X-Git-Url: https://git.saurik.com/apple/xnu.git/blobdiff_plain/e2fac8b15b12a7979f72090454d850e612fc5b13..b0d623f7f2ae71ed96e60569f61f9a9a27016e80:/bsd/security/audit/audit.c diff --git a/bsd/security/audit/audit.c b/bsd/security/audit/audit.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c454867bf --- /dev/null +++ b/bsd/security/audit/audit.c @@ -0,0 +1,802 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1999-2009 Apple Inc. + * Copyright (c) 2006-2007 Robert N. M. Watson + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of Apple Inc. ("Apple") nor the names of + * its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived + * from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY APPLE AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL APPLE OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE + * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + */ +/* + * NOTICE: This file was modified by McAfee Research in 2004 to introduce + * support for mandatory and extensible security protections. This notice + * is included in support of clause 2.2 (b) of the Apple Public License, + * Version 2.0. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#include +#include + +#if CONFIG_AUDIT +MALLOC_DEFINE(M_AUDITDATA, "audit_data", "Audit data storage"); +MALLOC_DEFINE(M_AUDITPATH, "audit_path", "Audit path storage"); +MALLOC_DEFINE(M_AUDITTEXT, "audit_text", "Audit text storage"); + +/* + * Audit control settings that are set/read by system calls and are hence + * non-static. + * + * Define the audit control flags. + */ +int audit_enabled; +int audit_suspended; + +int audit_syscalls; +au_class_t audit_kevent_mask; + +/* + * Flags controlling behavior in low storage situations. Should we panic if + * a write fails? Should we fail stop if we're out of disk space? + */ +int audit_panic_on_write_fail; +int audit_fail_stop; +int audit_argv; +int audit_arge; + +/* + * Are we currently "failing stop" due to out of disk space? + */ +int audit_in_failure; + +/* + * Global audit statistics. + */ +struct audit_fstat audit_fstat; + +/* + * Preselection mask for non-attributable events. + */ +struct au_mask audit_nae_mask; + +/* + * Mutex to protect global variables shared between various threads and + * processes. + */ +struct mtx audit_mtx; + +/* + * Queue of audit records ready for delivery to disk. We insert new records + * at the tail, and remove records from the head. Also, a count of the + * number of records used for checking queue depth. In addition, a counter + * of records that we have allocated but are not yet in the queue, which is + * needed to estimate the total size of the combined set of records + * outstanding in the system. + */ +struct kaudit_queue audit_q; +int audit_q_len; +int audit_pre_q_len; + +/* + * Audit queue control settings (minimum free, low/high water marks, etc.) + */ +struct au_qctrl audit_qctrl; + +/* + * Condition variable to signal to the worker that it has work to do: either + * new records are in the queue, or a log replacement is taking place. + */ +struct cv audit_worker_cv; + +/* + * Condition variable to signal when the worker is done draining the audit + * queue. + */ +struct cv audit_drain_cv; + +/* + * Condition variable to flag when crossing the low watermark, meaning that + * threads blocked due to hitting the high watermark can wake up and continue + * to commit records. + */ +struct cv audit_watermark_cv; + +/* + * Condition variable for auditing threads wait on when in fail-stop mode. + * Threads wait on this CV forever (and ever), never seeing the light of day + * again. + */ +static struct cv audit_fail_cv; + +static zone_t audit_record_zone; + +/* + * Kernel audit information. This will store the current audit address + * or host information that the kernel will use when it's generating + * audit records. This data is modified by the A_GET{SET}KAUDIT auditon(2) + * command. + */ +static struct auditinfo_addr audit_kinfo; +static struct rwlock audit_kinfo_lock; + +#define KINFO_LOCK_INIT() rw_init(&audit_kinfo_lock, \ + "audit_kinfo_lock") +#define KINFO_RLOCK() rw_rlock(&audit_kinfo_lock) +#define KINFO_WLOCK() rw_wlock(&audit_kinfo_lock) +#define KINFO_RUNLOCK() rw_runlock(&audit_kinfo_lock) +#define KINFO_WUNLOCK() rw_wunlock(&audit_kinfo_lock) + +void +audit_set_kinfo(struct auditinfo_addr *ak) +{ + + KASSERT(ak->ai_termid.at_type == AU_IPv4 || + ak->ai_termid.at_type == AU_IPv6, + ("audit_set_kinfo: invalid address type")); + + KINFO_WLOCK(); + bcopy(ak, &audit_kinfo, sizeof(audit_kinfo)); + KINFO_WUNLOCK(); +} + +void +audit_get_kinfo(struct auditinfo_addr *ak) +{ + + KASSERT(audit_kinfo.ai_termid.at_type == AU_IPv4 || + audit_kinfo.ai_termid.at_type == AU_IPv6, + ("audit_set_kinfo: invalid address type")); + + KINFO_RLOCK(); + bcopy(&audit_kinfo, ak, sizeof(*ak)); + KINFO_RUNLOCK(); +} + +/* + * Construct an audit record for the passed thread. + */ +static void +audit_record_ctor(proc_t p, struct kaudit_record *ar) +{ + kauth_cred_t cred; + + bzero(ar, sizeof(*ar)); + ar->k_ar.ar_magic = AUDIT_RECORD_MAGIC; + nanotime(&ar->k_ar.ar_starttime); + + cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p); + + /* + * Export the subject credential. + */ + cru2x(cred, &ar->k_ar.ar_subj_cred); + ar->k_ar.ar_subj_ruid = cred->cr_ruid; + ar->k_ar.ar_subj_rgid = cred->cr_rgid; + ar->k_ar.ar_subj_egid = cred->cr_groups[0]; + ar->k_ar.ar_subj_pid = p->p_pid; + ar->k_ar.ar_subj_auid = cred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_auid; + ar->k_ar.ar_subj_asid = cred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_asid; + bcopy(&cred->cr_audit.as_mask, &ar->k_ar.ar_subj_amask, + sizeof(struct au_mask)); + bcopy(&cred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_termid, &ar->k_ar.ar_subj_term_addr, + sizeof(struct au_tid_addr)); + kauth_cred_unref(&cred); +} + +static void +audit_record_dtor(struct kaudit_record *ar) +{ + + if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_upath1 != NULL) + free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_upath1, M_AUDITPATH); + if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_upath2 != NULL) + free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_upath2, M_AUDITPATH); + if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_kpath1 != NULL) + free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_kpath1, M_AUDITPATH); + if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_kpath2 != NULL) + free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_kpath2, M_AUDITPATH); + if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_text != NULL) + free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_text, M_AUDITTEXT); + if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_opaque != NULL) + free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_opaque, M_AUDITDATA); + if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_data != NULL) + free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_data, M_AUDITDATA); + if (ar->k_udata != NULL) + free(ar->k_udata, M_AUDITDATA); + if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_argv != NULL) + free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_argv, M_AUDITTEXT); + if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_envv != NULL) + free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_envv, M_AUDITTEXT); +} + +/* + * Initialize the Audit subsystem: configuration state, work queue, + * synchronization primitives, worker thread, and trigger device node. Also + * call into the BSM assembly code to initialize it. + */ +void +audit_init(void) +{ + + audit_enabled = 0; + audit_syscalls = 0; + audit_kevent_mask = 0; + audit_suspended = 0; + audit_panic_on_write_fail = 0; + audit_fail_stop = 0; + audit_in_failure = 0; + audit_argv = 0; + audit_arge = 0; + + audit_fstat.af_filesz = 0; /* '0' means unset, unbounded. */ + audit_fstat.af_currsz = 0; + audit_nae_mask.am_success = 0; + audit_nae_mask.am_failure = 0; + + TAILQ_INIT(&audit_q); + audit_q_len = 0; + audit_pre_q_len = 0; + audit_qctrl.aq_hiwater = AQ_HIWATER; + audit_qctrl.aq_lowater = AQ_LOWATER; + audit_qctrl.aq_bufsz = AQ_BUFSZ; + audit_qctrl.aq_minfree = AU_FS_MINFREE; + + audit_kinfo.ai_termid.at_type = AU_IPv4; + audit_kinfo.ai_termid.at_addr[0] = INADDR_ANY; + + mtx_init(&audit_mtx, "audit_mtx", NULL, MTX_DEF); + KINFO_LOCK_INIT(); + cv_init(&audit_worker_cv, "audit_worker_cv"); + cv_init(&audit_drain_cv, "audit_drain_cv"); + cv_init(&audit_watermark_cv, "audit_watermark_cv"); + cv_init(&audit_fail_cv, "audit_fail_cv"); + + audit_record_zone = zinit(sizeof(struct kaudit_record), + AQ_HIWATER*sizeof(struct kaudit_record), 8192, "audit_zone"); +#if CONFIG_MACF + audit_mac_init(); +#endif + /* Init audit session subsystem. */ + audit_session_init(); + + /* Initialize the BSM audit subsystem. */ + kau_init(); + + /* audit_trigger_init(); */ + + /* Start audit worker thread. */ + (void) audit_pipe_init(); + + /* Start audit worker thread. */ + audit_worker_init(); +} + +/* + * Drain the audit queue and close the log at shutdown. Note that this can + * be called both from the system shutdown path and also from audit + * configuration syscalls, so 'arg' and 'howto' are ignored. + */ +void +audit_shutdown(void) +{ + + audit_rotate_vnode(NULL, NULL); +} + +/* + * Return the current thread's audit record, if any. + */ +__inline__ struct kaudit_record * +currecord(void) +{ + + return (curthread()->uu_ar); +} + +/* + * XXXAUDIT: There are a number of races present in the code below due to + * release and re-grab of the mutex. The code should be revised to become + * slightly less racy. + * + * XXXAUDIT: Shouldn't there be logic here to sleep waiting on available + * pre_q space, suspending the system call until there is room? + */ +struct kaudit_record * +audit_new(int event, proc_t p, __unused struct uthread *uthread) +{ + struct kaudit_record *ar; + int no_record; + + mtx_lock(&audit_mtx); + no_record = (audit_suspended || !audit_enabled); + mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx); + if (no_record) + return (NULL); + + /* + * Initialize the audit record header. + * XXX: We may want to fail-stop if allocation fails. + * + * Note: the number of outstanding uncommitted audit records is + * limited to the number of concurrent threads servicing system calls + * in the kernel. + */ + ar = zalloc(audit_record_zone); + if (ar == NULL) + return NULL; + audit_record_ctor(p, ar); + ar->k_ar.ar_event = event; + +#if CONFIG_MACF + if (audit_mac_new(p, ar) != 0) { + zfree(audit_record_zone, ar); + return (NULL); + } +#endif + + mtx_lock(&audit_mtx); + audit_pre_q_len++; + mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx); + + return (ar); +} + +void +audit_free(struct kaudit_record *ar) +{ + + audit_record_dtor(ar); +#if CONFIG_MACF + audit_mac_free(ar); +#endif + zfree(audit_record_zone, ar); +} + +void +audit_commit(struct kaudit_record *ar, int error, int retval) +{ + au_event_t event; + au_class_t class; + au_id_t auid; + int sorf; + struct au_mask *aumask; + + if (ar == NULL) + return; + + /* + * Decide whether to commit the audit record by checking the error + * value from the system call and using the appropriate audit mask. + */ + if (ar->k_ar.ar_subj_auid == AU_DEFAUDITID) + aumask = &audit_nae_mask; + else + aumask = &ar->k_ar.ar_subj_amask; + + if (error) + sorf = AU_PRS_FAILURE; + else + sorf = AU_PRS_SUCCESS; + + switch(ar->k_ar.ar_event) { + case AUE_OPEN_RWTC: + /* + * The open syscall always writes a AUE_OPEN_RWTC event; + * change it to the proper type of event based on the flags + * and the error value. + */ + ar->k_ar.ar_event = audit_flags_and_error_to_openevent( + ar->k_ar.ar_arg_fflags, error); + break; + + case AUE_OPEN_EXTENDED_RWTC: + /* + * The open_extended syscall always writes a + * AUE_OPEN_EXTENDEDRWTC event; change it to the proper type of + * event based on the flags and the error value. + */ + ar->k_ar.ar_event = audit_flags_and_error_to_openextendedevent( + ar->k_ar.ar_arg_fflags, error); + break; + + case AUE_SYSCTL: + ar->k_ar.ar_event = audit_ctlname_to_sysctlevent( + ar->k_ar.ar_arg_ctlname, ar->k_ar.ar_valid_arg); + break; + + case AUE_AUDITON: + /* Convert the auditon() command to an event. */ + ar->k_ar.ar_event = auditon_command_event(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_cmd); + break; + + case AUE_FCNTL: + /* Convert some fcntl() commands to their own events. */ + ar->k_ar.ar_event = audit_fcntl_command_event( + ar->k_ar.ar_arg_cmd, ar->k_ar.ar_arg_fflags, error); + break; + } + + auid = ar->k_ar.ar_subj_auid; + event = ar->k_ar.ar_event; + class = au_event_class(event); + + ar->k_ar_commit |= AR_COMMIT_KERNEL; + if (au_preselect(event, class, aumask, sorf) != 0) + ar->k_ar_commit |= AR_PRESELECT_TRAIL; + if (audit_pipe_preselect(auid, event, class, sorf, + ar->k_ar_commit & AR_PRESELECT_TRAIL) != 0) + ar->k_ar_commit |= AR_PRESELECT_PIPE; + if ((ar->k_ar_commit & (AR_PRESELECT_TRAIL | AR_PRESELECT_PIPE | + AR_PRESELECT_USER_TRAIL | AR_PRESELECT_USER_PIPE)) == 0) { + mtx_lock(&audit_mtx); + audit_pre_q_len--; + mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx); + audit_free(ar); + return; + } + + ar->k_ar.ar_errno = error; + ar->k_ar.ar_retval = retval; + nanotime(&ar->k_ar.ar_endtime); + + /* + * Note: it could be that some records initiated while audit was + * enabled should still be committed? + */ + mtx_lock(&audit_mtx); + if (audit_suspended || !audit_enabled) { + audit_pre_q_len--; + mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx); + audit_free(ar); + return; + } + + /* + * Constrain the number of committed audit records based on the + * configurable parameter. + */ + while (audit_q_len >= audit_qctrl.aq_hiwater) + cv_wait(&audit_watermark_cv, &audit_mtx); + + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&audit_q, ar, k_q); + audit_q_len++; + audit_pre_q_len--; + cv_signal(&audit_worker_cv); + mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx); +} + +/* + * audit_syscall_enter() is called on entry to each system call. It is + * responsible for deciding whether or not to audit the call (preselection), + * and if so, allocating a per-thread audit record. audit_new() will fill in + * basic thread/credential properties. + */ +void +audit_syscall_enter(unsigned int code, proc_t proc, struct uthread *uthread) +{ + struct au_mask *aumask; + au_class_t class; + au_event_t event; + au_id_t auid; + kauth_cred_t cred; + + /* + * In FreeBSD, each ABI has its own system call table, and hence + * mapping of system call codes to audit events. Convert the code to + * an audit event identifier using the process system call table + * reference. In Darwin, there's only one, so we use the global + * symbol for the system call table. No audit record is generated + * for bad system calls, as no operation has been performed. + * + * In Mac OS X, the audit events are stored in a table seperate from + * the syscall table(s). This table is generated by makesyscalls.sh + * from syscalls.master and stored in audit_kevents.c. + */ + if (code > NUM_SYSENT) + return; + event = sys_au_event[code]; + if (event == AUE_NULL) + return; + + KASSERT(uthread->uu_ar == NULL, + ("audit_syscall_enter: uthread->uu_ar != NULL")); + + /* + * Check which audit mask to use; either the kernel non-attributable + * event mask or the process audit mask. + */ + cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(proc); + auid = cred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_auid; + if (auid == AU_DEFAUDITID) + aumask = &audit_nae_mask; + else + aumask = &cred->cr_audit.as_mask; + + /* + * Allocate an audit record, if preselection allows it, and store in + * the thread for later use. + */ + class = au_event_class(event); +#if CONFIG_MACF + /* + * Note: audit_mac_syscall_enter() may call audit_new() and allocate + * memory for the audit record (uu_ar). + */ + if (audit_mac_syscall_enter(code, proc, uthread, cred, event) == 0) + goto out; +#endif + if (au_preselect(event, class, aumask, AU_PRS_BOTH)) { + /* + * If we're out of space and need to suspend unprivileged + * processes, do that here rather than trying to allocate + * another audit record. + * + * Note: we might wish to be able to continue here in the + * future, if the system recovers. That should be possible + * by means of checking the condition in a loop around + * cv_wait(). It might be desirable to reevaluate whether an + * audit record is still required for this event by + * re-calling au_preselect(). + */ + if (audit_in_failure && + suser(cred, &proc->p_acflag) != 0) { + cv_wait(&audit_fail_cv, &audit_mtx); + panic("audit_failing_stop: thread continued"); + } + if (uthread->uu_ar == NULL) + uthread->uu_ar = audit_new(event, proc, uthread); + } else if (audit_pipe_preselect(auid, event, class, AU_PRS_BOTH, 0)) { + if (uthread->uu_ar == NULL) + uthread->uu_ar = audit_new(event, proc, uthread); + } + +out: + kauth_cred_unref(&cred); +} + +/* + * audit_syscall_exit() is called from the return of every system call, or in + * the event of exit1(), during the execution of exit1(). It is responsible + * for committing the audit record, if any, along with return condition. + * + * Note: The audit_syscall_exit() parameter list was modified to support + * mac_audit_check_postselect(), which requires the syscall number. + */ +#if CONFIG_MACF +void +audit_syscall_exit(unsigned int code, int error, __unused proc_t proc, + struct uthread *uthread) +#else +void +audit_syscall_exit(int error, __unsed proc_t proc, struct uthread *uthread) +#endif +{ + int retval; + + /* + * Commit the audit record as desired; once we pass the record into + * audit_commit(), the memory is owned by the audit subsystem. The + * return value from the system call is stored on the user thread. + * If there was an error, the return value is set to -1, imitating + * the behavior of the cerror routine. + */ + if (error) + retval = -1; + else + retval = uthread->uu_rval[0]; + +#if CONFIG_MACF + if (audit_mac_syscall_exit(code, uthread, error, retval) != 0) + goto out; +#endif + audit_commit(uthread->uu_ar, error, retval); + +out: + uthread->uu_ar = NULL; +} + +/* + * Calls to set up and tear down audit structures used during Mach system + * calls. + */ +void +audit_mach_syscall_enter(unsigned short event) +{ + struct uthread *uthread; + proc_t proc; + struct au_mask *aumask; + kauth_cred_t cred; + au_class_t class; + au_id_t auid; + + if (event == AUE_NULL) + return; + + uthread = curthread(); + if (uthread == NULL) + return; + + proc = current_proc(); + if (proc == NULL) + return; + + KASSERT(uthread->uu_ar == NULL, + ("audit_mach_syscall_enter: uthread->uu_ar != NULL")); + + cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(proc); + auid = cred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_auid; + + /* + * Check which audit mask to use; either the kernel non-attributable + * event mask or the process audit mask. + */ + if (auid == AU_DEFAUDITID) + aumask = &audit_nae_mask; + else + aumask = &cred->cr_audit.as_mask; + + /* + * Allocate an audit record, if desired, and store in the BSD thread + * for later use. + */ + class = au_event_class(event); + if (au_preselect(event, class, aumask, AU_PRS_BOTH)) + uthread->uu_ar = audit_new(event, proc, uthread); + else if (audit_pipe_preselect(auid, event, class, AU_PRS_BOTH, 0)) + uthread->uu_ar = audit_new(event, proc, uthread); + else + uthread->uu_ar = NULL; + + kauth_cred_unref(&cred); +} + +void +audit_mach_syscall_exit(int retval, struct uthread *uthread) +{ + /* + * The error code from Mach system calls is the same as the + * return value + */ + /* XXX Is the above statement always true? */ + audit_commit(uthread->uu_ar, retval, retval); + uthread->uu_ar = NULL; +} + +/* + * kau_will_audit can be used by a security policy to determine + * if an audit record will be stored, reducing wasted memory allocation + * and string handling. + */ +int +kau_will_audit(void) +{ + + return (audit_enabled && currecord() != NULL); +} + +void +audit_proc_coredump(proc_t proc, char *path, int errcode) +{ + struct kaudit_record *ar; + struct au_mask *aumask; + au_class_t class; + int ret, sorf; + char **pathp; + au_id_t auid; + kauth_cred_t my_cred; + struct uthread *uthread; + + ret = 0; + + /* + * Make sure we are using the correct preselection mask. + */ + my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(proc); + auid = my_cred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_auid; + if (auid == AU_DEFAUDITID) + aumask = &audit_nae_mask; + else + aumask = &my_cred->cr_audit.as_mask; + kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred); + /* + * It's possible for coredump(9) generation to fail. Make sure that + * we handle this case correctly for preselection. + */ + if (errcode != 0) + sorf = AU_PRS_FAILURE; + else + sorf = AU_PRS_SUCCESS; + class = au_event_class(AUE_CORE); + if (au_preselect(AUE_CORE, class, aumask, sorf) == 0 && + audit_pipe_preselect(auid, AUE_CORE, class, sorf, 0) == 0) + return; + /* + * If we are interested in seeing this audit record, allocate it. + * Where possible coredump records should contain a pathname and arg32 + * (signal) tokens. + */ + uthread = curthread(); + ar = audit_new(AUE_CORE, proc, uthread); + if (path != NULL) { + pathp = &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_upath1; + *pathp = malloc(MAXPATHLEN, M_AUDITPATH, M_WAITOK); + if (audit_canon_path(vfs_context_cwd(vfs_context_current()), path, + *pathp)) + free(*pathp, M_AUDITPATH); + else + ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_UPATH1); + } + ar->k_ar.ar_arg_signum = proc->p_sigacts->ps_sig; + ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SIGNUM); + if (errcode != 0) + ret = 1; + audit_commit(ar, errcode, ret); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */