Args;
 }
                                                                        /*}}}*/

-#undef CmdMatches

 #undef addArg
 static void ShowHelpListCommands(std::vector<aptDispatchWithHelp> const &Cmds)/*{{{*/
 {
 #undef addArg
 static void ShowHelpListCommands(std::vector<aptDispatchWithHelp> const &Cmds)/*{{{*/
 {


@@ -445,15 +444,22 @@ static void BinarySpecificConfiguration(char const * const Binary)        /*{{{*/
       _config->CndSet("Binary::apt::APT::Get::Upgrade-Allow-New", true);
       _config->CndSet("Binary::apt::APT::Cmd::Show-Update-Stats", true);
       _config->CndSet("Binary::apt::DPkg::Progress-Fancy", true);
       _config->CndSet("Binary::apt::APT::Get::Upgrade-Allow-New", true);
       _config->CndSet("Binary::apt::APT::Cmd::Show-Update-Stats", true);
       _config->CndSet("Binary::apt::DPkg::Progress-Fancy", true);

-      _config->CndSet("Binary::apt::Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories", false);

       _config->CndSet("Binary::apt::APT::Keep-Downloaded-Packages", false);
    }
       _config->CndSet("Binary::apt::APT::Keep-Downloaded-Packages", false);
    }

+   if (binary == "apt-config")
+      _config->CndSet("Binary::apt-get::Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories", true);

 
    _config->Set("Binary", binary);
 
    _config->Set("Binary", binary);

-   std::string const conf = "Binary::" + binary;
-   _config->MoveSubTree(conf.c_str(), NULL);

 }
                                                                        /*}}}*/
 }
                                                                        /*}}}*/

+static void BinaryCommandSpecificConfiguration(char const * const Binary, char const * const Cmd)/*{{{*/
+{
+   std::string const binary = flNotDir(Binary);
+   if (binary == "apt-get" && CmdMatches("update"))
+      _config->CndSet("Binary::apt-get::Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories", true);
+}
+#undef CmdMatches
+                                                                       /*}}}*/

 std::vector<CommandLine::Dispatch> ParseCommandLine(CommandLine &CmdL, APT_CMD const Binary,/*{{{*/
       Configuration * const * const Cnf, pkgSystem ** const Sys, int const argc, const char *argv[],
       bool (*ShowHelp)(CommandLine &), std::vector<aptDispatchWithHelp> (*GetCommands)(void))
 std::vector<CommandLine::Dispatch> ParseCommandLine(CommandLine &CmdL, APT_CMD const Binary,/*{{{*/
       Configuration * const * const Cnf, pkgSystem ** const Sys, int const argc, const char *argv[],
       bool (*ShowHelp)(CommandLine &), std::vector<aptDispatchWithHelp> (*GetCommands)(void))


@@ -481,11 +487,14 @@ std::vector<CommandLine::Dispatch> ParseCommandLine(CommandLine &CmdL, APT_CMD c
    // Args running out of scope invalidates the pointer stored in CmdL,
    // but we don't use the pointer after this function, so we ignore
    // this problem for now and figure something out if we have to.
    // Args running out of scope invalidates the pointer stored in CmdL,
    // but we don't use the pointer after this function, so we ignore
    // this problem for now and figure something out if we have to.

-   std::vector<CommandLine::Args> Args;
+   char const * CmdCalled = nullptr;

    if (Cmds.empty() == false && Cmds[0].Handler != nullptr)
    if (Cmds.empty() == false && Cmds[0].Handler != nullptr)

-      Args = getCommandArgs(Binary, CommandLine::GetCommand(Cmds.data(), argc, argv));
-   else
-      Args = getCommandArgs(Binary, nullptr);
+      CmdCalled = CommandLine::GetCommand(Cmds.data(), argc, argv);
+   if (CmdCalled != nullptr)
+      BinaryCommandSpecificConfiguration(argv[0], CmdCalled);
+   std::string const conf = "Binary::" + _config->Find("Binary");
+   _config->MoveSubTree(conf.c_str(), nullptr);
+   auto Args = getCommandArgs(Binary, CmdCalled);

    CmdL = CommandLine(Args.data(), _config);
 
    if (CmdL.Parse(argc,argv) == false ||
    CmdL = CommandLine(Args.data(), _config);
 
    if (CmdL.Parse(argc,argv) == false ||

diff --git a/doc/apt-get.8.xml b/doc/apt-get.8.xml
index 20d761075e95547982928ce1fe290bbde9dc2e57..8fc6cc26d87dad12e3ca02a381919c8fa0b72d17 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/apt-get.8.xml
+++ b/doc/apt-get.8.xml
@@ -563,8 +563,9 @@
 
      <varlistentry><term><option>--no-allow-insecure-repositories</option></term>
      <listitem><para>Forbid the update command to acquire unverifiable
 
      <varlistentry><term><option>--no-allow-insecure-repositories</option></term>
      <listitem><para>Forbid the update command to acquire unverifiable

-     data from configured sources. Apt will fail at the update command
-     for repositories without valid cryptographically signatures.
+     data from configured sources. APT will fail at the update command
+     for repositories without valid cryptographically signatures. See
+     also &apt-secure; for details on the concept and the implications.

 
      Configuration Item: <literal>Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories</literal>.</para></listitem>
      </varlistentry>
 
      Configuration Item: <literal>Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories</literal>.</para></listitem>
      </varlistentry>

diff --git a/doc/apt-secure.8.xml b/doc/apt-secure.8.xml
index 1cf6539c63376d0cf8ed838b710648d3753d6dcd..2c1c192d4dfe64558eedec34521d49bbdc988f54 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/apt-secure.8.xml
+++ b/doc/apt-secure.8.xml
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
    &apt-email;
    &apt-product;
    <!-- The last update date -->
    &apt-email;
    &apt-product;
    <!-- The last update date -->

-   <date>2015-10-15T00:00:00Z</date>
+   <date>2016-03-18T00:00:00Z</date>

  </refentryinfo>
 
  <refmeta>
  </refentryinfo>
 
  <refmeta>


@@ -48,22 +48,46 @@
    Starting with version 0.6, <command>APT</command> contains code that does
    signature checking of the Release file for all repositories. This ensures
    that data like packages in the archive can't be modified by people who
    Starting with version 0.6, <command>APT</command> contains code that does
    signature checking of the Release file for all repositories. This ensures
    that data like packages in the archive can't be modified by people who

-   have no access to the Release file signing key.
+   have no access to the Release file signing key. Starting with version 1.1
+   <command>APT</command> requires repositories to provide recent authentication
+   information for unimpeded usage of the repository.

    </para>
 
    <para>
    If an archive has an unsigned Release file or no Release file at all
    </para>
 
    <para>
    If an archive has an unsigned Release file or no Release file at all

-   current APT versions will raise a warning in <command>update</command>
-   operations and front-ends like <command>apt-get</command> will require
-   explicit confirmation if an installation request includes a package from
-   such an unauthenticated archive.
+   current APT versions will refuse to download data from them by default
+   in <command>update</command> operations and even if forced to download
+   front-ends like &apt-get; will require explicit confirmation if an
+   installation request includes a package from such an unauthenticated
+   archive.

    </para>
 
    <para>
    </para>
 
    <para>

-   In the future APT will refuse to work with unauthenticated repositories by
-   default until support for them is removed entirely. Users have the option to
-   opt-in to this behavior already by setting the configuration option
-   <option>Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories</option> to <literal>false</literal>.
+   As a temporary exception &apt-get; (not &apt;!) raises warnings only if it
+   encounters unauthenticated archives to give a slightly longer grace period
+   on this backward compatibility effecting change. This exception will be removed
+   in future releases and you can opt-out of this grace period by setting the
+   configuration option <option>Binary::apt-get::Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories</option>
+   to <literal>false</literal> or <option>--no-allow-insecure-repositories</option>
+   on the command line.
+   </para>
+
+   <para>
+   You can force all APT clients to raise only warnings by setting the
+   configuration option <option>Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories</option> to
+   <literal>true</literal>. Note that this option will eventually be removed.
+   Users also have the <option>Trusted</option> option available to disable
+   even the warnings, but be sure to understand the implications as detailed in
+   &sources-list;.
+   </para>
+
+   <para>
+   A repository which previously was authentication but would loose this state in
+   an <command>update</command> operation raises an error in all APT clients
+   irrespective of the option to allow or forbid usage of insecure repositories.
+   The error can be overcome by additionally setting
+   <option>Acquire::AllowDowngradeToInsecureRepositories</option>
+   to <literal>true</literal>.

    </para>
 
    <para>
    </para>
 
    <para>

diff --git a/doc/apt.conf.5.xml b/doc/apt.conf.5.xml
index d71f99c0a9c1e729b5f701276c2218e37768ae08..01540160583544a2e274a0578cefca63a220d8a5 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/apt.conf.5.xml
+++ b/doc/apt.conf.5.xml
@@ -650,27 +650,24 @@ APT::Compressor::rev {
 
      <varlistentry><term><option>AllowInsecureRepositories</option></term>
         <listitem><para>
 
      <varlistentry><term><option>AllowInsecureRepositories</option></term>
         <listitem><para>

-           Allow the update operation to load data files from
-           a repository without a trusted signature. If enabled this
-           option no data files will be loaded and the update
-           operation fails with a error for this source. The default
-           is false for backward compatibility. This will be changed
-           in the future.
+          Allow update operations to load data files from
+          repositories without sufficient security information.
+          The default value is "<literal>false</literal>".
+          Concept and implications of this are detailed in &apt-secure;.

         </para></listitem>
      </varlistentry>
 
      <varlistentry><term><option>AllowDowngradeToInsecureRepositories</option></term>
         <listitem><para>
         </para></listitem>
      </varlistentry>
 
      <varlistentry><term><option>AllowDowngradeToInsecureRepositories</option></term>
         <listitem><para>

-           Allow that a repository that was previously gpg signed to become
-           unsigned durign a update operation. When there is no valid signature
-           of a previously trusted repository apt will refuse the update. This
-           option can be used to override this protection. You almost certainly
-           never want to enable this. The default is false.
-
-           Note that apt will still consider packages from this source
-           untrusted and warn about them if you try to install
-           them.
-         </para></listitem>
+          Allow that a repository that was previously gpg signed to become
+          unsigned during an update operation. When there is no valid signature
+          for a previously trusted repository apt will refuse the update. This
+          option can be used to override this protection. You almost certainly
+          never want to enable this. The default is <literal>false</literal>.
+
+          Note that apt will still consider packages from this source
+          untrusted and warns about them if you try to install them.
+        </para></listitem>

      </varlistentry>
 
      <varlistentry><term><option>Changelogs::URI</option> scope</term>
      </varlistentry>
 
      <varlistentry><term><option>Changelogs::URI</option> scope</term>