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1 /*-
2 * Copyright (c) 1999-2016 Apple Inc.
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
6 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
7 * are met:
8 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
9 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
10 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
11 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
12 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
13 * 3. Neither the name of Apple Inc. ("Apple") nor the names of
14 * its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
15 * from this software without specific prior written permission.
16 *
17 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY APPLE AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND
18 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
19 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
20 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL APPLE OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR
21 * ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
22 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
23 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
24 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
25 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING
26 * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
27 * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
28 *
29 */
30 /*
31 * NOTICE: This file was modified by McAfee Research in 2004 to introduce
32 * support for mandatory and extensible security protections. This notice
33 * is included in support of clause 2.2 (b) of the Apple Public License,
34 * Version 2.0.
35 */
36
37 #include <sys/param.h>
38 #include <sys/fcntl.h>
39 #include <sys/kernel.h>
40 #include <sys/lock.h>
41 #include <sys/namei.h>
42 #include <sys/proc_internal.h>
43 #include <sys/kauth.h>
44 #include <sys/queue.h>
45 #include <sys/systm.h>
46 #include <sys/time.h>
47 #include <sys/ucred.h>
48 #include <sys/uio.h>
49 #include <sys/unistd.h>
50 #include <sys/file_internal.h>
51 #include <sys/vnode_internal.h>
52 #include <sys/user.h>
53 #include <sys/syscall.h>
54 #include <sys/malloc.h>
55 #include <sys/un.h>
56 #include <sys/sysent.h>
57 #include <sys/sysproto.h>
58 #include <sys/vfs_context.h>
59 #include <sys/domain.h>
60 #include <sys/protosw.h>
61 #include <sys/socketvar.h>
62 #include <sys/codesign.h>
63 #include <sys/ubc.h>
64
65 #include <bsm/audit.h>
66 #include <bsm/audit_internal.h>
67 #include <bsm/audit_kevents.h>
68
69 #include <security/audit/audit.h>
70 #include <security/audit/audit_bsd.h>
71 #include <security/audit/audit_private.h>
72
73 #include <mach/host_priv.h>
74 #include <mach/host_special_ports.h>
75 #include <mach/audit_triggers_server.h>
76
77 #include <kern/host.h>
78 #include <kern/zalloc.h>
79 #include <kern/sched_prim.h>
80
81 #if CONFIG_MACF
82 #include <bsm/audit_record.h>
83 #include <security/mac.h>
84 #include <security/mac_framework.h>
85 #include <security/mac_policy.h>
86 extern zone_t audit_mac_label_zone;
87 #endif
88
89 #include <net/route.h>
90
91 #include <netinet/in.h>
92 #include <netinet/in_pcb.h>
93
94 #if CONFIG_AUDIT
95 /*
96 * Calls to manipulate elements of the audit record structure from system
97 * call code. Macro wrappers will prevent this functions from being entered
98 * if auditing is disabled, avoiding the function call cost. We check the
99 * thread audit record pointer anyway, as the audit condition could change,
100 * and pre-selection may not have allocated an audit record for this event.
101 *
102 * XXXAUDIT: Should we assert, in each case, that this field of the record
103 * hasn't already been filled in?
104 */
105 void
106 audit_arg_addr(struct kaudit_record *ar, user_addr_t addr)
107 {
108 struct proc *p = current_proc();
109
110 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_addr = addr;
111
112 /*
113 * If the process is 64-bit then flag the address as such.
114 */
115 if (proc_is64bit(p)) {
116 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_ADDR64);
117 } else {
118 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_ADDR32);
119 }
120 }
121
122 void
123 audit_arg_exit(struct kaudit_record *ar, int status, int retval)
124 {
125 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_exitstatus = status;
126 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_exitretval = retval;
127 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_EXIT);
128 }
129
130 void
131 audit_arg_len(struct kaudit_record *ar, user_size_t len)
132 {
133 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_len = len;
134 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_LEN);
135 }
136
137 void
138 audit_arg_fd2(struct kaudit_record *ar, int fd)
139 {
140 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_fd2 = fd;
141 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_FD2);
142 }
143
144 void
145 audit_arg_fd(struct kaudit_record *ar, int fd)
146 {
147 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_fd = fd;
148 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_FD);
149 }
150
151 void
152 audit_arg_fflags(struct kaudit_record *ar, int fflags)
153 {
154 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_fflags = fflags;
155 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_FFLAGS);
156 }
157
158 void
159 audit_arg_gid(struct kaudit_record *ar, gid_t gid)
160 {
161 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_gid = gid;
162 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_GID);
163 }
164
165 void
166 audit_arg_uid(struct kaudit_record *ar, uid_t uid)
167 {
168 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_uid = uid;
169 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_UID);
170 }
171
172 void
173 audit_arg_egid(struct kaudit_record *ar, gid_t egid)
174 {
175 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_egid = egid;
176 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_EGID);
177 }
178
179 void
180 audit_arg_euid(struct kaudit_record *ar, uid_t euid)
181 {
182 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_euid = euid;
183 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_EUID);
184 }
185
186 void
187 audit_arg_rgid(struct kaudit_record *ar, gid_t rgid)
188 {
189 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_rgid = rgid;
190 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_RGID);
191 }
192
193 void
194 audit_arg_ruid(struct kaudit_record *ar, uid_t ruid)
195 {
196 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_ruid = ruid;
197 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_RUID);
198 }
199
200 void
201 audit_arg_sgid(struct kaudit_record *ar, gid_t sgid)
202 {
203 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sgid = sgid;
204 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SGID);
205 }
206
207 void
208 audit_arg_suid(struct kaudit_record *ar, uid_t suid)
209 {
210 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_suid = suid;
211 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SUID);
212 }
213
214 void
215 audit_arg_groupset(struct kaudit_record *ar, gid_t *gidset, u_int gidset_size)
216 {
217 u_int i;
218
219 for (i = 0; i < gidset_size; i++) {
220 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_groups.gidset[i] = gidset[i];
221 }
222 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_groups.gidset_size = gidset_size;
223 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_GROUPSET);
224 }
225
226 void
227 audit_arg_login(struct kaudit_record *ar, char *login)
228 {
229 strlcpy(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_login, login, MAXLOGNAME);
230 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_LOGIN);
231 }
232
233 void
234 audit_arg_ctlname(struct kaudit_record *ar, int *name, int namelen)
235 {
236 bcopy(name, &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_ctlname, namelen * sizeof(int));
237 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_len = namelen;
238 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_CTLNAME | ARG_LEN);
239 }
240
241 void
242 audit_arg_mask(struct kaudit_record *ar, int mask)
243 {
244 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_mask = mask;
245 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_MASK);
246 }
247
248 void
249 audit_arg_mode(struct kaudit_record *ar, mode_t mode)
250 {
251 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_mode = mode;
252 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_MODE);
253 }
254
255 void
256 audit_arg_value32(struct kaudit_record *ar, uint32_t value32)
257 {
258 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_value32 = value32;
259 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_VALUE32);
260 }
261
262 void
263 audit_arg_value64(struct kaudit_record *ar, uint64_t value64)
264 {
265 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_value64 = value64;
266 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_VALUE64);
267 }
268
269 void
270 audit_arg_owner(struct kaudit_record *ar, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
271 {
272 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_uid = uid;
273 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_gid = gid;
274 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_UID | ARG_GID);
275 }
276
277 void
278 audit_arg_pid(struct kaudit_record *ar, pid_t pid)
279 {
280 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_pid = pid;
281 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_PID);
282 }
283
284 void
285 audit_arg_process(struct kaudit_record *ar, proc_t p)
286 {
287 kauth_cred_t my_cred;
288
289 KASSERT(p != NULL, ("audit_arg_process: p == NULL"));
290
291 if (p == NULL) {
292 return;
293 }
294
295 my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
296 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_auid = my_cred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_auid;
297 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_asid = my_cred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_asid;
298 bcopy(&my_cred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_termid,
299 &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid_addr, sizeof(au_tid_addr_t));
300 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_euid = kauth_cred_getuid(my_cred);
301 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_egid = kauth_cred_getgid(my_cred);
302 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_ruid = kauth_cred_getruid(my_cred);
303 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_rgid = kauth_cred_getrgid(my_cred);
304 kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
305 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_pid = p->p_pid;
306 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_AUID | ARG_EUID | ARG_EGID | ARG_RUID |
307 ARG_RGID | ARG_ASID | ARG_TERMID_ADDR | ARG_PID | ARG_PROCESS);
308 }
309
310 void
311 audit_arg_signum(struct kaudit_record *ar, u_int signum)
312 {
313 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_signum = signum;
314 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SIGNUM);
315 }
316
317 void
318 audit_arg_socket(struct kaudit_record *ar, int sodomain, int sotype,
319 int soprotocol)
320 {
321 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.sai_domain = sodomain;
322 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.sai_type = sotype;
323 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.sai_protocol = soprotocol;
324 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SOCKINFO);
325 }
326
327 /*
328 * Note that the current working directory vp must be supplied at the audit
329 * call site to permit per thread current working directories, and that it
330 * must take a upath starting with '/' into account for chroot if the path
331 * is absolute. This results in the real (non-chroot) path being recorded
332 * in the audit record.
333 */
334 void
335 audit_arg_sockaddr(struct kaudit_record *ar, struct vnode *cwd_vp,
336 struct sockaddr *sa)
337 {
338 char path[SOCK_MAXADDRLEN - offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + 1] = "";
339 struct sockaddr_un *sun;
340 ssize_t namelen;
341
342 KASSERT(sa != NULL, ("audit_arg_sockaddr: sa == NULL"));
343
344 if (cwd_vp == NULL || sa == NULL) {
345 return;
346 }
347
348 if (sa->sa_len > sizeof(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockaddr)) {
349 bcopy(sa, &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockaddr, sizeof(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockaddr));
350 } else {
351 bcopy(sa, &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockaddr, sa->sa_len);
352 }
353
354 switch (sa->sa_family) {
355 case AF_INET:
356 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SADDRINET);
357 break;
358
359 case AF_INET6:
360 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SADDRINET6);
361 break;
362
363 case AF_UNIX:
364 sun = (struct sockaddr_un *)sa;
365 namelen = sun->sun_len - offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path);
366 if (namelen > 0 && (size_t)namelen < sizeof(path)) {
367 /*
368 * Make sure the path is NUL-terminated
369 */
370 bcopy(sun->sun_path, path, namelen);
371 path[namelen] = 0;
372 audit_arg_upath(ar, cwd_vp, path, ARG_UPATH1);
373 }
374 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SADDRUNIX);
375 break;
376 /* XXXAUDIT: default:? */
377 }
378 }
379
380 void
381 audit_arg_auid(struct kaudit_record *ar, uid_t auid)
382 {
383 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_auid = auid;
384 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_AUID);
385 }
386
387 void
388 audit_arg_auditinfo(struct kaudit_record *ar, struct auditinfo *au_info)
389 {
390 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_auid = au_info->ai_auid;
391 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_asid = au_info->ai_asid;
392 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_amask.am_success = au_info->ai_mask.am_success;
393 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_amask.am_failure = au_info->ai_mask.am_failure;
394 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid.port = au_info->ai_termid.port;
395 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid.machine = au_info->ai_termid.machine;
396 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_AUID | ARG_ASID | ARG_AMASK | ARG_TERMID);
397 }
398
399 void
400 audit_arg_auditinfo_addr(struct kaudit_record *ar,
401 struct auditinfo_addr *au_info)
402 {
403 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_auid = au_info->ai_auid;
404 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_asid = au_info->ai_asid;
405 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_amask.am_success = au_info->ai_mask.am_success;
406 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_amask.am_failure = au_info->ai_mask.am_failure;
407 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid_addr.at_type = au_info->ai_termid.at_type;
408 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid_addr.at_port = au_info->ai_termid.at_port;
409 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid_addr.at_addr[0] = au_info->ai_termid.at_addr[0];
410 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid_addr.at_addr[1] = au_info->ai_termid.at_addr[1];
411 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid_addr.at_addr[2] = au_info->ai_termid.at_addr[2];
412 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid_addr.at_addr[3] = au_info->ai_termid.at_addr[3];
413 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_AUID | ARG_ASID | ARG_AMASK | ARG_TERMID_ADDR);
414 }
415
416 void
417 audit_arg_text(struct kaudit_record *ar, char *text)
418 {
419 KASSERT(text != NULL, ("audit_arg_text: text == NULL"));
420
421 /* Invalidate the text string */
422 ar->k_ar.ar_valid_arg &= (ARG_ALL ^ ARG_TEXT);
423 if (text == NULL) {
424 return;
425 }
426
427 if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_text == NULL) {
428 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_text = malloc(MAXPATHLEN, M_AUDITTEXT,
429 M_WAITOK);
430 }
431
432 strlcpy(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_text, text, MAXPATHLEN);
433 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_TEXT);
434 }
435
436 void
437 audit_arg_opaque(struct kaudit_record *ar, void *data, size_t size)
438 {
439 KASSERT(data != NULL, ("audit_arg_opaque: data == NULL"));
440 KASSERT(size <= UINT16_MAX, ("audit_arg_opaque: size > UINT16_MAX"));
441
442 if (data == NULL || size > UINT16_MAX) {
443 return;
444 }
445
446 if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_opaque == NULL) {
447 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_opaque = malloc(size, M_AUDITDATA, M_WAITOK);
448 } else {
449 return;
450 }
451
452 memcpy(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_opaque, data, size);
453 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_opq_size = (u_int16_t) size;
454 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_OPAQUE);
455 }
456
457 void
458 audit_arg_data(struct kaudit_record *ar, void *data, size_t size, size_t number)
459 {
460 size_t sz;
461
462 KASSERT(data != NULL, ("audit_arg_data: data == NULL"));
463 KASSERT(size >= AUR_BYTE_SIZE && size <= AUR_INT64_SIZE,
464 ("audit_arg_data: size < AUR_BYTE_SIZE or size > AUR_INT64_SIZE"));
465 KASSERT(number <= UINT8_MAX,
466 ("audit_arg_data: number > UINT8_MAX"));
467
468 if (data == NULL || size < AUR_BYTE_SIZE || size > AUR_INT64_SIZE ||
469 number > UINT8_MAX) {
470 return;
471 }
472
473 sz = size * number;
474
475 if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_data == NULL) {
476 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_data = malloc(sz, M_AUDITDATA, M_WAITOK);
477 } else {
478 return;
479 }
480
481 memcpy(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_data, data, sz);
482
483 switch (size) {
484 case AUR_BYTE_SIZE:
485 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_data_type = AUR_BYTE;
486 break;
487
488 case AUR_SHORT_SIZE:
489 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_data_type = AUR_SHORT;
490 break;
491
492 case AUR_INT32_SIZE:
493 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_data_type = AUR_INT32;
494 break;
495
496 case AUR_INT64_SIZE:
497 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_data_type = AUR_INT64;
498 break;
499
500 default:
501 free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_data, M_AUDITDATA);
502 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_data = NULL;
503 return;
504 }
505
506 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_data_count = (u_char)number;
507
508 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_DATA);
509 }
510
511 void
512 audit_arg_cmd(struct kaudit_record *ar, int cmd)
513 {
514 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_cmd = cmd;
515 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_CMD);
516 }
517
518 void
519 audit_arg_svipc_cmd(struct kaudit_record *ar, int cmd)
520 {
521 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_svipc_cmd = cmd;
522 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SVIPC_CMD);
523 }
524
525 void
526 audit_arg_svipc_perm(struct kaudit_record *ar, struct ipc_perm *perm)
527 {
528 bcopy(perm, &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_svipc_perm,
529 sizeof(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_svipc_perm));
530 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SVIPC_PERM);
531 }
532
533 void
534 audit_arg_svipc_id(struct kaudit_record *ar, int id)
535 {
536 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_svipc_id = id;
537 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SVIPC_ID);
538 }
539
540 void
541 audit_arg_svipc_addr(struct kaudit_record *ar, user_addr_t addr)
542 {
543 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_svipc_addr = addr;
544 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SVIPC_ADDR);
545 }
546
547 void
548 audit_arg_posix_ipc_perm(struct kaudit_record *ar, uid_t uid, gid_t gid,
549 mode_t mode)
550 {
551 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_pipc_perm.pipc_uid = uid;
552 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_pipc_perm.pipc_gid = gid;
553 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_pipc_perm.pipc_mode = mode;
554 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_POSIX_IPC_PERM);
555 }
556
557 void
558 audit_arg_auditon(struct kaudit_record *ar, union auditon_udata *udata)
559 {
560 bcopy((void *)udata, &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_auditon,
561 sizeof(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_auditon));
562 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_AUDITON);
563 }
564
565 /*
566 * Audit information about a file, either the file's vnode info, or its
567 * socket address info.
568 */
569 void
570 audit_arg_file(struct kaudit_record *ar, __unused proc_t p,
571 struct fileproc *fp)
572 {
573 struct socket *so;
574 struct inpcb *pcb;
575 struct sockaddr_in *sin;
576 struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6;
577
578 switch (FILEGLOB_DTYPE(fp->fp_glob)) {
579 case DTYPE_VNODE:
580 /* case DTYPE_FIFO: */
581 audit_arg_vnpath_withref(ar,
582 (struct vnode *)fp->fp_glob->fg_data, ARG_VNODE1);
583 break;
584
585 case DTYPE_SOCKET:
586 so = (struct socket *)fp->fp_glob->fg_data;
587 if (SOCK_CHECK_DOM(so, PF_INET)) {
588 if (so->so_pcb == NULL) {
589 break;
590 }
591 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.sai_type =
592 so->so_type;
593 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.sai_domain = SOCK_DOM(so);
594 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.sai_protocol = SOCK_PROTO(so);
595 pcb = (struct inpcb *)so->so_pcb;
596 sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)
597 &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.sai_faddr;
598 sin->sin_addr.s_addr = pcb->inp_faddr.s_addr;
599 sin->sin_port = pcb->inp_fport;
600 sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)
601 &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.sai_laddr;
602 sin->sin_addr.s_addr = pcb->inp_laddr.s_addr;
603 sin->sin_port = pcb->inp_lport;
604 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SOCKINFO);
605 }
606 if (SOCK_CHECK_DOM(so, PF_INET6)) {
607 if (so->so_pcb == NULL) {
608 break;
609 }
610 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.sai_type =
611 so->so_type;
612 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.sai_domain = SOCK_DOM(so);
613 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.sai_protocol = SOCK_PROTO(so);
614 pcb = (struct inpcb *)so->so_pcb;
615 sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)
616 &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.sai_faddr;
617 sin6->sin6_addr = pcb->in6p_faddr;
618 sin6->sin6_port = pcb->in6p_fport;
619 sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)
620 &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.sai_laddr;
621 sin6->sin6_addr = pcb->in6p_laddr;
622 sin6->sin6_port = pcb->in6p_lport;
623 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SOCKINFO);
624 }
625 break;
626
627 default:
628 /* XXXAUDIT: else? */
629 break;
630 }
631 }
632
633 /*
634 * Store a path as given by the user process for auditing into the audit
635 * record stored on the user thread. This function will allocate the memory
636 * to store the path info if not already available. This memory will be
637 * freed when the audit record is freed.
638 *
639 * Note that the current working directory vp must be supplied at the audit call
640 * site to permit per thread current working directories, and that it must take
641 * a upath starting with '/' into account for chroot if the path is absolute.
642 * This results in the real (non-chroot) path being recorded in the audit
643 * record.
644 *
645 * XXXAUDIT: Possibly assert that the memory isn't already allocated?
646 */
647 void
648 audit_arg_upath(struct kaudit_record *ar, struct vnode *cwd_vp, char *upath, u_int64_t flag)
649 {
650 char **pathp;
651
652 KASSERT(upath != NULL, ("audit_arg_upath: upath == NULL"));
653 KASSERT((flag == ARG_UPATH1) || (flag == ARG_UPATH2),
654 ("audit_arg_upath: flag %llu", (unsigned long long)flag));
655 KASSERT((flag != ARG_UPATH1) || (flag != ARG_UPATH2),
656 ("audit_arg_upath: flag %llu", (unsigned long long)flag));
657
658 if (flag == ARG_UPATH1) {
659 pathp = &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_upath1;
660 } else {
661 pathp = &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_upath2;
662 }
663
664 if (*pathp == NULL) {
665 *pathp = malloc(MAXPATHLEN, M_AUDITPATH, M_WAITOK);
666 } else {
667 return;
668 }
669
670 if (audit_canon_path(cwd_vp, upath, *pathp) == 0) {
671 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, flag);
672 } else {
673 free(*pathp, M_AUDITPATH);
674 *pathp = NULL;
675 }
676 }
677
678 void
679 audit_arg_kpath(struct kaudit_record *ar, char *kpath, u_int64_t flag)
680 {
681 char **pathp;
682
683 KASSERT(kpath != NULL, ("audit_arg_kpath: kpath == NULL"));
684 KASSERT((flag == ARG_KPATH1) || (flag == ARG_KPATH2),
685 ("audit_arg_kpath: flag %llu", (unsigned long long)flag));
686 KASSERT((flag != ARG_KPATH1) || (flag != ARG_KPATH2),
687 ("audit_arg_kpath: flag %llu", (unsigned long long)flag));
688
689 if (flag == ARG_KPATH1) {
690 pathp = &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_kpath1;
691 } else {
692 pathp = &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_kpath2;
693 }
694
695 if (*pathp == NULL) {
696 *pathp = malloc(MAXPATHLEN, M_AUDITPATH, M_WAITOK);
697 } else {
698 return;
699 }
700
701 strlcpy(*pathp, kpath, MAXPATHLEN);
702 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, flag);
703 }
704
705 /*
706 * Function to save the path and vnode attr information into the audit
707 * record.
708 *
709 * It is assumed that the caller will hold any vnode locks necessary to
710 * perform a VNOP_GETATTR() on the passed vnode.
711 *
712 * XXX: The attr code is very similar to vfs_vnops.c:vn_stat(), but always
713 * provides access to the generation number as we need that to construct the
714 * BSM file ID.
715 *
716 * XXX: We should accept the process argument from the caller, since it's
717 * very likely they already have a reference.
718 *
719 * XXX: Error handling in this function is poor.
720 *
721 * XXXAUDIT: Possibly KASSERT the path pointer is NULL?
722 */
723 void
724 audit_arg_vnpath(struct kaudit_record *ar, struct vnode *vp, u_int64_t flags)
725 {
726 struct vnode_attr va;
727 int error;
728 int len;
729 char **pathp;
730 struct vnode_au_info *vnp;
731 proc_t p;
732 #if CONFIG_MACF
733 char **vnode_mac_labelp;
734 struct mac mac;
735 #endif
736
737 KASSERT(vp != NULL, ("audit_arg_vnpath: vp == NULL"));
738 KASSERT((flags == ARG_VNODE1) || (flags == ARG_VNODE2),
739 ("audit_arg_vnpath: flags != ARG_VNODE[1,2]"));
740
741 p = current_proc();
742
743 /*
744 * XXXAUDIT: The below clears, and then resets the flags for valid
745 * arguments. Ideally, either the new vnode is used, or the old one
746 * would be.
747 */
748 if (flags & ARG_VNODE1) {
749 ar->k_ar.ar_valid_arg &= (ARG_ALL ^ ARG_KPATH1);
750 ar->k_ar.ar_valid_arg &= (ARG_ALL ^ ARG_VNODE1);
751 pathp = &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_kpath1;
752 vnp = &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_vnode1;
753 #if CONFIG_MACF
754 vnode_mac_labelp = &ar->k_ar.ar_vnode1_mac_labels;
755 #endif
756 } else {
757 ar->k_ar.ar_valid_arg &= (ARG_ALL ^ ARG_KPATH2);
758 ar->k_ar.ar_valid_arg &= (ARG_ALL ^ ARG_VNODE2);
759 pathp = &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_kpath2;
760 vnp = &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_vnode2;
761 #if CONFIG_MACF
762 vnode_mac_labelp = &ar->k_ar.ar_vnode2_mac_labels;
763 #endif
764 }
765
766 if (*pathp == NULL) {
767 *pathp = malloc(MAXPATHLEN, M_AUDITPATH, M_WAITOK);
768 } else {
769 return;
770 }
771
772 /*
773 * If vn_getpath() succeeds, place it in a string buffer
774 * attached to the audit record, and set a flag indicating
775 * it is present.
776 */
777 len = MAXPATHLEN;
778 if (vn_getpath(vp, *pathp, &len) == 0) {
779 if (flags & ARG_VNODE1) {
780 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_KPATH1);
781 } else {
782 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_KPATH2);
783 }
784 } else {
785 free(*pathp, M_AUDITPATH);
786 *pathp = NULL;
787 }
788
789 VATTR_INIT(&va);
790 VATTR_WANTED(&va, va_mode);
791 VATTR_WANTED(&va, va_uid);
792 VATTR_WANTED(&va, va_gid);
793 VATTR_WANTED(&va, va_rdev);
794 VATTR_WANTED(&va, va_fsid);
795 VATTR_WANTED(&va, va_fileid);
796 VATTR_WANTED(&va, va_gen);
797 error = vnode_getattr(vp, &va, vfs_context_current());
798 if (error) {
799 /* XXX: How to handle this case? */
800 return;
801 }
802
803 #if CONFIG_MACF
804 if (*vnode_mac_labelp == NULL && (vp->v_lflag & VL_LABELED) == VL_LABELED) {
805 *vnode_mac_labelp = (char *)zalloc(audit_mac_label_zone);
806 if (*vnode_mac_labelp != NULL) {
807 mac.m_buflen = MAC_AUDIT_LABEL_LEN;
808 mac.m_string = *vnode_mac_labelp;
809 if (mac_vnode_label_externalize_audit(vp, &mac)) {
810 return;
811 }
812 }
813 }
814 #endif
815
816 /*
817 * XXX do we want to fall back here when these aren't supported?
818 */
819 vnp->vn_mode = va.va_mode;
820 vnp->vn_uid = va.va_uid;
821 vnp->vn_gid = va.va_gid;
822 vnp->vn_dev = va.va_rdev;
823 vnp->vn_fsid = va.va_fsid;
824 vnp->vn_fileid = (u_int32_t)va.va_fileid;
825 vnp->vn_gen = va.va_gen;
826 if (flags & ARG_VNODE1) {
827 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_VNODE1);
828 } else {
829 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_VNODE2);
830 }
831 }
832
833 void
834 audit_arg_vnpath_withref(struct kaudit_record *ar, struct vnode *vp, u_int64_t flags)
835 {
836 if (vp == NULL || vnode_getwithref(vp)) {
837 return;
838 }
839 audit_arg_vnpath(ar, vp, flags);
840 (void)vnode_put(vp);
841 }
842
843 void
844 audit_arg_mach_port1(struct kaudit_record *ar, mach_port_name_t port)
845 {
846 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_mach_port1 = port;
847 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_MACHPORT1);
848 }
849
850 void
851 audit_arg_mach_port2(struct kaudit_record *ar, mach_port_name_t port)
852 {
853 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_mach_port2 = port;
854 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_MACHPORT2);
855 }
856
857
858 /*
859 * Audit the argument strings passed to exec.
860 */
861 void
862 audit_arg_argv(struct kaudit_record *ar, char *argv, int argc, size_t length)
863 {
864 if (audit_argv == 0 || argc == 0) {
865 return;
866 }
867
868 if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_argv == NULL) {
869 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_argv = malloc(length, M_AUDITTEXT, M_WAITOK);
870 }
871 bcopy(argv, ar->k_ar.ar_arg_argv, length);
872 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_argc = argc;
873 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_ARGV);
874 }
875
876 /*
877 * Audit the environment strings passed to exec.
878 */
879 void
880 audit_arg_envv(struct kaudit_record *ar, char *envv, int envc, size_t length)
881 {
882 if (audit_arge == 0 || envc == 0) {
883 return;
884 }
885
886 if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_envv == NULL) {
887 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_envv = malloc(length, M_AUDITTEXT, M_WAITOK);
888 }
889 bcopy(envv, ar->k_ar.ar_arg_envv, length);
890 ar->k_ar.ar_arg_envc = envc;
891 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_ENVV);
892 }
893
894 /*
895 * The close() system call uses it's own audit call to capture the path/vnode
896 * information because those pieces are not easily obtained within the system
897 * call itself.
898 */
899 void
900 audit_sysclose(struct kaudit_record *ar, proc_t p, int fd)
901 {
902 struct fileproc *fp;
903 struct vnode *vp;
904
905 KASSERT(p != NULL, ("audit_sysclose: p == NULL"));
906
907 audit_arg_fd(ar, fd);
908
909 if (fp_getfvp(p, fd, &fp, &vp) != 0) {
910 return;
911 }
912
913 audit_arg_vnpath_withref(ar, (struct vnode *)fp->fp_glob->fg_data,
914 ARG_VNODE1);
915 fp_drop(p, fd, fp, 0);
916 }
917
918 void
919 audit_identity_info_destruct(struct au_identity_info *id_info)
920 {
921 if (!id_info) {
922 return;
923 }
924
925 if (id_info->signing_id != NULL) {
926 free(id_info->signing_id, M_AUDITTEXT);
927 id_info->signing_id = NULL;
928 }
929
930 if (id_info->team_id != NULL) {
931 free(id_info->team_id, M_AUDITTEXT);
932 id_info->team_id = NULL;
933 }
934
935 if (id_info->cdhash != NULL) {
936 free(id_info->cdhash, M_AUDITDATA);
937 id_info->cdhash = NULL;
938 }
939 }
940
941 void
942 audit_identity_info_construct(struct au_identity_info *id_info)
943 {
944 struct proc *p;
945 struct cs_blob *blob;
946 unsigned int signer_type = 0;
947 const char *signing_id = NULL;
948 const char* team_id = NULL;
949 const uint8_t *cdhash = NULL;
950 size_t src_len = 0;
951
952 p = current_proc();
953 blob = csproc_get_blob(p);
954 if (blob) {
955 signing_id = csblob_get_identity(blob);
956 cdhash = csblob_get_cdhash(blob);
957 team_id = csblob_get_teamid(blob);
958 signer_type = csblob_get_platform_binary(blob) ? 1 : 0;
959 }
960
961 id_info->signer_type = signer_type;
962
963 if (id_info->signing_id == NULL && signing_id != NULL) {
964 id_info->signing_id = malloc( MAX_AU_IDENTITY_SIGNING_ID_LENGTH,
965 M_AUDITTEXT, M_WAITOK);
966 if (id_info->signing_id != NULL) {
967 src_len = strlcpy(id_info->signing_id,
968 signing_id, MAX_AU_IDENTITY_SIGNING_ID_LENGTH);
969
970 if (src_len >= MAX_AU_IDENTITY_SIGNING_ID_LENGTH) {
971 id_info->signing_id_trunc = 1;
972 }
973 }
974 }
975
976 if (id_info->team_id == NULL && team_id != NULL) {
977 id_info->team_id = malloc(MAX_AU_IDENTITY_TEAM_ID_LENGTH,
978 M_AUDITTEXT, M_WAITOK);
979 if (id_info->team_id != NULL) {
980 src_len = strlcpy(id_info->team_id, team_id,
981 MAX_AU_IDENTITY_TEAM_ID_LENGTH);
982
983 if (src_len >= MAX_AU_IDENTITY_TEAM_ID_LENGTH) {
984 id_info->team_id_trunc = 1;
985 }
986 }
987 }
988
989 if (id_info->cdhash == NULL && cdhash != NULL) {
990 id_info->cdhash = malloc(CS_CDHASH_LEN, M_AUDITDATA, M_WAITOK);
991 if (id_info->cdhash != NULL) {
992 memcpy(id_info->cdhash, cdhash, CS_CDHASH_LEN);
993 id_info->cdhash_len = CS_CDHASH_LEN;
994 }
995 }
996 }
997
998 void
999 audit_arg_identity(struct kaudit_record *ar)
1000 {
1001 audit_identity_info_construct(&ar->k_ar.ar_arg_identity);
1002 ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_IDENTITY);
1003 }
1004
1005 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */