2 * Copyright (c) 2018 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
4 * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_START@
6 * This file contains Original Code and/or Modifications of Original Code
7 * as defined in and that are subject to the Apple Public Source License
8 * Version 2.0 (the 'License'). You may not use this file except in
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29 #include <sys/param.h>
30 #include <sys/systm.h>
31 #include <sys/filedesc.h>
32 #include <sys/kernel.h>
33 #include <sys/file_internal.h>
34 #include <kern/exc_guard.h>
35 #include <sys/guarded.h>
36 #include <kern/kalloc.h>
37 #include <sys/sysproto.h>
38 #include <sys/vnode.h>
39 #include <sys/vnode_internal.h>
40 #include <sys/uio_internal.h>
41 #include <sys/ubc_internal.h>
42 #include <vfs/vfs_support.h>
43 #include <security/audit/audit.h>
44 #include <sys/syscall.h>
45 #include <sys/kauth.h>
46 #include <sys/kdebug.h>
48 #include <vm/vm_protos.h>
49 #include <libkern/section_keywords.h>
50 #if CONFIG_MACF && CONFIG_VNGUARD
51 #include <security/mac.h>
52 #include <security/mac_framework.h>
53 #include <security/mac_policy.h>
54 #include <pexpert/pexpert.h>
55 #include <sys/sysctl.h>
56 #include <sys/reason.h>
60 #define f_flag fp_glob->fg_flag
61 extern int dofilewrite(vfs_context_t ctx
, struct fileproc
*fp
,
62 user_addr_t bufp
, user_size_t nbyte
, off_t offset
,
63 int flags
, user_ssize_t
*retval
);
64 extern int do_uiowrite(struct proc
*p
, struct fileproc
*fp
, uio_t uio
, int flags
, user_ssize_t
*retval
);
67 * Experimental guarded file descriptor support.
70 kern_return_t
task_exception_notify(exception_type_t exception
,
71 mach_exception_data_type_t code
, mach_exception_data_type_t subcode
);
72 kern_return_t
task_violated_guard(mach_exception_code_t
, mach_exception_subcode_t
, void *);
75 * Most fd's have an underlying fileproc struct; but some may be
76 * guarded_fileproc structs which implement guarded fds. The latter
77 * struct (below) embeds the former.
79 * The two types should be distinguished by the "type" portion of fp_flags.
80 * There's also a magic number to help catch misuse and bugs.
82 * This is a bit unpleasant, but results from the desire to allow
83 * alternate file behaviours for a few file descriptors without
84 * growing the fileproc data structure.
87 struct guarded_fileproc
{
88 struct fileproc gf_fileproc
;
94 const size_t sizeof_guarded_fileproc
= sizeof(struct guarded_fileproc
);
96 #define FP_TO_GFP(fp) ((struct guarded_fileproc *)(fp))
97 #define GFP_TO_FP(gfp) (&(gfp)->gf_fileproc)
99 #define GUARDED_FILEPROC_MAGIC 0x29083
106 static struct fileproc
*
107 guarded_fileproc_alloc_init(void *crarg
)
109 struct gfp_crarg
*aarg
= crarg
;
110 struct guarded_fileproc
*gfp
;
112 if ((gfp
= kalloc(sizeof(*gfp
))) == NULL
) {
116 bzero(gfp
, sizeof(*gfp
));
118 struct fileproc
*fp
= &gfp
->gf_fileproc
;
119 os_ref_init(&fp
->fp_iocount
, &f_refgrp
);
120 fp
->fp_flags
= FTYPE_GUARDED
;
122 gfp
->gf_magic
= GUARDED_FILEPROC_MAGIC
;
123 gfp
->gf_guard
= aarg
->gca_guard
;
124 gfp
->gf_attrs
= aarg
->gca_attrs
;
126 return GFP_TO_FP(gfp
);
130 guarded_fileproc_free(struct fileproc
*fp
)
132 struct guarded_fileproc
*gfp
= FP_TO_GFP(fp
);
134 if (FILEPROC_TYPE(fp
) != FTYPE_GUARDED
||
135 GUARDED_FILEPROC_MAGIC
!= gfp
->gf_magic
) {
136 panic("%s: corrupt fp %p flags %x", __func__
, fp
, fp
->fp_flags
);
139 kfree(gfp
, sizeof(*gfp
));
143 fp_lookup_guarded(proc_t p
, int fd
, guardid_t guard
,
144 struct guarded_fileproc
**gfpp
, int locked
)
149 if ((error
= fp_lookup(p
, fd
, &fp
, locked
)) != 0) {
152 if (FILEPROC_TYPE(fp
) != FTYPE_GUARDED
) {
153 (void) fp_drop(p
, fd
, fp
, locked
);
156 struct guarded_fileproc
*gfp
= FP_TO_GFP(fp
);
158 if (GUARDED_FILEPROC_MAGIC
!= gfp
->gf_magic
) {
159 panic("%s: corrupt fp %p", __func__
, fp
);
162 if (guard
!= gfp
->gf_guard
) {
163 (void) fp_drop(p
, fd
, fp
, locked
);
164 return EPERM
; /* *not* a mismatch exception */
173 * Expected use pattern:
175 * if (FP_ISGUARDED(fp, GUARD_CLOSE)) {
176 * error = fp_guard_exception(p, fd, fp, kGUARD_EXC_CLOSE);
183 fp_isguarded(struct fileproc
*fp
, u_int attrs
)
185 if (FILEPROC_TYPE(fp
) == FTYPE_GUARDED
) {
186 struct guarded_fileproc
*gfp
= FP_TO_GFP(fp
);
188 if (GUARDED_FILEPROC_MAGIC
!= gfp
->gf_magic
) {
189 panic("%s: corrupt gfp %p flags %x",
190 __func__
, gfp
, fp
->fp_flags
);
192 return (attrs
& gfp
->gf_attrs
) == attrs
;
197 extern char *proc_name_address(void *p
);
200 fp_guard_exception(proc_t p
, int fd
, struct fileproc
*fp
, u_int flavor
)
202 if (FILEPROC_TYPE(fp
) != FTYPE_GUARDED
) {
203 panic("%s corrupt fp %p flags %x", __func__
, fp
, fp
->fp_flags
);
206 struct guarded_fileproc
*gfp
= FP_TO_GFP(fp
);
207 /* all gfd fields protected via proc_fdlock() */
208 proc_fdlock_assert(p
, LCK_MTX_ASSERT_OWNED
);
210 mach_exception_code_t code
= 0;
211 EXC_GUARD_ENCODE_TYPE(code
, GUARD_TYPE_FD
);
212 EXC_GUARD_ENCODE_FLAVOR(code
, flavor
);
213 EXC_GUARD_ENCODE_TARGET(code
, fd
);
214 mach_exception_subcode_t subcode
= gfp
->gf_guard
;
216 thread_t t
= current_thread();
217 thread_guard_violation(t
, code
, subcode
, TRUE
);
222 * (Invoked before returning to userland from the syscall handler.)
227 mach_exception_code_t code
,
228 mach_exception_subcode_t subcode
)
230 task_exception_notify(EXC_GUARD
, code
, subcode
);
231 proc_t p
= current_proc();
236 * Experimental guarded file descriptor SPIs
240 * int guarded_open_np(const char *pathname, int flags,
241 * const guardid_t *guard, u_int guardflags, ...);
243 * In this initial implementation, GUARD_DUP must be specified.
244 * GUARD_CLOSE, GUARD_SOCKET_IPC and GUARD_FILEPORT are optional.
246 * If GUARD_DUP wasn't specified, then we'd have to do the (extra) work
247 * to allow dup-ing a descriptor to inherit the guard onto the new
248 * descriptor. (Perhaps GUARD_DUP behaviours should just always be true
249 * for a guarded fd? Or, more sanely, all the dup operations should
250 * just always propagate the guard?)
252 * Guarded descriptors are always close-on-exec, and GUARD_CLOSE
253 * requires close-on-fork; O_CLOEXEC must be set in flags.
254 * This setting is immutable; attempts to clear the flag will
255 * cause a guard exception.
257 * XXX It's somewhat broken that change_fdguard_np() can completely
258 * remove the guard and thus revoke down the immutability
259 * promises above. Ick.
262 guarded_open_np(proc_t p
, struct guarded_open_np_args
*uap
, int32_t *retval
)
264 if ((uap
->flags
& O_CLOEXEC
) == 0) {
268 #define GUARD_REQUIRED (GUARD_DUP)
269 #define GUARD_ALL (GUARD_REQUIRED | \
270 (GUARD_CLOSE | GUARD_SOCKET_IPC | GUARD_FILEPORT | GUARD_WRITE))
272 if (((uap
->guardflags
& GUARD_REQUIRED
) != GUARD_REQUIRED
) ||
273 ((uap
->guardflags
& ~GUARD_ALL
) != 0)) {
278 struct gfp_crarg crarg
= {
279 .gca_attrs
= uap
->guardflags
282 if ((error
= copyin(uap
->guard
,
283 &(crarg
.gca_guard
), sizeof(crarg
.gca_guard
))) != 0) {
288 * Disallow certain guard values -- is zero enough?
290 if (crarg
.gca_guard
== 0) {
294 struct filedesc
*fdp
= p
->p_fd
;
295 struct vnode_attr va
;
297 vfs_context_t ctx
= vfs_context_current();
301 cmode
= ((uap
->mode
& ~fdp
->fd_cmask
) & ALLPERMS
) & ~S_ISTXT
;
302 VATTR_SET(&va
, va_mode
, cmode
& ACCESSPERMS
);
304 NDINIT(&nd
, LOOKUP
, OP_OPEN
, FOLLOW
| AUDITVNPATH1
, UIO_USERSPACE
,
307 return open1(ctx
, &nd
, uap
->flags
| O_CLOFORK
, &va
,
308 guarded_fileproc_alloc_init
, &crarg
, retval
);
312 * int guarded_open_dprotected_np(const char *pathname, int flags,
313 * const guardid_t *guard, u_int guardflags, int dpclass, int dpflags, ...);
315 * This SPI is extension of guarded_open_np() to include dataprotection class on creation
316 * in "dpclass" and dataprotection flags 'dpflags'. Otherwise behaviors are same as in
320 guarded_open_dprotected_np(proc_t p
, struct guarded_open_dprotected_np_args
*uap
, int32_t *retval
)
322 if ((uap
->flags
& O_CLOEXEC
) == 0) {
326 if (((uap
->guardflags
& GUARD_REQUIRED
) != GUARD_REQUIRED
) ||
327 ((uap
->guardflags
& ~GUARD_ALL
) != 0)) {
332 struct gfp_crarg crarg
= {
333 .gca_attrs
= uap
->guardflags
336 if ((error
= copyin(uap
->guard
,
337 &(crarg
.gca_guard
), sizeof(crarg
.gca_guard
))) != 0) {
342 * Disallow certain guard values -- is zero enough?
344 if (crarg
.gca_guard
== 0) {
348 struct filedesc
*fdp
= p
->p_fd
;
349 struct vnode_attr va
;
351 vfs_context_t ctx
= vfs_context_current();
355 cmode
= ((uap
->mode
& ~fdp
->fd_cmask
) & ALLPERMS
) & ~S_ISTXT
;
356 VATTR_SET(&va
, va_mode
, cmode
& ACCESSPERMS
);
358 NDINIT(&nd
, LOOKUP
, OP_OPEN
, FOLLOW
| AUDITVNPATH1
, UIO_USERSPACE
,
362 * Initialize the extra fields in vnode_attr to pass down dataprotection
364 * 1. target cprotect class.
365 * 2. set a flag to mark it as requiring open-raw-encrypted semantics.
367 if (uap
->flags
& O_CREAT
) {
368 VATTR_SET(&va
, va_dataprotect_class
, uap
->dpclass
);
371 if (uap
->dpflags
& (O_DP_GETRAWENCRYPTED
| O_DP_GETRAWUNENCRYPTED
)) {
372 if (uap
->flags
& (O_RDWR
| O_WRONLY
)) {
373 /* Not allowed to write raw encrypted bytes */
376 if (uap
->dpflags
& O_DP_GETRAWENCRYPTED
) {
377 VATTR_SET(&va
, va_dataprotect_flags
, VA_DP_RAWENCRYPTED
);
379 if (uap
->dpflags
& O_DP_GETRAWUNENCRYPTED
) {
380 VATTR_SET(&va
, va_dataprotect_flags
, VA_DP_RAWUNENCRYPTED
);
384 return open1(ctx
, &nd
, uap
->flags
| O_CLOFORK
, &va
,
385 guarded_fileproc_alloc_init
, &crarg
, retval
);
389 * int guarded_kqueue_np(const guardid_t *guard, u_int guardflags);
391 * Create a guarded kqueue descriptor with guardid and guardflags.
393 * Same restrictions on guardflags as for guarded_open_np().
394 * All kqueues are -always- close-on-exec and close-on-fork by themselves
395 * and are not sendable.
398 guarded_kqueue_np(proc_t p
, struct guarded_kqueue_np_args
*uap
, int32_t *retval
)
400 if (((uap
->guardflags
& GUARD_REQUIRED
) != GUARD_REQUIRED
) ||
401 ((uap
->guardflags
& ~GUARD_ALL
) != 0)) {
406 struct gfp_crarg crarg
= {
407 .gca_attrs
= uap
->guardflags
410 if ((error
= copyin(uap
->guard
,
411 &(crarg
.gca_guard
), sizeof(crarg
.gca_guard
))) != 0) {
415 if (crarg
.gca_guard
== 0) {
419 return kqueue_internal(p
, guarded_fileproc_alloc_init
, &crarg
, retval
);
423 * int guarded_close_np(int fd, const guardid_t *guard);
426 guarded_close_np(proc_t p
, struct guarded_close_np_args
*uap
,
427 __unused
int32_t *retval
)
429 struct guarded_fileproc
*gfp
;
434 AUDIT_SYSCLOSE(p
, fd
);
436 if ((error
= copyin(uap
->guard
, &uguard
, sizeof(uguard
))) != 0) {
441 if ((error
= fp_lookup_guarded(p
, fd
, uguard
, &gfp
, 1)) != 0) {
445 fp_drop(p
, fd
, GFP_TO_FP(gfp
), 1);
446 return fp_close_and_unlock(p
, fd
, GFP_TO_FP(gfp
), 0);
451 * change_fdguard_np(int fd, const guardid_t *guard, u_int guardflags,
452 * const guardid_t *nguard, u_int nguardflags, int *fdflagsp);
454 * Given a file descriptor, atomically exchange <guard, guardflags> for
455 * a new guard <nguard, nguardflags>, returning the previous fd
456 * flags (see fcntl:F_SETFD) in *fdflagsp.
458 * This syscall can be used to either (a) add a new guard to an existing
459 * unguarded file descriptor (b) remove the old guard from an existing
460 * guarded file descriptor or (c) change the guard (guardid and/or
461 * guardflags) on a guarded file descriptor.
463 * If 'guard' is NULL, fd must be unguarded at entry. If the call completes
464 * successfully the fd will be guarded with <nguard, nguardflags>.
466 * Guarding a file descriptor has some side-effects on the "fdflags"
467 * associated with the descriptor - in particular FD_CLOEXEC is
468 * forced ON unconditionally, and FD_CLOFORK is forced ON by GUARD_CLOSE.
469 * Callers who wish to subsequently restore the state of the fd should save
470 * the value of *fdflagsp after a successful invocation.
472 * If 'nguard' is NULL, fd must be guarded at entry, <guard, guardflags>
473 * must match with what's already guarding the descriptor, and the
474 * result will be to completely remove the guard. Note also that the
475 * fdflags are copied to the descriptor from the incoming *fdflagsp argument.
477 * If the descriptor is guarded, and neither 'guard' nor 'nguard' is NULL
478 * and <guard, guardflags> matches what's already guarding the descriptor,
479 * then <nguard, nguardflags> becomes the new guard. In this case, even if
480 * the GUARD_CLOSE flag is being cleared, it is still possible to continue
481 * to keep FD_CLOFORK on the descriptor by passing FD_CLOFORK via fdflagsp.
483 * (File descriptors whose underlying fileglobs are marked FG_CONFINED are
484 * still close-on-fork, regardless of the setting of FD_CLOFORK.)
486 * Example 1: Guard an unguarded descriptor during a set of operations,
487 * then restore the original state of the descriptor.
490 * change_fdguard_np(fd, NULL, 0, &myguard, GUARD_CLOSE, &sav_flags);
491 * // do things with now guarded 'fd'
492 * change_fdguard_np(fd, &myguard, GUARD_CLOSE, NULL, 0, &sav_flags);
493 * // fd now unguarded.
495 * Example 2: Change the guard of a guarded descriptor during a set of
496 * operations, then restore the original state of the descriptor.
498 * int sav_flags = (gdflags & GUARD_CLOSE) ? FD_CLOFORK : 0;
499 * change_fdguard_np(fd, &gd, gdflags, &myguard, GUARD_CLOSE, &sav_flags);
500 * // do things with 'fd' with a different guard
501 * change_fdguard_np(fd, &myg, GUARD_CLOSE, &gd, gdflags, &sav_flags);
502 * // back to original guarded state
504 * XXX This SPI is too much of a chainsaw and should be revised.
508 change_fdguard_np(proc_t p
, struct change_fdguard_np_args
*uap
,
509 __unused
int32_t *retval
)
514 guardid_t oldg
= 0, newg
= 0;
517 if (0 != uap
->guard
&&
518 0 != (error
= copyin(uap
->guard
, &oldg
, sizeof(oldg
)))) {
519 return error
; /* can't copyin current guard */
521 if (0 != uap
->nguard
&&
522 0 != (error
= copyin(uap
->nguard
, &newg
, sizeof(newg
)))) {
523 return error
; /* can't copyin new guard */
525 if (0 != uap
->fdflagsp
&&
526 0 != (error
= copyin(uap
->fdflagsp
, &nfdflags
, sizeof(nfdflags
)))) {
527 return error
; /* can't copyin new fdflags */
531 if ((error
= fp_lookup(p
, fd
, &fp
, 1)) != 0) {
536 if (0 != uap
->fdflagsp
) {
537 int ofdflags
= FDFLAGS_GET(p
, fd
);
538 int ofl
= ((ofdflags
& UF_EXCLOSE
) ? FD_CLOEXEC
: 0) |
539 ((ofdflags
& UF_FORKCLOSE
) ? FD_CLOFORK
: 0);
541 if (0 != (error
= copyout(&ofl
, uap
->fdflagsp
, sizeof(ofl
)))) {
543 goto dropout
; /* can't copyout old fdflags */
548 if (FILEPROC_TYPE(fp
) == FTYPE_GUARDED
) {
549 if (0 == uap
->guard
|| 0 == uap
->guardflags
) {
550 error
= EINVAL
; /* missing guard! */
551 } else if (0 == oldg
) {
552 error
= EPERM
; /* guardids cannot be zero */
555 if (0 != uap
->guard
|| 0 != uap
->guardflags
) {
556 error
= EINVAL
; /* guard provided, but none needed! */
564 if (0 != uap
->nguard
) {
566 * There's a new guard in town.
569 error
= EINVAL
; /* guards cannot contain zero */
570 } else if (((uap
->nguardflags
& GUARD_REQUIRED
) != GUARD_REQUIRED
) ||
571 ((uap
->nguardflags
& ~GUARD_ALL
) != 0)) {
572 error
= EINVAL
; /* must have valid attributes too */
578 if (FILEPROC_TYPE(fp
) == FTYPE_GUARDED
) {
580 * Replace old guard with new guard
582 struct guarded_fileproc
*gfp
= FP_TO_GFP(fp
);
584 if (GUARDED_FILEPROC_MAGIC
!= gfp
->gf_magic
) {
585 panic("%s: corrupt gfp %p flags %x",
586 __func__
, gfp
, fp
->fp_flags
);
589 if (oldg
== gfp
->gf_guard
&&
590 uap
->guardflags
== gfp
->gf_attrs
) {
592 * Must match existing guard + attributes
593 * before we'll swap them to new ones, managing
594 * fdflags "side-effects" as we go. Note that
595 * userland can request FD_CLOFORK semantics.
597 if (gfp
->gf_attrs
& GUARD_CLOSE
) {
598 FDFLAGS_CLR(p
, fd
, UF_FORKCLOSE
);
600 gfp
->gf_guard
= newg
;
601 gfp
->gf_attrs
= uap
->nguardflags
;
602 if (gfp
->gf_attrs
& GUARD_CLOSE
) {
603 FDFLAGS_SET(p
, fd
, UF_FORKCLOSE
);
606 (nfdflags
& FD_CLOFORK
) ? UF_FORKCLOSE
: 0);
607 /* FG_CONFINED enforced regardless */
614 * Add a guard to a previously unguarded descriptor
616 switch (FILEGLOB_DTYPE(fp
->fp_glob
)) {
621 case DTYPE_NETPOLICY
:
630 struct gfp_crarg crarg
= {
632 .gca_attrs
= uap
->nguardflags
634 struct fileproc
*nfp
=
635 guarded_fileproc_alloc_init(&crarg
);
636 struct guarded_fileproc
*gfp
;
640 switch (error
= fp_tryswap(p
, fd
, nfp
)) {
641 case 0: /* success; guarded-ness comes with side-effects */
643 gfp
= FP_TO_GFP(nfp
);
644 if (gfp
->gf_attrs
& GUARD_CLOSE
) {
645 FDFLAGS_SET(p
, fd
, UF_FORKCLOSE
);
647 FDFLAGS_SET(p
, fd
, UF_EXCLOSE
);
648 (void) fp_drop(p
, fd
, nfp
, 1);
650 case EKEEPLOOKING
: /* fp_iocount indicates a collision */
651 (void) fp_drop(p
, fd
, fp
, 1);
655 (void) fp_drop(p
, fd
, fp
, 1);
666 if (FILEPROC_TYPE(fp
) == FTYPE_GUARDED
) {
668 * Remove the guard altogether.
670 struct guarded_fileproc
*gfp
= FP_TO_GFP(fp
);
672 if (0 != uap
->nguardflags
) {
677 if (GUARDED_FILEPROC_MAGIC
!= gfp
->gf_magic
) {
678 panic("%s: corrupt gfp %p flags %x",
679 __func__
, gfp
, fp
->fp_flags
);
682 if (oldg
!= gfp
->gf_guard
||
683 uap
->guardflags
!= gfp
->gf_attrs
) {
689 struct fileproc
*nfp
= fileproc_alloc_init(NULL
);
692 switch (error
= fp_tryswap(p
, fd
, nfp
)) {
693 case 0: /* success; undo side-effects of guarded-ness */
695 FDFLAGS_CLR(p
, fd
, UF_FORKCLOSE
| UF_EXCLOSE
);
697 (nfdflags
& FD_CLOFORK
) ? UF_FORKCLOSE
: 0);
698 /* FG_CONFINED enforced regardless */
700 (nfdflags
& FD_CLOEXEC
) ? UF_EXCLOSE
: 0);
701 (void) fp_drop(p
, fd
, nfp
, 1);
703 case EKEEPLOOKING
: /* fp_iocount indicates collision */
704 (void) fp_drop(p
, fd
, fp
, 1);
708 (void) fp_drop(p
, fd
, fp
, 1);
716 * Not already guarded, and no new guard?
723 (void) fp_drop(p
, fd
, fp
, 1);
729 * user_ssize_t guarded_write_np(int fd, const guardid_t *guard,
730 * user_addr_t cbuf, user_ssize_t nbyte);
732 * Initial implementation of guarded writes.
735 guarded_write_np(struct proc
*p
, struct guarded_write_np_args
*uap
, user_ssize_t
*retval
)
741 struct guarded_fileproc
*gfp
;
745 if ((error
= copyin(uap
->guard
, &uguard
, sizeof(uguard
))) != 0) {
749 error
= fp_lookup_guarded(p
, fd
, uguard
, &gfp
, 0);
755 if ((fp
->f_flag
& FWRITE
) == 0) {
758 struct vfs_context context
= *(vfs_context_current());
759 context
.vc_ucred
= fp
->fp_glob
->fg_cred
;
761 error
= dofilewrite(&context
, fp
, uap
->cbuf
, uap
->nbyte
,
762 (off_t
)-1, 0, retval
);
765 fp_drop(p
, fd
, fp
, 0);
771 * user_ssize_t guarded_pwrite_np(int fd, const guardid_t *guard,
772 * user_addr_t buf, user_size_t nbyte, off_t offset);
774 * Initial implementation of guarded pwrites.
777 guarded_pwrite_np(struct proc
*p
, struct guarded_pwrite_np_args
*uap
, user_ssize_t
*retval
)
782 vnode_t vp
= (vnode_t
)0;
784 struct guarded_fileproc
*gfp
;
788 if ((error
= copyin(uap
->guard
, &uguard
, sizeof(uguard
))) != 0) {
792 error
= fp_lookup_guarded(p
, fd
, uguard
, &gfp
, 0);
798 if ((fp
->f_flag
& FWRITE
) == 0) {
801 struct vfs_context context
= *vfs_context_current();
802 context
.vc_ucred
= fp
->fp_glob
->fg_cred
;
804 if (FILEGLOB_DTYPE(fp
->fp_glob
) != DTYPE_VNODE
) {
808 vp
= (vnode_t
)fp
->fp_glob
->fg_data
;
809 if (vnode_isfifo(vp
)) {
813 if ((vp
->v_flag
& VISTTY
)) {
817 if (uap
->offset
== (off_t
)-1) {
822 error
= dofilewrite(&context
, fp
, uap
->buf
, uap
->nbyte
,
823 uap
->offset
, FOF_OFFSET
, retval
);
826 fp_drop(p
, fd
, fp
, 0);
828 KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT((BSDDBG_CODE(DBG_BSD_SC_EXTENDED_INFO
, SYS_guarded_pwrite_np
) | DBG_FUNC_NONE
),
829 uap
->fd
, uap
->nbyte
, (unsigned int)((uap
->offset
>> 32)), (unsigned int)(uap
->offset
), 0);
835 * user_ssize_t guarded_writev_np(int fd, const guardid_t *guard,
836 * struct iovec *iovp, u_int iovcnt);
838 * Initial implementation of guarded writev.
842 guarded_writev_np(struct proc
*p
, struct guarded_writev_np_args
*uap
, user_ssize_t
*retval
)
847 struct user_iovec
*iovp
;
849 struct guarded_fileproc
*gfp
;
851 AUDIT_ARG(fd
, uap
->fd
);
853 /* Verify range bedfore calling uio_create() */
854 if (uap
->iovcnt
<= 0 || uap
->iovcnt
> UIO_MAXIOV
) {
858 /* allocate a uio large enough to hold the number of iovecs passed */
859 auio
= uio_create(uap
->iovcnt
, 0,
860 (IS_64BIT_PROCESS(p
) ? UIO_USERSPACE64
: UIO_USERSPACE32
),
863 /* get location of iovecs within the uio. then copyin the iovecs from
866 iovp
= uio_iovsaddr(auio
);
869 goto ExitThisRoutine
;
871 error
= copyin_user_iovec_array(uap
->iovp
,
872 IS_64BIT_PROCESS(p
) ? UIO_USERSPACE64
: UIO_USERSPACE32
,
875 goto ExitThisRoutine
;
878 /* finalize uio_t for use and do the IO
880 error
= uio_calculateresid(auio
);
882 goto ExitThisRoutine
;
885 if ((error
= copyin(uap
->guard
, &uguard
, sizeof(uguard
))) != 0) {
886 goto ExitThisRoutine
;
889 error
= fp_lookup_guarded(p
, uap
->fd
, uguard
, &gfp
, 0);
891 goto ExitThisRoutine
;
895 if ((fp
->f_flag
& FWRITE
) == 0) {
898 error
= do_uiowrite(p
, fp
, auio
, 0, retval
);
901 fp_drop(p
, uap
->fd
, fp
, 0);
910 * int falloc_guarded(struct proc *p, struct fileproc **fp, int *fd,
911 * vfs_context_t ctx, const guardid_t *guard, u_int attrs);
913 * This SPI is the guarded variant of falloc(). It borrows the same
914 * restrictions as those used by the rest of the guarded_* routines.
917 falloc_guarded(struct proc
*p
, struct fileproc
**fp
, int *fd
,
918 vfs_context_t ctx
, const guardid_t
*guard
, u_int attrs
)
920 struct gfp_crarg crarg
;
922 if (((attrs
& GUARD_REQUIRED
) != GUARD_REQUIRED
) ||
923 ((attrs
& ~GUARD_ALL
) != 0) || (*guard
== 0)) {
927 bzero(&crarg
, sizeof(crarg
));
928 crarg
.gca_guard
= *guard
;
929 crarg
.gca_attrs
= attrs
;
931 return falloc_withalloc(p
, fp
, fd
, ctx
, guarded_fileproc_alloc_init
,
935 #if CONFIG_MACF && CONFIG_VNGUARD
940 * Uses MAC hooks to guard operations on vnodes in the system. Given an fd,
941 * add data to the label on the fileglob and the vnode it points at.
942 * The data contains a pointer to the fileglob, the set of attributes to
943 * guard, a guard value for uniquification, and the pid of the process
944 * who set the guard up in the first place.
946 * The fd must have been opened read/write, and the underlying
947 * fileglob is FG_CONFINED so that there's no ambiguity about the
950 * When there's a callback for a vnode operation of interest (rename, unlink,
951 * etc.) check to see if the guard permits that operation, and if not
952 * take an action e.g. log a message or generate a crash report.
954 * The label is removed from the vnode and the fileglob when the fileglob
957 * The initial action to be taken can be specified by a boot arg (vnguard=0x42)
958 * and change via the "kern.vnguard.flags" sysctl.
963 struct vng_info
{ /* lives on the vnode label */
966 TAILQ_HEAD(, vng_owner
) vgi_owners
;
969 struct vng_owner
{ /* lives on the fileglob label */
971 struct fileglob
*vgo_fg
;
972 struct vng_info
*vgo_vgi
;
973 TAILQ_ENTRY(vng_owner
) vgo_link
;
976 static struct vng_info
*
977 new_vgi(unsigned attrs
, guardid_t guard
)
979 struct vng_info
*vgi
= kalloc(sizeof(*vgi
));
980 vgi
->vgi_guard
= guard
;
981 vgi
->vgi_attrs
= attrs
;
982 TAILQ_INIT(&vgi
->vgi_owners
);
986 static struct vng_owner
*
987 new_vgo(proc_t p
, struct fileglob
*fg
)
989 struct vng_owner
*vgo
= kalloc(sizeof(*vgo
));
990 memset(vgo
, 0, sizeof(*vgo
));
997 vgi_add_vgo(struct vng_info
*vgi
, struct vng_owner
*vgo
)
1000 TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(&vgi
->vgi_owners
, vgo
, vgo_link
);
1004 vgi_remove_vgo(struct vng_info
*vgi
, struct vng_owner
*vgo
)
1006 TAILQ_REMOVE(&vgi
->vgi_owners
, vgo
, vgo_link
);
1007 vgo
->vgo_vgi
= NULL
;
1008 return TAILQ_EMPTY(&vgi
->vgi_owners
);
1012 free_vgi(struct vng_info
*vgi
)
1014 assert(TAILQ_EMPTY(&vgi
->vgi_owners
));
1015 #if DEVELOP || DEBUG
1016 memset(vgi
, 0xbeadfade, sizeof(*vgi
));
1018 kfree(vgi
, sizeof(*vgi
));
1022 free_vgo(struct vng_owner
*vgo
)
1024 #if DEVELOP || DEBUG
1025 memset(vgo
, 0x2bedf1d0, sizeof(*vgo
));
1027 kfree(vgo
, sizeof(*vgo
));
1030 static int label_slot
;
1031 static lck_rw_t llock
;
1032 static lck_grp_t
*llock_grp
;
1034 static __inline
void *
1035 vng_lbl_get(struct label
*label
)
1037 lck_rw_assert(&llock
, LCK_RW_ASSERT_HELD
);
1039 if (NULL
== label
) {
1042 data
= (void *)mac_label_get(label
, label_slot
);
1047 static __inline
struct vng_info
*
1048 vng_lbl_get_withattr(struct label
*label
, unsigned attrmask
)
1050 struct vng_info
*vgi
= vng_lbl_get(label
);
1051 assert(NULL
== vgi
|| (vgi
->vgi_attrs
& ~VNG_ALL
) == 0);
1052 if (NULL
!= vgi
&& 0 == (vgi
->vgi_attrs
& attrmask
)) {
1058 static __inline
void
1059 vng_lbl_set(struct label
*label
, void *data
)
1061 assert(NULL
!= label
);
1062 lck_rw_assert(&llock
, LCK_RW_ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE
);
1063 mac_label_set(label
, label_slot
, (intptr_t)data
);
1067 vnguard_sysc_getguardattr(proc_t p
, struct vnguard_getattr
*vga
)
1069 const int fd
= vga
->vga_fd
;
1071 if (0 == vga
->vga_guard
) {
1076 struct fileproc
*fp
;
1077 if (0 != (error
= fp_lookup(p
, fd
, &fp
, 0))) {
1081 struct fileglob
*fg
= fp
->fp_glob
;
1082 if (FILEGLOB_DTYPE(fg
) != DTYPE_VNODE
) {
1086 struct vnode
*vp
= fg
->fg_data
;
1087 if (!vnode_isreg(vp
) || NULL
== vp
->v_mount
) {
1091 error
= vnode_getwithref(vp
);
1098 lck_rw_lock_shared(&llock
);
1100 if (NULL
!= vp
->v_label
) {
1101 const struct vng_info
*vgi
= vng_lbl_get(vp
->v_label
);
1103 if (vgi
->vgi_guard
!= vga
->vga_guard
) {
1106 vga
->vga_attrs
= vgi
->vgi_attrs
;
1111 lck_rw_unlock_shared(&llock
);
1115 fp_drop(p
, fd
, fp
, 0);
1120 vnguard_sysc_setguard(proc_t p
, const struct vnguard_set
*vns
)
1122 const int fd
= vns
->vns_fd
;
1124 if ((vns
->vns_attrs
& ~VNG_ALL
) != 0 ||
1125 0 == vns
->vns_attrs
|| 0 == vns
->vns_guard
) {
1130 struct fileproc
*fp
;
1131 if (0 != (error
= fp_lookup(p
, fd
, &fp
, 0))) {
1136 * To avoid trivial DoS, insist that the caller
1137 * has read/write access to the file.
1139 if ((FREAD
| FWRITE
) != (fp
->f_flag
& (FREAD
| FWRITE
))) {
1143 struct fileglob
*fg
= fp
->fp_glob
;
1144 if (FILEGLOB_DTYPE(fg
) != DTYPE_VNODE
) {
1149 * Confinement means there's only one fd pointing at
1150 * this fileglob, and will always be associated with
1153 if (0 == (FG_CONFINED
& fg
->fg_lflags
)) {
1157 struct vnode
*vp
= fg
->fg_data
;
1158 if (!vnode_isreg(vp
) || NULL
== vp
->v_mount
) {
1162 error
= vnode_getwithref(vp
);
1167 /* Ensure the target vnode -has- a label */
1168 struct vfs_context
*ctx
= vfs_context_current();
1169 mac_vnode_label_update(ctx
, vp
, NULL
);
1171 struct vng_info
*nvgi
= new_vgi(vns
->vns_attrs
, vns
->vns_guard
);
1172 struct vng_owner
*nvgo
= new_vgo(p
, fg
);
1174 lck_rw_lock_exclusive(&llock
);
1178 * A vnode guard is associated with one or more
1179 * fileglobs in one or more processes.
1181 struct vng_info
*vgi
= vng_lbl_get(vp
->v_label
);
1182 struct vng_owner
*vgo
= vng_lbl_get(fg
->fg_label
);
1185 /* vnode unguarded, add the first guard */
1187 panic("vnguard label on fileglob "
1190 /* add a kusecount so we can unlabel later */
1191 error
= vnode_ref_ext(vp
, O_EVTONLY
, 0);
1194 vgi_add_vgo(nvgi
, nvgo
);
1195 vng_lbl_set(vp
->v_label
, nvgi
);
1196 vng_lbl_set(fg
->fg_label
, nvgo
);
1202 /* vnode already guarded */
1204 if (vgi
->vgi_guard
!= vns
->vns_guard
) {
1205 error
= EPERM
; /* guard mismatch */
1206 } else if (vgi
->vgi_attrs
!= vns
->vns_attrs
) {
1208 * Temporary workaround for older versions of SQLite:
1209 * allow newer guard attributes to be silently cleared.
1211 const unsigned mask
= ~(VNG_WRITE_OTHER
| VNG_TRUNC_OTHER
);
1212 if ((vgi
->vgi_attrs
& mask
) == (vns
->vns_attrs
& mask
)) {
1213 vgi
->vgi_attrs
&= vns
->vns_attrs
;
1215 error
= EACCES
; /* attr mismatch */
1218 if (0 != error
|| NULL
!= vgo
) {
1222 /* record shared ownership */
1223 vgi_add_vgo(vgi
, nvgo
);
1224 vng_lbl_set(fg
->fg_label
, nvgo
);
1228 lck_rw_unlock_exclusive(&llock
);
1232 fp_drop(p
, fd
, fp
, 0);
1237 vng_policy_syscall(proc_t p
, int cmd
, user_addr_t arg
)
1247 case VNG_SYSC_SET_GUARD
: {
1248 struct vnguard_set vns
;
1249 error
= copyin(arg
, (void *)&vns
, sizeof(vns
));
1253 error
= vnguard_sysc_setguard(p
, &vns
);
1256 case VNG_SYSC_GET_ATTR
: {
1257 struct vnguard_getattr vga
;
1258 error
= copyin(arg
, (void *)&vga
, sizeof(vga
));
1262 error
= vnguard_sysc_getguardattr(p
, &vga
);
1266 error
= copyout((void *)&vga
, arg
, sizeof(vga
));
1276 * This is called just before the fileglob disappears in fg_free().
1277 * Take the exclusive lock: no other thread can add or remove
1278 * a vng_info to any vnode in the system.
1281 vng_file_label_destroy(struct label
*label
)
1283 lck_rw_lock_exclusive(&llock
);
1284 struct vng_owner
*lvgo
= vng_lbl_get(label
);
1286 vng_lbl_set(label
, 0);
1287 struct vng_info
*vgi
= lvgo
->vgo_vgi
;
1289 if (vgi_remove_vgo(vgi
, lvgo
)) {
1290 /* that was the last reference */
1292 struct fileglob
*fg
= lvgo
->vgo_fg
;
1294 if (DTYPE_VNODE
== FILEGLOB_DTYPE(fg
)) {
1295 struct vnode
*vp
= fg
->fg_data
;
1296 int error
= vnode_getwithref(vp
);
1298 vng_lbl_set(vp
->v_label
, 0);
1299 lck_rw_unlock_exclusive(&llock
);
1300 /* may trigger VNOP_INACTIVE */
1301 vnode_rele_ext(vp
, O_EVTONLY
, 0);
1311 lck_rw_unlock_exclusive(&llock
);
1315 vng_reason_from_pathname(const char *path
, uint32_t pathlen
)
1317 os_reason_t r
= os_reason_create(OS_REASON_GUARD
, GUARD_REASON_VNODE
);
1322 * If the pathname is very long, just keep the trailing part
1324 const uint32_t pathmax
= 3 * EXIT_REASON_USER_DESC_MAX_LEN
/ 4;
1325 if (pathlen
> pathmax
) {
1326 path
+= (pathlen
- pathmax
);
1329 uint32_t rsize
= kcdata_estimate_required_buffer_size(1, pathlen
);
1330 if (0 == os_reason_alloc_buffer(r
, rsize
)) {
1331 struct kcdata_descriptor
*kcd
= &r
->osr_kcd_descriptor
;
1332 mach_vm_address_t addr
;
1333 if (kcdata_get_memory_addr(kcd
,
1334 EXIT_REASON_USER_DESC
, pathlen
, &addr
) == KERN_SUCCESS
) {
1335 kcdata_memcpy(kcd
, addr
, path
, pathlen
);
1340 return OS_REASON_NULL
;
1343 static int vng_policy_flags
;
1346 * Note: if an EXC_GUARD is generated, llock will be dropped and
1347 * subsequently reacquired by this routine. Data derived from
1348 * any label in the caller should be regenerated.
1351 vng_guard_violation(const struct vng_info
*vgi
,
1352 unsigned opval
, vnode_t vp
)
1356 if (vng_policy_flags
& kVNG_POLICY_EPERM
) {
1357 /* deny the operation */
1361 if (vng_policy_flags
& (kVNG_POLICY_LOGMSG
| kVNG_POLICY_UPRINTMSG
)) {
1365 case VNG_RENAME_FROM
:
1380 case VNG_WRITE_OTHER
:
1383 case VNG_TRUNC_OTHER
:
1391 const char *nm
= vnode_getname(vp
);
1392 proc_t p
= current_proc();
1393 const struct vng_owner
*vgo
;
1394 TAILQ_FOREACH(vgo
, &vgi
->vgi_owners
, vgo_link
) {
1396 "%s[%d]: %s%s: '%s' guarded by %s[%d] (0x%llx)\n";
1398 if (vng_policy_flags
& kVNG_POLICY_LOGMSG
) {
1400 proc_name_address(p
), proc_pid(p
), op
,
1401 0 != retval
? " denied" : "",
1402 NULL
!= nm
? nm
: "(unknown)",
1403 proc_name_address(vgo
->vgo_p
),
1404 proc_pid(vgo
->vgo_p
), vgi
->vgi_guard
);
1406 if (vng_policy_flags
& kVNG_POLICY_UPRINTMSG
) {
1408 proc_name_address(p
), proc_pid(p
), op
,
1409 0 != retval
? " denied" : "",
1410 NULL
!= nm
? nm
: "(unknown)",
1411 proc_name_address(vgo
->vgo_p
),
1412 proc_pid(vgo
->vgo_p
), vgi
->vgi_guard
);
1420 if (vng_policy_flags
& (kVNG_POLICY_EXC
| kVNG_POLICY_EXC_CORPSE
)) {
1421 /* EXC_GUARD exception */
1422 const struct vng_owner
*vgo
= TAILQ_FIRST(&vgi
->vgi_owners
);
1423 pid_t pid
= vgo
? proc_pid(vgo
->vgo_p
) : 0;
1424 mach_exception_code_t code
;
1425 mach_exception_subcode_t subcode
;
1428 EXC_GUARD_ENCODE_TYPE(code
, GUARD_TYPE_VN
);
1429 EXC_GUARD_ENCODE_FLAVOR(code
, opval
);
1430 EXC_GUARD_ENCODE_TARGET(code
, pid
);
1431 subcode
= vgi
->vgi_guard
;
1433 lck_rw_unlock_shared(&llock
);
1435 if (vng_policy_flags
& kVNG_POLICY_EXC_CORPSE
) {
1437 int len
= MAXPATHLEN
;
1438 MALLOC(path
, char *, len
, M_TEMP
, M_WAITOK
);
1439 os_reason_t r
= NULL
;
1441 vn_getpath(vp
, path
, &len
);
1443 r
= vng_reason_from_pathname(path
, len
);
1446 task_violated_guard(code
, subcode
, r
); /* not fatal */
1454 thread_t t
= current_thread();
1455 thread_guard_violation(t
, code
, subcode
, TRUE
);
1458 lck_rw_lock_shared(&llock
);
1459 } else if (vng_policy_flags
& kVNG_POLICY_SIGKILL
) {
1460 proc_t p
= current_proc();
1461 psignal(p
, SIGKILL
);
1468 * A fatal vnode guard was tripped on this thread.
1470 * (Invoked before returning to userland from the syscall handler.)
1473 vn_guard_ast(thread_t __unused t
,
1474 mach_exception_data_type_t code
, mach_exception_data_type_t subcode
)
1476 task_exception_notify(EXC_GUARD
, code
, subcode
);
1477 proc_t p
= current_proc();
1478 psignal(p
, SIGKILL
);
1486 vng_vnode_check_rename(kauth_cred_t __unused cred
,
1487 struct vnode
*__unused dvp
, struct label
*__unused dlabel
,
1488 struct vnode
*vp
, struct label
*label
,
1489 struct componentname
*__unused cnp
,
1490 struct vnode
*__unused tdvp
, struct label
*__unused tdlabel
,
1491 struct vnode
*tvp
, struct label
*tlabel
,
1492 struct componentname
*__unused tcnp
)
1495 if (NULL
!= label
|| NULL
!= tlabel
) {
1496 lck_rw_lock_shared(&llock
);
1497 const struct vng_info
*vgi
=
1498 vng_lbl_get_withattr(label
, VNG_RENAME_FROM
);
1500 error
= vng_guard_violation(vgi
, VNG_RENAME_FROM
, vp
);
1503 vgi
= vng_lbl_get_withattr(tlabel
, VNG_RENAME_TO
);
1505 error
= vng_guard_violation(vgi
,
1506 VNG_RENAME_TO
, tvp
);
1509 lck_rw_unlock_shared(&llock
);
1515 vng_vnode_check_link(kauth_cred_t __unused cred
,
1516 struct vnode
*__unused dvp
, struct label
*__unused dlabel
,
1517 struct vnode
*vp
, struct label
*label
, struct componentname
*__unused cnp
)
1520 if (NULL
!= label
) {
1521 lck_rw_lock_shared(&llock
);
1522 const struct vng_info
*vgi
=
1523 vng_lbl_get_withattr(label
, VNG_LINK
);
1525 error
= vng_guard_violation(vgi
, VNG_LINK
, vp
);
1527 lck_rw_unlock_shared(&llock
);
1533 vng_vnode_check_unlink(kauth_cred_t __unused cred
,
1534 struct vnode
*__unused dvp
, struct label
*__unused dlabel
,
1535 struct vnode
*vp
, struct label
*label
, struct componentname
*__unused cnp
)
1538 if (NULL
!= label
) {
1539 lck_rw_lock_shared(&llock
);
1540 const struct vng_info
*vgi
=
1541 vng_lbl_get_withattr(label
, VNG_UNLINK
);
1543 error
= vng_guard_violation(vgi
, VNG_UNLINK
, vp
);
1545 lck_rw_unlock_shared(&llock
);
1551 * Only check violations for writes performed by "other processes"
1554 vng_vnode_check_write(kauth_cred_t __unused actv_cred
,
1555 kauth_cred_t __unused file_cred
, struct vnode
*vp
, struct label
*label
)
1558 if (NULL
!= label
) {
1559 lck_rw_lock_shared(&llock
);
1560 const struct vng_info
*vgi
=
1561 vng_lbl_get_withattr(label
, VNG_WRITE_OTHER
);
1563 proc_t p
= current_proc();
1564 const struct vng_owner
*vgo
;
1565 TAILQ_FOREACH(vgo
, &vgi
->vgi_owners
, vgo_link
) {
1566 if (vgo
->vgo_p
== p
) {
1570 error
= vng_guard_violation(vgi
, VNG_WRITE_OTHER
, vp
);
1573 lck_rw_unlock_shared(&llock
);
1579 * Only check violations for truncates performed by "other processes"
1582 vng_vnode_check_truncate(kauth_cred_t __unused actv_cred
,
1583 kauth_cred_t __unused file_cred
, struct vnode
*vp
,
1584 struct label
*label
)
1587 if (NULL
!= label
) {
1588 lck_rw_lock_shared(&llock
);
1589 const struct vng_info
*vgi
=
1590 vng_lbl_get_withattr(label
, VNG_TRUNC_OTHER
);
1592 proc_t p
= current_proc();
1593 const struct vng_owner
*vgo
;
1594 TAILQ_FOREACH(vgo
, &vgi
->vgi_owners
, vgo_link
) {
1595 if (vgo
->vgo_p
== p
) {
1599 error
= vng_guard_violation(vgi
, VNG_TRUNC_OTHER
, vp
);
1602 lck_rw_unlock_shared(&llock
);
1608 vng_vnode_check_exchangedata(kauth_cred_t __unused cred
,
1609 struct vnode
*fvp
, struct label
*flabel
,
1610 struct vnode
*svp
, struct label
*slabel
)
1613 if (NULL
!= flabel
|| NULL
!= slabel
) {
1614 lck_rw_lock_shared(&llock
);
1615 const struct vng_info
*vgi
=
1616 vng_lbl_get_withattr(flabel
, VNG_EXCHDATA
);
1618 error
= vng_guard_violation(vgi
, VNG_EXCHDATA
, fvp
);
1621 vgi
= vng_lbl_get_withattr(slabel
, VNG_EXCHDATA
);
1623 error
= vng_guard_violation(vgi
,
1627 lck_rw_unlock_shared(&llock
);
1632 /* Intercept open-time truncations (by "other") of a guarded vnode */
1635 vng_vnode_check_open(kauth_cred_t cred
,
1636 struct vnode
*vp
, struct label
*label
, int acc_mode
)
1638 if (0 == (acc_mode
& O_TRUNC
)) {
1641 return vng_vnode_check_truncate(cred
, NULL
, vp
, label
);
1645 * Configuration gorp
1649 vng_init(struct mac_policy_conf
*mpc
)
1651 llock_grp
= lck_grp_alloc_init(mpc
->mpc_name
, LCK_GRP_ATTR_NULL
);
1652 lck_rw_init(&llock
, llock_grp
, LCK_ATTR_NULL
);
1655 SECURITY_READ_ONLY_EARLY(static struct mac_policy_ops
) vng_policy_ops
= {
1656 .mpo_file_label_destroy
= vng_file_label_destroy
,
1658 .mpo_vnode_check_link
= vng_vnode_check_link
,
1659 .mpo_vnode_check_unlink
= vng_vnode_check_unlink
,
1660 .mpo_vnode_check_rename
= vng_vnode_check_rename
,
1661 .mpo_vnode_check_write
= vng_vnode_check_write
,
1662 .mpo_vnode_check_truncate
= vng_vnode_check_truncate
,
1663 .mpo_vnode_check_exchangedata
= vng_vnode_check_exchangedata
,
1664 .mpo_vnode_check_open
= vng_vnode_check_open
,
1666 .mpo_policy_syscall
= vng_policy_syscall
,
1667 .mpo_policy_init
= vng_init
,
1670 static const char *vng_labelnames
[] = {
1674 #define ACOUNT(arr) ((unsigned)(sizeof (arr) / sizeof (arr[0])))
1676 SECURITY_READ_ONLY_LATE(static struct mac_policy_conf
) vng_policy_conf
= {
1677 .mpc_name
= VNG_POLICY_NAME
,
1678 .mpc_fullname
= "Guarded vnode policy",
1679 .mpc_field_off
= &label_slot
,
1680 .mpc_labelnames
= vng_labelnames
,
1681 .mpc_labelname_count
= ACOUNT(vng_labelnames
),
1682 .mpc_ops
= &vng_policy_ops
,
1683 .mpc_loadtime_flags
= 0,
1684 .mpc_runtime_flags
= 0
1687 SECURITY_READ_ONLY_LATE(static mac_policy_handle_t
) vng_policy_handle
;
1690 vnguard_policy_init(void)
1692 if (0 == PE_i_can_has_debugger(NULL
)) {
1695 vng_policy_flags
= kVNG_POLICY_LOGMSG
|
1696 kVNG_POLICY_EXC_CORPSE
| kVNG_POLICY_UPRINTMSG
;
1697 PE_parse_boot_argn("vnguard", &vng_policy_flags
, sizeof(vng_policy_flags
));
1698 if (vng_policy_flags
) {
1699 mac_policy_register(&vng_policy_conf
, &vng_policy_handle
, NULL
);
1703 #if DEBUG || DEVELOPMENT
1704 #include <sys/sysctl.h>
1706 SYSCTL_DECL(_kern_vnguard
);
1707 SYSCTL_NODE(_kern
, OID_AUTO
, vnguard
, CTLFLAG_RW
| CTLFLAG_LOCKED
, 0, "vnguard");
1708 SYSCTL_INT(_kern_vnguard
, OID_AUTO
, flags
, CTLFLAG_RW
| CTLFLAG_LOCKED
,
1709 &vng_policy_flags
, 0, "vnguard policy flags");
1712 #endif /* CONFIG_MACF && CONFIG_VNGUARD */