}
/*}}}*/
-static bool MessageInsecureRepository(bool const isError, std::string const &msg)/*{{{*/
+static APT_NONNULL(2) bool MessageInsecureRepository(bool const isError, char const * const msg, std::string const &repo)/*{{{*/
{
+ std::string m;
+ strprintf(m, msg, repo.c_str());
if (isError)
{
- _error->Error("%s", msg.c_str());
+ _error->Error("%s", m.c_str());
_error->Notice("%s", _("Updating from such a repository can't be done securely, and is therefore disabled by default."));
}
else
{
- _error->Warning("%s", msg.c_str());
+ _error->Warning("%s", m.c_str());
_error->Notice("%s", _("Data from such a repository can't be authenticated and is therefore potentially dangerous to use."));
}
_error->Notice("%s", _("See apt-secure(8) manpage for repository creation and user configuration details."));
return false;
}
-static bool APT_NONNULL(2) MessageInsecureRepository(bool const isError, char const * const msg, std::string const &repo)
+ /*}}}*/
+// AllowInsecureRepositories /*{{{*/
+enum class InsecureType { UNSIGNED, WEAK, NORELEASE };
+static bool TargetIsAllowedToBe(IndexTarget const &Target, InsecureType const type)
{
- std::string m;
- strprintf(m, msg, repo.c_str());
- return MessageInsecureRepository(isError, m);
+ if (_config->FindB("Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories"))
+ return true;
+
+ if (Target.OptionBool(IndexTarget::ALLOW_INSECURE))
+ return true;
+
+ switch (type)
+ {
+ case InsecureType::UNSIGNED: break;
+ case InsecureType::NORELEASE: break;
+ case InsecureType::WEAK:
+ if (_config->FindB("Acquire::AllowWeakRepositories"))
+ return true;
+ if (Target.OptionBool(IndexTarget::ALLOW_WEAK))
+ return true;
+ break;
+ }
+ return false;
}
- /*}}}*/
-static bool APT_NONNULL(1, 3, 4, 5) AllowInsecureRepositories(char const * const msg, std::string const &repo,/*{{{*/
+static bool APT_NONNULL(3, 4, 5) AllowInsecureRepositories(InsecureType const msg, std::string const &repo,
metaIndex const * const MetaIndexParser, pkgAcqMetaClearSig * const TransactionManager, pkgAcquire::Item * const I)
{
+ // we skip weak downgrades as its unlikely that a repository gets really weaker –
+ // its more realistic that apt got pickier in a newer version
+ if (msg != InsecureType::WEAK)
+ {
+ std::string const FinalInRelease = TransactionManager->GetFinalFilename();
+ std::string const FinalReleasegpg = FinalInRelease.substr(0, FinalInRelease.length() - strlen("InRelease")) + "Release.gpg";
+ if (RealFileExists(FinalReleasegpg) || RealFileExists(FinalInRelease))
+ {
+ char const * msgstr = nullptr;
+ switch (msg)
+ {
+ case InsecureType::UNSIGNED: msgstr = _("The repository '%s' is no longer signed."); break;
+ case InsecureType::NORELEASE: msgstr = _("The repository '%s' does no longer have a Release file."); break;
+ case InsecureType::WEAK: /* unreachable */ break;
+ }
+ if (_config->FindB("Acquire::AllowDowngradeToInsecureRepositories") ||
+ TransactionManager->Target.OptionBool(IndexTarget::ALLOW_DOWNGRADE_TO_INSECURE))
+ {
+ // meh, the users wants to take risks (we still mark the packages
+ // from this repository as unauthenticated)
+ _error->Warning(msgstr, repo.c_str());
+ _error->Warning(_("This is normally not allowed, but the option "
+ "Acquire::AllowDowngradeToInsecureRepositories was "
+ "given to override it."));
+ } else {
+ MessageInsecureRepository(true, msgstr, repo);
+ TransactionManager->AbortTransaction();
+ I->Status = pkgAcquire::Item::StatError;
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
if(MetaIndexParser->GetTrusted() == metaIndex::TRI_YES)
return true;
- if (_config->FindB("Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories") == true)
+ char const * msgstr = nullptr;
+ switch (msg)
{
- MessageInsecureRepository(false, msg, repo);
+ case InsecureType::UNSIGNED: msgstr = _("The repository '%s' is not signed."); break;
+ case InsecureType::NORELEASE: msgstr = _("The repository '%s' does not have a Release file."); break;
+ case InsecureType::WEAK: msgstr = _("The repository '%s' provides only weak security information."); break;
+ }
+
+ if (TargetIsAllowedToBe(TransactionManager->Target, msg) == true)
+ {
+ MessageInsecureRepository(false, msgstr, repo);
return true;
}
- MessageInsecureRepository(true, msg, repo);
+ MessageInsecureRepository(true, msgstr, repo);
TransactionManager->AbortTransaction();
I->Status = pkgAcquire::Item::StatError;
return false;
we can at least trust them for integrity of the download itself.
Only repositories without a Release file can (obviously) not have
hashes – and they are very uncommon and strongly discouraged */
- return TransactionManager->MetaIndexParser->GetLoadedSuccessfully() == metaIndex::TRI_YES;
+ if (TransactionManager->MetaIndexParser->GetLoadedSuccessfully() != metaIndex::TRI_YES)
+ return false;
+ if (TargetIsAllowedToBe(Target, InsecureType::WEAK))
+ {
+ /* If we allow weak hashes, we check that we have some (weak) and then
+ declare hashes not needed. That will tip us in the right direction
+ as if hashes exist, they will be used, even if not required */
+ auto const hsl = GetExpectedHashes();
+ if (hsl.usable())
+ return true;
+ if (hsl.empty() == false)
+ return false;
+ }
+ return true;
}
HashStringList pkgAcqTransactionItem::GetExpectedHashes() const
{
}
string const FailReason = LookupTag(Message, "FailReason");
- enum { MAXIMUM_SIZE_EXCEEDED, HASHSUM_MISMATCH, OTHER } failreason = OTHER;
+ enum { MAXIMUM_SIZE_EXCEEDED, HASHSUM_MISMATCH, WEAK_HASHSUMS, OTHER } failreason = OTHER;
if ( FailReason == "MaximumSizeExceeded")
failreason = MAXIMUM_SIZE_EXCEEDED;
+ else if ( FailReason == "WeakHashSums")
+ failreason = WEAK_HASHSUMS;
else if (Status == StatAuthError)
failreason = HASHSUM_MISMATCH;
case HASHSUM_MISMATCH:
out << _("Hash Sum mismatch") << std::endl;
break;
+ case WEAK_HASHSUMS:
+ out << _("Insufficient information available to perform this download securely") << std::endl;
+ break;
case MAXIMUM_SIZE_EXCEEDED:
case OTHER:
out << LookupTag(Message, "Message") << std::endl;
{
out << "Hashes of expected file:" << std::endl;
for (auto const &hs: ExpectedHashes)
- out << " - " << hs.toStr() << std::endl;
+ {
+ out << " - " << hs.toStr();
+ if (hs.usable() == false)
+ out << " [weak]";
+ out << std::endl;
+ }
}
if (failreason == HASHSUM_MISMATCH)
{
std::string const tagname = std::string(*type) + "-Hash";
std::string const hashsum = LookupTag(Message, tagname.c_str());
if (hashsum.empty() == false)
- out << " - " << HashString(*type, hashsum).toStr() << std::endl;
+ {
+ auto const hs = HashString(*type, hashsum);
+ out << " - " << hs.toStr();
+ if (hs.usable() == false)
+ out << " [weak]";
+ out << std::endl;
+ }
}
out << "Last modification reported: " << LookupTag(Message, "Last-Modified", "<none>") << std::endl;
}
{
case MAXIMUM_SIZE_EXCEEDED: RenameOnError(MaximumSizeExceeded); break;
case HASHSUM_MISMATCH: RenameOnError(HashSumMismatch); break;
+ case WEAK_HASHSUMS: break;
case OTHER: break;
}
{
case TransactionStarted: break;
case TransactionAbort: _error->Fatal("Transaction %s was already aborted and is aborted again", TransactionManager->Target.URI.c_str()); return;
- case TransactionCommit: _error->Fatal("Transaction %s was already aborted and is now commited", TransactionManager->Target.URI.c_str()); return;
+ case TransactionCommit: _error->Fatal("Transaction %s was already aborted and is now committed", TransactionManager->Target.URI.c_str()); return;
}
TransactionManager->State = TransactionAbort;
switch (TransactionManager->State)
{
case TransactionStarted: break;
- case TransactionAbort: _error->Fatal("Transaction %s was already commited and is now aborted", TransactionManager->Target.URI.c_str()); return;
- case TransactionCommit: _error->Fatal("Transaction %s was already commited and is again commited", TransactionManager->Target.URI.c_str()); return;
+ case TransactionAbort: _error->Fatal("Transaction %s was already committed and is now aborted", TransactionManager->Target.URI.c_str()); return;
+ case TransactionCommit: _error->Fatal("Transaction %s was already committed and is again committed", TransactionManager->Target.URI.c_str()); return;
}
TransactionManager->State = TransactionCommit;
string const FinalFile = GetFinalFilename();
struct stat Buf;
if (stat(FinalFile.c_str(),&Buf) == 0)
- Header += "\nLast-Modified: " + TimeRFC1123(Buf.st_mtime);
+ Header += "\nLast-Modified: " + TimeRFC1123(Buf.st_mtime, false);
return Header;
}
// valid signature from a key in the trusted keyring. We
// perform additional verification of its contents, and use them
// to verify the indexes we are about to download
+ if (_config->FindB("Debug::pkgAcquire::Auth", false))
+ std::cerr << "Signature verification succeeded: " << DestFile << std::endl;
if (TransactionManager->IMSHit == false)
{
LoadLastMetaIndexParser(TransactionManager, FinalRelease, FinalInRelease);
}
- if (TransactionManager->MetaIndexParser->Load(DestFile, &ErrorText) == false)
+ bool const GoodAuth = TransactionManager->MetaIndexParser->Load(DestFile, &ErrorText);
+ if (GoodAuth == false && AllowInsecureRepositories(InsecureType::WEAK, Target.Description, TransactionManager->MetaIndexParser, TransactionManager, this) == false)
{
Status = StatAuthError;
return false;
return false;
}
- if (_config->FindB("Debug::pkgAcquire::Auth", false))
- std::cerr << "Signature verification succeeded: "
- << DestFile << std::endl;
-
// Download further indexes with verification
- TransactionManager->QueueIndexes(true);
+ TransactionManager->QueueIndexes(GoodAuth);
- return true;
+ return GoodAuth;
}
/*}}}*/
void pkgAcqMetaClearSig::QueueIndexes(bool const verify) /*{{{*/
ExpectedAdditionalItems = 0;
std::set<std::string> targetsSeen;
- bool const metaBaseSupportsByHash = TransactionManager->MetaIndexParser->GetSupportsAcquireByHash();
- for (auto &Target: TransactionManager->MetaIndexParser->GetIndexTargets())
+ bool const hasReleaseFile = TransactionManager->MetaIndexParser != NULL;
+ bool const metaBaseSupportsByHash = hasReleaseFile && TransactionManager->MetaIndexParser->GetSupportsAcquireByHash();
+ bool hasHashes = true;
+ auto IndexTargets = TransactionManager->MetaIndexParser->GetIndexTargets();
+ if (hasReleaseFile && verify == false)
+ hasHashes = std::any_of(IndexTargets.begin(), IndexTargets.end(),
+ [&](IndexTarget const &Target) { return TransactionManager->MetaIndexParser->Exists(Target.MetaKey); });
+ for (auto&& Target: IndexTargets)
{
// if we have seen a target which is created-by a target this one here is declared a
// fallback to, we skip acquiring the fallback (but we make sure we clean up)
// download time, bandwidth and diskspace for nothing, BUT Debian doesn't feature all
// in the set of supported architectures, so we can filter based on this property rather
// than invent an entirely new flag we would need to carry for all of eternity.
- if (Target.Option(IndexTarget::ARCHITECTURE) == "all")
+ if (hasReleaseFile && Target.Option(IndexTarget::ARCHITECTURE) == "all")
{
- if (TransactionManager->MetaIndexParser->IsArchitectureSupported("all") == false ||
- TransactionManager->MetaIndexParser->IsArchitectureAllSupportedFor(Target) == false)
+ if (TransactionManager->MetaIndexParser->IsArchitectureAllSupportedFor(Target) == false)
{
new CleanupItem(Owner, TransactionManager, Target);
continue;
}
bool trypdiff = Target.OptionBool(IndexTarget::PDIFFS);
- if (verify == true)
+ if (hasReleaseFile == true)
{
if (TransactionManager->MetaIndexParser->Exists(Target.MetaKey) == false)
{
// optional targets that we do not have in the Release file are skipped
- if (Target.IsOptional)
+ if (hasHashes == true && Target.IsOptional)
{
new CleanupItem(Owner, TransactionManager, Target);
continue;
// if the architecture is officially supported but currently no packages for it available,
// ignore silently as this is pretty much the same as just shipping an empty file.
// if we don't know which architectures are supported, we do NOT ignore it to notify user about this
- if (TransactionManager->MetaIndexParser->IsArchitectureSupported("*undefined*") == false)
+ if (hasHashes == true && TransactionManager->MetaIndexParser->IsArchitectureSupported("*undefined*") == false)
{
new CleanupItem(Owner, TransactionManager, Target);
continue;
}
}
- Status = StatAuthError;
- strprintf(ErrorText, _("Unable to find expected entry '%s' in Release file (Wrong sources.list entry or malformed file)"), Target.MetaKey.c_str());
- return;
+ if (hasHashes == true)
+ {
+ Status = StatAuthError;
+ strprintf(ErrorText, _("Unable to find expected entry '%s' in Release file (Wrong sources.list entry or malformed file)"), Target.MetaKey.c_str());
+ return;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ new pkgAcqIndex(Owner, TransactionManager, Target);
+ continue;
+ }
}
- else
+ else if (verify)
{
auto const hashes = GetExpectedHashesFor(Target.MetaKey);
if (hashes.empty() == false)
{
- if (hashes.usable() == false)
+ if (hashes.usable() == false && TargetIsAllowedToBe(TransactionManager->Target, InsecureType::WEAK) == false)
{
new CleanupItem(Owner, TransactionManager, Target);
_error->Warning(_("Skipping acquire of configured file '%s' as repository '%s' provides only weak security information for it"),
IndexTarget const &DetachedDataTarget, IndexTarget const &DetachedSigTarget,
metaIndex * const MetaIndexParser) :
pkgAcqMetaIndex(Owner, this, ClearsignedTarget, DetachedSigTarget),
- d(NULL), ClearsignedTarget(ClearsignedTarget),
- DetachedDataTarget(DetachedDataTarget),
+ d(NULL), DetachedDataTarget(DetachedDataTarget),
MetaIndexParser(MetaIndexParser), LastMetaIndexParser(NULL)
{
// index targets + (worst case:) Release/Release.gpg
new NoActionItem(Owner, DetachedSigTarget);
}
}
+ else if (Status != StatAuthError)
+ {
+ string const FinalFile = GetFinalFileNameFromURI(DetachedDataTarget.URI);
+ string const OldFile = GetFinalFilename();
+ if (TransactionManager->IMSHit == false)
+ TransactionManager->TransactionStageCopy(this, DestFile, FinalFile);
+ else if (RealFileExists(OldFile) == false)
+ new NoActionItem(Owner, DetachedDataTarget);
+ else
+ TransactionManager->TransactionStageCopy(this, OldFile, FinalFile);
+ }
}
/*}}}*/
void pkgAcqMetaClearSig::Failed(string const &Message,pkgAcquire::MethodConfig const * const Cnf) /*{{{*/
if(CheckStopAuthentication(this, Message))
return;
- // No Release file was present, or verification failed, so fall
- // back to queueing Packages files without verification
- // only allow going further if the user explicitly wants it
- if(AllowInsecureRepositories(_("The repository '%s' is not signed."), ClearsignedTarget.Description, TransactionManager->MetaIndexParser, TransactionManager, this) == true)
+ if(AllowInsecureRepositories(InsecureType::UNSIGNED, Target.Description, TransactionManager->MetaIndexParser, TransactionManager, this) == true)
{
Status = StatDone;
// No Release file was present so fall
// back to queueing Packages files without verification
// only allow going further if the user explicitly wants it
- if(AllowInsecureRepositories(_("The repository '%s' does not have a Release file."), Target.Description, TransactionManager->MetaIndexParser, TransactionManager, this) == true)
+ if(AllowInsecureRepositories(InsecureType::NORELEASE, Target.Description, TransactionManager->MetaIndexParser, TransactionManager, this) == true)
{
// ensure old Release files are removed
TransactionManager->TransactionStageRemoval(this, GetFinalFilename());
TransactionManager->TransactionStageCopy(MetaIndex, MetaIndex->DestFile, MetaIndex->GetFinalFilename());
}
}
+ else if (MetaIndex->Status != StatAuthError)
+ {
+ std::string const FinalFile = MetaIndex->GetFinalFilename();
+ if (TransactionManager->IMSHit == false)
+ TransactionManager->TransactionStageCopy(MetaIndex, MetaIndex->DestFile, FinalFile);
+ else
+ TransactionManager->TransactionStageCopy(MetaIndex, FinalFile, FinalFile);
+ }
}
/*}}}*/
void pkgAcqMetaSig::Failed(string const &Message,pkgAcquire::MethodConfig const * const Cnf)/*{{{*/
if (MetaIndex->AuthPass == true && MetaIndex->CheckStopAuthentication(this, Message))
return;
- string const FinalRelease = MetaIndex->GetFinalFilename();
- string const FinalReleasegpg = GetFinalFilename();
- string const FinalInRelease = TransactionManager->GetFinalFilename();
-
- if (RealFileExists(FinalReleasegpg) || RealFileExists(FinalInRelease))
- {
- std::string downgrade_msg;
- strprintf(downgrade_msg, _("The repository '%s' is no longer signed."),
- MetaIndex->Target.Description.c_str());
- if(_config->FindB("Acquire::AllowDowngradeToInsecureRepositories"))
- {
- // meh, the users wants to take risks (we still mark the packages
- // from this repository as unauthenticated)
- _error->Warning("%s", downgrade_msg.c_str());
- _error->Warning(_("This is normally not allowed, but the option "
- "Acquire::AllowDowngradeToInsecureRepositories was "
- "given to override it."));
- Status = StatDone;
- } else {
- MessageInsecureRepository(true, downgrade_msg);
- if (TransactionManager->IMSHit == false)
- Rename(MetaIndex->DestFile, MetaIndex->DestFile + ".FAILED");
- Item::Failed("Message: " + downgrade_msg, Cnf);
- TransactionManager->AbortTransaction();
- return;
- }
- }
-
// ensures that a Release.gpg file in the lists/ is removed by the transaction
TransactionManager->TransactionStageRemoval(this, DestFile);
// only allow going further if the user explicitly wants it
- if (AllowInsecureRepositories(_("The repository '%s' is not signed."), MetaIndex->Target.Description, TransactionManager->MetaIndexParser, TransactionManager, this) == true)
+ if (AllowInsecureRepositories(InsecureType::UNSIGNED, MetaIndex->Target.Description, TransactionManager->MetaIndexParser, TransactionManager, this) == true)
{
+ string const FinalRelease = MetaIndex->GetFinalFilename();
+ string const FinalInRelease = TransactionManager->GetFinalFilename();
LoadLastMetaIndexParser(TransactionManager, FinalRelease, FinalInRelease);
// we parse the indexes here because at this point the user wanted
else
TransactionManager->QueueIndexes(GoodLoad);
- TransactionManager->TransactionStageCopy(MetaIndex, MetaIndex->DestFile, MetaIndex->GetFinalFilename());
+ TransactionManager->TransactionStageCopy(MetaIndex, MetaIndex->DestFile, FinalRelease);
}
+ else if (TransactionManager->IMSHit == false)
+ Rename(MetaIndex->DestFile, MetaIndex->DestFile + ".FAILED");
// FIXME: this is used often (e.g. in pkgAcqIndexTrans) so refactor
if (Cnf->LocalOnly == true ||
if (timespec == 0)
ErrorText.append("<unknown>");
else
- ErrorText.append(TimeRFC1123(timespec));
+ ErrorText.append(TimeRFC1123(timespec, true));
ErrorText.append("\n");
}
/*}}}*/
if (stat(Final.c_str(),&Buf) != 0)
return "\nIndex-File: true";
- return "\nIndex-File: true\nLast-Modified: " + TimeRFC1123(Buf.st_mtime);
+ return "\nIndex-File: true\nLast-Modified: " + TimeRFC1123(Buf.st_mtime, false);
}
/*}}}*/
void pkgAcqDiffIndex::QueueOnIMSHit() const /*{{{*/
HashStringList ServerHashes;
unsigned long long ServerSize = 0;
+ auto const &posix = std::locale("C.UTF-8");
for (char const * const * type = HashString::SupportedHashes(); *type != NULL; ++type)
{
std::string tagname = *type;
string hash;
unsigned long long size;
std::stringstream ss(tmp);
+ ss.imbue(posix);
ss >> hash >> size;
if (unlikely(hash.empty() == true))
continue;
string hash, filename;
unsigned long long size;
std::stringstream ss(tmp);
+ ss.imbue(posix);
while (ss >> hash >> size >> filename)
{
string hash, filename;
unsigned long long size;
std::stringstream ss(tmp);
+ ss.imbue(posix);
while (ss >> hash >> size >> filename)
{
string hash, filename;
unsigned long long size;
std::stringstream ss(tmp);
+ ss.imbue(posix);
// FIXME: all of pdiff supports only .gz compressed patches
while (ss >> hash >> size >> filename)
struct stat Buf;
if (stat(Final.c_str(),&Buf) == 0)
- msg += "\nLast-Modified: " + TimeRFC1123(Buf.st_mtime);
+ msg += "\nLast-Modified: " + TimeRFC1123(Buf.st_mtime, false);
}
if(Target.IsOptional)
projects / apt.git / blobdiff