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1 /*
2 * Copyright (c) 2000-2001,2011-2014 Apple Inc. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * The contents of this file constitute Original Code as defined in and are
5 * subject to the Apple Public Source License Version 1.2 (the 'License').
6 * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. Please obtain
7 * a copy of the License at http://www.apple.com/publicsource and read it before
8 * using this file.
9 *
10 * This Original Code and all software distributed under the License are
11 * distributed on an 'AS IS' basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS
12 * OR IMPLIED, AND APPLE HEREBY DISCLAIMS ALL SUCH WARRANTIES, INCLUDING WITHOUT
13 * LIMITATION, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
14 * PURPOSE, QUIET ENJOYMENT OR NON-INFRINGEMENT. Please see the License for the
15 * specific language governing rights and limitations under the License.
16 */
17
18
19 /*
20 * tpCertGroup.cpp - Cert group functions (construct, verify)
21 */
22
23 #include "AppleTPSession.h"
24 #include "certGroupUtils.h"
25 #include "TPCertInfo.h"
26 #include "TPCrlInfo.h"
27 #include "tpCertAllowList.h"
28 #include "tpPolicies.h"
29 #include "tpdebugging.h"
30 #include "tpCrlVerify.h"
31 #include <Security/oidsalg.h>
32 #include <Security/cssmapple.h>
33
34 /*
35 * This is a temporary hack to allow verification of PKINIT server certs
36 * which are self-signed and not in the system anchors list. If the self-
37 * signed cert is in a magic keychain (whose location is not published),
38 * we'll allow it as if it were indeed a full-fledged anchor cert.
39 */
40 #define TP_PKINIT_SERVER_HACK 1
41 #if TP_PKINIT_SERVER_HACK
42
43 #include <Security/SecKeychain.h>
44 #include <Security/SecKeychainSearch.h>
45 #include <Security/SecCertificate.h>
46 #include <Security/oidscert.h>
47 #include <sys/types.h>
48 #include <pwd.h>
49
50 #define CFRELEASE(cf) if(cf) { CFRelease(cf); }
51
52 /*
53 * Returns true if we are to allow/trust the specified
54 * cert as a PKINIT-only anchor.
55 */
56 static bool tpCheckPkinitServerCert(
57 TPCertGroup &certGroup)
58 {
59 /*
60 * Basic requirement: exactly one cert, self-signed.
61 * The numCerts == 1 requirement might change...
62 */
63 unsigned numCerts = certGroup.numCerts();
64 if(numCerts != 1) {
65 tpDebug("tpCheckPkinitServerCert: too many certs");
66 return false;
67 }
68 /* end of chain... */
69 TPCertInfo *theCert = certGroup.certAtIndex(numCerts - 1);
70 if(!theCert->isSelfSigned()) {
71 tpDebug("tpCheckPkinitServerCert: 1 cert, not self-signed");
72 return false;
73 }
74 const CSSM_DATA *subjectName = theCert->subjectName();
75
76 /*
77 * Open the magic keychain.
78 * We're going up and over the Sec layer here, not generally
79 * kosher, but this is a hack.
80 */
81 OSStatus ortn;
82 SecKeychainRef kcRef = NULL;
83 string fullPathName;
84 const char *homeDir = getenv("HOME");
85 if (homeDir == NULL)
86 {
87 // If $HOME is unset get the current user's home directory
88 // from the passwd file.
89 uid_t uid = geteuid();
90 if (!uid) uid = getuid();
91 struct passwd *pw = getpwuid(uid);
92 if (!pw) {
93 return false;
94 }
95 homeDir = pw->pw_dir;
96 }
97 fullPathName = homeDir;
98 fullPathName += "/Library/Application Support/PKINIT/TrustedServers.keychain";
99 ortn = SecKeychainOpen(fullPathName.c_str(), &kcRef);
100 if(ortn) {
101 tpDebug("tpCheckPkinitServerCert: keychain not found (1)");
102 return false;
103 }
104 /* subsequent errors to errOut: */
105
106 bool ourRtn = false;
107 SecKeychainStatus kcStatus;
108 CSSM_DATA_PTR subjSerial = NULL;
109 CSSM_RETURN crtn;
110 SecKeychainSearchRef srchRef = NULL;
111 SecKeychainAttributeList attrList;
112 SecKeychainAttribute attrs[2];
113 SecKeychainItemRef foundItem = NULL;
114
115 ortn = SecKeychainGetStatus(kcRef, &kcStatus);
116 if(ortn) {
117 tpDebug("tpCheckPkinitServerCert: keychain not found (2)");
118 goto errOut;
119 }
120
121 /*
122 * We already have this cert's normalized name; get its
123 * serial number.
124 */
125 crtn = theCert->fetchField(&CSSMOID_X509V1SerialNumber, &subjSerial);
126 if(crtn) {
127 /* should never happen */
128 tpDebug("tpCheckPkinitServerCert: error fetching serial number");
129 goto errOut;
130 }
131
132 attrs[0].tag = kSecSubjectItemAttr;
133 attrs[0].length = (UInt32)subjectName->Length;
134 attrs[0].data = subjectName->Data;
135 attrs[1].tag = kSecSerialNumberItemAttr;
136 attrs[1].length = (UInt32)subjSerial->Length;
137 attrs[1].data = subjSerial->Data;
138 attrList.count = 2;
139 attrList.attr = attrs;
140
141 ortn = SecKeychainSearchCreateFromAttributes(kcRef,
142 kSecCertificateItemClass,
143 &attrList,
144 &srchRef);
145 if(ortn) {
146 tpDebug("tpCheckPkinitServerCert: search failure");
147 goto errOut;
148 }
149 for(;;) {
150 ortn = SecKeychainSearchCopyNext(srchRef, &foundItem);
151 if(ortn) {
152 tpDebug("tpCheckPkinitServerCert: end search");
153 break;
154 }
155
156 /* found a matching cert; do byte-for-byte compare */
157 CSSM_DATA certData;
158 ortn = SecCertificateGetData((SecCertificateRef)foundItem, &certData);
159 if(ortn) {
160 tpDebug("tpCheckPkinitServerCert: SecCertificateGetData failure");
161 continue;
162 }
163 if(tpCompareCssmData(&certData, theCert->itemData())){
164 tpDebug("tpCheckPkinitServerCert: FOUND CERT");
165 ourRtn = true;
166 break;
167 }
168 tpDebug("tpCheckPkinitServerCert: skipping matching cert");
169 CFRelease(foundItem);
170 foundItem = NULL;
171 }
172 errOut:
173 CFRELEASE(kcRef);
174 CFRELEASE(srchRef);
175 CFRELEASE(foundItem);
176 if(subjSerial != NULL) {
177 theCert->freeField(&CSSMOID_X509V1SerialNumber, subjSerial);
178 }
179 return ourRtn;
180 }
181 #endif /* TP_PKINIT_SERVER_HACK */
182
183 /*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
184 * CertGroupConstruct
185 *
186 * Description:
187 * This function returns a pointer to a mallocd CSSM_CERTGROUP which
188 * refers to a mallocd list of raw ordered X.509 certs which verify back as
189 * far as the TP is able to go. The first cert of the returned list is the
190 * subject cert. The TP will attempt to search thru the DBs passed in
191 * DBList in order to complete the chain. The chain is completed when a
192 * self-signed (root) cert is found in the chain. The root cert may be
193 * present in the input CertGroupFrag, or it may have been obtained from
194 * one of the DBs passed in DBList. It is not an error if no root cert is
195 * found.
196 *
197 * The error conditions are:
198 * -- The first cert of CertGroupFrag is an invalid cert. NULL is returned,
199 * err = CSSM_TP_INVALID_CERTIFICATE.
200 * -- The root cert (if found) fails to verify. Valid certgroup is returned,
201 * err = CSSMERR_TP_VERIFICATION_FAILURE.
202 * -- Any cert in the (possibly partially) constructed chain has expired or
203 * isn't valid yet, err = CSSMERR_TP_CERT_EXPIRED or
204 * CSSMERR_TP_CERT_NOT_VALID_YET. A CertGroup is returned.
205 * -- CSSMERR_TP_CERT_EXPIRED and CSSMERR_TP_CERT_NOT_VALID_YET. If one of these
206 * conditions obtains for the first (leaf) cert, the function throws this
207 * error immediately and the outgoing cert group is empty. For subsequent certs,
208 * the temporal validity of a cert is only tested AFTER a cert successfully
209 * meets the cert chaining criteria (subject/issuer match and signature
210 * verify). A cert in a chain with this error is not added to the outgoing
211 * cert group.
212 * -- the usual errors like bad handle or memory failure.
213 *
214 * Parameters:
215 * Two handles - to an open CL and CSP. The CSP must be capable of
216 * dealing with the signature algorithms used by the certs. The CL must be
217 * an X.509-savvy CL.
218 *
219 * CertGroupFrag, an unordered array of raw X.509 certs in the form of a
220 * CSSM_CERTGROUP_PTR. The first cert of this list is the subject cert
221 * which is eventually to be verified. The other certs can be in any order
222 * and may not even have any relevance to the cert chain being constructed.
223 * They may also be invalid certs.
224 *
225 * DBList, a list of DB/DL handles which may contain certs necessary to
226 * complete the desired cert chain. (Not currently implemented.)
227 *
228 *---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
229
230 /* public version */
231 void AppleTPSession::CertGroupConstruct(CSSM_CL_HANDLE clHand,
232 CSSM_CSP_HANDLE cspHand,
233 const CSSM_DL_DB_LIST &DBList,
234 const void *ConstructParams,
235 const CSSM_CERTGROUP &CertGroupFrag,
236 CSSM_CERTGROUP_PTR &CertGroup)
237 {
238 TPCertGroup outCertGroup(*this, TGO_Caller);
239 TPCertGroup inCertGroup(CertGroupFrag,
240 clHand,
241 cspHand,
242 *this,
243 NULL, // cssmTimeStr
244 true, // firstCertMustBeValid
245 TGO_Group);
246
247 /* set up for disposal of TPCertInfos created by CertGroupConstructPriv */
248 TPCertGroup gatheredCerts(*this, TGO_Group);
249
250 CSSM_RETURN constructReturn = CSSM_OK;
251 CSSM_APPLE_TP_ACTION_FLAGS actionFlags = 0;
252 CSSM_BOOL verifiedToRoot; // not used
253 CSSM_BOOL verifiedToAnchor; // not used
254 CSSM_BOOL verifiedViaTrustSetting; // not used
255
256 try {
257 CertGroupConstructPriv(clHand,
258 cspHand,
259 inCertGroup,
260 &DBList,
261 NULL, // cssmTimeStr
262 /* no anchors */
263 0, NULL,
264 actionFlags,
265 /* no user trust */
266 NULL, NULL, 0, 0,
267 gatheredCerts,
268 verifiedToRoot,
269 verifiedToAnchor,
270 verifiedViaTrustSetting,
271 outCertGroup);
272 }
273 catch(const CssmError &cerr) {
274 constructReturn = cerr.error;
275 /* abort if no certs found */
276 if(outCertGroup.numCerts() == 0) {
277 CssmError::throwMe(constructReturn);
278 }
279 }
280 CertGroup = outCertGroup.buildCssmCertGroup();
281 /* caller of this function never gets evidence... */
282 outCertGroup.freeDbRecords();
283
284 if(constructReturn) {
285 CssmError::throwMe(constructReturn);
286 }
287 }
288
289
290 /*
291 * Private version of CertGroupConstruct, used by CertGroupConstruct and
292 * CertGroupVerify. Populates a TP-style TPCertGroup for further processing.
293 * This only throws CSSM-style exceptions in the following cases:
294 *
295 * -- input parameter errors
296 * -- the first (leaf) cert is bad (doesn't parse, expired, not valid yet).
297 * -- root found but it doesn't self-verify
298 *
299 * All other cert-related errors simply result in the bad cert being ignored.
300 * Other exceptions are gross system errors like malloc failure.
301 */
302 void AppleTPSession::CertGroupConstructPriv(CSSM_CL_HANDLE clHand,
303 CSSM_CSP_HANDLE cspHand,
304 TPCertGroup &inCertGroup,
305 const CSSM_DL_DB_LIST *DBList, // optional here
306 const char *cssmTimeStr, // optional
307
308 /* trusted anchors, optional */
309 /* FIXME - maybe this should be a TPCertGroup */
310 uint32 numAnchorCerts,
311 const CSSM_DATA *anchorCerts,
312
313 /* CSSM_TP_ACTION_FETCH_CERT_FROM_NET, CSSM_TP_ACTION_TRUST_SETTINGS */
314 CSSM_APPLE_TP_ACTION_FLAGS actionFlags,
315
316 /* optional user trust parameters */
317 const CSSM_OID *policyOid,
318 const char *policyStr,
319 uint32 policyStrLen,
320 SecTrustSettingsKeyUsage keyUse,
321
322 /*
323 * Certs to be freed by caller (i.e., TPCertInfo which we allocate
324 * as a result of using a cert from anchorCerts or dbList) are added
325 * to this group.
326 */
327 TPCertGroup &certsToBeFreed,
328
329 /* returned */
330 CSSM_BOOL &verifiedToRoot, // end of chain self-verifies
331 CSSM_BOOL &verifiedToAnchor, // end of chain in anchors
332 CSSM_BOOL &verifiedViaTrustSetting, // chain ends per User Trust setting
333 TPCertGroup &outCertGroup) // RETURNED
334 {
335 TPCertInfo *subjectCert; // the one we're working on
336 CSSM_RETURN outErr = CSSM_OK;
337
338 /* this'll be the first subject cert in the main loop */
339 subjectCert = inCertGroup.certAtIndex(0);
340
341 /* Append leaf cert to outCertGroup */
342 outCertGroup.appendCert(subjectCert);
343 subjectCert->isLeaf(true);
344 subjectCert->isFromInputCerts(true);
345 outCertGroup.setAllUnused();
346 subjectCert->used(true);
347
348 outErr = outCertGroup.buildCertGroup(
349 *subjectCert,
350 &inCertGroup,
351 DBList,
352 clHand,
353 cspHand,
354 cssmTimeStr,
355 numAnchorCerts,
356 anchorCerts,
357 certsToBeFreed,
358 &certsToBeFreed, // gatheredCerts to accumulate net/DB fetches
359 CSSM_TRUE, // subjectIsInGroup - enables root check on
360 // subject cert
361 actionFlags,
362 policyOid,
363 policyStr,
364 policyStrLen,
365 keyUse,
366
367 verifiedToRoot,
368 verifiedToAnchor,
369 verifiedViaTrustSetting);
370 if(outErr) {
371 CssmError::throwMe(outErr);
372 }
373 }
374
375 /*
376 * Map a policy OID to one of the standard (non-revocation) policies.
377 * Returns true if it's a standard policy.
378 */
379 static bool checkPolicyOid(
380 const CSSM_OID &oid,
381 TPPolicy &tpPolicy) /* RETURNED */
382 {
383 if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_SSL)) {
384 tpPolicy = kTP_SSL;
385 return true;
386 }
387 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_X509_BASIC)) {
388 tpPolicy = kTPx509Basic;
389 return true;
390 }
391 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_SMIME)) {
392 tpPolicy = kTP_SMIME;
393 return true;
394 }
395 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_EAP)) {
396 tpPolicy = kTP_EAP;
397 return true;
398 }
399 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_SW_UPDATE_SIGNING)) {
400 /* note: this was CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_CODE_SIGN until 8/15/06 */
401 tpPolicy = kTP_SWUpdateSign;
402 return true;
403 }
404 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_RESOURCE_SIGN)) {
405 tpPolicy = kTP_ResourceSign;
406 return true;
407 }
408 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_IP_SEC)) {
409 tpPolicy = kTP_IPSec;
410 return true;
411 }
412 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_ICHAT)) {
413 tpPolicy = kTP_iChat;
414 return true;
415 }
416 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_ISIGN)) {
417 tpPolicy = kTPiSign;
418 return true;
419 }
420 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_PKINIT_CLIENT)) {
421 tpPolicy = kTP_PKINIT_Client;
422 return true;
423 }
424 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_PKINIT_SERVER)) {
425 tpPolicy = kTP_PKINIT_Server;
426 return true;
427 }
428 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_CODE_SIGNING)) {
429 tpPolicy = kTP_CodeSigning;
430 return true;
431 }
432 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_PACKAGE_SIGNING)) {
433 tpPolicy = kTP_PackageSigning;
434 return true;
435 }
436 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_MACAPPSTORE_RECEIPT)) {
437 tpPolicy = kTP_MacAppStoreRec;
438 return true;
439 }
440 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_APPLEID_SHARING)) {
441 tpPolicy = kTP_AppleIDSharing;
442 return true;
443 }
444 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_TIMESTAMPING)) {
445 tpPolicy = kTP_TimeStamping;
446 return true;
447 }
448 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_PASSBOOK_SIGNING)) {
449 tpPolicy = kTP_PassbookSigning;
450 return true;
451 }
452 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_MOBILE_STORE)) {
453 tpPolicy = kTP_MobileStore;
454 return true;
455 }
456 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_TEST_MOBILE_STORE)) {
457 tpPolicy = kTP_TestMobileStore;
458 return true;
459 }
460 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_ESCROW_SERVICE)) {
461 tpPolicy = kTP_EscrowService;
462 return true;
463 }
464 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_PROFILE_SIGNING)) {
465 tpPolicy = kTP_ProfileSigning;
466 return true;
467 }
468 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_QA_PROFILE_SIGNING)) {
469 tpPolicy = kTP_QAProfileSigning;
470 return true;
471 }
472 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_PCS_ESCROW_SERVICE)) {
473 tpPolicy = kTP_PCSEscrowService;
474 return true;
475 }
476 return false;
477 }
478
479 /*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
480 * CertGroupVerify
481 *
482 * Description:
483 * -- Construct a cert chain using TP_CertGroupConstruct.
484 * -- Attempt to verify that cert chain against one of the known
485 * good certs passed in AnchorCerts.
486 * -- Optionally enforces additional policies (TBD) when verifying the cert chain.
487 * -- Optionally returns the entire cert chain constructed in
488 * TP_CertGroupConstruct and here, all the way to an anchor cert or as
489 * far as we were able to go, in *Evidence.
490 *
491 * Parameters:
492 * Two handles - to an open CL and CSP. The CSP must be capable of
493 * dealing with the signature algorithms used by the certs. The CL must be
494 * an X.509-savvy CL.
495 *
496 * RawCerts, an unordered array of raw certs in the form of a
497 * CSSM_CERTGROUP_PTR. The first cert of this list is the subject cert
498 * which is eventually to be verified. The other certs can be in any order
499 * and may not even have any relevance to the cert chain being constructed.
500 * They may also be invalid certs.
501 *
502 * DBList, a list of DB/DL handles which may contain certs necessary to
503 * complete the desired cert chain. (Currently not implemented.)
504 *
505 * AnchorCerts, a list of known trusted certs.
506 * NumberOfAnchorCerts, size of AnchorCerts array.
507 *
508 * PolicyIdentifiers, Optional policy OID. NULL indicates default
509 * X.509 trust policy.
510 *
511 * Supported Policies:
512 * CSSMOID_APPLE_ISIGN
513 * CSSMOID_APPLE_X509_BASIC
514 *
515 * For both of these, the associated FieldValue must be {0, NULL},
516 *
517 * NumberOfPolicyIdentifiers, size of PolicyIdentifiers array, must be
518 * zero or one.
519 *
520 * All other arguments must be zero/NULL.
521 *
522 * Returns:
523 * CSSM_OK : cert chain verified all the way back to an AnchorCert.
524 * CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_ANCHOR_CERT : In this case, the cert chain
525 * was validated back to a self-signed (root) cert found in either
526 * CertToBeVerified or in one of the DBs in DBList, but that root cert
527 * was *NOT* found in the AnchorCert list.
528 * CSSMERR_TP_NOT_TRUSTED: no root cert was found and no AnchorCert
529 * verified the end of the constructed cert chain.
530 * CSSMERR_TP_VERIFICATION_FAILURE: a root cert was found which does
531 * not self-verify.
532 * CSSMERR_TP_VERIFY_ACTION_FAILED: indicates a failure of the requested
533 * policy action.
534 * CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_CERTIFICATE: indicates a bad leaf cert.
535 * CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_REQUEST_INPUTS : no incoming VerifyContext.
536 * CSSMERR_TP_CERT_EXPIRED and CSSMERR_TP_CERT_NOT_VALID_YET: see comments
537 * for CertGroupConstruct.
538 * CSSMERR_TP_CERTIFICATE_CANT_OPERATE : issuer cert was found with a partial
539 * public key, rendering full verification impossible.
540 * CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_CERT_AUTHORITY : issuer cert was found with a partial
541 * public key and which failed to perform subsequent signature
542 * verification.
543 *---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
544
545 void AppleTPSession::CertGroupVerify(CSSM_CL_HANDLE clHand,
546 CSSM_CSP_HANDLE cspHand,
547 const CSSM_CERTGROUP &CertGroupToBeVerified,
548 const CSSM_TP_VERIFY_CONTEXT *VerifyContext,
549 CSSM_TP_VERIFY_CONTEXT_RESULT_PTR VerifyContextResult)
550 {
551 CSSM_BOOL verifiedToRoot = CSSM_FALSE;
552 CSSM_BOOL verifiedToAnchor = CSSM_FALSE;
553 CSSM_BOOL verifiedViaTrustSetting = CSSM_FALSE;
554 CSSM_RETURN constructReturn = CSSM_OK;
555 CSSM_RETURN policyReturn = CSSM_OK;
556 const CSSM_TP_CALLERAUTH_CONTEXT *cred;
557 /* declare volatile as compiler workaround to avoid caching in CR4 */
558 const CSSM_APPLE_TP_ACTION_DATA * volatile actionData = NULL;
559 CSSM_TIMESTRING cssmTimeStr;
560 CSSM_APPLE_TP_ACTION_FLAGS actionFlags = 0;
561 CSSM_TP_STOP_ON tpStopOn = 0;
562
563 /* keep track of whether we did policy checking; if not, we do defaults */
564 bool didCertPolicy = false;
565 bool didRevokePolicy = false;
566
567 /* user trust parameters */
568 CSSM_OID utNullPolicy = {0, NULL};
569 const CSSM_OID *utPolicyOid = NULL;
570 const char *utPolicyStr = NULL;
571 uint32 utPolicyStrLen = 0;
572 SecTrustSettingsKeyUsage utKeyUse = 0;
573 bool utTrustSettingEnabled = false;
574
575 if(VerifyContextResult) {
576 memset(VerifyContextResult, 0, sizeof(*VerifyContextResult));
577 }
578
579 /* verify input args, skipping the ones checked by CertGroupConstruct */
580 if((VerifyContext == NULL) || (VerifyContext->Cred == NULL)) {
581 /* the spec says that this is optional but we require it */
582 CssmError::throwMe(CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_REQUEST_INPUTS);
583 }
584 cred = VerifyContext->Cred;
585
586 /* Optional ActionData affecting all policies */
587 actionData = (CSSM_APPLE_TP_ACTION_DATA * volatile)VerifyContext->ActionData.Data;
588 if(actionData != NULL) {
589 switch(actionData->Version) {
590 case CSSM_APPLE_TP_ACTION_VERSION:
591 if(VerifyContext->ActionData.Length !=
592 sizeof(CSSM_APPLE_TP_ACTION_DATA)) {
593 CssmError::throwMe(CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_ACTION_DATA);
594 }
595 break;
596 /* handle backwards versions here if we ever go beyond version 0 */
597 default:
598 CssmError::throwMe(CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_ACTION_DATA);
599 }
600 actionFlags = actionData->ActionFlags;
601 if(actionFlags & CSSM_TP_ACTION_TRUST_SETTINGS) {
602 utTrustSettingEnabled = true;
603 }
604 }
605
606 /* optional, may be NULL */
607 cssmTimeStr = cred->VerifyTime;
608
609 tpStopOn = cred->VerificationAbortOn;
610 switch(tpStopOn) {
611 /* the only two we support */
612 case CSSM_TP_STOP_ON_NONE:
613 case CSSM_TP_STOP_ON_FIRST_FAIL:
614 break;
615 /* default maps to stop on first fail */
616 case CSSM_TP_STOP_ON_POLICY:
617 tpStopOn = CSSM_TP_STOP_ON_FIRST_FAIL;
618 break;
619 default:
620 CssmError::throwMe(CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_STOP_ON_POLICY);
621 }
622
623 /* now the args we can't deal with */
624 if(cred->CallerCredentials != NULL) {
625 CssmError::throwMe(CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_CALLERAUTH_CONTEXT_POINTER);
626 }
627 /* ...any others? */
628
629 /* set up for optional user trust evaluation */
630 if(utTrustSettingEnabled) {
631 const CSSM_TP_POLICYINFO *pinfo = &cred->Policy;
632 TPPolicy utPolicy = kTPx509Basic;
633
634 /* default policy OID in case caller hasn't specified one */
635 utPolicyOid = &utNullPolicy;
636 if(pinfo->NumberOfPolicyIds == 0) {
637 tpTrustSettingsDbg("CertGroupVerify: User trust enabled but no policies (1)");
638 /* keep going, I guess - no policy-specific info - use kTPx509Basic */
639 }
640 else {
641 CSSM_FIELD_PTR utPolicyField = &pinfo->PolicyIds[0];
642 utPolicyOid = &utPolicyField->FieldOid;
643 bool foundPolicy = checkPolicyOid(*utPolicyOid, utPolicy);
644 if(!foundPolicy) {
645 tpTrustSettingsDbg("CertGroupVerify: User trust enabled but no policies");
646 /* keep going, I guess - no policy-specific info - use kTPx509Basic */
647 }
648 else {
649 /* get policy-specific info */
650 tp_policyTrustSettingParams(utPolicy, &utPolicyField->FieldValue,
651 &utPolicyStr, &utPolicyStrLen, &utKeyUse);
652 }
653 }
654 }
655
656 /* get verified (possibly partial) outCertGroup - error is fatal */
657 /* BUT: we still return partial evidence if asked to...from now on. */
658 TPCertGroup outCertGroup(*this,
659 TGO_Caller); // certs are owned by inCertGroup
660 TPCertGroup inCertGroup(CertGroupToBeVerified, clHand, cspHand, *this,
661 cssmTimeStr, // optional 'this' time
662 true, // firstCertMustBeValid
663 TGO_Group);
664
665 /* set up for disposal of TPCertInfos created by CertGroupConstructPriv */
666 TPCertGroup gatheredCerts(*this, TGO_Group);
667
668 try {
669 CertGroupConstructPriv(
670 clHand,
671 cspHand,
672 inCertGroup,
673 cred->DBList,
674 cssmTimeStr,
675 cred->NumberOfAnchorCerts,
676 cred->AnchorCerts,
677 actionFlags,
678 utPolicyOid,
679 utPolicyStr,
680 utPolicyStrLen,
681 utKeyUse,
682 gatheredCerts,
683 verifiedToRoot,
684 verifiedToAnchor,
685 verifiedViaTrustSetting,
686 outCertGroup);
687 }
688 catch(const CssmError &cerr) {
689 constructReturn = cerr.error;
690 /* abort if no certs found */
691 if(outCertGroup.numCerts() == 0) {
692 CssmError::throwMe(constructReturn);
693 }
694 /* else press on, collecting as much info as we can */
695 }
696 /* others are way fatal */
697 assert(outCertGroup.numCerts() >= 1);
698
699 /* Infer interim status from return values */
700 switch(constructReturn) {
701 /* these values do not get overridden */
702 case CSSMERR_TP_CERTIFICATE_CANT_OPERATE:
703 case CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_CERT_AUTHORITY:
704 case CSSMERR_APPLETP_TRUST_SETTING_DENY:
705 case errSecInvalidTrustSettings:
706 break;
707 default:
708 /* infer status from these values... */
709 if(verifiedToAnchor || verifiedViaTrustSetting) {
710 /* full success; anchor doesn't have to be root */
711 constructReturn = CSSM_OK;
712 }
713 else if(verifiedToRoot) {
714 if(actionFlags & CSSM_TP_ACTION_IMPLICIT_ANCHORS) {
715 constructReturn = CSSM_OK;
716 }
717 else {
718 /* verified to root which is not an anchor */
719 constructReturn = CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_ANCHOR_CERT;
720 }
721 }
722 else {
723 /* partial chain, no root, not verifiable by anchor */
724 constructReturn = CSSMERR_TP_NOT_TRUSTED;
725 }
726
727 /*
728 * Those errors can be allowed, cert-chain-wide, per individual
729 * certs' allowedErrors
730 */
731 if((constructReturn != CSSM_OK) &&
732 outCertGroup.isAllowedError(constructReturn)) {
733 constructReturn = CSSM_OK;
734 }
735
736 /*
737 * Allow non-trusted root if whitelist check permits
738 */
739 if (constructReturn == CSSMERR_TP_NOT_TRUSTED) {
740 constructReturn = tpCheckCertificateAllowList(outCertGroup);
741 }
742 break;
743 }
744
745 /*
746 * Parameters passed to tp_policyVerify() and which vary per policy
747 * in the loop below
748 */
749 TPPolicy tpPolicy;
750 const CSSM_APPLE_TP_SSL_OPTIONS *sslOpts;
751 CSSM_RETURN thisPolicyRtn = CSSM_OK; // returned from tp_policyVerify()
752
753 /* common CRL verify parameters */
754 TPCrlGroup *crlGroup = NULL;
755 try {
756 crlGroup = new TPCrlGroup(&VerifyContext->Crls,
757 clHand, cspHand,
758 *this, // alloc
759 NULL, // cssmTimeStr - we want CRLs that are valid 'now'
760 TGO_Group);
761 }
762 catch(const CssmError &cerr) {
763 CSSM_RETURN cr = cerr.error;
764 /* I don't see a straightforward way to report this error,
765 * other than adding it to the leaf cert's status... */
766 outCertGroup.certAtIndex(0)->addStatusCode(cr);
767 tpDebug("CertGroupVerify: error constructing CrlGroup; continuing\n");
768 }
769 /* others are way fatal */
770
771 TPVerifyContext revokeVfyContext(*this,
772 clHand,
773 cspHand,
774 cssmTimeStr,
775 cred->NumberOfAnchorCerts,
776 cred->AnchorCerts,
777 &inCertGroup,
778 crlGroup,
779 /*
780 * This may consist of certs gathered from the net (which is the purpose
781 * of this argument) and from DLDBs (a side-effect optimization).
782 */
783 gatheredCerts,
784 cred->DBList,
785 kRevokeNone, // policy
786 actionFlags,
787 NULL, // CRL options
788 NULL, // OCSP options
789 utPolicyOid,
790 utPolicyStr,
791 utPolicyStrLen,
792 utKeyUse);
793
794 /* true if we're to execute tp_policyVerify at end of loop */
795 bool doPolicyVerify;
796 /* true if we're to execute a revocation policy at end of loop */
797 bool doRevocationPolicy;
798
799 /* grind thru each policy */
800 for(uint32 polDex=0; polDex<cred->Policy.NumberOfPolicyIds; polDex++) {
801 if(cred->Policy.PolicyIds == NULL) {
802 policyReturn = CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_POLICY_IDENTIFIERS;
803 break;
804 }
805 CSSM_FIELD_PTR policyId = &cred->Policy.PolicyIds[polDex];
806 const CSSM_DATA *fieldVal = &policyId->FieldValue;
807 const CSSM_OID *oid = &policyId->FieldOid;
808 thisPolicyRtn = CSSM_OK;
809 doPolicyVerify = false;
810 doRevocationPolicy = false;
811 sslOpts = NULL;
812
813 /* first the basic cert policies */
814 doPolicyVerify = checkPolicyOid(*oid, tpPolicy);
815 if(doPolicyVerify) {
816 /* some basic checks... */
817 bool policyAbort = false;
818 switch(tpPolicy) {
819 case kTPx509Basic:
820 case kTPiSign:
821 case kTP_PKINIT_Client:
822 case kTP_PKINIT_Server:
823 if(fieldVal->Data != NULL) {
824 policyReturn = CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_POLICY_IDENTIFIERS;
825 policyAbort = true;
826 break;
827 }
828 break;
829 default:
830 break;
831 }
832 if(policyAbort) {
833 break;
834 }
835 #if TP_PKINIT_SERVER_HACK
836 if(tpPolicy == kTP_PKINIT_Server) {
837 /* possible override of "root not in anchors" */
838 if(constructReturn == CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_ANCHOR_CERT) {
839 if(tpCheckPkinitServerCert(outCertGroup)) {
840 constructReturn = CSSM_OK;
841 }
842 }
843 }
844 #endif /* TP_PKINIT_SERVER_HACK */
845 }
846
847 /*
848 * Now revocation policies. Note some fields in revokeVfyContext can
849 * accumulate across multiple policy calls, e.g., signerCerts.
850 */
851 else if(tpCompareOids(oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_REVOCATION_CRL)) {
852 /* CRL-specific options */
853 const CSSM_APPLE_TP_CRL_OPTIONS *crlOpts;
854 crlOpts = (CSSM_APPLE_TP_CRL_OPTIONS *)fieldVal->Data;
855 thisPolicyRtn = CSSM_OK;
856 if(crlOpts != NULL) {
857 switch(crlOpts->Version) {
858 case CSSM_APPLE_TP_CRL_OPTS_VERSION:
859 if(fieldVal->Length !=
860 sizeof(CSSM_APPLE_TP_CRL_OPTIONS)) {
861 thisPolicyRtn =
862 CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_POLICY_IDENTIFIERS;
863 break;
864 }
865 break;
866 /* handle backwards compatibility here if necessary */
867 default:
868 thisPolicyRtn = CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_POLICY_IDENTIFIERS;
869 break;
870 }
871 if(thisPolicyRtn != CSSM_OK) {
872 policyReturn = thisPolicyRtn;
873 break;
874 }
875 }
876 revokeVfyContext.policy = kRevokeCrlBasic;
877 revokeVfyContext.crlOpts = crlOpts;
878 doRevocationPolicy = true;
879 }
880 else if(tpCompareOids(oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_REVOCATION_OCSP)) {
881 /* OCSP-specific options */
882 const CSSM_APPLE_TP_OCSP_OPTIONS *ocspOpts;
883 ocspOpts = (CSSM_APPLE_TP_OCSP_OPTIONS *)fieldVal->Data;
884 thisPolicyRtn = CSSM_OK;
885 if(ocspOpts != NULL) {
886 switch(ocspOpts->Version) {
887 case CSSM_APPLE_TP_OCSP_OPTS_VERSION:
888 if(fieldVal->Length !=
889 sizeof(CSSM_APPLE_TP_OCSP_OPTIONS)) {
890 thisPolicyRtn =
891 CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_POLICY_IDENTIFIERS;
892 break;
893 }
894 break;
895 /* handle backwards compatibility here if necessary */
896 default:
897 thisPolicyRtn = CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_POLICY_IDENTIFIERS;
898 break;
899 }
900 if(thisPolicyRtn != CSSM_OK) {
901 policyReturn = thisPolicyRtn;
902 break;
903 }
904 }
905 revokeVfyContext.policy = kRevokeOcsp;
906 revokeVfyContext.ocspOpts = ocspOpts;
907 doRevocationPolicy = true;
908 }
909 /* etc. - add more policies here */
910 else {
911 /* unknown TP policy OID */
912 policyReturn = CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_POLICY_IDENTIFIERS;
913 break;
914 }
915
916 /* common cert policy call */
917 if(doPolicyVerify) {
918 assert(!doRevocationPolicy); // one at a time
919 thisPolicyRtn = tp_policyVerify(tpPolicy,
920 *this,
921 clHand,
922 cspHand,
923 &outCertGroup,
924 verifiedToRoot,
925 verifiedViaTrustSetting,
926 actionFlags,
927 fieldVal,
928 cred->Policy.PolicyControl); // not currently used
929 didCertPolicy = true;
930 }
931 /* common revocation policy call */
932 if(doRevocationPolicy) {
933 assert(!doPolicyVerify); // one at a time
934 thisPolicyRtn = tpRevocationPolicyVerify(revokeVfyContext, outCertGroup);
935 didRevokePolicy = true;
936 }
937 /* See if possible error is allowed, cert-chain-wide. */
938 if((thisPolicyRtn != CSSM_OK) &&
939 outCertGroup.isAllowedError(thisPolicyRtn)) {
940 thisPolicyRtn = CSSM_OK;
941 }
942 if(thisPolicyRtn) {
943 /* Now remember the error if it's the first policy
944 * error we've seen. */
945 if(policyReturn == CSSM_OK) {
946 policyReturn = thisPolicyRtn;
947 }
948 /* Keep going? */
949 if(tpStopOn == CSSM_TP_STOP_ON_FIRST_FAIL) {
950 /* Nope; we're done with policy evaluation */
951 break;
952 }
953 }
954 } /* for each policy */
955
956 /*
957 * Upon completion of the above loop, perform default policy ops if
958 * appropriate.
959 */
960 if((policyReturn == CSSM_OK) || (tpStopOn == CSSM_TP_STOP_ON_NONE)) {
961 if(!didCertPolicy) {
962 policyReturn = tp_policyVerify(kTPDefault,
963 *this,
964 clHand,
965 cspHand,
966 &outCertGroup,
967 verifiedToRoot,
968 verifiedViaTrustSetting,
969 actionFlags,
970 NULL, // policyFieldData
971 cred->Policy.PolicyControl); // not currently used
972 /* See if error is allowed, cert-chain-wide. */
973 if((policyReturn != CSSM_OK) &&
974 outCertGroup.isAllowedError(policyReturn)) {
975 policyReturn = CSSM_OK;
976 }
977 }
978 if( !didRevokePolicy && // no revoke policy yet
979 ( (policyReturn == CSSM_OK || // default cert policy OK
980 (tpStopOn == CSSM_TP_STOP_ON_NONE)) // keep going anyway
981 )
982 ) {
983 revokeVfyContext.policy = TP_CRL_POLICY_DEFAULT;
984 CSSM_RETURN thisPolicyRtn = tpRevocationPolicyVerify(revokeVfyContext,
985 outCertGroup);
986 if((thisPolicyRtn != CSSM_OK) &&
987 outCertGroup.isAllowedError(thisPolicyRtn)) {
988 thisPolicyRtn = CSSM_OK;
989 }
990 if((thisPolicyRtn != CSSM_OK) && (policyReturn == CSSM_OK)) {
991 policyReturn = thisPolicyRtn;
992 }
993
994 }
995 } /* default policy opts */
996
997 delete crlGroup;
998
999 /* return evidence - i.e., constructed chain - if asked to */
1000 if(VerifyContextResult != NULL) {
1001 /*
1002 * VerifyContextResult->Evidence[0] : CSSM_TP_APPLE_EVIDENCE_HEADER
1003 * VerifyContextResult->Evidence[1] : CSSM_CERTGROUP
1004 * VerifyContextResult->Evidence[2] : CSSM_TP_APPLE_EVIDENCE_INFO
1005 */
1006 VerifyContextResult->NumberOfEvidences = 3;
1007 VerifyContextResult->Evidence =
1008 (CSSM_EVIDENCE_PTR)calloc(3, sizeof(CSSM_EVIDENCE));
1009
1010 CSSM_TP_APPLE_EVIDENCE_HEADER *hdr =
1011 (CSSM_TP_APPLE_EVIDENCE_HEADER *)malloc(
1012 sizeof(CSSM_TP_APPLE_EVIDENCE_HEADER));
1013 hdr->Version = CSSM_TP_APPLE_EVIDENCE_VERSION;
1014 CSSM_EVIDENCE_PTR ev = &VerifyContextResult->Evidence[0];
1015 ev->EvidenceForm = CSSM_EVIDENCE_FORM_APPLE_HEADER;
1016 ev->Evidence = hdr;
1017
1018 ev = &VerifyContextResult->Evidence[1];
1019 ev->EvidenceForm = CSSM_EVIDENCE_FORM_APPLE_CERTGROUP;
1020 ev->Evidence = outCertGroup.buildCssmCertGroup();
1021
1022 ev = &VerifyContextResult->Evidence[2];
1023 ev->EvidenceForm = CSSM_EVIDENCE_FORM_APPLE_CERT_INFO;
1024 ev->Evidence = outCertGroup.buildCssmEvidenceInfo();
1025 }
1026 else {
1027 /* caller responsible for freeing these if they are for evidence.... */
1028 outCertGroup.freeDbRecords();
1029 }
1030 CSSM_RETURN outErr = outCertGroup.getReturnCode(constructReturn, policyReturn,
1031 actionFlags);
1032
1033 if(outErr) {
1034 CssmError::throwMe(outErr);
1035 }
1036 }
1037
1038