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1 /*
2 * Copyright (c) 2007 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
3 *
4 * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_START@
5 *
6 * This file contains Original Code and/or Modifications of Original Code
7 * as defined in and that are subject to the Apple Public Source License
8 * Version 2.0 (the 'License'). You may not use this file except in
9 * compliance with the License. The rights granted to you under the License
10 * may not be used to create, or enable the creation or redistribution of,
11 * unlawful or unlicensed copies of an Apple operating system, or to
12 * circumvent, violate, or enable the circumvention or violation of, any
13 * terms of an Apple operating system software license agreement.
14 *
15 * Please obtain a copy of the License at
16 * http://www.opensource.apple.com/apsl/ and read it before using this file.
17 *
18 * The Original Code and all software distributed under the License are
19 * distributed on an 'AS IS' basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER
20 * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AND APPLE HEREBY DISCLAIMS ALL SUCH WARRANTIES,
21 * INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
22 * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, QUIET ENJOYMENT OR NON-INFRINGEMENT.
23 * Please see the License for the specific language governing rights and
24 * limitations under the License.
25 *
26 * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_END@
27 */
28 /*-
29 * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Robert N. M. Watson
30 * Copyright (c) 2001 Ilmar S. Habibulin
31 * Copyright (c) 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
32 * Copyright (c) 2005 SPARTA, Inc.
33 *
34 * This software was developed by Robert Watson and Ilmar Habibulin for the
35 * TrustedBSD Project.
36 *
37 * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by Network
38 * Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network
39 * Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"),
40 * as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
41 *
42 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
43 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
44 * are met:
45 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
46 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
47 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
48 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
49 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
50 *
51 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
52 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
53 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
54 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
55 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
56 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
57 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
58 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
59 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
60 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
61 * SUCH DAMAGE.
62 *
63 */
64
65 #include <sys/param.h>
66 #include <sys/systm.h>
67 #include <sys/kernel.h>
68 #include <sys/proc.h>
69 #include <sys/kauth.h>
70
71 #include <sys/file_internal.h>
72 #include <sys/imgact.h>
73 #include <sys/namei.h>
74 #include <sys/mount_internal.h>
75 #include <sys/pipe.h>
76 #include <sys/posix_sem.h>
77 #include <sys/posix_shm.h>
78 #include <sys/uio_internal.h>
79 #include <sys/vnode_internal.h>
80
81 #include <miscfs/devfs/devfsdefs.h>
82 #include <miscfs/devfs/fdesc.h>
83
84 #include <security/mac_internal.h>
85
86 /* convert {R,W,X}_OK values to V{READ,WRITE,EXEC} */
87 #define ACCESS_MODE_TO_VNODE_MASK(m) (m << 6)
88
89 static struct label *
90 mac_devfsdirent_label_alloc(void)
91 {
92 struct label *label;
93
94 label = mac_labelzone_alloc(MAC_WAITOK);
95 if (label == NULL)
96 return (NULL);
97 MAC_PERFORM(devfs_label_init, label);
98 return (label);
99 }
100
101 void
102 mac_devfs_label_init(struct devnode *de)
103 {
104
105 de->dn_label = mac_devfsdirent_label_alloc();
106 }
107
108 static struct label *
109 mac_mount_label_alloc(void)
110 {
111 struct label *label;
112
113 label = mac_labelzone_alloc(MAC_WAITOK);
114 if (label == NULL)
115 return (NULL);
116 MAC_PERFORM(mount_label_init, label);
117 return (label);
118 }
119
120 void
121 mac_mount_label_init(struct mount *mp)
122 {
123
124 mp->mnt_mntlabel = mac_mount_label_alloc();
125 }
126
127 struct label *
128 mac_vnode_label_alloc(void)
129 {
130 struct label *label;
131
132 label = mac_labelzone_alloc(MAC_WAITOK);
133 if (label == NULL)
134 return (NULL);
135 MAC_PERFORM(vnode_label_init, label);
136 return (label);
137 }
138
139 void
140 mac_vnode_label_init(vnode_t vp)
141 {
142 vp->v_label = mac_vnode_label_alloc();
143 }
144
145 int
146 mac_vnode_label_init_needed(vnode_t vp)
147 {
148 return (mac_label_vnodes != 0 && vp->v_label == NULL);
149 }
150
151 /*
152 * vnode labels are allocated at the same time as vnodes, but vnodes are never
153 * freed. Instead, we want to remove any sensitive information before putting
154 * them on the free list for reuse.
155 */
156 void
157 mac_vnode_label_recycle(vnode_t vp)
158 {
159
160 MAC_PERFORM(vnode_label_recycle, vp->v_label);
161 }
162
163 static void
164 mac_devfs_label_free(struct label *label)
165 {
166 MAC_PERFORM(devfs_label_destroy, label);
167 mac_labelzone_free(label);
168 }
169
170 void
171 mac_devfs_label_destroy(struct devnode *de)
172 {
173 if (de->dn_label != NULL) {
174 mac_devfs_label_free(de->dn_label);
175 de->dn_label = NULL;
176 }
177 }
178
179 static void
180 mac_mount_label_free(struct label *label)
181 {
182
183 MAC_PERFORM(mount_label_destroy, label);
184 mac_labelzone_free(label);
185 }
186
187 void
188 mac_mount_label_destroy(struct mount *mp)
189 {
190 if (mp->mnt_mntlabel != NULL) {
191 mac_mount_label_free(mp->mnt_mntlabel);
192 mp->mnt_mntlabel = NULL;
193 }
194 }
195
196 void
197 mac_vnode_label_free(struct label *label)
198 {
199 MAC_PERFORM(vnode_label_destroy, label);
200 mac_labelzone_free(label);
201 }
202
203 #ifndef __APPLE__
204 void
205 mac_vnode_label_destroy(struct vnode *vp)
206 {
207 if (vp->v_label != NULL) {
208 mac_vnode_label_free(vp->v_label);
209 vp->v_label = NULL;
210 }
211 }
212 #endif
213
214 void
215 mac_vnode_label_copy(struct label *src, struct label *dest)
216 {
217 if (src == NULL) {
218 MAC_PERFORM(vnode_label_init, dest);
219 } else {
220 MAC_PERFORM(vnode_label_copy, src, dest);
221 }
222 }
223
224 int
225 mac_vnode_label_externalize_audit(struct vnode *vp, struct mac *mac)
226 {
227 int error;
228
229 /* It is assumed that any necessary vnode locking is done on entry */
230 error = MAC_EXTERNALIZE_AUDIT(vnode, vp->v_label,
231 mac->m_string, mac->m_buflen);
232
233 return (error);
234 }
235
236 int
237 mac_vnode_label_externalize(struct label *label, char *elements,
238 char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen, int flags __unused)
239 {
240 int error;
241
242 error = MAC_EXTERNALIZE(vnode, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen);
243
244 return (error);
245 }
246
247 int
248 mac_vnode_label_internalize(struct label *label, char *string)
249 {
250 int error;
251
252 error = MAC_INTERNALIZE(vnode, label, string);
253
254 return (error);
255 }
256
257 int
258 mac_mount_label_internalize(struct label *label, char *string)
259 {
260 int error;
261
262 error = MAC_INTERNALIZE(mount, label, string);
263
264 return (error);
265 }
266
267 int
268 mac_mount_label_externalize(struct label *label, char *elements,
269 char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen)
270 {
271 int error;
272
273 error = MAC_EXTERNALIZE(mount, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen);
274
275 return (error);
276 }
277
278 void
279 mac_devfs_label_copy(struct label *src, struct label *dest)
280 {
281 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
282 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
283 if (!mac_device_enforce)
284 return;
285 #endif
286
287 MAC_PERFORM(devfs_label_copy, src, dest);
288 }
289
290 void
291 mac_devfs_label_update(struct mount *mp, struct devnode *de,
292 struct vnode *vp)
293 {
294 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
295 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
296 if (!mac_device_enforce)
297 return;
298 #endif
299
300 MAC_PERFORM(devfs_label_update, mp, de, de->dn_label, vp,
301 vp->v_label);
302 }
303
304 int
305 mac_vnode_label_associate(struct mount *mp, struct vnode *vp, vfs_context_t ctx)
306 {
307 struct devnode *dnp;
308 struct fdescnode *fnp;
309 int error = 0;
310
311 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
312 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
313 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
314 return (error);
315 #endif
316
317 /* XXX: should not inspect v_tag in kernel! */
318 switch (vp->v_tag) {
319 case VT_DEVFS:
320 dnp = VTODN(vp);
321 mac_vnode_label_associate_devfs(mp, dnp, vp);
322 break;
323 case VT_FDESC:
324 fnp = VTOFDESC(vp);
325 error = mac_vnode_label_associate_fdesc(mp, fnp, vp, ctx);
326 break;
327 default:
328 error = mac_vnode_label_associate_extattr(mp, vp);
329 break;
330 }
331
332 return (error);
333 }
334
335 void
336 mac_vnode_label_associate_devfs(struct mount *mp, struct devnode *de,
337 struct vnode *vp)
338 {
339 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
340 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
341 if (!mac_device_enforce)
342 return;
343 #endif
344
345 MAC_PERFORM(vnode_label_associate_devfs,
346 mp, mp ? mp->mnt_mntlabel : NULL,
347 de, de->dn_label,
348 vp, vp->v_label);
349 }
350
351 int
352 mac_vnode_label_associate_extattr(struct mount *mp, struct vnode *vp)
353 {
354 int error;
355
356 MAC_CHECK(vnode_label_associate_extattr, mp, mp->mnt_mntlabel, vp,
357 vp->v_label);
358
359 return (error);
360 }
361
362 void
363 mac_vnode_label_associate_singlelabel(struct mount *mp, struct vnode *vp)
364 {
365 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
366 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
367 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
368 return;
369 #endif
370 if (!mac_label_vnodes)
371 return;
372
373 MAC_PERFORM(vnode_label_associate_singlelabel, mp,
374 mp ? mp->mnt_mntlabel : NULL, vp, vp->v_label);
375 }
376
377 int
378 mac_vnode_notify_create(vfs_context_t ctx, struct mount *mp,
379 struct vnode *dvp, struct vnode *vp, struct componentname *cnp)
380 {
381 kauth_cred_t cred;
382 int error;
383
384 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
385 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
386 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
387 return (0);
388 #endif
389 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
390 return (0);
391
392 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
393 MAC_CHECK(vnode_notify_create, cred, mp, mp->mnt_mntlabel,
394 dvp, dvp->v_label, vp, vp->v_label, cnp);
395
396 return (error);
397 }
398
399 void
400 mac_vnode_notify_rename(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *vp,
401 struct vnode *dvp, struct componentname *cnp)
402 {
403 kauth_cred_t cred;
404
405 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
406 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
407 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
408 return;
409 #endif
410 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
411 return;
412
413 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
414 MAC_PERFORM(vnode_notify_rename, cred, vp, vp->v_label,
415 dvp, dvp->v_label, cnp);
416 }
417
418 void
419 mac_vnode_notify_open(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *vp, int acc_flags)
420 {
421 kauth_cred_t cred;
422
423 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
424 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
425 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
426 return;
427 #endif
428 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
429 return;
430
431 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
432 MAC_PERFORM(vnode_notify_open, cred, vp, vp->v_label, acc_flags);
433 }
434
435 void
436 mac_vnode_notify_link(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *vp,
437 struct vnode *dvp, struct componentname *cnp)
438 {
439 kauth_cred_t cred;
440
441 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
442 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
443 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
444 return;
445 #endif
446 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
447 return;
448
449 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
450 MAC_PERFORM(vnode_notify_link, cred, dvp, dvp->v_label, vp, vp->v_label, cnp);
451 }
452
453 /*
454 * Extended attribute 'name' was updated via
455 * vn_setxattr() or vn_removexattr(). Allow the
456 * policy to update the vnode label.
457 */
458 void
459 mac_vnode_label_update_extattr(struct mount *mp, struct vnode *vp,
460 const char *name)
461 {
462 int error = 0;
463
464 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
465 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
466 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
467 return;
468 #endif
469 if (!mac_label_vnodes)
470 return;
471
472 MAC_PERFORM(vnode_label_update_extattr, mp, mp->mnt_mntlabel, vp,
473 vp->v_label, name);
474 if (error == 0)
475 return;
476
477 vnode_lock(vp);
478 vnode_relabel(vp);
479 vnode_unlock(vp);
480 return;
481 }
482
483 static int
484 mac_vnode_label_store(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *vp,
485 struct label *intlabel)
486 {
487 kauth_cred_t cred;
488 int error;
489
490 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
491 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
492 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
493 return 0;
494 #endif
495 if (!mac_label_vnodes ||
496 !mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
497 return 0;
498
499 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
500 MAC_CHECK(vnode_label_store, cred, vp, vp->v_label, intlabel);
501
502 return (error);
503 }
504
505 void
506 mac_cred_label_update_execve(vfs_context_t ctx, kauth_cred_t new, struct vnode *vp, off_t offset,
507 struct vnode *scriptvp, struct label *scriptvnodelabel, struct label *execl, u_int *csflags,
508 void *macextensions, int *disjoint, int *labelupdateerror)
509 {
510 kauth_cred_t cred;
511 *disjoint = 0;
512 int error;
513 posix_cred_t pcred = posix_cred_get(new);
514
515 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
516 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
517 if (!mac_proc_enforce || !mac_vnode_enforce)
518 return;
519 #endif
520
521 /* mark the new cred to indicate "matching" includes the label */
522 pcred->cr_flags |= CRF_MAC_ENFORCE;
523
524 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
525
526 /*
527 * NB: Cannot use MAC_CHECK macro because we need a sequence point after
528 * calling exec_spawnattr_getmacpolicyinfo() and before passing the
529 * spawnattrlen as an argument to the hook.
530 */
531 {
532 struct mac_policy_conf *mpc;
533 u_int i;
534
535 error = 0;
536 for (i = 0; i< mac_policy_list.staticmax; i++) {
537 mpc = mac_policy_list.entries[i].mpc;
538 if (mpc == NULL)
539 continue;
540
541 mpo_cred_label_update_execve_t *hook = mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_cred_label_update_execve;
542 if (hook == NULL)
543 continue;
544
545 size_t spawnattrlen = 0;
546 void *spawnattr = exec_spawnattr_getmacpolicyinfo(macextensions, mpc->mpc_name, &spawnattrlen);
547
548 error = mac_error_select(hook(cred, new, vfs_context_proc(ctx), vp, offset, scriptvp,
549 vp->v_label, scriptvnodelabel, execl, csflags, spawnattr, spawnattrlen, disjoint),
550 error);
551 }
552 if (mac_policy_list_conditional_busy() != 0) {
553 for (; i <= mac_policy_list.maxindex; i++) {
554 mpc = mac_policy_list.entries[i].mpc;
555 if (mpc == NULL)
556 continue;
557
558 mpo_cred_label_update_execve_t *hook = mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_cred_label_update_execve;
559 if (hook == NULL)
560 continue;
561
562 size_t spawnattrlen = 0;
563 void *spawnattr = exec_spawnattr_getmacpolicyinfo(macextensions, mpc->mpc_name, &spawnattrlen);
564
565 error = mac_error_select(hook(cred, new, vfs_context_proc(ctx), vp, offset, scriptvp,
566 vp->v_label, scriptvnodelabel, execl, csflags, spawnattr, spawnattrlen, disjoint),
567 error);
568 }
569 mac_policy_list_unbusy();
570 }
571 }
572 *labelupdateerror = error;
573 }
574
575 int
576 mac_cred_check_label_update_execve(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *vp, off_t offset,
577 struct vnode *scriptvp, struct label *scriptvnodelabel, struct label *execlabel,
578 struct proc *p, void *macextensions)
579 {
580 kauth_cred_t cred;
581 int result = 0;
582
583 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
584 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
585 if (!mac_proc_enforce || !mac_vnode_enforce)
586 return result;
587 #endif
588
589 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
590
591 /*
592 * NB: Cannot use MAC_BOOLEAN macro because we need a sequence point after
593 * calling exec_spawnattr_getmacpolicyinfo() and before passing the
594 * spawnattrlen as an argument to the hook.
595 */
596 {
597 struct mac_policy_conf *mpc;
598 u_int i;
599
600 for (i = 0; i< mac_policy_list.staticmax; i++) {
601 mpc = mac_policy_list.entries[i].mpc;
602 if (mpc == NULL)
603 continue;
604
605 mpo_cred_check_label_update_execve_t *hook = mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_cred_check_label_update_execve;
606 if (hook == NULL)
607 continue;
608
609 size_t spawnattrlen = 0;
610 void *spawnattr = exec_spawnattr_getmacpolicyinfo(macextensions, mpc->mpc_name, &spawnattrlen);
611
612 result = result || hook(cred, vp, offset, scriptvp, vp->v_label, scriptvnodelabel, execlabel, p, spawnattr, spawnattrlen);
613 }
614 if (mac_policy_list_conditional_busy() != 0) {
615 for (; i <= mac_policy_list.maxindex; i++) {
616 mpc = mac_policy_list.entries[i].mpc;
617 if (mpc == NULL)
618 continue;
619
620 mpo_cred_check_label_update_execve_t *hook = mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_cred_check_label_update_execve;
621 if (hook == NULL)
622 continue;
623
624 size_t spawnattrlen = 0;
625 void *spawnattr = exec_spawnattr_getmacpolicyinfo(macextensions, mpc->mpc_name, &spawnattrlen);
626
627 result = result || hook(cred, vp, offset, scriptvp, vp->v_label, scriptvnodelabel, execlabel, p, spawnattr, spawnattrlen);
628 }
629 mac_policy_list_unbusy();
630 }
631 }
632
633 return (result);
634 }
635
636 int
637 mac_vnode_check_access(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *vp,
638 int acc_mode)
639 {
640 kauth_cred_t cred;
641 int error;
642 int mask;
643
644 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
645 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
646 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
647 return 0;
648 #endif
649 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
650 return 0;
651
652 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
653 /* Convert {R,W,X}_OK values to V{READ,WRITE,EXEC} for entry points */
654 mask = ACCESS_MODE_TO_VNODE_MASK(acc_mode);
655 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_access, cred, vp, vp->v_label, mask);
656 return (error);
657 }
658
659 int
660 mac_vnode_check_chdir(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *dvp)
661 {
662 kauth_cred_t cred;
663 int error;
664
665 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
666 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
667 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
668 return 0;
669 #endif
670 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
671 return 0;
672
673 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
674 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_chdir, cred, dvp, dvp->v_label);
675 return (error);
676 }
677
678 int
679 mac_vnode_check_chroot(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *dvp,
680 struct componentname *cnp)
681 {
682 kauth_cred_t cred;
683 int error;
684
685 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
686 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
687 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
688 return 0;
689 #endif
690 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
691 return 0;
692
693 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
694 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_chroot, cred, dvp, dvp->v_label, cnp);
695 return (error);
696 }
697
698 int
699 mac_vnode_check_create(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *dvp,
700 struct componentname *cnp, struct vnode_attr *vap)
701 {
702 kauth_cred_t cred;
703 int error;
704
705 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
706 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
707 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
708 return 0;
709 #endif
710 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
711 return 0;
712
713 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
714 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_create, cred, dvp, dvp->v_label, cnp, vap);
715 return (error);
716 }
717
718 int
719 mac_vnode_check_unlink(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *dvp, struct vnode *vp,
720 struct componentname *cnp)
721 {
722 kauth_cred_t cred;
723 int error;
724
725 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
726 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
727 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
728 return 0;
729 #endif
730 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
731 return 0;
732
733 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
734 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_unlink, cred, dvp, dvp->v_label, vp,
735 vp->v_label, cnp);
736 return (error);
737 }
738 #if 0
739 int
740 mac_vnode_check_deleteacl(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *vp,
741 acl_type_t type)
742 {
743 kauth_cred_t cred;
744 int error;
745
746 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
747 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
748 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
749 return 0;
750 #endif
751 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
752 return 0;
753
754 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
755 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_deleteacl, cred, vp, vp->v_label, type);
756 return (error);
757 }
758 #endif
759
760 int
761 mac_vnode_check_deleteextattr(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *vp,
762 const char *name)
763 {
764 kauth_cred_t cred;
765 int error;
766
767 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
768 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
769 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
770 return 0;
771 #endif
772 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
773 return 0;
774
775 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
776 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_deleteextattr, cred, vp, vp->v_label, name);
777 return (error);
778 }
779 int
780 mac_vnode_check_exchangedata(vfs_context_t ctx,
781 struct vnode *v1, struct vnode *v2)
782 {
783 kauth_cred_t cred;
784 int error;
785
786 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
787 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
788 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
789 return 0;
790 #endif
791 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
792 return 0;
793
794 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
795 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_exchangedata, cred, v1, v1->v_label,
796 v2, v2->v_label);
797
798 return (error);
799 }
800
801 #if 0
802 int
803 mac_vnode_check_getacl(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *vp, acl_type_t type)
804 {
805 kauth_cred_t cred;
806 int error;
807
808 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
809 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
810 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
811 return 0;
812 #endif
813 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
814 return 0;
815
816 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
817 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_getacl, cred, vp, vp->v_label, type);
818 return (error);
819 }
820 #endif
821
822 int
823 mac_vnode_check_getattrlist(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *vp,
824 struct attrlist *alist)
825 {
826 kauth_cred_t cred;
827 int error;
828
829 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
830 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
831 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
832 return 0;
833 #endif
834 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
835 return 0;
836
837 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
838 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_getattrlist, cred, vp, vp->v_label, alist);
839
840 /* Falsify results instead of returning error? */
841 return (error);
842 }
843
844 int
845 mac_vnode_check_exec(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *vp,
846 struct image_params *imgp)
847 {
848 kauth_cred_t cred;
849 int error = 0;
850
851 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
852 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
853 if (!mac_proc_enforce || !mac_vnode_enforce)
854 return 0;
855 #endif
856
857 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
858
859 /*
860 * NB: Cannot use MAC_CHECK macro because we need a sequence point after
861 * calling exec_spawnattr_getmacpolicyinfo() and before passing the
862 * spawnattrlen as an argument to the hook.
863 */
864 {
865 struct mac_policy_conf *mpc;
866 u_int i;
867
868 for (i = 0; i< mac_policy_list.staticmax; i++) {
869 mpc = mac_policy_list.entries[i].mpc;
870 if (mpc == NULL)
871 continue;
872
873 mpo_vnode_check_exec_t *hook = mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_vnode_check_exec;
874 if (hook == NULL)
875 continue;
876
877 size_t spawnattrlen = 0;
878 void *spawnattr = exec_spawnattr_getmacpolicyinfo(imgp->ip_px_smpx, mpc->mpc_name, &spawnattrlen);
879
880 error = mac_error_select(
881 hook(cred,
882 vp, imgp->ip_scriptvp, vp->v_label, imgp->ip_scriptlabelp,
883 imgp->ip_execlabelp, &imgp->ip_ndp->ni_cnd, &imgp->ip_csflags,
884 spawnattr, spawnattrlen), error);
885 }
886 if (mac_policy_list_conditional_busy() != 0) {
887 for (; i <= mac_policy_list.maxindex; i++) {
888 mpc = mac_policy_list.entries[i].mpc;
889 if (mpc == NULL)
890 continue;
891
892 mpo_vnode_check_exec_t *hook = mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_vnode_check_exec;
893 if (hook == NULL)
894 continue;
895
896 size_t spawnattrlen = 0;
897 void *spawnattr = exec_spawnattr_getmacpolicyinfo(imgp->ip_px_smpx, mpc->mpc_name, &spawnattrlen);
898
899 error = mac_error_select(
900 hook(cred,
901 vp, imgp->ip_scriptvp, vp->v_label, imgp->ip_scriptlabelp,
902 imgp->ip_execlabelp, &imgp->ip_ndp->ni_cnd, &imgp->ip_csflags,
903 spawnattr, spawnattrlen), error);
904 }
905 mac_policy_list_unbusy();
906 }
907 }
908
909 return (error);
910 }
911
912 int
913 mac_vnode_check_fsgetpath(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *vp)
914 {
915 kauth_cred_t cred;
916 int error;
917
918 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
919 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
920 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
921 return 0;
922 #endif
923 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
924 return 0;
925
926 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
927 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_fsgetpath, cred, vp, vp->v_label);
928 return (error);
929 }
930
931 int
932 mac_vnode_check_signature(struct vnode *vp, off_t macho_offset,
933 unsigned char *sha1,
934 const void *signature, size_t size,
935 int flags, int *is_platform_binary)
936 {
937 int error;
938
939 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
940 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
941 if (!mac_proc_enforce || !mac_vnode_enforce)
942 return 0;
943 #endif
944
945 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_signature, vp, vp->v_label, macho_offset, sha1,
946 signature, size,
947 flags, is_platform_binary);
948 return (error);
949 }
950
951 #if 0
952 int
953 mac_vnode_check_getacl(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *vp, acl_type_t type)
954 {
955 kauth_cred_t cred;
956 int error;
957
958 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
959 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
960 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
961 return 0;
962 #endif
963 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
964 return 0;
965
966 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
967 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_getacl, cred, vp, vp->v_label, type);
968 return (error);
969 }
970 #endif
971
972 int
973 mac_vnode_check_getextattr(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *vp,
974 const char *name, struct uio *uio)
975 {
976 kauth_cred_t cred;
977 int error;
978
979 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
980 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
981 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
982 return 0;
983 #endif
984 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
985 return 0;
986
987 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
988 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_getextattr, cred, vp, vp->v_label,
989 name, uio);
990 return (error);
991 }
992
993 int
994 mac_vnode_check_ioctl(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *vp, u_int cmd)
995 {
996 kauth_cred_t cred;
997 int error;
998
999 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1000 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1001 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1002 return 0;
1003 #endif
1004 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1005 return 0;
1006
1007 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1008 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_ioctl, cred, vp, vp->v_label, cmd);
1009 return (error);
1010 }
1011
1012 int
1013 mac_vnode_check_kqfilter(vfs_context_t ctx, kauth_cred_t file_cred,
1014 struct knote *kn, struct vnode *vp)
1015 {
1016 kauth_cred_t cred;
1017 int error;
1018
1019 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1020 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1021 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1022 return 0;
1023 #endif
1024 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1025 return 0;
1026
1027 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1028 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_kqfilter, cred, file_cred, kn, vp,
1029 vp->v_label);
1030
1031 return (error);
1032 }
1033
1034 int
1035 mac_vnode_check_link(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *dvp,
1036 struct vnode *vp, struct componentname *cnp)
1037 {
1038 kauth_cred_t cred;
1039 int error;
1040
1041 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1042 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1043 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1044 return 0;
1045 #endif
1046 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1047 return 0;
1048
1049 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1050 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_link, cred, dvp, dvp->v_label, vp,
1051 vp->v_label, cnp);
1052 return (error);
1053 }
1054
1055 int
1056 mac_vnode_check_listextattr(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *vp)
1057 {
1058 kauth_cred_t cred;
1059 int error;
1060
1061 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1062 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1063 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1064 return 0;
1065 #endif
1066 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1067 return 0;
1068
1069 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1070 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_listextattr, cred, vp, vp->v_label);
1071 return (error);
1072 }
1073
1074 int
1075 mac_vnode_check_lookup(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *dvp,
1076 struct componentname *cnp)
1077 {
1078 kauth_cred_t cred;
1079 int error;
1080
1081 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1082 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1083 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1084 return 0;
1085 #endif
1086 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1087 return 0;
1088
1089 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1090 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_lookup, cred, dvp, dvp->v_label, cnp);
1091 return (error);
1092 }
1093
1094 int
1095 mac_vnode_check_open(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *vp, int acc_mode)
1096 {
1097 kauth_cred_t cred;
1098 int error;
1099
1100 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1101 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1102 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1103 return 0;
1104 #endif
1105 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1106 return 0;
1107
1108 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1109 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_open, cred, vp, vp->v_label, acc_mode);
1110 return (error);
1111 }
1112
1113 int
1114 mac_vnode_check_read(vfs_context_t ctx, struct ucred *file_cred,
1115 struct vnode *vp)
1116 {
1117 kauth_cred_t cred;
1118 int error;
1119
1120 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1121 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1122 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1123 return 0;
1124 #endif
1125 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1126 return 0;
1127
1128 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1129 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_read, cred, file_cred, vp,
1130 vp->v_label);
1131
1132 return (error);
1133 }
1134
1135 int
1136 mac_vnode_check_readdir(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *dvp)
1137 {
1138 kauth_cred_t cred;
1139 int error;
1140
1141 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1142 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1143 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1144 return 0;
1145 #endif
1146 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1147 return 0;
1148
1149 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1150 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_readdir, cred, dvp, dvp->v_label);
1151 return (error);
1152 }
1153
1154 int
1155 mac_vnode_check_readlink(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *vp)
1156 {
1157 kauth_cred_t cred;
1158 int error;
1159
1160 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1161 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1162 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1163 return 0;
1164 #endif
1165 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1166 return 0;
1167
1168 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1169 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_readlink, cred, vp, vp->v_label);
1170 return (error);
1171 }
1172
1173 int
1174 mac_vnode_check_label_update(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *vp,
1175 struct label *newlabel)
1176 {
1177 kauth_cred_t cred;
1178 int error;
1179
1180 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1181 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1182 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1183 return 0;
1184 #endif
1185 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1186 return 0;
1187
1188 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1189 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_label_update, cred, vp, vp->v_label, newlabel);
1190
1191 return (error);
1192 }
1193
1194 int
1195 mac_vnode_check_rename(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *dvp,
1196 struct vnode *vp, struct componentname *cnp, struct vnode *tdvp,
1197 struct vnode *tvp, struct componentname *tcnp)
1198 {
1199 kauth_cred_t cred;
1200 int error;
1201
1202 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1203 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1204 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1205 return 0;
1206 #endif
1207 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1208 return 0;
1209
1210 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1211
1212 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_rename_from, cred, dvp, dvp->v_label, vp,
1213 vp->v_label, cnp);
1214 if (error)
1215 return (error);
1216
1217 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_rename_to, cred, tdvp, tdvp->v_label, tvp,
1218 tvp != NULL ? tvp->v_label : NULL, dvp == tdvp, tcnp);
1219 if (error)
1220 return (error);
1221
1222 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_rename, cred, dvp, dvp->v_label, vp,
1223 vp->v_label, cnp, tdvp, tdvp->v_label, tvp,
1224 tvp != NULL ? tvp->v_label : NULL, tcnp);
1225 return (error);
1226 }
1227
1228 int
1229 mac_vnode_check_revoke(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *vp)
1230 {
1231 kauth_cred_t cred;
1232 int error;
1233
1234 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1235 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1236 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1237 return 0;
1238 #endif
1239 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1240 return 0;
1241
1242 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1243 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_revoke, cred, vp, vp->v_label);
1244 return (error);
1245 }
1246
1247 int
1248 mac_vnode_check_searchfs(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *vp, struct attrlist *alist)
1249 {
1250 kauth_cred_t cred;
1251 int error;
1252
1253 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1254 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1255 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1256 return 0;
1257 #endif
1258 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1259 return 0;
1260
1261 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1262 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_searchfs, cred, vp, vp->v_label, alist);
1263 return (error);
1264 }
1265
1266 int
1267 mac_vnode_check_select(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *vp, int which)
1268 {
1269 kauth_cred_t cred;
1270 int error;
1271
1272 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1273 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1274 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1275 return 0;
1276 #endif
1277 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1278 return 0;
1279
1280 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1281 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_select, cred, vp, vp->v_label, which);
1282 return (error);
1283 }
1284
1285 #if 0
1286 int
1287 mac_vnode_check_setacl(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *vp, acl_type_t type,
1288 struct acl *acl)
1289 {
1290 kauth_cred_t cred;
1291 int error;
1292
1293 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1294 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1295 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1296 return 0;
1297 #endif
1298 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1299 return 0;
1300
1301 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1302 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_setacl, cred, vp, vp->v_label, type, acl);
1303 return (error);
1304 }
1305 #endif
1306
1307 int
1308 mac_vnode_check_setattrlist(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *vp,
1309 struct attrlist *alist)
1310 {
1311 kauth_cred_t cred;
1312 int error;
1313
1314 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1315 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1316 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1317 return 0;
1318 #endif
1319 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1320 return 0;
1321
1322 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1323 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_setattrlist, cred, vp, vp->v_label, alist);
1324 return (error);
1325 }
1326
1327 int
1328 mac_vnode_check_setextattr(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *vp,
1329 const char *name, struct uio *uio)
1330 {
1331 kauth_cred_t cred;
1332 int error;
1333
1334 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1335 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1336 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1337 return 0;
1338 #endif
1339 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1340 return 0;
1341
1342 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1343 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_setextattr, cred, vp, vp->v_label,
1344 name, uio);
1345 return (error);
1346 }
1347
1348 int
1349 mac_vnode_check_setflags(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *vp, u_long flags)
1350 {
1351 kauth_cred_t cred;
1352 int error;
1353
1354 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1355 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1356 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1357 return 0;
1358 #endif
1359 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1360 return 0;
1361
1362 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1363 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_setflags, cred, vp, vp->v_label, flags);
1364 return (error);
1365 }
1366
1367 int
1368 mac_vnode_check_setmode(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *vp, mode_t mode)
1369 {
1370 kauth_cred_t cred;
1371 int error;
1372
1373 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1374 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1375 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1376 return 0;
1377 #endif
1378 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1379 return 0;
1380
1381 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1382 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_setmode, cred, vp, vp->v_label, mode);
1383 return (error);
1384 }
1385
1386 int
1387 mac_vnode_check_setowner(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *vp, uid_t uid,
1388 gid_t gid)
1389 {
1390 kauth_cred_t cred;
1391 int error;
1392
1393 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1394 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1395 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1396 return 0;
1397 #endif
1398 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1399 return 0;
1400
1401 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1402 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_setowner, cred, vp, vp->v_label, uid, gid);
1403 return (error);
1404 }
1405
1406 int
1407 mac_vnode_check_setutimes(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *vp,
1408 struct timespec atime, struct timespec mtime)
1409 {
1410 kauth_cred_t cred;
1411 int error;
1412
1413 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1414 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1415 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1416 return 0;
1417 #endif
1418 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1419 return 0;
1420
1421 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1422 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_setutimes, cred, vp, vp->v_label, atime,
1423 mtime);
1424 return (error);
1425 }
1426
1427 int
1428 mac_vnode_check_stat(vfs_context_t ctx, struct ucred *file_cred,
1429 struct vnode *vp)
1430 {
1431 kauth_cred_t cred;
1432 int error;
1433
1434 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1435 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1436 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1437 return 0;
1438 #endif
1439 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1440 return 0;
1441
1442 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1443 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_stat, cred, file_cred, vp,
1444 vp->v_label);
1445 return (error);
1446 }
1447
1448 int
1449 mac_vnode_check_truncate(vfs_context_t ctx, struct ucred *file_cred,
1450 struct vnode *vp)
1451 {
1452 kauth_cred_t cred;
1453 int error;
1454
1455 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1456 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1457 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1458 return 0;
1459 #endif
1460 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1461 return 0;
1462
1463 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1464 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_truncate, cred, file_cred, vp,
1465 vp->v_label);
1466
1467 return (error);
1468 }
1469
1470 int
1471 mac_vnode_check_write(vfs_context_t ctx, struct ucred *file_cred,
1472 struct vnode *vp)
1473 {
1474 kauth_cred_t cred;
1475 int error;
1476
1477 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1478 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1479 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1480 return 0;
1481 #endif
1482 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1483 return 0;
1484
1485 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1486 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_write, cred, file_cred, vp, vp->v_label);
1487
1488 return (error);
1489 }
1490
1491 int
1492 mac_vnode_check_uipc_bind(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *dvp,
1493 struct componentname *cnp, struct vnode_attr *vap)
1494 {
1495 kauth_cred_t cred;
1496 int error;
1497
1498 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1499 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1500 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1501 return 0;
1502 #endif
1503 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1504 return 0;
1505
1506 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1507 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_uipc_bind, cred, dvp, dvp->v_label, cnp, vap);
1508 return (error);
1509 }
1510
1511 int
1512 mac_vnode_check_uipc_connect(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *vp)
1513 {
1514 kauth_cred_t cred;
1515 int error;
1516
1517 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1518 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1519 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1520 return 0;
1521 #endif
1522 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1523 return 0;
1524
1525 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1526 MAC_CHECK(vnode_check_uipc_connect, cred, vp, vp->v_label);
1527 return (error);
1528 }
1529
1530 void
1531 mac_vnode_label_update(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *vp, struct label *newlabel)
1532 {
1533 kauth_cred_t cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1534 struct label *tmpl = NULL;
1535
1536 if (vp->v_label == NULL)
1537 tmpl = mac_vnode_label_alloc();
1538
1539 vnode_lock(vp);
1540
1541 /* recheck after lock */
1542 if (vp->v_label == NULL) {
1543 vp->v_label = tmpl;
1544 tmpl = NULL;
1545 }
1546
1547 MAC_PERFORM(vnode_label_update, cred, vp, vp->v_label, newlabel);
1548 vnode_unlock(vp);
1549
1550 if (tmpl != NULL)
1551 mac_vnode_label_free(tmpl);
1552 }
1553
1554 int
1555 mac_vnode_find_sigs(struct proc *p, struct vnode *vp, off_t offset)
1556 {
1557 int error;
1558
1559 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1560 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1561 if (!mac_proc_enforce || !mac_vnode_enforce)
1562 return 0;
1563 #endif
1564
1565 MAC_CHECK(vnode_find_sigs, p, vp, offset, vp->v_label);
1566
1567 return (error);
1568 }
1569
1570 void
1571 mac_mount_label_associate(vfs_context_t ctx, struct mount *mp)
1572 {
1573 kauth_cred_t cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1574
1575 /* XXX: eventually this logic may be handled by the policy? */
1576
1577 /* We desire MULTILABEL for the root filesystem. */
1578 if ((mp->mnt_flag & MNT_ROOTFS) &&
1579 (strcmp(mp->mnt_vfsstat.f_fstypename, "hfs") == 0))
1580 mp->mnt_flag |= MNT_MULTILABEL;
1581
1582 /* MULTILABEL on DEVFS. */
1583 if (strcmp(mp->mnt_vfsstat.f_fstypename, "devfs") == 0)
1584 mp->mnt_flag |= MNT_MULTILABEL;
1585
1586 /* MULTILABEL on FDESC pseudo-filesystem. */
1587 if (strcmp(mp->mnt_vfsstat.f_fstypename, "fdesc") == 0)
1588 mp->mnt_flag |= MNT_MULTILABEL;
1589
1590 /* MULTILABEL on all NFS filesystems. */
1591 if (strcmp(mp->mnt_vfsstat.f_fstypename, "nfs") == 0)
1592 mp->mnt_flag |= MNT_MULTILABEL;
1593
1594 /* MULTILABEL on all AFP filesystems. */
1595 if (strcmp(mp->mnt_vfsstat.f_fstypename, "afpfs") == 0)
1596 mp->mnt_flag |= MNT_MULTILABEL;
1597
1598 if (mp->mnt_vtable != NULL) {
1599 /* Any filesystem that supports native XATTRs. */
1600 if ((mp->mnt_vtable->vfc_vfsflags & VFC_VFSNATIVEXATTR))
1601 mp->mnt_flag |= MNT_MULTILABEL;
1602
1603 /* Filesystem does not support multilabel. */
1604 if ((mp->mnt_vtable->vfc_vfsflags & VFC_VFSNOMACLABEL) &&
1605 (mp->mnt_flag & MNT_MULTILABEL))
1606 mp->mnt_flag &= ~MNT_MULTILABEL;
1607 }
1608
1609 MAC_PERFORM(mount_label_associate, cred, mp, mp->mnt_mntlabel);
1610 #if DEBUG
1611 printf("MAC Framework enabling %s support: %s -> %s (%s)\n",
1612 mp->mnt_flag & MNT_MULTILABEL ? "multilabel" : "singlelabel",
1613 mp->mnt_vfsstat.f_mntfromname,
1614 mp->mnt_vfsstat.f_mntonname,
1615 mp->mnt_vfsstat.f_fstypename);
1616 #endif
1617 }
1618
1619 int
1620 mac_mount_check_mount(vfs_context_t ctx, struct vnode *vp,
1621 struct componentname *cnp, const char *vfc_name)
1622 {
1623 kauth_cred_t cred;
1624 int error;
1625
1626 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1627 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1628 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1629 return 0;
1630 #endif
1631 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1632 return 0;
1633
1634 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1635 MAC_CHECK(mount_check_mount, cred, vp, vp->v_label, cnp, vfc_name);
1636
1637 return (error);
1638 }
1639
1640 int
1641 mac_mount_check_remount(vfs_context_t ctx, struct mount *mp)
1642 {
1643 kauth_cred_t cred;
1644 int error;
1645
1646 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1647 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1648 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1649 return 0;
1650 #endif
1651 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1652 return 0;
1653
1654 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1655 MAC_CHECK(mount_check_remount, cred, mp, mp->mnt_mntlabel);
1656
1657 return (error);
1658 }
1659
1660 int
1661 mac_mount_check_umount(vfs_context_t ctx, struct mount *mp)
1662 {
1663 kauth_cred_t cred;
1664 int error;
1665
1666 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1667 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1668 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1669 return 0;
1670 #endif
1671 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1672 return 0;
1673
1674 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1675 MAC_CHECK(mount_check_umount, cred, mp, mp->mnt_mntlabel);
1676
1677 return (error);
1678 }
1679
1680 int
1681 mac_mount_check_getattr(vfs_context_t ctx, struct mount *mp,
1682 struct vfs_attr *vfa)
1683 {
1684 kauth_cred_t cred;
1685 int error;
1686
1687 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1688 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1689 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1690 return 0;
1691 #endif
1692 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1693 return 0;
1694
1695 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1696 MAC_CHECK(mount_check_getattr, cred, mp, mp->mnt_mntlabel, vfa);
1697 return (error);
1698 }
1699
1700 int
1701 mac_mount_check_setattr(vfs_context_t ctx, struct mount *mp,
1702 struct vfs_attr *vfa)
1703 {
1704 kauth_cred_t cred;
1705 int error;
1706
1707 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1708 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1709 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1710 return 0;
1711 #endif
1712 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1713 return 0;
1714
1715 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1716 MAC_CHECK(mount_check_setattr, cred, mp, mp->mnt_mntlabel, vfa);
1717 return (error);
1718 }
1719
1720 int
1721 mac_mount_check_stat(vfs_context_t ctx, struct mount *mount)
1722 {
1723 kauth_cred_t cred;
1724 int error;
1725
1726 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1727 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1728 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1729 return 0;
1730 #endif
1731 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1732 return 0;
1733
1734 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1735 MAC_CHECK(mount_check_stat, cred, mount, mount->mnt_mntlabel);
1736
1737 return (error);
1738 }
1739
1740 int
1741 mac_mount_check_label_update(vfs_context_t ctx, struct mount *mount)
1742 {
1743 kauth_cred_t cred;
1744 int error;
1745
1746 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1747 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1748 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1749 return 0;
1750 #endif
1751 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1752 return 0;
1753
1754 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1755 MAC_CHECK(mount_check_label_update, cred, mount, mount->mnt_mntlabel);
1756
1757 return (error);
1758 }
1759
1760 int
1761 mac_mount_check_fsctl(vfs_context_t ctx, struct mount *mp, u_int cmd)
1762 {
1763 kauth_cred_t cred;
1764 int error;
1765
1766 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1767 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1768 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1769 return 0;
1770 #endif
1771 if (!mac_context_check_enforce(ctx, MAC_VNODE_ENFORCE))
1772 return 0;
1773
1774 cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
1775 MAC_CHECK(mount_check_fsctl, cred, mp, mp->mnt_mntlabel, cmd);
1776
1777 return (error);
1778 }
1779
1780 void
1781 mac_devfs_label_associate_device(dev_t dev, struct devnode *de,
1782 const char *fullpath)
1783 {
1784 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1785 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1786 if (!mac_device_enforce)
1787 return;
1788 #endif
1789
1790 MAC_PERFORM(devfs_label_associate_device, dev, de, de->dn_label,
1791 fullpath);
1792 }
1793
1794 void
1795 mac_devfs_label_associate_directory(const char *dirname, int dirnamelen,
1796 struct devnode *de, const char *fullpath)
1797 {
1798 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1799 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1800 if (!mac_device_enforce)
1801 return;
1802 #endif
1803
1804 MAC_PERFORM(devfs_label_associate_directory, dirname, dirnamelen, de,
1805 de->dn_label, fullpath);
1806 }
1807
1808 int
1809 vn_setlabel(struct vnode *vp, struct label *intlabel, vfs_context_t context)
1810 {
1811 int error;
1812
1813 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
1814 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
1815 if (!mac_vnode_enforce)
1816 return 0;
1817 #endif
1818 if (!mac_label_vnodes)
1819 return (0);
1820
1821 if (vp->v_mount == NULL) {
1822 printf("vn_setlabel: null v_mount\n");
1823 if (vp->v_type != VNON)
1824 printf("vn_setlabel: null v_mount with non-VNON\n");
1825 return (EBADF);
1826 }
1827
1828 if ((vp->v_mount->mnt_flag & MNT_MULTILABEL) == 0)
1829 return (ENOTSUP);
1830
1831 /*
1832 * Multi-phase commit. First check the policies to confirm the
1833 * change is OK. Then commit via the filesystem. Finally,
1834 * update the actual vnode label. Question: maybe the filesystem
1835 * should update the vnode at the end as part of VNOP_SETLABEL()?
1836 */
1837 error = mac_vnode_check_label_update(context, vp, intlabel);
1838 if (error)
1839 return (error);
1840
1841 error = VNOP_SETLABEL(vp, intlabel, context);
1842 if (error == ENOTSUP) {
1843 error = mac_vnode_label_store(context, vp,
1844 intlabel);
1845 if (error) {
1846 printf("%s: mac_vnode_label_store failed %d\n",
1847 __func__, error);
1848 return (error);
1849 }
1850 mac_vnode_label_update(context, vp, intlabel);
1851 } else
1852 if (error) {
1853 printf("vn_setlabel: vop setlabel failed %d\n", error);
1854 return (error);
1855 }
1856
1857 return (0);
1858 }
1859
1860 int
1861 mac_vnode_label_associate_fdesc(struct mount *mp, struct fdescnode *fnp,
1862 struct vnode *vp, vfs_context_t ctx)
1863 {
1864 struct fileproc *fp;
1865 #if CONFIG_MACF_SOCKET_SUBSET
1866 struct socket *so;
1867 #endif
1868 struct pipe *cpipe;
1869 struct vnode *fvp;
1870 struct proc *p;
1871 int error;
1872
1873 error = 0;
1874
1875 /*
1876 * If no backing file, let the policy choose which label to use.
1877 */
1878 if (fnp->fd_fd == -1) {
1879 MAC_PERFORM(vnode_label_associate_file, vfs_context_ucred(ctx),
1880 mp, mp->mnt_mntlabel, NULL, NULL, vp, vp->v_label);
1881 return (0);
1882 }
1883
1884 p = vfs_context_proc(ctx);
1885 error = fp_lookup(p, fnp->fd_fd, &fp, 0);
1886 if (error)
1887 return (error);
1888
1889 if (fp->f_fglob == NULL) {
1890 error = EBADF;
1891 goto out;
1892 }
1893
1894 switch (FILEGLOB_DTYPE(fp->f_fglob)) {
1895 case DTYPE_VNODE:
1896 fvp = (struct vnode *)fp->f_fglob->fg_data;
1897 if ((error = vnode_getwithref(fvp)))
1898 goto out;
1899 MAC_PERFORM(vnode_label_copy, fvp->v_label, vp->v_label);
1900 (void)vnode_put(fvp);
1901 break;
1902 #if CONFIG_MACF_SOCKET_SUBSET
1903 case DTYPE_SOCKET:
1904 so = (struct socket *)fp->f_fglob->fg_data;
1905 socket_lock(so, 1);
1906 MAC_PERFORM(vnode_label_associate_socket,
1907 vfs_context_ucred(ctx), (socket_t)so, so->so_label,
1908 vp, vp->v_label);
1909 socket_unlock(so, 1);
1910 break;
1911 #endif
1912 case DTYPE_PSXSHM:
1913 pshm_label_associate(fp, vp, ctx);
1914 break;
1915 case DTYPE_PSXSEM:
1916 psem_label_associate(fp, vp, ctx);
1917 break;
1918 case DTYPE_PIPE:
1919 cpipe = (struct pipe *)fp->f_fglob->fg_data;
1920 /* kern/sys_pipe.c:pipe_select() suggests this test. */
1921 if (cpipe == (struct pipe *)-1) {
1922 error = EINVAL;
1923 goto out;
1924 }
1925 PIPE_LOCK(cpipe);
1926 MAC_PERFORM(vnode_label_associate_pipe, vfs_context_ucred(ctx),
1927 cpipe, cpipe->pipe_label, vp, vp->v_label);
1928 PIPE_UNLOCK(cpipe);
1929 break;
1930 case DTYPE_KQUEUE:
1931 case DTYPE_FSEVENTS:
1932 default:
1933 MAC_PERFORM(vnode_label_associate_file, vfs_context_ucred(ctx),
1934 mp, mp->mnt_mntlabel, fp->f_fglob, fp->f_fglob->fg_label,
1935 vp, vp->v_label);
1936 break;
1937 }
1938 out:
1939 fp_drop(p, fnp->fd_fd, fp, 0);
1940 return (error);
1941 }