#!/bin/sh
set -e
+unset GREP_OPTIONS
# We don't use a secret keyring, of course, but gpg panics and
# implodes if there isn't one available
# when adding new keys, make sure that the archive-master-keyring
# is honored. so:
- # all keys that are exported and have the name
- # "Ubuntu Archive Automatic Signing Key" must have a valid signature
- # from a key in the ubuntu-master-keyring
+ # all keys that are exported must have a valid signature
+ # from a key in the $distro-master-keyring
add_keys=`$GPG_CMD --keyring $ADD_KEYRING --with-colons --list-keys | grep ^pub | cut -d: -f5`
master_keys=`$GPG_CMD --keyring $MASTER --with-colons --list-keys | grep ^pub | cut -d: -f5`
for add_key in $add_keys; do
fi
new_mtime=$(stat -c %Y $keyring)
if [ $new_mtime -ne $old_mtime ]; then
+ echo "Checking for new archive signing keys now"
add_keys_with_verify_against_master_keyring $keyring $MASTER_KEYRING
fi
}
exit 1
fi
- # add new keys, if no MASTER_KEYRING is used, use the traditional
- # way
- if [ -z "$MASTER_KEYRING" ]; then
- $GPG_CMD --quiet --batch --keyring $ARCHIVE_KEYRING --export | $GPG --import
- else
- add_keys_with_verify_against_master_keyring $ARCHIVE_KEYRING $MASTER_KEYRING
- fi
+ # add new keys from the package;
+
+ # we do not use add_keys_with_verify_against_master_keyring here,
+ # because "update" is run on regular package updates. A
+ # attacker might as well replace the master-archive-keyring file
+ # in the package and add his own keys. so this check wouldn't
+ # add any security. we *need* this check on net-update though
+ $GPG_CMD --quiet --batch --keyring $ARCHIVE_KEYRING --export | $GPG --import
# remove no-longer supported/used keys
keys=`$GPG_CMD --keyring $REMOVED_KEYS --with-colons --list-keys | grep ^pub | cut -d: -f5`
echo " apt-key update - update keys using the keyring package"
echo " apt-key net-update - update keys using the network"
echo " apt-key list - list keys"
+ echo " apt-key finger - list fingerprints"
+ echo " apt-key adv - pass advanced options to gpg (download key)"
echo
}