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1 /*
2 * Copyright (c) 2009-2010,2012-2014 Apple Inc. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * @APPLE_LICENSE_HEADER_START@
5 *
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23 */
24
25 /*!
26 @header SecOCSPCache
27 The functions provided in SecOCSPCache.h provide an interface to
28 an OCSP caching module.
29 */
30
31 #ifndef _SECURITY_SECOCSPCACHE_H_
32 #define _SECURITY_SECOCSPCACHE_H_
33
34 #include <securityd/SecOCSPRequest.h>
35 #include <securityd/SecOCSPResponse.h>
36 #include <CoreFoundation/CFURL.h>
37
38 __BEGIN_DECLS
39
40
41 void SecOCSPCacheReplaceResponse(SecOCSPResponseRef old_response,
42 SecOCSPResponseRef response, CFURLRef localResponderURI, CFAbsoluteTime verifyTime);
43
44 SecOCSPResponseRef SecOCSPCacheCopyMatching(SecOCSPRequestRef request,
45 CFURLRef localResponderURI /* may be NULL */);
46
47 __END_DECLS
48
49 #endif /* _SECURITY_SECOCSPCACHE_H_ */
50
51 #if 0
52 /*
53 Experation policy assumptions:
54 - We never check revocation status of anchors, whether they be system anchors,
55 passed in anchors or anchors hardcoded in a policy.
56 - Revocation information is cached for positive reponses for a limited time.
57 - Revocation information can be cached for negative reponses for an unlimited time.
58 - Revocation information need never be kept around after the certificate has expired (unless we still check after the cert has expired like we were talking about for EERI).
59 - Revocation information records that are used and still valid should be kept longer.
60 - We can set an upper limit in number of records (or certificates) in the cache.
61 - We can set an upper limit on total space consumed by the cache.
62 Questions:
63 - Remember bad server responses too? some ocsp responders required signed requests which we don't support, so we could consider caching the 6 (Not Authorized or something) response.
64
65 Data needed per type of revocation record to implement this policy.
66
67 Caching policy:
68 - Deleting cache should not be user option.
69 - Cache should surrvive backups.
70 - Negative caching as long as possible.
71
72 CRL certificate stati:
73 unspecified, keyCompromise, cACompromise,
74 affiliationChanged, superseded, cessationOfOperation,
75 certificateHold, removeFromCRL, privilegeWithdrawn,
76 aACompromise, the special value UNREVOKED, or the special
77 value UNDETERMINED. This variable is initialized to the
78 special value UNREVOKED.
79
80 CRL Timestamp values:
81 - thisUpdate
82 - nextUpdate (optional but not really 5280 says CAs must provide it even though ASN.1 is optional)
83 (no producedAt in CRLs, that's what thisUpdate is by definition it seems).
84
85
86 OCSP Timestamp values:
87 thisUpdate = May 1, 2005 01:00:00 GMT
88 nextUpdate = May 3, 2005 01:00:00 GMT (optional abscence means update available any time)
89 productedAt = May 1, 2005 01:00:00 GMT
90
91 PER CERTIFICATE RETURN in INFO
92
93 Revocation object used: OCSP Response, mapping from
94 reasons-> (CRL + most current delta CRL), Error Object (with status code).
95 -- good
96 -- revoked
97 -- unknown
98
99 other exceptions (unsigned responses):
100 -- malformedRequest
101 -- internalError
102 -- tryLater
103 -- sigRequired
104 -- unauthorized (5019 The response "unauthorized" is returned in cases where the client
105 is not authorized to make this query to this server or the server
106 is not capable of responding authoritatively. (Expired certs might get this answer too))
107
108
109 CRL signer chain rules:
110 1) Must use same anchor as cert itself.
111 This implies that we can only cache the validity of a leaf or intermediate certificate for CRL checking based on the mapping:
112 (certificate, path anchor, use_deltas) -> Revocation_status (unspecified, keyCompromise, cACompromise,
113 affiliationChanged, superseded, cessationOfOperation,certificateHold, removeFromCRL, privilegeWithdrawn,aACompromise, UNREVOKED, UNDETERMINED).
114
115 OCSP signer chain rules:
116 (Wikipedia confirmed in rfc): The key that signs a response need not be the same key that signed the certificate. The certificate's issuer may delegate another authority to be the OCSP responder. In this case, the responder's certificate (the one that is used to sign the response) must be issued by the issuer of the certificate in question, and must include a certain extension that marks it as an OCSP signing authority (more precisely, an extended key usage extension with the OID {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) keyPurpose(3) ocspSigning(9)})
117
118 rfc text of the wikipedia: Therefore, a certificate's issuer MUST either sign the OCSP
119 responses itself or it MUST explicitly designate this authority to
120 another entity. OCSP signing delegation SHALL be designated by the
121 inclusion of id-kp-OCSPSigning in an extendedKeyUsage certificate
122 extension included in the OCSP response signer's certificate. This
123 certificate MUST be issued directly by the CA that issued the
124 certificate in question.
125
126 rfc: If ocsp signing cert has id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck extension we don't check it's revocation status.
127
128 (certificate, direct issuer certificate) -> Revocation_status good (UNREVOKED) revoked revocationTime, CRLReason (unspecified, keyCompromise, cACompromise,affiliationChanged, superseded, cessationOfOperation,certificateHold, removeFromCRL, privilegeWithdrawn,aACompromise) unknown (UNDETERMINED).
129
130 ocsp CertID ::= SEQUENCE {
131 hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
132 issuerNameHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of Issuer's DN
133 issuerKeyHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of Issuers public key
134 serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber }
135 )
136
137 In order to accomadate the responder using a different hashAlgorithm than we used in the request we need to recalc these from the cert itself.
138
139 If all we have is a list of ocspresponses without knowing where they came from, we have to calculate the hashes of our issuerName and issuerKey for each hashAlgorithm we have cached ocsp responses for (optionally after limiting our candidates to those with matching serialNumbers first).
140
141 SELECT from ocsp_cache hashAlgorithm WHERE serialNumber = <SERIAL>
142
143 for hix = 0 hix < hashAlgorithms.count
144 ALG(hix).id = hashAlgorithms(hix)
145
146 SELECT from ocsp_cache response WHERE serialNumber = <SERIAL> hashAlgorithm = ALG(hix).id issuerNameHash = ALG(hix).hash(issuer) issuerKeyHash = ALG(hix).hash(key)
147
148
149
150
151
152
153 Notes for Matt:
154 - ttl in amfi cache (to force recheck when ocsp response is invalid)?
155 - Periodic check before launch to remove in band waiting for ocsp response?
156
157 Notes on Nonces in ocsp request and responses. Only ask for nonce if we think server supports it (no way to know today). Fall back on time based validity checking if reponse has no nonce, even if we asked for one
158
159 Note on CRL checking and experation and retries of OCSP checking.
160 Clients MAY attempt to retrieve the CRL if no
161 OCSPResponse is received from the responder after a locally
162 configured timeout and number of retries..
163
164
165
166 CRL/OCSP cache design idea:
167
168 revocation status table:
169
170 rowid certhash issuer-rowid lastUsed thisUpdate producedAt nextUpdate revocationTime revocationStatus
171
172 cacheAddOCSP(path, index_of_cert_resp_is_for, ocspResp)
173 cacheAddCRLStatus(path, index_of_cert_in_path, nextUpdate, revocationTime, revocationStatus)
174 (revocationTime, revocationStatus) = cacheLookupStatus(path, ix)
175
176 Return a list of parent certificate hashes for the current leaf. If a result is returned, we have a candiate path leading up to an anchor, for which we already trust the signature in the chain and revocation information has been checked.
177
178 CFArrayRef cacheSuggestParentsHashesFor(cert)
179
180 for crl based status root must match root of path. For ocsp status issuer must match issuer of leaf in path
181
182 presence in the cache means cert chain leading to an anchor is valid, and signed properly and trusted by the ocsp or crl policy, revocation status for cert is valid until the time indicated by nextUpdate. Cert chain itself may or may not be valid but that's checked by the policy engine.
183
184 If a chain isn't properly signed or fails to satisfy the crl policy, it should not be in the cache.
185
186 ocsp cache
187
188 rowid ocspResponse (responder) lastUsed nextUpdate
189
190 hashAlgorithm->(issuerNameHash,issuerKeyHash,serialNumber)->response
191
192
193 crl cache ()
194
195 crlDistributionPoint (reasons) crl thisUpdate nextUpdate isDelta
196
197
198 crlEntry cache table
199 (certHash anchorHash) crlIssuer revocationStatus revocationTime expires lastUsed
200 crlTable
201 (crlIssuer anchorHash distributionPointURL?) crl sigVerified expires
202 ocspEntry cache table
203 (certHash parentHash ocspReponderID) hashAlg revocationStatus revocationTime expires lastUsed
204 ocspTable
205 ((hashAlg, pubKeyHash, issuerHash, serialNum) anchorHash) ocspResponse sigVerified expires
206
207 or
208 cert cache table
209 (certHash parentHash anchorHash) crlEntryID ocspID
210
211 crlEntry cache table
212 (crlEntryID anchorHash) crlIssuer revocationStatus revocationTime
213
214 crlIssuerTable
215 (crlIssuer anchorHash) crl sigVerified
216
217 ocsp table
218 (ocspID) ocspResponse
219
220
221 but so does caching the raw response as a link to a blob table containing crls
222 and ocsp-responses
223 But also cache the revocationStatus for a (cert,parent) or (cert,anchor) via
224 a link to a cached ocspResponse or revocationStatus and revocationTime entry from crl
225 */
226
227 #endif