--- /dev/null
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2009 Apple Inc.
+ * Copyright (c) 2006-2007 Robert N. M. Watson
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of Apple Inc. ("Apple") nor the names of
+ * its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
+ * from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY APPLE AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL APPLE OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING
+ * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+ * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ */
+/*
+ * NOTICE: This file was modified by McAfee Research in 2004 to introduce
+ * support for mandatory and extensible security protections. This notice
+ * is included in support of clause 2.2 (b) of the Apple Public License,
+ * Version 2.0.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/kernel.h>
+#include <sys/lock.h>
+#include <sys/namei.h>
+#include <sys/proc_internal.h>
+#include <sys/kauth.h>
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+#include <sys/systm.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/ucred.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <sys/unistd.h>
+#include <sys/file_internal.h>
+#include <sys/vnode_internal.h>
+#include <sys/user.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <sys/malloc.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#include <sys/sysent.h>
+#include <sys/sysproto.h>
+#include <sys/vfs_context.h>
+#include <sys/domain.h>
+#include <sys/protosw.h>
+#include <sys/socketvar.h>
+
+#include <bsm/audit.h>
+#include <bsm/audit_internal.h>
+#include <bsm/audit_kevents.h>
+
+#include <security/audit/audit.h>
+#include <security/audit/audit_bsd.h>
+#include <security/audit/audit_private.h>
+
+#include <mach/host_priv.h>
+#include <mach/host_special_ports.h>
+#include <mach/audit_triggers_server.h>
+
+#include <kern/host.h>
+#include <kern/kalloc.h>
+#include <kern/zalloc.h>
+#include <kern/lock.h>
+#include <kern/wait_queue.h>
+#include <kern/sched_prim.h>
+
+#include <net/route.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <netinet/in_pcb.h>
+
+#if CONFIG_AUDIT
+MALLOC_DEFINE(M_AUDITDATA, "audit_data", "Audit data storage");
+MALLOC_DEFINE(M_AUDITPATH, "audit_path", "Audit path storage");
+MALLOC_DEFINE(M_AUDITTEXT, "audit_text", "Audit text storage");
+
+/*
+ * Audit control settings that are set/read by system calls and are hence
+ * non-static.
+ *
+ * Define the audit control flags.
+ */
+int audit_enabled;
+int audit_suspended;
+
+int audit_syscalls;
+au_class_t audit_kevent_mask;
+
+/*
+ * Flags controlling behavior in low storage situations. Should we panic if
+ * a write fails? Should we fail stop if we're out of disk space?
+ */
+int audit_panic_on_write_fail;
+int audit_fail_stop;
+int audit_argv;
+int audit_arge;
+
+/*
+ * Are we currently "failing stop" due to out of disk space?
+ */
+int audit_in_failure;
+
+/*
+ * Global audit statistics.
+ */
+struct audit_fstat audit_fstat;
+
+/*
+ * Preselection mask for non-attributable events.
+ */
+struct au_mask audit_nae_mask;
+
+/*
+ * Mutex to protect global variables shared between various threads and
+ * processes.
+ */
+struct mtx audit_mtx;
+
+/*
+ * Queue of audit records ready for delivery to disk. We insert new records
+ * at the tail, and remove records from the head. Also, a count of the
+ * number of records used for checking queue depth. In addition, a counter
+ * of records that we have allocated but are not yet in the queue, which is
+ * needed to estimate the total size of the combined set of records
+ * outstanding in the system.
+ */
+struct kaudit_queue audit_q;
+int audit_q_len;
+int audit_pre_q_len;
+
+/*
+ * Audit queue control settings (minimum free, low/high water marks, etc.)
+ */
+struct au_qctrl audit_qctrl;
+
+/*
+ * Condition variable to signal to the worker that it has work to do: either
+ * new records are in the queue, or a log replacement is taking place.
+ */
+struct cv audit_worker_cv;
+
+/*
+ * Condition variable to signal when the worker is done draining the audit
+ * queue.
+ */
+struct cv audit_drain_cv;
+
+/*
+ * Condition variable to flag when crossing the low watermark, meaning that
+ * threads blocked due to hitting the high watermark can wake up and continue
+ * to commit records.
+ */
+struct cv audit_watermark_cv;
+
+/*
+ * Condition variable for auditing threads wait on when in fail-stop mode.
+ * Threads wait on this CV forever (and ever), never seeing the light of day
+ * again.
+ */
+static struct cv audit_fail_cv;
+
+static zone_t audit_record_zone;
+
+/*
+ * Kernel audit information. This will store the current audit address
+ * or host information that the kernel will use when it's generating
+ * audit records. This data is modified by the A_GET{SET}KAUDIT auditon(2)
+ * command.
+ */
+static struct auditinfo_addr audit_kinfo;
+static struct rwlock audit_kinfo_lock;
+
+#define KINFO_LOCK_INIT() rw_init(&audit_kinfo_lock, \
+ "audit_kinfo_lock")
+#define KINFO_RLOCK() rw_rlock(&audit_kinfo_lock)
+#define KINFO_WLOCK() rw_wlock(&audit_kinfo_lock)
+#define KINFO_RUNLOCK() rw_runlock(&audit_kinfo_lock)
+#define KINFO_WUNLOCK() rw_wunlock(&audit_kinfo_lock)
+
+void
+audit_set_kinfo(struct auditinfo_addr *ak)
+{
+
+ KASSERT(ak->ai_termid.at_type == AU_IPv4 ||
+ ak->ai_termid.at_type == AU_IPv6,
+ ("audit_set_kinfo: invalid address type"));
+
+ KINFO_WLOCK();
+ bcopy(ak, &audit_kinfo, sizeof(audit_kinfo));
+ KINFO_WUNLOCK();
+}
+
+void
+audit_get_kinfo(struct auditinfo_addr *ak)
+{
+
+ KASSERT(audit_kinfo.ai_termid.at_type == AU_IPv4 ||
+ audit_kinfo.ai_termid.at_type == AU_IPv6,
+ ("audit_set_kinfo: invalid address type"));
+
+ KINFO_RLOCK();
+ bcopy(&audit_kinfo, ak, sizeof(*ak));
+ KINFO_RUNLOCK();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct an audit record for the passed thread.
+ */
+static void
+audit_record_ctor(proc_t p, struct kaudit_record *ar)
+{
+ kauth_cred_t cred;
+
+ bzero(ar, sizeof(*ar));
+ ar->k_ar.ar_magic = AUDIT_RECORD_MAGIC;
+ nanotime(&ar->k_ar.ar_starttime);
+
+ cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
+
+ /*
+ * Export the subject credential.
+ */
+ cru2x(cred, &ar->k_ar.ar_subj_cred);
+ ar->k_ar.ar_subj_ruid = cred->cr_ruid;
+ ar->k_ar.ar_subj_rgid = cred->cr_rgid;
+ ar->k_ar.ar_subj_egid = cred->cr_groups[0];
+ ar->k_ar.ar_subj_pid = p->p_pid;
+ ar->k_ar.ar_subj_auid = cred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_auid;
+ ar->k_ar.ar_subj_asid = cred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_asid;
+ bcopy(&cred->cr_audit.as_mask, &ar->k_ar.ar_subj_amask,
+ sizeof(struct au_mask));
+ bcopy(&cred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_termid, &ar->k_ar.ar_subj_term_addr,
+ sizeof(struct au_tid_addr));
+ kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
+}
+
+static void
+audit_record_dtor(struct kaudit_record *ar)
+{
+
+ if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_upath1 != NULL)
+ free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_upath1, M_AUDITPATH);
+ if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_upath2 != NULL)
+ free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_upath2, M_AUDITPATH);
+ if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_kpath1 != NULL)
+ free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_kpath1, M_AUDITPATH);
+ if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_kpath2 != NULL)
+ free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_kpath2, M_AUDITPATH);
+ if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_text != NULL)
+ free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_text, M_AUDITTEXT);
+ if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_opaque != NULL)
+ free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_opaque, M_AUDITDATA);
+ if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_data != NULL)
+ free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_data, M_AUDITDATA);
+ if (ar->k_udata != NULL)
+ free(ar->k_udata, M_AUDITDATA);
+ if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_argv != NULL)
+ free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_argv, M_AUDITTEXT);
+ if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_envv != NULL)
+ free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_envv, M_AUDITTEXT);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize the Audit subsystem: configuration state, work queue,
+ * synchronization primitives, worker thread, and trigger device node. Also
+ * call into the BSM assembly code to initialize it.
+ */
+void
+audit_init(void)
+{
+
+ audit_enabled = 0;
+ audit_syscalls = 0;
+ audit_kevent_mask = 0;
+ audit_suspended = 0;
+ audit_panic_on_write_fail = 0;
+ audit_fail_stop = 0;
+ audit_in_failure = 0;
+ audit_argv = 0;
+ audit_arge = 0;
+
+ audit_fstat.af_filesz = 0; /* '0' means unset, unbounded. */
+ audit_fstat.af_currsz = 0;
+ audit_nae_mask.am_success = 0;
+ audit_nae_mask.am_failure = 0;
+
+ TAILQ_INIT(&audit_q);
+ audit_q_len = 0;
+ audit_pre_q_len = 0;
+ audit_qctrl.aq_hiwater = AQ_HIWATER;
+ audit_qctrl.aq_lowater = AQ_LOWATER;
+ audit_qctrl.aq_bufsz = AQ_BUFSZ;
+ audit_qctrl.aq_minfree = AU_FS_MINFREE;
+
+ audit_kinfo.ai_termid.at_type = AU_IPv4;
+ audit_kinfo.ai_termid.at_addr[0] = INADDR_ANY;
+
+ mtx_init(&audit_mtx, "audit_mtx", NULL, MTX_DEF);
+ KINFO_LOCK_INIT();
+ cv_init(&audit_worker_cv, "audit_worker_cv");
+ cv_init(&audit_drain_cv, "audit_drain_cv");
+ cv_init(&audit_watermark_cv, "audit_watermark_cv");
+ cv_init(&audit_fail_cv, "audit_fail_cv");
+
+ audit_record_zone = zinit(sizeof(struct kaudit_record),
+ AQ_HIWATER*sizeof(struct kaudit_record), 8192, "audit_zone");
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+ audit_mac_init();
+#endif
+ /* Init audit session subsystem. */
+ audit_session_init();
+
+ /* Initialize the BSM audit subsystem. */
+ kau_init();
+
+ /* audit_trigger_init(); */
+
+ /* Start audit worker thread. */
+ (void) audit_pipe_init();
+
+ /* Start audit worker thread. */
+ audit_worker_init();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Drain the audit queue and close the log at shutdown. Note that this can
+ * be called both from the system shutdown path and also from audit
+ * configuration syscalls, so 'arg' and 'howto' are ignored.
+ */
+void
+audit_shutdown(void)
+{
+
+ audit_rotate_vnode(NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the current thread's audit record, if any.
+ */
+__inline__ struct kaudit_record *
+currecord(void)
+{
+
+ return (curthread()->uu_ar);
+}
+
+/*
+ * XXXAUDIT: There are a number of races present in the code below due to
+ * release and re-grab of the mutex. The code should be revised to become
+ * slightly less racy.
+ *
+ * XXXAUDIT: Shouldn't there be logic here to sleep waiting on available
+ * pre_q space, suspending the system call until there is room?
+ */
+struct kaudit_record *
+audit_new(int event, proc_t p, __unused struct uthread *uthread)
+{
+ struct kaudit_record *ar;
+ int no_record;
+
+ mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
+ no_record = (audit_suspended || !audit_enabled);
+ mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
+ if (no_record)
+ return (NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize the audit record header.
+ * XXX: We may want to fail-stop if allocation fails.
+ *
+ * Note: the number of outstanding uncommitted audit records is
+ * limited to the number of concurrent threads servicing system calls
+ * in the kernel.
+ */
+ ar = zalloc(audit_record_zone);
+ if (ar == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ audit_record_ctor(p, ar);
+ ar->k_ar.ar_event = event;
+
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+ if (audit_mac_new(p, ar) != 0) {
+ zfree(audit_record_zone, ar);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
+ audit_pre_q_len++;
+ mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
+
+ return (ar);
+}
+
+void
+audit_free(struct kaudit_record *ar)
+{
+
+ audit_record_dtor(ar);
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+ audit_mac_free(ar);
+#endif
+ zfree(audit_record_zone, ar);
+}
+
+void
+audit_commit(struct kaudit_record *ar, int error, int retval)
+{
+ au_event_t event;
+ au_class_t class;
+ au_id_t auid;
+ int sorf;
+ struct au_mask *aumask;
+
+ if (ar == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Decide whether to commit the audit record by checking the error
+ * value from the system call and using the appropriate audit mask.
+ */
+ if (ar->k_ar.ar_subj_auid == AU_DEFAUDITID)
+ aumask = &audit_nae_mask;
+ else
+ aumask = &ar->k_ar.ar_subj_amask;
+
+ if (error)
+ sorf = AU_PRS_FAILURE;
+ else
+ sorf = AU_PRS_SUCCESS;
+
+ switch(ar->k_ar.ar_event) {
+ case AUE_OPEN_RWTC:
+ /*
+ * The open syscall always writes a AUE_OPEN_RWTC event;
+ * change it to the proper type of event based on the flags
+ * and the error value.
+ */
+ ar->k_ar.ar_event = audit_flags_and_error_to_openevent(
+ ar->k_ar.ar_arg_fflags, error);
+ break;
+
+ case AUE_OPEN_EXTENDED_RWTC:
+ /*
+ * The open_extended syscall always writes a
+ * AUE_OPEN_EXTENDEDRWTC event; change it to the proper type of
+ * event based on the flags and the error value.
+ */
+ ar->k_ar.ar_event = audit_flags_and_error_to_openextendedevent(
+ ar->k_ar.ar_arg_fflags, error);
+ break;
+
+ case AUE_SYSCTL:
+ ar->k_ar.ar_event = audit_ctlname_to_sysctlevent(
+ ar->k_ar.ar_arg_ctlname, ar->k_ar.ar_valid_arg);
+ break;
+
+ case AUE_AUDITON:
+ /* Convert the auditon() command to an event. */
+ ar->k_ar.ar_event = auditon_command_event(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_cmd);
+ break;
+
+ case AUE_FCNTL:
+ /* Convert some fcntl() commands to their own events. */
+ ar->k_ar.ar_event = audit_fcntl_command_event(
+ ar->k_ar.ar_arg_cmd, ar->k_ar.ar_arg_fflags, error);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ auid = ar->k_ar.ar_subj_auid;
+ event = ar->k_ar.ar_event;
+ class = au_event_class(event);
+
+ ar->k_ar_commit |= AR_COMMIT_KERNEL;
+ if (au_preselect(event, class, aumask, sorf) != 0)
+ ar->k_ar_commit |= AR_PRESELECT_TRAIL;
+ if (audit_pipe_preselect(auid, event, class, sorf,
+ ar->k_ar_commit & AR_PRESELECT_TRAIL) != 0)
+ ar->k_ar_commit |= AR_PRESELECT_PIPE;
+ if ((ar->k_ar_commit & (AR_PRESELECT_TRAIL | AR_PRESELECT_PIPE |
+ AR_PRESELECT_USER_TRAIL | AR_PRESELECT_USER_PIPE)) == 0) {
+ mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
+ audit_pre_q_len--;
+ mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
+ audit_free(ar);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ar->k_ar.ar_errno = error;
+ ar->k_ar.ar_retval = retval;
+ nanotime(&ar->k_ar.ar_endtime);
+
+ /*
+ * Note: it could be that some records initiated while audit was
+ * enabled should still be committed?
+ */
+ mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
+ if (audit_suspended || !audit_enabled) {
+ audit_pre_q_len--;
+ mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
+ audit_free(ar);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Constrain the number of committed audit records based on the
+ * configurable parameter.
+ */
+ while (audit_q_len >= audit_qctrl.aq_hiwater)
+ cv_wait(&audit_watermark_cv, &audit_mtx);
+
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&audit_q, ar, k_q);
+ audit_q_len++;
+ audit_pre_q_len--;
+ cv_signal(&audit_worker_cv);
+ mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * audit_syscall_enter() is called on entry to each system call. It is
+ * responsible for deciding whether or not to audit the call (preselection),
+ * and if so, allocating a per-thread audit record. audit_new() will fill in
+ * basic thread/credential properties.
+ */
+void
+audit_syscall_enter(unsigned int code, proc_t proc, struct uthread *uthread)
+{
+ struct au_mask *aumask;
+ au_class_t class;
+ au_event_t event;
+ au_id_t auid;
+ kauth_cred_t cred;
+
+ /*
+ * In FreeBSD, each ABI has its own system call table, and hence
+ * mapping of system call codes to audit events. Convert the code to
+ * an audit event identifier using the process system call table
+ * reference. In Darwin, there's only one, so we use the global
+ * symbol for the system call table. No audit record is generated
+ * for bad system calls, as no operation has been performed.
+ *
+ * In Mac OS X, the audit events are stored in a table seperate from
+ * the syscall table(s). This table is generated by makesyscalls.sh
+ * from syscalls.master and stored in audit_kevents.c.
+ */
+ if (code > NUM_SYSENT)
+ return;
+ event = sys_au_event[code];
+ if (event == AUE_NULL)
+ return;
+
+ KASSERT(uthread->uu_ar == NULL,
+ ("audit_syscall_enter: uthread->uu_ar != NULL"));
+
+ /*
+ * Check which audit mask to use; either the kernel non-attributable
+ * event mask or the process audit mask.
+ */
+ cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(proc);
+ auid = cred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_auid;
+ if (auid == AU_DEFAUDITID)
+ aumask = &audit_nae_mask;
+ else
+ aumask = &cred->cr_audit.as_mask;
+
+ /*
+ * Allocate an audit record, if preselection allows it, and store in
+ * the thread for later use.
+ */
+ class = au_event_class(event);
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+ /*
+ * Note: audit_mac_syscall_enter() may call audit_new() and allocate
+ * memory for the audit record (uu_ar).
+ */
+ if (audit_mac_syscall_enter(code, proc, uthread, cred, event) == 0)
+ goto out;
+#endif
+ if (au_preselect(event, class, aumask, AU_PRS_BOTH)) {
+ /*
+ * If we're out of space and need to suspend unprivileged
+ * processes, do that here rather than trying to allocate
+ * another audit record.
+ *
+ * Note: we might wish to be able to continue here in the
+ * future, if the system recovers. That should be possible
+ * by means of checking the condition in a loop around
+ * cv_wait(). It might be desirable to reevaluate whether an
+ * audit record is still required for this event by
+ * re-calling au_preselect().
+ */
+ if (audit_in_failure &&
+ suser(cred, &proc->p_acflag) != 0) {
+ cv_wait(&audit_fail_cv, &audit_mtx);
+ panic("audit_failing_stop: thread continued");
+ }
+ if (uthread->uu_ar == NULL)
+ uthread->uu_ar = audit_new(event, proc, uthread);
+ } else if (audit_pipe_preselect(auid, event, class, AU_PRS_BOTH, 0)) {
+ if (uthread->uu_ar == NULL)
+ uthread->uu_ar = audit_new(event, proc, uthread);
+ }
+
+out:
+ kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
+}
+
+/*
+ * audit_syscall_exit() is called from the return of every system call, or in
+ * the event of exit1(), during the execution of exit1(). It is responsible
+ * for committing the audit record, if any, along with return condition.
+ *
+ * Note: The audit_syscall_exit() parameter list was modified to support
+ * mac_audit_check_postselect(), which requires the syscall number.
+ */
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+void
+audit_syscall_exit(unsigned int code, int error, __unused proc_t proc,
+ struct uthread *uthread)
+#else
+void
+audit_syscall_exit(int error, __unsed proc_t proc, struct uthread *uthread)
+#endif
+{
+ int retval;
+
+ /*
+ * Commit the audit record as desired; once we pass the record into
+ * audit_commit(), the memory is owned by the audit subsystem. The
+ * return value from the system call is stored on the user thread.
+ * If there was an error, the return value is set to -1, imitating
+ * the behavior of the cerror routine.
+ */
+ if (error)
+ retval = -1;
+ else
+ retval = uthread->uu_rval[0];
+
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+ if (audit_mac_syscall_exit(code, uthread, error, retval) != 0)
+ goto out;
+#endif
+ audit_commit(uthread->uu_ar, error, retval);
+
+out:
+ uthread->uu_ar = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calls to set up and tear down audit structures used during Mach system
+ * calls.
+ */
+void
+audit_mach_syscall_enter(unsigned short event)
+{
+ struct uthread *uthread;
+ proc_t proc;
+ struct au_mask *aumask;
+ kauth_cred_t cred;
+ au_class_t class;
+ au_id_t auid;
+
+ if (event == AUE_NULL)
+ return;
+
+ uthread = curthread();
+ if (uthread == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ proc = current_proc();
+ if (proc == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ KASSERT(uthread->uu_ar == NULL,
+ ("audit_mach_syscall_enter: uthread->uu_ar != NULL"));
+
+ cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(proc);
+ auid = cred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_auid;
+
+ /*
+ * Check which audit mask to use; either the kernel non-attributable
+ * event mask or the process audit mask.
+ */
+ if (auid == AU_DEFAUDITID)
+ aumask = &audit_nae_mask;
+ else
+ aumask = &cred->cr_audit.as_mask;
+
+ /*
+ * Allocate an audit record, if desired, and store in the BSD thread
+ * for later use.
+ */
+ class = au_event_class(event);
+ if (au_preselect(event, class, aumask, AU_PRS_BOTH))
+ uthread->uu_ar = audit_new(event, proc, uthread);
+ else if (audit_pipe_preselect(auid, event, class, AU_PRS_BOTH, 0))
+ uthread->uu_ar = audit_new(event, proc, uthread);
+ else
+ uthread->uu_ar = NULL;
+
+ kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
+}
+
+void
+audit_mach_syscall_exit(int retval, struct uthread *uthread)
+{
+ /*
+ * The error code from Mach system calls is the same as the
+ * return value
+ */
+ /* XXX Is the above statement always true? */
+ audit_commit(uthread->uu_ar, retval, retval);
+ uthread->uu_ar = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * kau_will_audit can be used by a security policy to determine
+ * if an audit record will be stored, reducing wasted memory allocation
+ * and string handling.
+ */
+int
+kau_will_audit(void)
+{
+
+ return (audit_enabled && currecord() != NULL);
+}
+
+void
+audit_proc_coredump(proc_t proc, char *path, int errcode)
+{
+ struct kaudit_record *ar;
+ struct au_mask *aumask;
+ au_class_t class;
+ int ret, sorf;
+ char **pathp;
+ au_id_t auid;
+ kauth_cred_t my_cred;
+ struct uthread *uthread;
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure we are using the correct preselection mask.
+ */
+ my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(proc);
+ auid = my_cred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_auid;
+ if (auid == AU_DEFAUDITID)
+ aumask = &audit_nae_mask;
+ else
+ aumask = &my_cred->cr_audit.as_mask;
+ kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
+ /*
+ * It's possible for coredump(9) generation to fail. Make sure that
+ * we handle this case correctly for preselection.
+ */
+ if (errcode != 0)
+ sorf = AU_PRS_FAILURE;
+ else
+ sorf = AU_PRS_SUCCESS;
+ class = au_event_class(AUE_CORE);
+ if (au_preselect(AUE_CORE, class, aumask, sorf) == 0 &&
+ audit_pipe_preselect(auid, AUE_CORE, class, sorf, 0) == 0)
+ return;
+ /*
+ * If we are interested in seeing this audit record, allocate it.
+ * Where possible coredump records should contain a pathname and arg32
+ * (signal) tokens.
+ */
+ uthread = curthread();
+ ar = audit_new(AUE_CORE, proc, uthread);
+ if (path != NULL) {
+ pathp = &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_upath1;
+ *pathp = malloc(MAXPATHLEN, M_AUDITPATH, M_WAITOK);
+ if (audit_canon_path(vfs_context_cwd(vfs_context_current()), path,
+ *pathp))
+ free(*pathp, M_AUDITPATH);
+ else
+ ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_UPATH1);
+ }
+ ar->k_ar.ar_arg_signum = proc->p_sigacts->ps_sig;
+ ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SIGNUM);
+ if (errcode != 0)
+ ret = 1;
+ audit_commit(ar, errcode, ret);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */