Galician translation update (Miguel Anxo Bouzada). Closes: #626505

[apt.git] / doc / apt-secure.8.xml

diff --git a/doc/apt-secure.8.xml b/doc/apt-secure.8.xml
index e224460301ce2584ea133cbe5a9084e6d96196b9..f8ff678b957b91879ac5790c1deb8bb75930da35 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/apt-secure.8.xml
+++ b/doc/apt-secure.8.xml
@@ -5,6 +5,9 @@
 <!ENTITY % aptent SYSTEM "apt.ent">
 %aptent;
 
+<!ENTITY % aptverbatiment SYSTEM "apt-verbatim.ent">
+%aptverbatiment;
+
 ]>
 
 <refentry>
@@ -13,6 +16,7 @@
  <refmeta>
    <refentrytitle>apt-secure</refentrytitle>
    <manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
+   <refmiscinfo class="manual">APT</refmiscinfo>
  </refmeta>
 
 <!-- NOTE: This manpage has been written based on the
@@ -67,7 +71,7 @@
    different steps. <command>apt-secure</command> is the last step in
    this chain, trusting an archive does not mean that the packages
    that you trust it do not contain malicious code but means that you
-   trust the archive maintainer. Its the archive maintainer
+   trust the archive maintainer. It's the archive maintainer
    responsibility to ensure that the archive integrity is correct.
    </para>
 
@@ -93,7 +97,7 @@
    is computed and put in the Packages file. The MD5 sum of all of the
    packages files are then computed and put into the Release file. The
    Release file is then signed by the archive key (which is created
-   once a year and distributed through the FTP server. This key is
+   once a year) and distributed through the FTP server. This key is
    also on the Debian keyring.
    </para>
 
@@ -120,7 +124,7 @@
  
        <listitem><para><literal>Mirror network compromise</literal>.
         Without signature checking, a malicious agent can compromise a
-        mirror host and modify the files in it to propage malicious
+        mirror host and modify the files in it to propagate malicious
         software to all users downloading packages from that
         host.</para></listitem>
     </itemizedlist>
@@ -144,8 +148,8 @@
    (you should make sure you are using a trusted communication channel
    when retrieving it), add it with <command>apt-key</command> and
    then run <command>apt-get update</command> so that apt can download
-   and verify the <filename>Release.gpg</filename> files from the archives you
-   have configured.
+   and verify the <filename>InRelease</filename> or <filename>Release.gpg</filename>
+   files from the archives you have configured.
    </para>
 </refsect1>
 
@@ -156,15 +160,16 @@
    </para>
 
      <itemizedlist>
-       <listitem><para><literal>Create a toplevel Release
-       file</literal>.  if it does not exist already. You can do this
+       <listitem><para><emphasis>Create a toplevel Release
+       file</emphasis>,  if it does not exist already. You can do this
        by running <command>apt-ftparchive release</command> 
-       (provided inftp apt-utils).</para></listitem>
+       (provided in apt-utils).</para></listitem>
    
-      <listitem><para><literal>Sign it</literal>. You can do this by running
+      <listitem><para><emphasis>Sign it</emphasis>. You can do this by running
+      <command>gpg --clearsign -o InRelease Release</command> and
       <command>gpg -abs -o Release.gpg Release</command>.</para></listitem>
 
-      <listitem><para><literal>Publish the key fingerprint</literal>,
+      <listitem><para><emphasis>Publish the key fingerprint</emphasis>,
       that way your users will know what key they need to import in
       order to authenticate the files in the
       archive.</para></listitem>
@@ -179,11 +184,11 @@
 
 <refsect1><title>See Also</title> 
 <para> 
-&apt-conf;, &apt-get;, &sources-list;, &apt-key;, &apt-archive;,
+&apt-conf;, &apt-get;, &sources-list;, &apt-key;, &apt-ftparchive;,
 &debsign; &debsig-verify;, &gpg;
 </para>
 
-<para>For more backgound information you might want to review the
+<para>For more background information you might want to review the
 <ulink
 url="http://www.debian.org/doc/manuals/securing-debian-howto/ch7.en.html">Debian
 Security Infrastructure</ulink> chapter of the Securing Debian Manual