libsecurity_smime/lib/cmsrecinfo.c

   1 /*
   2  * The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public
   3  * License Version 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file
   4  * except in compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of
   5  * the License at http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/
   6  *
   7  * Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS
   8  * IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or
   9  * implied. See the License for the specific language governing
  10  * rights and limitations under the License.
  11  *
  12  * The Original Code is the Netscape security libraries.
  13  *
  14  * The Initial Developer of the Original Code is Netscape
  15  * Communications Corporation.  Portions created by Netscape are
  16  * Copyright (C) 1994-2000 Netscape Communications Corporation.  All
  17  * Rights Reserved.
  18  *
  19  * Contributor(s):
  20  *
  21  * Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the
  22  * terms of the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the
  23  * "GPL"), in which case the provisions of the GPL are applicable
  24  * instead of those above.  If you wish to allow use of your
  25  * version of this file only under the terms of the GPL and not to
  26  * allow others to use your version of this file under the MPL,
  27  * indicate your decision by deleting the provisions above and
  28  * replace them with the notice and other provisions required by
  29  * the GPL.  If you do not delete the provisions above, a recipient
  30  * may use your version of this file under either the MPL or the
  31  * GPL.
  32  */
  33
  34 /*
  35  * CMS recipientInfo methods.
  36  */
  37
  38 #include "cmslocal.h"
  39
  40 #include "cert.h"
  41 #include "SecAsn1Item.h"
  42 #include "secoid.h"
  43
  44 #include <security_asn1/secasn1.h>
  45 #include <security_asn1/secerr.h>
  46 #include <security_asn1/secport.h>
  47
  48 #include <Security/SecKeyPriv.h>
  49 #include <Security/SecCertificatePriv.h>
  50 #include <Security/SecCertificateInternal.h>
  51
  52 #include "SecCmsRecipientInfo.h"
  53
  54 static Boolean
  55 nss_cmsrecipientinfo_usessubjectkeyid(SecCmsRecipientInfoRef ri)
  56 {
  57     if (ri->recipientInfoType == SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKeyTrans) {
  58         SecCmsRecipientIdentifier *rid;
  59         rid = &ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.recipientIdentifier;
  60         if (rid->identifierType == SecCmsRecipientIDSubjectKeyID) {
  61             return PR_TRUE;
  62         }
  63     }
  64     return PR_FALSE;
  65 }
  66
  67
  68 static SecCmsRecipientInfoRef
  69 nss_cmsrecipientinfo_create(SecCmsEnvelopedDataRef envd, SecCmsRecipientIDSelector type,
  70                             SecCertificateRef cert, SecPublicKeyRef pubKey,
  71                             const SecAsn1Item *subjKeyID)
  72 {
  73     SecCmsRecipientInfoRef ri;
  74     void *mark;
  75     SECOidTag certalgtag;
  76     OSStatus rv = SECSuccess;
  77     SecCmsRecipientEncryptedKey *rek;
  78     SecCmsOriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oiok;
  79     unsigned long version;
  80     SecAsn1Item * dummy;
  81     PLArenaPool *poolp;
  82     const SECAlgorithmID *algid;
  83     SECAlgorithmID freeAlgID;
  84
  85     SecCmsRecipientIdentifier *rid;
  86
  87     poolp = envd->contentInfo.cmsg->poolp;
  88
  89     mark = PORT_ArenaMark(poolp);
  90
  91     ri = (SecCmsRecipientInfoRef)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(poolp, sizeof(SecCmsRecipientInfo));
  92     if (ri == NULL)
  93         goto loser;
  94
  95     ri->envelopedData = envd;
  96
  97 #if USE_CDSA_CRYPTO
  98     if (type == SecCmsRecipientIDIssuerSN)
  99     {
 100         rv = SecCertificateGetAlgorithmID(cert,&algid);
 101     } else {
 102         PORT_Assert(pubKey);
 103         rv = SecKeyGetAlgorithmID(pubKey,&algid);
 104     }
 105 #else
 106     ri->cert = CERT_DupCertificate(cert);
 107     if (ri->cert == NULL)
 108         goto loser;
 109
 110     const SecAsn1AlgId *length_data_swapped = (const SecAsn1AlgId *)SecCertificateGetPublicKeyAlgorithm(cert);
 111     freeAlgID.algorithm.Length = (size_t)length_data_swapped->algorithm.Data;
 112     freeAlgID.algorithm.Data = (uint8_t *)length_data_swapped->algorithm.Length;
 113     freeAlgID.parameters.Length = (size_t)length_data_swapped->parameters.Data;
 114     freeAlgID.parameters.Data = (uint8_t *)length_data_swapped->parameters.Length;
 115     algid = &freeAlgID;
 116 #endif
 117
 118     certalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(algid);
 119
 120     rid = &ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.recipientIdentifier;
 121     switch (certalgtag) {
 122     case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
 123         ri->recipientInfoType = SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKeyTrans;
 124         rid->identifierType = type;
 125         if (type == SecCmsRecipientIDIssuerSN) {
 126             rid->id.issuerAndSN = CERT_GetCertIssuerAndSN(poolp, cert);
 127             if (rid->id.issuerAndSN == NULL) {
 128               break;
 129             }
 130         } else if (type == SecCmsRecipientIDSubjectKeyID){
 131
 132             rid->id.subjectKeyID = PORT_ArenaNew(poolp, SecAsn1Item);
 133             if (rid->id.subjectKeyID == NULL) {
 134                 rv = SECFailure;
 135                 PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
 136                 break;
 137             }
 138             SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, rid->id.subjectKeyID, subjKeyID);
 139             if (rid->id.subjectKeyID->Data == NULL) {
 140                 rv = SECFailure;
 141                 PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
 142                 break;
 143             }
 144
 145 #if 0
 146             SecCmsKeyTransRecipientInfoEx *riExtra;
 147             riExtra = &ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfoEx;
 148             riExtra->version = 0;
 149             riExtra->pubKey = SECKEY_CopyPublicKey(pubKey);
 150             if (riExtra->pubKey == NULL) {
 151                 rv = SECFailure;
 152                 PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
 153                 break;
 154             }
 155 #endif
 156         } else {
 157             PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
 158             rv = SECFailure;
 159         }
 160         break;
 161     case SEC_OID_MISSI_KEA_DSS_OLD:
 162     case SEC_OID_MISSI_KEA_DSS:
 163     case SEC_OID_MISSI_KEA:
 164         PORT_Assert(type != SecCmsRecipientIDSubjectKeyID);
 165         if (type == SecCmsRecipientIDSubjectKeyID) {
 166             rv = SECFailure;
 167             break;
 168         }
 169         /* backward compatibility - this is not really a keytrans operation */
 170         ri->recipientInfoType = SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKeyTrans;
 171         /* hardcoded issuerSN choice for now */
 172         ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.recipientIdentifier.identifierType = SecCmsRecipientIDIssuerSN;
 173         ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.recipientIdentifier.id.issuerAndSN = CERT_GetCertIssuerAndSN(poolp, cert);
 174         if (ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.recipientIdentifier.id.issuerAndSN == NULL) {
 175             rv = SECFailure;
 176             break;
 177         }
 178         break;
 179     case SEC_OID_X942_DIFFIE_HELMAN_KEY: /* dh-public-number */
 180         PORT_Assert(type != SecCmsRecipientIDSubjectKeyID);
 181         if (type == SecCmsRecipientIDSubjectKeyID) {
 182             rv = SECFailure;
 183             break;
 184         }
 185         /* a key agreement op */
 186         ri->recipientInfoType = SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKeyAgree;
 187
 188         if (ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.recipientIdentifier.id.issuerAndSN == NULL) {
 189             rv = SECFailure;
 190             break;
 191         }
 192         /* we do not support the case where multiple recipients
 193          * share the same KeyAgreeRecipientInfo and have multiple RecipientEncryptedKeys
 194          * in this case, we would need to walk all the recipientInfos, take the
 195          * ones that do KeyAgreement algorithms and join them, algorithm by algorithm
 196          * Then, we'd generate ONE ukm and OriginatorIdentifierOrKey */
 197
 198         /* only epheremal-static Diffie-Hellman is supported for now
 199          * this is the only form of key agreement that provides potential anonymity
 200          * of the sender, plus we do not have to include certs in the message */
 201
 202         /* force single recipientEncryptedKey for now */
 203         if ((rek = SecCmsRecipientEncryptedKeyCreate(poolp)) == NULL) {
 204             rv = SECFailure;
 205             break;
 206         }
 207
 208         /* hardcoded IssuerSN choice for now */
 209         rek->recipientIdentifier.identifierType = SecCmsKeyAgreeRecipientIDIssuerSN;
 210         if ((rek->recipientIdentifier.id.issuerAndSN = CERT_GetCertIssuerAndSN(poolp, cert)) == NULL) {
 211             rv = SECFailure;
 212             break;
 213         }
 214
 215         oiok = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.originatorIdentifierOrKey);
 216
 217         /* see RFC2630 12.3.1.1 */
 218         oiok->identifierType = SecCmsOriginatorIDOrKeyOriginatorPublicKey;
 219
 220         rv = SecCmsArrayAdd(poolp, (void ***)&ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.recipientEncryptedKeys,
 221                                     (void *)rek);
 222
 223         break;
 224     default:
 225         /* other algorithms not supported yet */
 226         /* NOTE that we do not support any KEK algorithm */
 227         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
 228         rv = SECFailure;
 229         break;
 230     }
 231
 232     if (rv == SECFailure)
 233         goto loser;
 234
 235     /* set version */
 236     switch (ri->recipientInfoType) {
 237     case SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKeyTrans:
 238         if (ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.recipientIdentifier.identifierType == SecCmsRecipientIDIssuerSN)
 239             version = SEC_CMS_KEYTRANS_RECIPIENT_INFO_VERSION_ISSUERSN;
 240         else
 241             version = SEC_CMS_KEYTRANS_RECIPIENT_INFO_VERSION_SUBJKEY;
 242         dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeInteger(poolp, &(ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.version), version);
 243         if (dummy == NULL)
 244             goto loser;
 245         break;
 246     case SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKeyAgree:
 247         dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeInteger(poolp, &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.version),
 248                                                 SEC_CMS_KEYAGREE_RECIPIENT_INFO_VERSION);
 249         if (dummy == NULL)
 250             goto loser;
 251         break;
 252     case SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKEK:
 253         /* NOTE: this cannot happen as long as we do not support any KEK algorithm */
 254         dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeInteger(poolp, &(ri->ri.kekRecipientInfo.version),
 255                                                 SEC_CMS_KEK_RECIPIENT_INFO_VERSION);
 256         if (dummy == NULL)
 257             goto loser;
 258         break;
 259
 260     }
 261
 262     if (SecCmsEnvelopedDataAddRecipient(envd, ri))
 263         goto loser;
 264
 265     PORT_ArenaUnmark (poolp, mark);
 266 #if 0
 267     if (freeSpki)
 268       SECKEY_DestroySubjectPublicKeyInfo(freeSpki);
 269 #endif
 270     return ri;
 271
 272 loser:
 273 #if 0
 274     if (freeSpki)
 275       SECKEY_DestroySubjectPublicKeyInfo(freeSpki);
 276 #endif
 277     PORT_ArenaRelease (poolp, mark);
 278     return NULL;
 279 }
 280
 281 /*
 282  * SecCmsRecipientInfoCreate - create a recipientinfo
 283  *
 284  * we currently do not create KeyAgreement recipientinfos with multiple
 285  * recipientEncryptedKeys the certificate is supposed to have been
 286  * verified by the caller
 287  */
 288 SecCmsRecipientInfoRef
 289 SecCmsRecipientInfoCreate(SecCmsEnvelopedDataRef envd, SecCertificateRef cert)
 290 {
 291 #if 0
 292     SecCmsRecipientInfoRef info = SecCmsRecipientInfoCreateWithSubjKeyIDFromCert(envd, cert);
 293
 294     if (info)
 295         return info;
 296     else
 297 #endif
 298         return nss_cmsrecipientinfo_create(envd, SecCmsRecipientIDIssuerSN, cert,
 299                                        NULL, NULL);
 300 }
 301
 302 SecCmsRecipientInfoRef
 303 SecCmsRecipientInfoCreateWithSubjKeyID(SecCmsEnvelopedDataRef envd,
 304                                      const SecAsn1Item * subjKeyID,
 305                                      SecPublicKeyRef pubKey)
 306 {
 307     return nss_cmsrecipientinfo_create(envd, SecCmsRecipientIDSubjectKeyID,
 308                                        NULL, pubKey, subjKeyID);
 309 }
 310
 311 #if USE_CDSA_CRYPTO
 312 SecCmsRecipientInfoRef
 313 SecCmsRecipientInfoCreateWithSubjKeyIDFromCert(SecCmsEnvelopedDataRef envd,
 314                                              SecCertificateRef cert)
 315 {
 316     SecPublicKeyRef pubKey = NULL;
 317     SecAsn1Item subjKeyID = {0, NULL};
 318     SecCmsRecipientInfoRef retVal = NULL;
 319
 320     if (!envd || !cert) {
 321         return NULL;
 322     }
 323     pubKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert);
 324     if (!pubKey) {
 325         goto done;
 326     }
 327     if (CERT_FindSubjectKeyIDExtension(cert, &subjKeyID) != SECSuccess ||
 328         subjKeyID.Data == NULL) {
 329         goto done;
 330     }
 331     retVal = SecCmsRecipientInfoCreateWithSubjKeyID(envd, &subjKeyID, pubKey);
 332 done:
 333     if (pubKey)
 334         SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey);
 335
 336     if (subjKeyID.Data)
 337         SECITEM_FreeItem(&subjKeyID, PR_FALSE);
 338
 339     return retVal;
 340 }
 341 #else
 342 SecCmsRecipientInfoRef
 343 SecCmsRecipientInfoCreateWithSubjKeyIDFromCert(SecCmsEnvelopedDataRef envd,
 344                                                SecCertificateRef cert)
 345 {
 346     SecPublicKeyRef pubKey = NULL;
 347     SecAsn1Item subjKeyID = {0, NULL};
 348     SecCmsRecipientInfoRef retVal = NULL;
 349     CFDataRef subjectKeyIDData = NULL;
 350
 351     if (!envd || !cert) {
 352         return NULL;
 353     }
 354     subjectKeyIDData = SecCertificateGetSubjectKeyID(cert);
 355     if (!subjectKeyIDData)
 356         goto done;
 357     subjKeyID.Length =
 358     CFDataGetLength(subjectKeyIDData);
 359     subjKeyID.Data = (uint8_t *)CFDataGetBytePtr(subjectKeyIDData);
 360     retVal = nss_cmsrecipientinfo_create(envd, SecCmsRecipientIDSubjectKeyID,
 361                                          cert, pubKey, &subjKeyID);
 362
 363 done:
 364
 365     return retVal;
 366 }
 367 #endif
 368
 369 void
 370 SecCmsRecipientInfoDestroy(SecCmsRecipientInfoRef ri)
 371 {
 372     /* version was allocated on the pool, so no need to destroy it */
 373     /* issuerAndSN was allocated on the pool, so no need to destroy it */
 374     if (ri->cert != NULL)
 375         CERT_DestroyCertificate(ri->cert);
 376
 377     if (nss_cmsrecipientinfo_usessubjectkeyid(ri)) {
 378         SecCmsKeyTransRecipientInfoEx *extra;
 379         extra = &ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfoEx;
 380         if (extra->pubKey)
 381             SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(extra->pubKey);
 382     }
 383
 384     /* recipientInfo structure itself was allocated on the pool, so no need to destroy it */
 385     /* we're done. */
 386 }
 387
 388 int
 389 SecCmsRecipientInfoGetVersion(SecCmsRecipientInfoRef ri)
 390 {
 391     unsigned long version;
 392     SecAsn1Item * versionitem = NULL;
 393
 394     switch (ri->recipientInfoType) {
 395     case SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKeyTrans:
 396         /* ignore subIndex */
 397         versionitem = &(ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.version);
 398         break;
 399     case SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKEK:
 400         /* ignore subIndex */
 401         versionitem = &(ri->ri.kekRecipientInfo.version);
 402         break;
 403     case SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKeyAgree:
 404         versionitem = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.version);
 405         break;
 406     }
 407
 408     PORT_Assert(versionitem);
 409     if (versionitem == NULL)
 410         return 0;
 411
 412     /* always take apart the SecAsn1Item */
 413     if (SEC_ASN1DecodeInteger(versionitem, &version) != SECSuccess)
 414         return 0;
 415     else
 416         return (int)version;
 417 }
 418
 419 SecAsn1Item *
 420 SecCmsRecipientInfoGetEncryptedKey(SecCmsRecipientInfoRef ri, int subIndex)
 421 {
 422     SecAsn1Item * enckey = NULL;
 423
 424     switch (ri->recipientInfoType) {
 425     case SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKeyTrans:
 426         /* ignore subIndex */
 427         enckey = &(ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.encKey);
 428         break;
 429     case SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKEK:
 430         /* ignore subIndex */
 431         enckey = &(ri->ri.kekRecipientInfo.encKey);
 432         break;
 433     case SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKeyAgree:
 434         enckey = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.recipientEncryptedKeys[subIndex]->encKey);
 435         break;
 436     }
 437     return enckey;
 438 }
 439
 440
 441 SECOidTag
 442 SecCmsRecipientInfoGetKeyEncryptionAlgorithmTag(SecCmsRecipientInfoRef ri)
 443 {
 444     SECOidTag encalgtag = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN; /* an invalid encryption alg */
 445
 446     switch (ri->recipientInfoType) {
 447     case SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKeyTrans:
 448         encalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg));
 449         break;
 450     case SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKeyAgree:
 451         encalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg));
 452         break;
 453     case SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKEK:
 454         encalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(ri->ri.kekRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg));
 455         break;
 456     }
 457     return encalgtag;
 458 }
 459
 460 OSStatus
 461 SecCmsRecipientInfoWrapBulkKey(SecCmsRecipientInfoRef ri, SecSymmetricKeyRef bulkkey,
 462                                  SECOidTag bulkalgtag)
 463 {
 464     SecCertificateRef cert;
 465     SECOidTag certalgtag;
 466     OSStatus rv = SECSuccess;
 467 #if 0
 468     SecAsn1Item * params = NULL;
 469     SecCmsRecipientEncryptedKey *rek;
 470     SecCmsOriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oiok;
 471 #endif /* 0 */
 472     const SECAlgorithmID *algid;
 473     PLArenaPool *poolp;
 474     SecCmsKeyTransRecipientInfoEx *extra = NULL;
 475     Boolean usesSubjKeyID;
 476
 477     poolp = ri->envelopedData->contentInfo.cmsg->poolp;
 478     cert = ri->cert;
 479     usesSubjKeyID = nss_cmsrecipientinfo_usessubjectkeyid(ri);
 480     if (cert) {
 481 #if USE_CDSA_CRYPTO
 482         rv = SecCertificateGetAlgorithmID(cert,&algid);
 483         if (rv)
 484             return SECFailure;
 485 #else
 486         SECAlgorithmID freeAlgID;
 487         const SecAsn1AlgId *length_data_swapped = (const SecAsn1AlgId *)SecCertificateGetPublicKeyAlgorithm(cert);
 488         freeAlgID.algorithm.Length = (size_t)length_data_swapped->algorithm.Data;
 489         freeAlgID.algorithm.Data = (uint8_t *)length_data_swapped->algorithm.Length;
 490         freeAlgID.parameters.Length = (size_t)length_data_swapped->parameters.Data;
 491         freeAlgID.parameters.Data = (uint8_t *)length_data_swapped->parameters.Length;
 492         algid = &freeAlgID;
 493 #endif
 494     } else if (usesSubjKeyID) {
 495         extra = &ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfoEx;
 496         /* sanity check */
 497         PORT_Assert(extra->pubKey);
 498         if (!extra->pubKey) {
 499             PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
 500             return SECFailure;
 501         }
 502 #if USE_CDSA_CRYPTO
 503         rv = SecKeyGetAlgorithmID(extra->pubKey,&algid);
 504         if (rv)
 505 #endif
 506             return SECFailure;
 507         certalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(algid);
 508     } else {
 509         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
 510         return SECFailure;
 511     }
 512
 513     /* XXX set ri->recipientInfoType to the proper value here */
 514     /* or should we look if it's been set already ? */
 515
 516     certalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(algid);
 517     switch (certalgtag) {
 518     case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
 519         /* wrap the symkey */
 520         if (cert) {
 521             rv = SecCmsUtilEncryptSymKeyRSA(poolp, cert, bulkkey,
 522                                  &ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.encKey);
 523             if (rv != SECSuccess)
 524                 break;
 525         } else if (usesSubjKeyID) {
 526             PORT_Assert(extra != NULL);
 527             rv = SecCmsUtilEncryptSymKeyRSAPubKey(poolp, extra->pubKey,
 528                                  bulkkey, &ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.encKey);
 529             if (rv != SECSuccess)
 530                 break;
 531         }
 532
 533         rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(poolp, &(ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg), certalgtag, NULL);
 534         break;
 535 #if 0
 536     case SEC_OID_MISSI_KEA_DSS_OLD:
 537     case SEC_OID_MISSI_KEA_DSS:
 538     case SEC_OID_MISSI_KEA:
 539         rv = SecCmsUtilEncryptSymKeyMISSI(poolp, cert, bulkkey,
 540                                         bulkalgtag,
 541                                         &ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.encKey,
 542                                         &params, ri->cmsg->pwfn_arg);
 543         if (rv != SECSuccess)
 544             break;
 545
 546         /* here, we DO need to pass the params to the wrap function because, with
 547          * RSA, there is no funny stuff going on with generation of IV vectors or so */
 548         rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(poolp, &(ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg), certalgtag, params);
 549         break;
 550     case SEC_OID_X942_DIFFIE_HELMAN_KEY: /* dh-public-number */
 551         rek = ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.recipientEncryptedKeys[0];
 552         if (rek == NULL) {
 553             rv = SECFailure;
 554             break;
 555         }
 556
 557         oiok = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.originatorIdentifierOrKey);
 558         PORT_Assert(oiok->identifierType == SecCmsOriginatorIDOrKeyOriginatorPublicKey);
 559
 560         /* see RFC2630 12.3.1.1 */
 561         if (SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(poolp, &oiok->id.originatorPublicKey.algorithmIdentifier,
 562                                     SEC_OID_X942_DIFFIE_HELMAN_KEY, NULL) != SECSuccess) {
 563             rv = SECFailure;
 564             break;
 565         }
 566
 567         /* this will generate a key pair, compute the shared secret, */
 568         /* derive a key and ukm for the keyEncAlg out of it, encrypt the bulk key with */
 569         /* the keyEncAlg, set encKey, keyEncAlg, publicKey etc. */
 570         rv = SecCmsUtilEncryptSymKeyESDH(poolp, cert, bulkkey,
 571                                         &rek->encKey,
 572                                         &ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.ukm,
 573                                         &ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg,
 574                                         &oiok->id.originatorPublicKey.publicKey);
 575
 576         break;
 577 #endif /* 0 */
 578     default:
 579         /* other algorithms not supported yet */
 580         /* NOTE that we do not support any KEK algorithm */
 581         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
 582         rv = SECFailure;
 583         break;
 584     }
 585 #if 0
 586     if (freeSpki)
 587         SECKEY_DestroySubjectPublicKeyInfo(freeSpki);
 588 #endif
 589
 590     return rv;
 591 }
 592
 593 SecSymmetricKeyRef
 594 SecCmsRecipientInfoUnwrapBulkKey(SecCmsRecipientInfoRef ri, int subIndex,
 595         SecCertificateRef cert, SecPrivateKeyRef privkey, SECOidTag bulkalgtag)
 596 {
 597     SecSymmetricKeyRef bulkkey = NULL;
 598     SECAlgorithmID *encalg;
 599     SECOidTag encalgtag;
 600     SecAsn1Item * enckey;
 601     int error;
 602
 603     ri->cert = CERT_DupCertificate(cert);
 604                 /* mark the recipientInfo so we can find it later */
 605
 606     switch (ri->recipientInfoType) {
 607     case SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKeyTrans:
 608         encalg = &(ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg);
 609         encalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg));
 610         enckey = &(ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.encKey); /* ignore subIndex */
 611         switch (encalgtag) {
 612         case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
 613             /* RSA encryption algorithm: */
 614             /* get the symmetric (bulk) key by unwrapping it using our private key */
 615             bulkkey = SecCmsUtilDecryptSymKeyRSA(privkey, enckey, bulkalgtag);
 616             break;
 617 #if 0
 618         case SEC_OID_NETSCAPE_SMIME_KEA:
 619             /* FORTEZZA key exchange algorithm */
 620             /* the supplemental data is in the parameters of encalg */
 621             bulkkey = SecCmsUtilDecryptSymKeyMISSI(privkey, enckey, encalg, bulkalgtag, ri->cmsg->pwfn_arg);
 622             break;
 623 #endif /* 0 */
 624         default:
 625             error = SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG;
 626             goto loser;
 627         }
 628         break;
 629     case SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKeyAgree:
 630         encalg = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg);
 631         encalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg));
 632         enckey = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.recipientEncryptedKeys[subIndex]->encKey);
 633         switch (encalgtag) {
 634         case SEC_OID_X942_DIFFIE_HELMAN_KEY:
 635             /* Diffie-Helman key exchange */
 636             /* XXX not yet implemented */
 637             /* XXX problem: SEC_OID_X942_DIFFIE_HELMAN_KEY points to a PKCS3 mechanism! */
 638             /* we support ephemeral-static DH only, so if the recipientinfo */
 639             /* has originator stuff in it, we punt (or do we? shouldn't be that hard...) */
 640             /* first, we derive the KEK (a symkey!) using a Derive operation, then we get the */
 641             /* content encryption key using a Unwrap op */
 642             /* the derive operation has to generate the key using the algorithm in RFC2631 */
 643             error = SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG;
 644             break;
 645         default:
 646             error = SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG;
 647             goto loser;
 648         }
 649         break;
 650     case SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKEK:
 651         encalg = &(ri->ri.kekRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg);
 652         encalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(ri->ri.kekRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg));
 653         enckey = &(ri->ri.kekRecipientInfo.encKey);
 654         /* not supported yet */
 655         error = SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG;
 656         goto loser;
 657         break;
 658     }
 659     /* XXXX continue here */
 660     return bulkkey;
 661
 662 loser:
 663     return NULL;
 664 }