&apt-email;
&apt-product;
<!-- The last update date -->
- <date>2015-10-14T00:00:00Z</date>
+ <date>2016-08-06T00:00:00Z</date>
</refentryinfo>
<refmeta>
Starting with version 0.6, <command>APT</command> contains code that does
signature checking of the Release file for all repositories. This ensures
that data like packages in the archive can't be modified by people who
- have no access to the Release file signing key.
+ have no access to the Release file signing key. Starting with version 1.1
+ <command>APT</command> requires repositories to provide recent authentication
+ information for unimpeded usage of the repository.
</para>
<para>
- If an archive doesn't have a signed Release file or no Release file at all
- current APT versions will raise a warning in <command>update</command>
- operations and frontends like <command>apt-get</command> will require
- explicit confirmation if an installation request includes a package from
- such an unauthenticated archive.
+ If an archive has an unsigned Release file or no Release file at all
+ current APT versions will refuse to download data from them by default
+ in <command>update</command> operations and even if forced to download
+ front-ends like &apt-get; will require explicit confirmation if an
+ installation request includes a package from such an unauthenticated
+ archive.
</para>
<para>
- In the future APT will refuse to work with unauthenticated repositories by
- default until support for them is removed entirely. Users have the option to
- opt-in to this behavior already by setting the configuration option
- <option>Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories</option> to <literal>false</literal>.
+ As a temporary exception &apt-get; (not &apt;!) raises warnings only if it
+ encounters unauthenticated archives to give a slightly longer grace period
+ on this backward compatibility effecting change. This exception will be removed
+ in future releases and you can opt-out of this grace period by setting the
+ configuration option <option>Binary::apt-get::Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories</option>
+ to <literal>false</literal> or <option>--no-allow-insecure-repositories</option>
+ on the command line.
</para>
<para>
- Note: All APT-based package management frontends like &apt-get;, &aptitude;
+ You can force all APT clients to raise only warnings by setting the
+ configuration option <option>Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories</option> to
+ <literal>true</literal>. Individual repositories can also be allowed to be insecure
+ via the &sources-list; option <literal>allow-insecure=yes</literal>.
+ Note that insecure repositories are strongly discouraged and all options
+ to force apt to continue supporting them will eventually be removed.
+ Users also have the <option>Trusted</option> option available to disable
+ even the warnings, but be sure to understand the implications as detailed in
+ &sources-list;.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ A repository which previously was authenticated but would loose this state in
+ an <command>update</command> operation raises an error in all APT clients
+ irrespective of the option to allow or forbid usage of insecure repositories.
+ The error can be overcome by additionally setting
+ <option>Acquire::AllowDowngradeToInsecureRepositories</option>
+ to <literal>true</literal> or for Individual repositories with the &sources-list;
+ option <literal>allow-downgrade-to-insecure=yes</literal>.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ Note: All APT-based package management front-ends like &apt-get;, &aptitude;
and &synaptic; support this authentication feature, so this manpage uses
<literal>APT</literal> to refer to them all for simplicity only.
</para>
</refsect1>
- <refsect1><title>Trusted repositories</title>
+ <refsect1><title>Trusted Repositories</title>
<para>
The chain of trust from an APT archive to the end user is made up of
devscripts packages respectively).</para>
<para>
- The chain of trust in Debian e.g. starts when a maintainer uploads a new
+ The chain of trust in Debian starts (e.g.) when a maintainer uploads a new
package or a new version of a package to the Debian archive. In
order to become effective, this upload needs to be signed by a key
- contained in one of the Debian package maintainers keyrings (available in
+ contained in one of the Debian package maintainer keyrings (available in
the debian-keyring package). Maintainers' keys are signed by
other maintainers following pre-established procedures to
ensure the identity of the key holder. Similar procedures exist in all
this mechanism can complement a per-package signature.</para>
</refsect1>
- <refsect1><title>User configuration</title>
+ <refsect1><title>User Configuration</title>
<para>
<command>apt-key</command> is the program that manages the list of keys used
by APT to trust repositories. It can be used to add or remove keys as well
</para>
</refsect1>
-<refsect1><title>Archive configuration</title>
+<refsect1><title>Archive Configuration</title>
<para>
If you want to provide archive signatures in an archive under your
maintenance you have to:
<command>gpg -abs -o Release.gpg Release</command>.</para></listitem>
<listitem><para>
- <emphasis>Publish the key fingerprint</emphasis>, that way your users
+ <emphasis>Publish the key fingerprint</emphasis>, so that your users
will know what key they need to import in order to authenticate the files
in the archive. It is best to ship your key in its own keyring package
like &keyring-distro; does with &keyring-package; to be able to
If your users can't acquire your key securely the chain of trust described above is broken.
How you can help users add your key depends on your archive and target audience ranging
from having your keyring package included in another archive users already have configured
- (like the default repositories of their distribution) to leverage the web of trust.
+ (like the default repositories of their distribution) to leveraging the web of trust.
</para></listitem>
</itemizedlist>
<ulink
url="https://www.debian.org/doc/manuals/securing-debian-howto/ch7">Debian
Security Infrastructure</ulink> chapter of the Securing Debian Manual
-(available also in the harden-doc package) and the
+(also available in the harden-doc package) and the
<ulink url="http://www.cryptnet.net/fdp/crypto/strong_distro.html"
>Strong Distribution HOWTO</ulink> by V. Alex Brennen. </para>
</refentry>
-
projects / apt.git / blobdiff