<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="no"?>
<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.5//EN"
"http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.5/docbookx.dtd" [
-
-<!ENTITY % aptent SYSTEM "apt.ent">
-%aptent;
-
-<!ENTITY % aptverbatiment SYSTEM "apt-verbatim.ent">
-%aptverbatiment;
-
-<!ENTITY % aptvendor SYSTEM "apt-vendor.ent">
-%aptvendor;
+<!ENTITY % aptent SYSTEM "apt.ent"> %aptent;
+<!ENTITY % aptverbatiment SYSTEM "apt-verbatim.ent"> %aptverbatiment;
+<!ENTITY % aptvendor SYSTEM "apt-vendor.ent"> %aptvendor;
]>
<refentry>
&apt-email;
&apt-product;
<!-- The last update date -->
- <date>2012-06-09T00:00:00Z</date>
+ <date>2015-10-14T00:00:00Z</date>
</refentryinfo>
<refmeta>
<refsect1><title>Description</title>
<para>
- Starting with version 0.6, <command>apt</command> contains code
- that does signature checking of the Release file for all
- archives. This ensures that packages in the archive can't be
- modified by people who have no access to the Release file signing
- key.
+ Starting with version 0.6, <command>APT</command> contains code that does
+ signature checking of the Release file for all repositories. This ensures
+ that data like packages in the archive can't be modified by people who
+ have no access to the Release file signing key.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ If an archive has an unsigned Release file or no Release file at all
+ current APT versions will raise a warning in <command>update</command>
+ operations and front-ends like <command>apt-get</command> will require
+ explicit confirmation if an installation request includes a package from
+ such an unauthenticated archive.
</para>
<para>
- If a package comes from a archive without a signature, or with a
- signature that apt does not have a key for, that package is
- considered untrusted, and installing it will result in a big
- warning. <command>apt-get</command> will currently only warn
- for unsigned archives; future releases might force all sources
- to be verified before downloading packages from them.
+ In the future APT will refuse to work with unauthenticated repositories by
+ default until support for them is removed entirely. Users have the option to
+ opt-in to this behavior already by setting the configuration option
+ <option>Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories</option> to <literal>false</literal>.
</para>
<para>
- The package frontends &apt-get;, &aptitude; and &synaptic; support this new
- authentication feature.
+ Note: All APT-based package management front-ends like &apt-get;, &aptitude;
+ and &synaptic; support this authentication feature, so this manpage uses
+ <literal>APT</literal> to refer to them all for simplicity only.
</para>
</refsect1>
- <refsect1><title>Trusted archives</title>
+ <refsect1><title>Trusted Repositories</title>
- <para>
- The chain of trust from an apt archive to the end user is made up of
+ <para>
+ The chain of trust from an APT archive to the end user is made up of
several steps. <command>apt-secure</command> is the last step in
this chain; trusting an archive does not mean that you trust its
packages not to contain malicious code, but means that you
devscripts packages respectively).</para>
<para>
- The chain of trust in Debian starts when a maintainer uploads a new
+ The chain of trust in Debian starts (e.g.) when a maintainer uploads a new
package or a new version of a package to the Debian archive. In
order to become effective, this upload needs to be signed by a key
- contained in the Debian Maintainers keyring (available in
+ contained in one of the Debian package maintainer keyrings (available in
the debian-keyring package). Maintainers' keys are signed by
other maintainers following pre-established procedures to
- ensure the identity of the key holder.
+ ensure the identity of the key holder. Similar procedures exist in all
+ Debian-based distributions.
</para>
<para>
</itemizedlist>
<para>However, it does not defend against a compromise of the
- Debian master server itself (which signs the packages) or against a
+ master server itself (which signs the packages) or against a
compromise of the key used to sign the Release files. In any case,
this mechanism can complement a per-package signature.</para>
</refsect1>
- <refsect1><title>User configuration</title>
- <para>
- <command>apt-key</command> is the program that manages the list
- of keys used by apt. It can be used to add or remove keys, although
- an installation of this release will automatically contain the
- default Debian archive signing keys used in the Debian package
- repositories.
- </para>
+ <refsect1><title>User Configuration</title>
<para>
+ <command>apt-key</command> is the program that manages the list of keys used
+ by APT to trust repositories. It can be used to add or remove keys as well
+ as list the trusted keys. Limiting which key(s) are able to sign which archive
+ is possible via the <option>Signed-By</option> in &sources-list;.
+ </para><para>
+ Note that a default installation already contains all keys to securely
+ acquire packages from the default repositories, so fiddling with
+ <command>apt-key</command> is only needed if third-party repositories are
+ added.
+ </para><para>
In order to add a new key you need to first download it
(you should make sure you are using a trusted communication channel
when retrieving it), add it with <command>apt-key</command> and
</para>
</refsect1>
-<refsect1><title>Archive configuration</title>
+<refsect1><title>Archive Configuration</title>
<para>
If you want to provide archive signatures in an archive under your
maintenance you have to:
<command>gpg --clearsign -o InRelease Release</command> and
<command>gpg -abs -o Release.gpg Release</command>.</para></listitem>
- <listitem><para><emphasis>Publish the key fingerprint</emphasis>,
- that way your users will know what key they need to import in
- order to authenticate the files in the
- archive.</para></listitem>
+ <listitem><para>
+ <emphasis>Publish the key fingerprint</emphasis>, so that your users
+ will know what key they need to import in order to authenticate the files
+ in the archive. It is best to ship your key in its own keyring package
+ like &keyring-distro; does with &keyring-package; to be able to
+ distribute updates and key transitions automatically later.
+ </para></listitem>
+
+ <listitem><para>
+ <emphasis>Provide instructions on how to add your archive and key</emphasis>.
+ If your users can't acquire your key securely the chain of trust described above is broken.
+ How you can help users add your key depends on your archive and target audience ranging
+ from having your keyring package included in another archive users already have configured
+ (like the default repositories of their distribution) to leveraging the web of trust.
+ </para></listitem>
</itemizedlist>
<refsect1><title>See Also</title>
<para>
&apt-conf;, &apt-get;, &sources-list;, &apt-key;, &apt-ftparchive;,
-&debsign; &debsig-verify;, &gpg;
+&debsign;, &debsig-verify;, &gpg;
</para>
<para>For more background information you might want to review the
<ulink
-url="http://www.debian.org/doc/manuals/securing-debian-howto/ch7">Debian
+url="https://www.debian.org/doc/manuals/securing-debian-howto/ch7">Debian
Security Infrastructure</ulink> chapter of the Securing Debian Manual
-(available also in the harden-doc package) and the
+(also available in the harden-doc package) and the
<ulink url="http://www.cryptnet.net/fdp/crypto/strong_distro.html"
>Strong Distribution HOWTO</ulink> by V. Alex Brennen. </para>
</refentry>
-
projects / apt.git / blobdiff