security/mac_process.c

   1 /*
   2  * Copyright (c) 2007-2010 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
   3  *
   4  * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_START@
   5  *
   6  * This file contains Original Code and/or Modifications of Original Code
   7  * as defined in and that are subject to the Apple Public Source License
   8  * Version 2.0 (the 'License'). You may not use this file except in
   9  * compliance with the License. The rights granted to you under the License
  10  * may not be used to create, or enable the creation or redistribution of,
  11  * unlawful or unlicensed copies of an Apple operating system, or to
  12  * circumvent, violate, or enable the circumvention or violation of, any
  13  * terms of an Apple operating system software license agreement.
  14  *
  15  * Please obtain a copy of the License at
  16  * http://www.opensource.apple.com/apsl/ and read it before using this file.
  17  *
  18  * The Original Code and all software distributed under the License are
  19  * distributed on an 'AS IS' basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER
  20  * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AND APPLE HEREBY DISCLAIMS ALL SUCH WARRANTIES,
  21  * INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
  22  * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, QUIET ENJOYMENT OR NON-INFRINGEMENT.
  23  * Please see the License for the specific language governing rights and
  24  * limitations under the License.
  25  *
  26  * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_END@
  27  */
  28
  29 /*-
  30  * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Robert N. M. Watson
  31  * Copyright (c) 2001 Ilmar S. Habibulin
  32  * Copyright (c) 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
  33  *
  34  * This software was developed by Robert Watson and Ilmar Habibulin for the
  35  * TrustedBSD Project.
  36  *
  37  * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by Network
  38  * Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network
  39  * Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"),
  40  * as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
  41  *
  42  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  43  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  44  * are met:
  45  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
  46  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  47  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
  48  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
  49  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
  50  *
  51  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
  52  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
  53  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
  54  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
  55  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
  56  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
  57  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
  58  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
  59  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  60  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  61  * SUCH DAMAGE.
  62  *
  63  */
  64
  65 #include <string.h>
  66 #include <sys/param.h>
  67 #include <sys/ucred.h>
  68 #include <sys/malloc.h>
  69 #include <sys/sbuf.h>
  70 #include <sys/vnode.h>
  71 #include <sys/proc.h>
  72 #include <sys/proc_internal.h>
  73 #include <sys/kauth.h>
  74 #include <sys/imgact.h>
  75 #include <mach/mach_types.h>
  76 #include <kern/task.h>
  77
  78 #include <security/mac_internal.h>
  79 #include <security/mac_mach_internal.h>
  80
  81 #include <bsd/security/audit/audit.h>
  82
  83 struct label *
  84 mac_cred_label_alloc(void)
  85 {
  86         struct label *label;
  87
  88         label = mac_labelzone_alloc(MAC_WAITOK);
  89         if (label == NULL) {
  90                 return NULL;
  91         }
  92         MAC_PERFORM(cred_label_init, label);
  93         return label;
  94 }
  95
  96 void
  97 mac_cred_label_init(struct ucred *cred)
  98 {
  99         cred->cr_label = mac_cred_label_alloc();
 100 }
 101
 102 void
 103 mac_cred_label_free(struct label *label)
 104 {
 105         MAC_PERFORM(cred_label_destroy, label);
 106         mac_labelzone_free(label);
 107 }
 108
 109 int
 110 mac_cred_label_compare(struct label *a, struct label *b)
 111 {
 112         return bcmp(a, b, sizeof(*a)) == 0;
 113 }
 114
 115 int
 116 mac_cred_label_externalize_audit(struct proc *p, struct mac *mac)
 117 {
 118         kauth_cred_t cr;
 119         int error;
 120
 121         cr = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
 122
 123         error = MAC_EXTERNALIZE_AUDIT(cred, cr->cr_label,
 124             mac->m_string, mac->m_buflen);
 125
 126         kauth_cred_unref(&cr);
 127         return error;
 128 }
 129
 130 void
 131 mac_cred_label_destroy(kauth_cred_t cred)
 132 {
 133         mac_cred_label_free(cred->cr_label);
 134         cred->cr_label = NULL;
 135 }
 136
 137 int
 138 mac_cred_label_externalize(struct label *label, char *elements,
 139     char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen, int flags __unused)
 140 {
 141         int error = 0;
 142
 143         error = MAC_EXTERNALIZE(cred, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen);
 144
 145         return error;
 146 }
 147
 148 int
 149 mac_cred_label_internalize(struct label *label, char *string)
 150 {
 151         int error;
 152
 153         error = MAC_INTERNALIZE(cred, label, string);
 154
 155         return error;
 156 }
 157
 158 /*
 159  * By default, fork just adds a reference to the parent
 160  * credential.  Policies may need to know about this reference
 161  * if they are tracking exit calls to know when to free the
 162  * label.
 163  */
 164 void
 165 mac_cred_label_associate_fork(kauth_cred_t cred, proc_t proc)
 166 {
 167         MAC_PERFORM(cred_label_associate_fork, cred, proc);
 168 }
 169
 170 /*
 171  * Initialize MAC label for the first kernel process, from which other
 172  * kernel processes and threads are spawned.
 173  */
 174 void
 175 mac_cred_label_associate_kernel(kauth_cred_t cred)
 176 {
 177         MAC_PERFORM(cred_label_associate_kernel, cred);
 178 }
 179
 180 /*
 181  * Initialize MAC label for the first userland process, from which other
 182  * userland processes and threads are spawned.
 183  */
 184 void
 185 mac_cred_label_associate_user(kauth_cred_t cred)
 186 {
 187         MAC_PERFORM(cred_label_associate_user, cred);
 188 }
 189
 190 /*
 191  * When a new process is created, its label must be initialized.  Generally,
 192  * this involves inheritence from the parent process, modulo possible
 193  * deltas.  This function allows that processing to take place.
 194  */
 195 void
 196 mac_cred_label_associate(struct ucred *parent_cred, struct ucred *child_cred)
 197 {
 198         MAC_PERFORM(cred_label_associate, parent_cred, child_cred);
 199 }
 200
 201 int
 202 mac_execve_enter(user_addr_t mac_p, struct image_params *imgp)
 203 {
 204         struct user_mac mac;
 205         struct label *execlabel;
 206         char *buffer;
 207         int error;
 208         size_t ulen;
 209
 210         if (mac_p == USER_ADDR_NULL) {
 211                 return 0;
 212         }
 213
 214         if (IS_64BIT_PROCESS(current_proc())) {
 215                 struct user64_mac mac64;
 216                 error = copyin(mac_p, &mac64, sizeof(mac64));
 217                 mac.m_buflen = mac64.m_buflen;
 218                 mac.m_string = mac64.m_string;
 219         } else {
 220                 struct user32_mac mac32;
 221                 error = copyin(mac_p, &mac32, sizeof(mac32));
 222                 mac.m_buflen = mac32.m_buflen;
 223                 mac.m_string = mac32.m_string;
 224         }
 225         if (error) {
 226                 return error;
 227         }
 228
 229         error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac);
 230         if (error) {
 231                 return error;
 232         }
 233
 234         execlabel = mac_cred_label_alloc();
 235         MALLOC(buffer, char *, mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK);
 236         error = copyinstr(CAST_USER_ADDR_T(mac.m_string), buffer, mac.m_buflen, &ulen);
 237         if (error) {
 238                 goto out;
 239         }
 240         AUDIT_ARG(mac_string, buffer);
 241
 242         error = mac_cred_label_internalize(execlabel, buffer);
 243 out:
 244         if (error) {
 245                 mac_cred_label_free(execlabel);
 246                 execlabel = NULL;
 247         }
 248         imgp->ip_execlabelp = execlabel;
 249         FREE(buffer, M_MACTEMP);
 250         return error;
 251 }
 252
 253 /*
 254  * When the subject's label changes, it may require revocation of privilege
 255  * to mapped objects.  This can't be done on-the-fly later with a unified
 256  * buffer cache.
 257  *
 258  * XXX:         CRF_MAC_ENFORCE should be in a kauth_cred_t field, rather
 259  * XXX:         than a posix_cred_t field.
 260  */
 261 void
 262 mac_cred_label_update(kauth_cred_t cred, struct label *newlabel)
 263 {
 264         posix_cred_t pcred = posix_cred_get(cred);
 265
 266         /* force label to be part of "matching" for credential */
 267         pcred->cr_flags |= CRF_MAC_ENFORCE;
 268
 269         /* inform the policies of the update */
 270         MAC_PERFORM(cred_label_update, cred, newlabel);
 271 }
 272
 273 int
 274 mac_cred_check_label_update(kauth_cred_t cred, struct label *newlabel)
 275 {
 276         int error;
 277
 278 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
 279         /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
 280         if (!mac_proc_enforce) {
 281                 return 0;
 282         }
 283 #endif
 284
 285         MAC_CHECK(cred_check_label_update, cred, newlabel);
 286
 287         return error;
 288 }
 289
 290 int
 291 mac_cred_check_visible(kauth_cred_t u1, kauth_cred_t u2)
 292 {
 293         int error;
 294
 295 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
 296         /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
 297         if (!mac_proc_enforce) {
 298                 return 0;
 299         }
 300 #endif
 301
 302         MAC_CHECK(cred_check_visible, u1, u2);
 303
 304         return error;
 305 }
 306
 307 int
 308 mac_proc_check_debug(proc_ident_t tracing_ident, kauth_cred_t tracing_cred, proc_ident_t traced_ident)
 309 {
 310         int error;
 311         bool enforce;
 312         proc_t tracingp;
 313
 314 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
 315         /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
 316         if (!mac_proc_enforce) {
 317                 return 0;
 318         }
 319 #endif
 320         /*
 321          * Once all mac hooks adopt proc_ident_t, finding proc_t and releasing
 322          * it below should go to mac_proc_check_enforce().
 323          */
 324         if ((tracingp = proc_find_ident(tracing_ident)) == PROC_NULL) {
 325                 return ESRCH;
 326         }
 327         enforce = mac_proc_check_enforce(tracingp);
 328         proc_rele(tracingp);
 329
 330         if (!enforce) {
 331                 return 0;
 332         }
 333         MAC_CHECK(proc_check_debug, tracing_cred, traced_ident);
 334
 335         return error;
 336 }
 337
 338 int
 339 mac_proc_check_dump_core(struct proc *proc)
 340 {
 341         int error;
 342
 343 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
 344         /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
 345         if (!mac_proc_enforce) {
 346                 return 0;
 347         }
 348 #endif
 349         if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(proc)) {
 350                 return 0;
 351         }
 352
 353         MAC_CHECK(proc_check_dump_core, proc);
 354
 355         return error;
 356 }
 357
 358 int
 359 mac_proc_check_remote_thread_create(struct task *task, int flavor, thread_state_t new_state, mach_msg_type_number_t new_state_count)
 360 {
 361         proc_t curp = current_proc();
 362         proc_t proc;
 363         kauth_cred_t cred;
 364         int error;
 365
 366 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
 367         /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
 368         if (!mac_proc_enforce) {
 369                 return 0;
 370         }
 371 #endif
 372         if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp)) {
 373                 return 0;
 374         }
 375
 376         proc = proc_find(task_pid(task));
 377         if (proc == PROC_NULL) {
 378                 return ESRCH;
 379         }
 380
 381         cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
 382         MAC_CHECK(proc_check_remote_thread_create, cred, proc, flavor, new_state, new_state_count);
 383         kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
 384         proc_rele(proc);
 385
 386         return error;
 387 }
 388
 389 int
 390 mac_proc_check_fork(proc_t curp)
 391 {
 392         kauth_cred_t cred;
 393         int error;
 394
 395 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
 396         /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
 397         if (!mac_proc_enforce) {
 398                 return 0;
 399         }
 400 #endif
 401         if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp)) {
 402                 return 0;
 403         }
 404
 405         cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
 406         MAC_CHECK(proc_check_fork, cred, curp);
 407         kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
 408
 409         return error;
 410 }
 411
 412 int
 413 mac_proc_check_get_task_name(struct ucred *cred, proc_ident_t pident)
 414 {
 415         int error;
 416
 417         MAC_CHECK(proc_check_get_task_name, cred, pident);
 418
 419         return error;
 420 }
 421
 422 int
 423 mac_proc_check_get_task(struct ucred *cred, proc_ident_t pident)
 424 {
 425         int error;
 426
 427         MAC_CHECK(proc_check_get_task, cred, pident);
 428
 429         return error;
 430 }
 431
 432 int
 433 mac_proc_check_expose_task(struct ucred *cred, proc_ident_t pident)
 434 {
 435         int error;
 436
 437         MAC_CHECK(proc_check_expose_task, cred, pident);
 438
 439         return error;
 440 }
 441
 442 int
 443 mac_proc_check_inherit_ipc_ports(struct proc *p, struct vnode *cur_vp, off_t cur_offset, struct vnode *img_vp, off_t img_offset, struct vnode *scriptvp)
 444 {
 445         int error;
 446
 447         MAC_CHECK(proc_check_inherit_ipc_ports, p, cur_vp, cur_offset, img_vp, img_offset, scriptvp);
 448
 449         return error;
 450 }
 451
 452 /*
 453  * The type of maxprot in proc_check_map_anon must be equivalent to vm_prot_t
 454  * (defined in <mach/vm_prot.h>). mac_policy.h does not include any header
 455  * files, so cannot use the typedef itself.
 456  */
 457 int
 458 mac_proc_check_map_anon(proc_t proc, user_addr_t u_addr,
 459     user_size_t u_size, int prot, int flags, int *maxprot)
 460 {
 461         kauth_cred_t cred;
 462         int error;
 463
 464 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
 465         /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
 466         if (!mac_vm_enforce) {
 467                 return 0;
 468         }
 469 #endif
 470         if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(proc)) {
 471                 return 0;
 472         }
 473
 474         cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(proc);
 475         MAC_CHECK(proc_check_map_anon, proc, cred, u_addr, u_size, prot, flags, maxprot);
 476         kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
 477
 478         return error;
 479 }
 480
 481 int
 482 mac_proc_check_mprotect(proc_t proc,
 483     user_addr_t addr, user_size_t size, int prot)
 484 {
 485         kauth_cred_t cred;
 486         int error;
 487
 488 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
 489         /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
 490         if (!mac_vm_enforce) {
 491                 return 0;
 492         }
 493 #endif
 494         if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(proc)) {
 495                 return 0;
 496         }
 497
 498         cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(proc);
 499         MAC_CHECK(proc_check_mprotect, cred, proc, addr, size, prot);
 500         kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
 501
 502         return error;
 503 }
 504
 505 int
 506 mac_proc_check_run_cs_invalid(proc_t proc)
 507 {
 508         int error;
 509
 510 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
 511         /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
 512         if (!mac_vm_enforce) {
 513                 return 0;
 514         }
 515 #endif
 516
 517         MAC_CHECK(proc_check_run_cs_invalid, proc);
 518
 519         return error;
 520 }
 521
 522 void
 523 mac_proc_notify_cs_invalidated(proc_t proc)
 524 {
 525         MAC_PERFORM(proc_notify_cs_invalidated, proc);
 526 }
 527
 528 int
 529 mac_proc_check_sched(proc_t curp, struct proc *proc)
 530 {
 531         kauth_cred_t cred;
 532         int error;
 533
 534 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
 535         /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
 536         if (!mac_proc_enforce) {
 537                 return 0;
 538         }
 539 #endif
 540         if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp)) {
 541                 return 0;
 542         }
 543
 544         cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
 545         MAC_CHECK(proc_check_sched, cred, proc);
 546         kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
 547
 548         return error;
 549 }
 550
 551 int
 552 mac_proc_check_signal(proc_t curp, struct proc *proc, int signum)
 553 {
 554         kauth_cred_t cred;
 555         int error;
 556
 557 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
 558         /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
 559         if (!mac_proc_enforce) {
 560                 return 0;
 561         }
 562 #endif
 563         if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp)) {
 564                 return 0;
 565         }
 566
 567         cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
 568         MAC_CHECK(proc_check_signal, cred, proc, signum);
 569         kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
 570
 571         return error;
 572 }
 573
 574 int
 575 mac_proc_check_syscall_unix(proc_t curp, int scnum)
 576 {
 577         int error;
 578
 579 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
 580         /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
 581         if (!mac_proc_enforce) {
 582                 return 0;
 583         }
 584 #endif
 585         if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp)) {
 586                 return 0;
 587         }
 588
 589         MAC_CHECK(proc_check_syscall_unix, curp, scnum);
 590
 591         return error;
 592 }
 593
 594 int
 595 mac_proc_check_wait(proc_t curp, struct proc *proc)
 596 {
 597         kauth_cred_t cred;
 598         int error;
 599
 600 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
 601         /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
 602         if (!mac_proc_enforce) {
 603                 return 0;
 604         }
 605 #endif
 606         if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp)) {
 607                 return 0;
 608         }
 609
 610         cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
 611         MAC_CHECK(proc_check_wait, cred, proc);
 612         kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
 613
 614         return error;
 615 }
 616
 617 void
 618 mac_proc_notify_exit(struct proc *proc)
 619 {
 620         MAC_PERFORM(proc_notify_exit, proc);
 621 }
 622
 623 int
 624 mac_proc_check_suspend_resume(proc_t proc, int sr)
 625 {
 626         kauth_cred_t cred;
 627         int error;
 628
 629 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
 630         /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
 631         if (!mac_proc_enforce) {
 632                 return 0;
 633         }
 634 #endif
 635         if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(current_proc())) {
 636                 return 0;
 637         }
 638
 639         cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(current_proc());
 640         MAC_CHECK(proc_check_suspend_resume, cred, proc, sr);
 641         kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
 642
 643         return error;
 644 }
 645
 646 int
 647 mac_proc_check_ledger(proc_t curp, proc_t proc, int ledger_op)
 648 {
 649         kauth_cred_t cred;
 650         int error = 0;
 651
 652 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
 653         /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
 654         if (!mac_proc_enforce) {
 655                 return 0;
 656         }
 657 #endif
 658         if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp)) {
 659                 return 0;
 660         }
 661
 662         cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
 663         MAC_CHECK(proc_check_ledger, cred, proc, ledger_op);
 664         kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
 665
 666         return error;
 667 }
 668
 669 int
 670 mac_proc_check_proc_info(proc_t curp, proc_t target, int callnum, int flavor)
 671 {
 672         kauth_cred_t cred;
 673         int error = 0;
 674
 675 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
 676         /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
 677         if (!mac_proc_enforce) {
 678                 return 0;
 679         }
 680 #endif
 681         if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp)) {
 682                 return 0;
 683         }
 684
 685         cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
 686         MAC_CHECK(proc_check_proc_info, cred, target, callnum, flavor);
 687         kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
 688
 689         return error;
 690 }
 691
 692 int
 693 mac_proc_check_get_cs_info(proc_t curp, proc_t target, unsigned int op)
 694 {
 695         kauth_cred_t cred;
 696         int error = 0;
 697
 698 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
 699         /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
 700         if (!mac_proc_enforce) {
 701                 return 0;
 702         }
 703 #endif
 704         if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp)) {
 705                 return 0;
 706         }
 707
 708         cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
 709         MAC_CHECK(proc_check_get_cs_info, cred, target, op);
 710         kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
 711
 712         return error;
 713 }
 714
 715 int
 716 mac_proc_check_set_cs_info(proc_t curp, proc_t target, unsigned int op)
 717 {
 718         kauth_cred_t cred;
 719         int error = 0;
 720
 721 #if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
 722         /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
 723         if (!mac_proc_enforce) {
 724                 return 0;
 725         }
 726 #endif
 727         if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp)) {
 728                 return 0;
 729         }
 730
 731         cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
 732         MAC_CHECK(proc_check_set_cs_info, cred, target, op);
 733         kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
 734
 735         return error;
 736 }