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1 /*-
2 * Copyright (c) 1999-2016 Apple Inc.
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
6 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
7 * are met:
8 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
9 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
10 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
11 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
12 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
13 * 3. Neither the name of Apple Inc. ("Apple") nor the names of
14 * its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
15 * from this software without specific prior written permission.
16 *
17 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY APPLE AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND
18 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
19 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
20 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL APPLE OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR
21 * ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
22 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
23 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
24 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
25 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING
26 * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
27 * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
28 *
29 */
30 /*
31 * NOTICE: This file was modified by McAfee Research in 2004 to introduce
32 * support for mandatory and extensible security protections. This notice
33 * is included in support of clause 2.2 (b) of the Apple Public License,
34 * Version 2.0.
35 */
36
37 #include <sys/param.h>
38 #include <sys/fcntl.h>
39 #include <sys/kernel.h>
40 #include <sys/lock.h>
41 #include <sys/namei.h>
42 #include <sys/proc_internal.h>
43 #include <sys/kauth.h>
44 #include <sys/queue.h>
45 #include <sys/systm.h>
46 #include <sys/time.h>
47 #include <sys/ucred.h>
48 #include <sys/uio.h>
49 #include <sys/unistd.h>
50 #include <sys/file_internal.h>
51 #include <sys/vnode_internal.h>
52 #include <sys/user.h>
53 #include <sys/syscall.h>
54 #include <sys/malloc.h>
55 #include <sys/un.h>
56 #include <sys/sysent.h>
57 #include <sys/sysproto.h>
58 #include <sys/vfs_context.h>
59 #include <sys/domain.h>
60 #include <sys/protosw.h>
61 #include <sys/socketvar.h>
62
63 #include <bsm/audit.h>
64 #include <bsm/audit_internal.h>
65 #include <bsm/audit_kevents.h>
66
67 #include <security/audit/audit.h>
68 #include <security/audit/audit_bsd.h>
69 #include <security/audit/audit_private.h>
70
71 #include <mach/host_priv.h>
72 #include <mach/host_special_ports.h>
73 #include <mach/audit_triggers_server.h>
74
75 #include <kern/host.h>
76 #include <kern/kalloc.h>
77 #include <kern/zalloc.h>
78 #include <kern/sched_prim.h>
79
80 #if CONFIG_MACF
81 #include <bsm/audit_record.h>
82 #include <security/mac.h>
83 #include <security/mac_framework.h>
84 #include <security/mac_policy.h>
85 extern zone_t audit_mac_label_zone;
86 #endif
87
88 #include <net/route.h>
89
90 #include <netinet/in.h>
91 #include <netinet/in_pcb.h>
92
93 #if CONFIG_AUDIT
94 /*
95 * Calls to manipulate elements of the audit record structure from system
96 * call code. Macro wrappers will prevent this functions from being entered
97 * if auditing is disabled, avoiding the function call cost. We check the
98 * thread audit record pointer anyway, as the audit condition could change,
99 * and pre-selection may not have allocated an audit record for this event.
100 *
101 * XXXAUDIT: Should we assert, in each case, that this field of the record
102 * hasn't already been filled in?
103 */
104 void
105 audit_arg_addr(struct kaudit_record *ar, user_addr_t addr)
106 {
107 struct proc *p = current_proc();
108
109 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_addr = addr;
110
111 /*
112 * If the process is 64-bit then flag the address as such.
113 */
114 if (proc_is64bit(p))
115 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_ADDR64);
116 else
117 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_ADDR32);
118 }
119
120 void
121 audit_arg_exit(struct kaudit_record *ar, int status, int retval)
122 {
123
124 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_exitstatus = status;
125 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_exitretval = retval;
126 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_EXIT);
127 }
128
129 void
130 audit_arg_len(struct kaudit_record *ar, user_size_t len)
131 {
132
133 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_len = len;
134 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_LEN);
135 }
136
137 void
138 audit_arg_fd2(struct kaudit_record *ar, int fd)
139 {
140
141 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_fd2 = fd;
142 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_FD2);
143 }
144
145 void
146 audit_arg_fd(struct kaudit_record *ar, int fd)
147 {
148
149 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_fd = fd;
150 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_FD);
151 }
152
153 void
154 audit_arg_fflags(struct kaudit_record *ar, int fflags)
155 {
156
157 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_fflags = fflags;
158 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_FFLAGS);
159 }
160
161 void
162 audit_arg_gid(struct kaudit_record *ar, gid_t gid)
163 {
164
165 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_gid = gid;
166 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_GID);
167 }
168
169 void
170 audit_arg_uid(struct kaudit_record *ar, uid_t uid)
171 {
172
173 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_uid = uid;
174 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_UID);
175 }
176
177 void
178 audit_arg_egid(struct kaudit_record *ar, gid_t egid)
179 {
180
181 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_egid = egid;
182 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_EGID);
183 }
184
185 void
186 audit_arg_euid(struct kaudit_record *ar, uid_t euid)
187 {
188
189 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_euid = euid;
190 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_EUID);
191 }
192
193 void
194 audit_arg_rgid(struct kaudit_record *ar, gid_t rgid)
195 {
196
197 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_rgid = rgid;
198 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_RGID);
199 }
200
201 void
202 audit_arg_ruid(struct kaudit_record *ar, uid_t ruid)
203 {
204
205 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_ruid = ruid;
206 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_RUID);
207 }
208
209 void
210 audit_arg_sgid(struct kaudit_record *ar, gid_t sgid)
211 {
212
213 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sgid = sgid;
214 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SGID);
215 }
216
217 void
218 audit_arg_suid(struct kaudit_record *ar, uid_t suid)
219 {
220
221 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_suid = suid;
222 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SUID);
223 }
224
225 void
226 audit_arg_groupset(struct kaudit_record *ar, gid_t *gidset, u_int gidset_size)
227 {
228 u_int i;
229
230 for (i = 0; i < gidset_size; i++)
231 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_groups.gidset[i] = gidset[i];
232 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_groups.gidset_size = gidset_size;
233 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_GROUPSET);
234 }
235
236 void
237 audit_arg_login(struct kaudit_record *ar, char *login)
238 {
239
240 strlcpy(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_login, login, MAXLOGNAME);
241 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_LOGIN);
242 }
243
244 void
245 audit_arg_ctlname(struct kaudit_record *ar, int *name, int namelen)
246 {
247
248 bcopy(name, &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_ctlname, namelen * sizeof(int));
249 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_len = namelen;
250 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_CTLNAME | ARG_LEN);
251 }
252
253 void
254 audit_arg_mask(struct kaudit_record *ar, int mask)
255 {
256
257 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_mask = mask;
258 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_MASK);
259 }
260
261 void
262 audit_arg_mode(struct kaudit_record *ar, mode_t mode)
263 {
264
265 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_mode = mode;
266 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_MODE);
267 }
268
269 void
270 audit_arg_value32(struct kaudit_record *ar, uint32_t value32)
271 {
272
273 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_value32 = value32;
274 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_VALUE32);
275 }
276
277 void
278 audit_arg_value64(struct kaudit_record *ar, uint64_t value64)
279 {
280
281 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_value64 = value64;
282 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_VALUE64);
283 }
284
285 void
286 audit_arg_owner(struct kaudit_record *ar, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
287 {
288
289 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_uid = uid;
290 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_gid = gid;
291 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_UID | ARG_GID);
292 }
293
294 void
295 audit_arg_pid(struct kaudit_record *ar, pid_t pid)
296 {
297
298 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_pid = pid;
299 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_PID);
300 }
301
302 void
303 audit_arg_process(struct kaudit_record *ar, proc_t p)
304 {
305 kauth_cred_t my_cred;
306
307 KASSERT(p != NULL, ("audit_arg_process: p == NULL"));
308
309 if ( p == NULL)
310 return;
311
312 my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
313 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_auid = my_cred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_auid;
314 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_asid = my_cred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_asid;
315 bcopy(&my_cred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_termid,
316 &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid_addr, sizeof(au_tid_addr_t));
317 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_euid = kauth_cred_getuid(my_cred);
318 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_egid = kauth_cred_getgid(my_cred);
319 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_ruid = kauth_cred_getruid(my_cred);
320 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_rgid = kauth_cred_getrgid(my_cred);
321 kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
322 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_pid = p->p_pid;
323 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_AUID | ARG_EUID | ARG_EGID | ARG_RUID |
324 ARG_RGID | ARG_ASID | ARG_TERMID_ADDR | ARG_PID | ARG_PROCESS);
325 }
326
327 void
328 audit_arg_signum(struct kaudit_record *ar, u_int signum)
329 {
330
331 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_signum = signum;
332 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SIGNUM);
333 }
334
335 void
336 audit_arg_socket(struct kaudit_record *ar, int sodomain, int sotype,
337 int soprotocol)
338 {
339
340 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.sai_domain = sodomain;
341 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.sai_type = sotype;
342 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.sai_protocol = soprotocol;
343 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SOCKINFO);
344 }
345
346 /*
347 * Note that the current working directory vp must be supplied at the audit
348 * call site to permit per thread current working directories, and that it
349 * must take a upath starting with '/' into account for chroot if the path
350 * is absolute. This results in the real (non-chroot) path being recorded
351 * in the audit record.
352 */
353 void
354 audit_arg_sockaddr(struct kaudit_record *ar, struct vnode *cwd_vp,
355 struct sockaddr *sa)
356 {
357 char path[SOCK_MAXADDRLEN - offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + 1] = "";
358 struct sockaddr_un *sun;
359 ssize_t namelen;
360
361 KASSERT(sa != NULL, ("audit_arg_sockaddr: sa == NULL"));
362
363 if (cwd_vp == NULL || sa == NULL)
364 return;
365
366 if (sa->sa_len > sizeof(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockaddr))
367 bcopy(sa, &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockaddr, sizeof(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockaddr));
368 else
369 bcopy(sa, &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockaddr, sa->sa_len);
370
371 switch (sa->sa_family) {
372 case AF_INET:
373 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SADDRINET);
374 break;
375
376 case AF_INET6:
377 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SADDRINET6);
378 break;
379
380 case AF_UNIX:
381 sun = (struct sockaddr_un *)sa;
382 namelen = sun->sun_len - offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path);
383 if (namelen > 0 && (size_t)namelen < sizeof(path)) {
384 /*
385 * Make sure the path is NUL-terminated
386 */
387 bcopy(sun->sun_path, path, namelen);
388 path[namelen] = 0;
389 audit_arg_upath(ar, cwd_vp, path, ARG_UPATH1);
390 }
391 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SADDRUNIX);
392 break;
393 /* XXXAUDIT: default:? */
394 }
395 }
396
397 void
398 audit_arg_auid(struct kaudit_record *ar, uid_t auid)
399 {
400
401 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_auid = auid;
402 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_AUID);
403 }
404
405 void
406 audit_arg_auditinfo(struct kaudit_record *ar, struct auditinfo *au_info)
407 {
408
409 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_auid = au_info->ai_auid;
410 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_asid = au_info->ai_asid;
411 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_amask.am_success = au_info->ai_mask.am_success;
412 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_amask.am_failure = au_info->ai_mask.am_failure;
413 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid.port = au_info->ai_termid.port;
414 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid.machine = au_info->ai_termid.machine;
415 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_AUID | ARG_ASID | ARG_AMASK | ARG_TERMID);
416 }
417
418 void
419 audit_arg_auditinfo_addr(struct kaudit_record *ar,
420 struct auditinfo_addr *au_info)
421 {
422
423 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_auid = au_info->ai_auid;
424 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_asid = au_info->ai_asid;
425 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_amask.am_success = au_info->ai_mask.am_success;
426 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_amask.am_failure = au_info->ai_mask.am_failure;
427 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid_addr.at_type = au_info->ai_termid.at_type;
428 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid_addr.at_port = au_info->ai_termid.at_port;
429 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid_addr.at_addr[0] = au_info->ai_termid.at_addr[0];
430 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid_addr.at_addr[1] = au_info->ai_termid.at_addr[1];
431 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid_addr.at_addr[2] = au_info->ai_termid.at_addr[2];
432 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid_addr.at_addr[3] = au_info->ai_termid.at_addr[3];
433 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_AUID | ARG_ASID | ARG_AMASK | ARG_TERMID_ADDR);
434 }
435
436 void
437 audit_arg_text(struct kaudit_record *ar, char *text)
438 {
439
440 KASSERT(text != NULL, ("audit_arg_text: text == NULL"));
441
442 /* Invalidate the text string */
443 ar->k_ar.ar_valid_arg &= (ARG_ALL ^ ARG_TEXT);
444 if (text == NULL)
445 return;
446
447 if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_text == NULL)
448 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_text = malloc(MAXPATHLEN, M_AUDITTEXT,
449 M_WAITOK);
450
451 strncpy(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_text, text, MAXPATHLEN);
452 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_TEXT);
453 }
454
455 void
456 audit_arg_opaque(struct kaudit_record *ar, void *data, size_t size)
457 {
458
459 KASSERT(data != NULL, ("audit_arg_opaque: data == NULL"));
460 KASSERT(size <= UINT16_MAX, ("audit_arg_opaque: size > UINT16_MAX"));
461
462 if (data == NULL || size > UINT16_MAX)
463 return;
464
465 if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_opaque == NULL)
466 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_opaque = malloc(size, M_AUDITDATA, M_WAITOK);
467 else
468 return;
469
470 memcpy(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_opaque, data, size);
471 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_opq_size = (u_int16_t) size;
472 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_OPAQUE);
473 }
474
475 void
476 audit_arg_data(struct kaudit_record *ar, void *data, size_t size, size_t number)
477 {
478 size_t sz;
479
480 KASSERT(data != NULL, ("audit_arg_data: data == NULL"));
481 KASSERT(size >= AUR_BYTE_SIZE && size <= AUR_INT64_SIZE,
482 ("audit_arg_data: size < AUR_BYTE_SIZE or size > AUR_INT64_SIZE"));
483 KASSERT(number <= UINT8_MAX,
484 ("audit_arg_data: number > UINT8_MAX"));
485
486 if (data == NULL || size < AUR_BYTE_SIZE || size > AUR_INT64_SIZE ||
487 number > UINT8_MAX)
488 return;
489
490 sz = size * number;
491
492 if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_data == NULL)
493 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_data = malloc(sz, M_AUDITDATA, M_WAITOK);
494 else
495 return;
496
497 memcpy(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_data, data, sz);
498
499 switch(size) {
500 case AUR_BYTE_SIZE:
501 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_data_type = AUR_BYTE;
502 break;
503
504 case AUR_SHORT_SIZE:
505 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_data_type = AUR_SHORT;
506 break;
507
508 case AUR_INT32_SIZE:
509 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_data_type = AUR_INT32;
510 break;
511
512 case AUR_INT64_SIZE:
513 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_data_type = AUR_INT64;
514 break;
515
516 default:
517 free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_data, M_AUDITDATA);
518 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_data = NULL;
519 return;
520 }
521
522 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_data_count = (u_char)number;
523
524 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_DATA);
525 }
526
527 void
528 audit_arg_cmd(struct kaudit_record *ar, int cmd)
529 {
530
531 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_cmd = cmd;
532 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_CMD);
533 }
534
535 void
536 audit_arg_svipc_cmd(struct kaudit_record *ar, int cmd)
537 {
538
539 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_svipc_cmd = cmd;
540 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SVIPC_CMD);
541 }
542
543 void
544 audit_arg_svipc_perm(struct kaudit_record *ar, struct ipc_perm *perm)
545 {
546
547 bcopy(perm, &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_svipc_perm,
548 sizeof(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_svipc_perm));
549 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SVIPC_PERM);
550 }
551
552 void
553 audit_arg_svipc_id(struct kaudit_record *ar, int id)
554 {
555
556 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_svipc_id = id;
557 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SVIPC_ID);
558 }
559
560 void
561 audit_arg_svipc_addr(struct kaudit_record *ar, user_addr_t addr)
562 {
563
564 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_svipc_addr = addr;
565 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SVIPC_ADDR);
566 }
567
568 void
569 audit_arg_posix_ipc_perm(struct kaudit_record *ar, uid_t uid, gid_t gid,
570 mode_t mode)
571 {
572
573 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_pipc_perm.pipc_uid = uid;
574 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_pipc_perm.pipc_gid = gid;
575 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_pipc_perm.pipc_mode = mode;
576 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_POSIX_IPC_PERM);
577 }
578
579 void
580 audit_arg_auditon(struct kaudit_record *ar, union auditon_udata *udata)
581 {
582
583 bcopy((void *)udata, &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_auditon,
584 sizeof(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_auditon));
585 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_AUDITON);
586 }
587
588 /*
589 * Audit information about a file, either the file's vnode info, or its
590 * socket address info.
591 */
592 void
593 audit_arg_file(struct kaudit_record *ar, __unused proc_t p,
594 struct fileproc *fp)
595 {
596 struct socket *so;
597 struct inpcb *pcb;
598 struct sockaddr_in *sin;
599 struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6;
600
601 switch (FILEGLOB_DTYPE(fp->f_fglob)) {
602 case DTYPE_VNODE:
603 /* case DTYPE_FIFO: */
604 audit_arg_vnpath_withref(ar,
605 (struct vnode *)fp->f_fglob->fg_data, ARG_VNODE1);
606 break;
607
608 case DTYPE_SOCKET:
609 so = (struct socket *)fp->f_fglob->fg_data;
610 if (SOCK_CHECK_DOM(so, PF_INET)) {
611 if (so->so_pcb == NULL)
612 break;
613 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.sai_type =
614 so->so_type;
615 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.sai_domain = SOCK_DOM(so);
616 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.sai_protocol = SOCK_PROTO(so);
617 pcb = (struct inpcb *)so->so_pcb;
618 sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)
619 &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.sai_faddr;
620 sin->sin_addr.s_addr = pcb->inp_faddr.s_addr;
621 sin->sin_port = pcb->inp_fport;
622 sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)
623 &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.sai_laddr;
624 sin->sin_addr.s_addr = pcb->inp_laddr.s_addr;
625 sin->sin_port = pcb->inp_lport;
626 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SOCKINFO);
627 }
628 if (SOCK_CHECK_DOM(so, PF_INET6)) {
629 if (so->so_pcb == NULL)
630 break;
631 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.sai_type =
632 so->so_type;
633 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.sai_domain = SOCK_DOM(so);
634 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.sai_protocol = SOCK_PROTO(so);
635 pcb = (struct inpcb *)so->so_pcb;
636 sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)
637 &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.sai_faddr;
638 sin6->sin6_addr = pcb->in6p_faddr;
639 sin6->sin6_port = pcb->in6p_fport;
640 sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)
641 &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.sai_laddr;
642 sin6->sin6_addr = pcb->in6p_laddr;
643 sin6->sin6_port = pcb->in6p_lport;
644 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SOCKINFO);
645 }
646 break;
647
648 default:
649 /* XXXAUDIT: else? */
650 break;
651 }
652 }
653
654 /*
655 * Store a path as given by the user process for auditing into the audit
656 * record stored on the user thread. This function will allocate the memory
657 * to store the path info if not already available. This memory will be
658 * freed when the audit record is freed.
659 *
660 * Note that the current working directory vp must be supplied at the audit call
661 * site to permit per thread current working directories, and that it must take
662 * a upath starting with '/' into account for chroot if the path is absolute.
663 * This results in the real (non-chroot) path being recorded in the audit
664 * record.
665 *
666 * XXXAUDIT: Possibly assert that the memory isn't already allocated?
667 */
668 void
669 audit_arg_upath(struct kaudit_record *ar, struct vnode *cwd_vp, char *upath, u_int64_t flag)
670 {
671 char **pathp;
672
673 KASSERT(upath != NULL, ("audit_arg_upath: upath == NULL"));
674 KASSERT((flag == ARG_UPATH1) || (flag == ARG_UPATH2),
675 ("audit_arg_upath: flag %llu", (unsigned long long)flag));
676 KASSERT((flag != ARG_UPATH1) || (flag != ARG_UPATH2),
677 ("audit_arg_upath: flag %llu", (unsigned long long)flag));
678
679 if (flag == ARG_UPATH1)
680 pathp = &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_upath1;
681 else
682 pathp = &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_upath2;
683
684 if (*pathp == NULL)
685 *pathp = malloc(MAXPATHLEN, M_AUDITPATH, M_WAITOK);
686 else
687 return;
688
689 if (audit_canon_path(cwd_vp, upath, *pathp) == 0)
690 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, flag);
691 else {
692 free(*pathp, M_AUDITPATH);
693 *pathp = NULL;
694 }
695 }
696
697 /*
698 * Function to save the path and vnode attr information into the audit
699 * record.
700 *
701 * It is assumed that the caller will hold any vnode locks necessary to
702 * perform a VNOP_GETATTR() on the passed vnode.
703 *
704 * XXX: The attr code is very similar to vfs_vnops.c:vn_stat(), but always
705 * provides access to the generation number as we need that to construct the
706 * BSM file ID.
707 *
708 * XXX: We should accept the process argument from the caller, since it's
709 * very likely they already have a reference.
710 *
711 * XXX: Error handling in this function is poor.
712 *
713 * XXXAUDIT: Possibly KASSERT the path pointer is NULL?
714 */
715 void
716 audit_arg_vnpath(struct kaudit_record *ar, struct vnode *vp, u_int64_t flags)
717 {
718 struct vnode_attr va;
719 int error;
720 int len;
721 char **pathp;
722 struct vnode_au_info *vnp;
723 proc_t p;
724 #if CONFIG_MACF
725 char **vnode_mac_labelp;
726 struct mac mac;
727 #endif
728
729 KASSERT(vp != NULL, ("audit_arg_vnpath: vp == NULL"));
730 KASSERT((flags == ARG_VNODE1) || (flags == ARG_VNODE2),
731 ("audit_arg_vnpath: flags != ARG_VNODE[1,2]"));
732
733 p = current_proc();
734
735 /*
736 * XXXAUDIT: The below clears, and then resets the flags for valid
737 * arguments. Ideally, either the new vnode is used, or the old one
738 * would be.
739 */
740 if (flags & ARG_VNODE1) {
741 ar->k_ar.ar_valid_arg &= (ARG_ALL ^ ARG_KPATH1);
742 ar->k_ar.ar_valid_arg &= (ARG_ALL ^ ARG_VNODE1);
743 pathp = &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_kpath1;
744 vnp = &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_vnode1;
745 #if CONFIG_MACF
746 vnode_mac_labelp = &ar->k_ar.ar_vnode1_mac_labels;
747 #endif
748 } else {
749 ar->k_ar.ar_valid_arg &= (ARG_ALL ^ ARG_KPATH2);
750 ar->k_ar.ar_valid_arg &= (ARG_ALL ^ ARG_VNODE2);
751 pathp = &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_kpath2;
752 vnp = &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_vnode2;
753 #if CONFIG_MACF
754 vnode_mac_labelp = &ar->k_ar.ar_vnode2_mac_labels;
755 #endif
756 }
757
758 if (*pathp == NULL)
759 *pathp = malloc(MAXPATHLEN, M_AUDITPATH, M_WAITOK);
760 else
761 return;
762
763 /*
764 * If vn_getpath() succeeds, place it in a string buffer
765 * attached to the audit record, and set a flag indicating
766 * it is present.
767 */
768 len = MAXPATHLEN;
769 if (vn_getpath(vp, *pathp, &len) == 0) {
770 if (flags & ARG_VNODE1)
771 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_KPATH1);
772 else
773 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_KPATH2);
774 } else {
775 free(*pathp, M_AUDITPATH);
776 *pathp = NULL;
777 }
778
779 VATTR_INIT(&va);
780 VATTR_WANTED(&va, va_mode);
781 VATTR_WANTED(&va, va_uid);
782 VATTR_WANTED(&va, va_gid);
783 VATTR_WANTED(&va, va_rdev);
784 VATTR_WANTED(&va, va_fsid);
785 VATTR_WANTED(&va, va_fileid);
786 VATTR_WANTED(&va, va_gen);
787 error = vnode_getattr(vp, &va, vfs_context_current());
788 if (error) {
789 /* XXX: How to handle this case? */
790 return;
791 }
792
793 #if CONFIG_MACF
794 if (*vnode_mac_labelp == NULL && (vp->v_lflag & VL_LABELED) == VL_LABELED) {
795 *vnode_mac_labelp = (char *)zalloc(audit_mac_label_zone);
796 if (*vnode_mac_labelp != NULL) {
797 mac.m_buflen = MAC_AUDIT_LABEL_LEN;
798 mac.m_string = *vnode_mac_labelp;
799 mac_vnode_label_externalize_audit(vp, &mac);
800 }
801 }
802 #endif
803
804 /*
805 * XXX do we want to fall back here when these aren't supported?
806 */
807 vnp->vn_mode = va.va_mode;
808 vnp->vn_uid = va.va_uid;
809 vnp->vn_gid = va.va_gid;
810 vnp->vn_dev = va.va_rdev;
811 vnp->vn_fsid = va.va_fsid;
812 vnp->vn_fileid = (u_int32_t)va.va_fileid;
813 vnp->vn_gen = va.va_gen;
814 if (flags & ARG_VNODE1)
815 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_VNODE1);
816 else
817 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_VNODE2);
818 }
819
820 void
821 audit_arg_vnpath_withref(struct kaudit_record *ar, struct vnode *vp, u_int64_t flags)
822 {
823 if (vp == NULL || vnode_getwithref(vp))
824 return;
825 audit_arg_vnpath(ar, vp, flags);
826 (void)vnode_put(vp);
827 }
828
829 void
830 audit_arg_mach_port1(struct kaudit_record *ar, mach_port_name_t port)
831 {
832
833 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_mach_port1 = port;
834 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_MACHPORT1);
835 }
836
837 void
838 audit_arg_mach_port2(struct kaudit_record *ar, mach_port_name_t port)
839 {
840
841 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_mach_port2 = port;
842 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_MACHPORT2);
843 }
844
845
846 /*
847 * Audit the argument strings passed to exec.
848 */
849 void
850 audit_arg_argv(struct kaudit_record *ar, char *argv, int argc, int length)
851 {
852
853 if (audit_argv == 0 || argc == 0)
854 return;
855
856 if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_argv == NULL)
857 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_argv = malloc(length, M_AUDITTEXT, M_WAITOK);
858 bcopy(argv, ar->k_ar.ar_arg_argv, length);
859 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_argc = argc;
860 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_ARGV);
861 }
862
863 /*
864 * Audit the environment strings passed to exec.
865 */
866 void
867 audit_arg_envv(struct kaudit_record *ar, char *envv, int envc, int length)
868 {
869
870 if (audit_arge == 0 || envc == 0)
871 return;
872
873 if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_envv == NULL)
874 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_envv = malloc(length, M_AUDITTEXT, M_WAITOK);
875 bcopy(envv, ar->k_ar.ar_arg_envv, length);
876 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_envc = envc;
877 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_ENVV);
878 }
879
880 /*
881 * The close() system call uses it's own audit call to capture the path/vnode
882 * information because those pieces are not easily obtained within the system
883 * call itself.
884 */
885 void
886 audit_sysclose(struct kaudit_record *ar, proc_t p, int fd)
887 {
888 struct fileproc *fp;
889 struct vnode *vp;
890
891 KASSERT(p != NULL, ("audit_sysclose: p == NULL"));
892
893 audit_arg_fd(ar, fd);
894
895 if (fp_getfvp(p, fd, &fp, &vp) != 0)
896 return;
897
898 audit_arg_vnpath_withref(ar, (struct vnode *)fp->f_fglob->fg_data,
899 ARG_VNODE1);
900 fp_drop(p, fd, fp, 0);
901 }
902
903 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */