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1 /*
2 * Copyright (c) 2000-2001, 2011 Apple Inc. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * The contents of this file constitute Original Code as defined in and are
5 * subject to the Apple Public Source License Version 1.2 (the 'License').
6 * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. Please obtain
7 * a copy of the License at http://www.apple.com/publicsource and read it before
8 * using this file.
9 *
10 * This Original Code and all software distributed under the License are
11 * distributed on an 'AS IS' basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS
12 * OR IMPLIED, AND APPLE HEREBY DISCLAIMS ALL SUCH WARRANTIES, INCLUDING WITHOUT
13 * LIMITATION, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
14 * PURPOSE, QUIET ENJOYMENT OR NON-INFRINGEMENT. Please see the License for the
15 * specific language governing rights and limitations under the License.
16 */
17
18
19 /*
20 * tpCertGroup.cpp - Cert group functions (construct, verify)
21 */
22
23 #include "AppleTPSession.h"
24 #include "certGroupUtils.h"
25 #include "TPCertInfo.h"
26 #include "TPCrlInfo.h"
27 #include "tpPolicies.h"
28 #include "tpdebugging.h"
29 #include "tpCrlVerify.h"
30 #include <Security/oidsalg.h>
31 #include <Security/cssmapple.h>
32
33 /*
34 * This is a temporary hack to allow verification of PKINIT server certs
35 * which are self-signed and not in the system anchors list. If the self-
36 * signed cert is in a magic keychain (whose location is not published),
37 * we'll allow it as if it were indeed a full-fledged anchor cert.
38 */
39 #define TP_PKINIT_SERVER_HACK 1
40 #if TP_PKINIT_SERVER_HACK
41
42 #include <Security/SecKeychain.h>
43 #include <Security/SecKeychainSearch.h>
44 #include <Security/SecCertificate.h>
45 #include <Security/oidscert.h>
46 #include <sys/types.h>
47 #include <pwd.h>
48
49 #define CFRELEASE(cf) if(cf) { CFRelease(cf); }
50
51 /*
52 * Returns true if we are to allow/trust the specified
53 * cert as a PKINIT-only anchor.
54 */
55 static bool tpCheckPkinitServerCert(
56 TPCertGroup &certGroup)
57 {
58 /*
59 * Basic requirement: exactly one cert, self-signed.
60 * The numCerts == 1 requirement might change...
61 */
62 unsigned numCerts = certGroup.numCerts();
63 if(numCerts != 1) {
64 tpDebug("tpCheckPkinitServerCert: too many certs");
65 return false;
66 }
67 /* end of chain... */
68 TPCertInfo *theCert = certGroup.certAtIndex(numCerts - 1);
69 if(!theCert->isSelfSigned()) {
70 tpDebug("tpCheckPkinitServerCert: 1 cert, not self-signed");
71 return false;
72 }
73 const CSSM_DATA *subjectName = theCert->subjectName();
74
75 /*
76 * Open the magic keychain.
77 * We're going up and over the Sec layer here, not generally
78 * kosher, but this is a hack.
79 */
80 OSStatus ortn;
81 SecKeychainRef kcRef = NULL;
82 string fullPathName;
83 const char *homeDir = getenv("HOME");
84 if (homeDir == NULL)
85 {
86 // If $HOME is unset get the current user's home directory
87 // from the passwd file.
88 uid_t uid = geteuid();
89 if (!uid) uid = getuid();
90 struct passwd *pw = getpwuid(uid);
91 if (!pw) {
92 return false;
93 }
94 homeDir = pw->pw_dir;
95 }
96 fullPathName = homeDir;
97 fullPathName += "/Library/Application Support/PKINIT/TrustedServers.keychain";
98 ortn = SecKeychainOpen(fullPathName.c_str(), &kcRef);
99 if(ortn) {
100 tpDebug("tpCheckPkinitServerCert: keychain not found (1)");
101 return false;
102 }
103 /* subsequent errors to errOut: */
104
105 bool ourRtn = false;
106 SecKeychainStatus kcStatus;
107 CSSM_DATA_PTR subjSerial = NULL;
108 CSSM_RETURN crtn;
109 SecKeychainSearchRef srchRef = NULL;
110 SecKeychainAttributeList attrList;
111 SecKeychainAttribute attrs[2];
112 SecKeychainItemRef foundItem = NULL;
113
114 ortn = SecKeychainGetStatus(kcRef, &kcStatus);
115 if(ortn) {
116 tpDebug("tpCheckPkinitServerCert: keychain not found (2)");
117 goto errOut;
118 }
119
120 /*
121 * We already have this cert's normalized name; get its
122 * serial number.
123 */
124 crtn = theCert->fetchField(&CSSMOID_X509V1SerialNumber, &subjSerial);
125 if(crtn) {
126 /* should never happen */
127 tpDebug("tpCheckPkinitServerCert: error fetching serial number");
128 goto errOut;
129 }
130
131 attrs[0].tag = kSecSubjectItemAttr;
132 attrs[0].length = (UInt32)subjectName->Length;
133 attrs[0].data = subjectName->Data;
134 attrs[1].tag = kSecSerialNumberItemAttr;
135 attrs[1].length = (UInt32)subjSerial->Length;
136 attrs[1].data = subjSerial->Data;
137 attrList.count = 2;
138 attrList.attr = attrs;
139
140 ortn = SecKeychainSearchCreateFromAttributes(kcRef,
141 kSecCertificateItemClass,
142 &attrList,
143 &srchRef);
144 if(ortn) {
145 tpDebug("tpCheckPkinitServerCert: search failure");
146 goto errOut;
147 }
148 for(;;) {
149 ortn = SecKeychainSearchCopyNext(srchRef, &foundItem);
150 if(ortn) {
151 tpDebug("tpCheckPkinitServerCert: end search");
152 break;
153 }
154
155 /* found a matching cert; do byte-for-byte compare */
156 CSSM_DATA certData;
157 ortn = SecCertificateGetData((SecCertificateRef)foundItem, &certData);
158 if(ortn) {
159 tpDebug("tpCheckPkinitServerCert: SecCertificateGetData failure");
160 continue;
161 }
162 if(tpCompareCssmData(&certData, theCert->itemData())){
163 tpDebug("tpCheckPkinitServerCert: FOUND CERT");
164 ourRtn = true;
165 break;
166 }
167 tpDebug("tpCheckPkinitServerCert: skipping matching cert");
168 CFRelease(foundItem);
169 foundItem = NULL;
170 }
171 errOut:
172 CFRELEASE(kcRef);
173 CFRELEASE(srchRef);
174 CFRELEASE(foundItem);
175 if(subjSerial != NULL) {
176 theCert->freeField(&CSSMOID_X509V1SerialNumber, subjSerial);
177 }
178 return ourRtn;
179 }
180 #endif /* TP_PKINIT_SERVER_HACK */
181
182
183 /*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
184 * CertGroupConstruct
185 *
186 * Description:
187 * This function returns a pointer to a mallocd CSSM_CERTGROUP which
188 * refers to a mallocd list of raw ordered X.509 certs which verify back as
189 * far as the TP is able to go. The first cert of the returned list is the
190 * subject cert. The TP will attempt to search thru the DBs passed in
191 * DBList in order to complete the chain. The chain is completed when a
192 * self-signed (root) cert is found in the chain. The root cert may be
193 * present in the input CertGroupFrag, or it may have been obtained from
194 * one of the DBs passed in DBList. It is not an error if no root cert is
195 * found.
196 *
197 * The error conditions are:
198 * -- The first cert of CertGroupFrag is an invalid cert. NULL is returned,
199 * err = CSSM_TP_INVALID_CERTIFICATE.
200 * -- The root cert (if found) fails to verify. Valid certgroup is returned,
201 * err = CSSMERR_TP_VERIFICATION_FAILURE.
202 * -- Any cert in the (possibly partially) constructed chain has expired or
203 * isn't valid yet, err = CSSMERR_TP_CERT_EXPIRED or
204 * CSSMERR_TP_CERT_NOT_VALID_YET. A CertGroup is returned.
205 * -- CSSMERR_TP_CERT_EXPIRED and CSSMERR_TP_CERT_NOT_VALID_YET. If one of these
206 * conditions obtains for the first (leaf) cert, the function throws this
207 * error immediately and the outgoing cert group is empty. For subsequent certs,
208 * the temporal validity of a cert is only tested AFTER a cert successfully
209 * meets the cert chaining criteria (subject/issuer match and signature
210 * verify). A cert in a chain with this error is not added to the outgoing
211 * cert group.
212 * -- the usual errors like bad handle or memory failure.
213 *
214 * Parameters:
215 * Two handles - to an open CL and CSP. The CSP must be capable of
216 * dealing with the signature algorithms used by the certs. The CL must be
217 * an X.509-savvy CL.
218 *
219 * CertGroupFrag, an unordered array of raw X.509 certs in the form of a
220 * CSSM_CERTGROUP_PTR. The first cert of this list is the subject cert
221 * which is eventually to be verified. The other certs can be in any order
222 * and may not even have any relevance to the cert chain being constructed.
223 * They may also be invalid certs.
224 *
225 * DBList, a list of DB/DL handles which may contain certs necessary to
226 * complete the desired cert chain. (Not currently implemented.)
227 *
228 *---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
229
230 /* public version */
231 void AppleTPSession::CertGroupConstruct(CSSM_CL_HANDLE clHand,
232 CSSM_CSP_HANDLE cspHand,
233 const CSSM_DL_DB_LIST &DBList,
234 const void *ConstructParams,
235 const CSSM_CERTGROUP &CertGroupFrag,
236 CSSM_CERTGROUP_PTR &CertGroup)
237 {
238 TPCertGroup outCertGroup(*this, TGO_Caller);
239 TPCertGroup inCertGroup(CertGroupFrag,
240 clHand,
241 cspHand,
242 *this,
243 NULL, // cssmTimeStr
244 true, // firstCertMustBeValid
245 TGO_Group);
246
247 /* set up for disposal of TPCertInfos created by CertGroupConstructPriv */
248 TPCertGroup gatheredCerts(*this, TGO_Group);
249
250 CSSM_RETURN constructReturn = CSSM_OK;
251 CSSM_APPLE_TP_ACTION_FLAGS actionFlags = 0;
252 CSSM_BOOL verifiedToRoot; // not used
253 CSSM_BOOL verifiedToAnchor; // not used
254 CSSM_BOOL verifiedViaTrustSetting; // not used
255
256 try {
257 CertGroupConstructPriv(clHand,
258 cspHand,
259 inCertGroup,
260 &DBList,
261 NULL, // cssmTimeStr
262 /* no anchors */
263 0, NULL,
264 actionFlags,
265 /* no user trust */
266 NULL, NULL, 0, 0,
267 gatheredCerts,
268 verifiedToRoot,
269 verifiedToAnchor,
270 verifiedViaTrustSetting,
271 outCertGroup);
272 }
273 catch(const CssmError &cerr) {
274 constructReturn = cerr.error;
275 /* abort if no certs found */
276 if(outCertGroup.numCerts() == 0) {
277 CssmError::throwMe(constructReturn);
278 }
279 }
280 CertGroup = outCertGroup.buildCssmCertGroup();
281 /* caller of this function never gets evidence... */
282 outCertGroup.freeDbRecords();
283
284 if(constructReturn) {
285 CssmError::throwMe(constructReturn);
286 }
287 }
288
289
290 /*
291 * Private version of CertGroupConstruct, used by CertGroupConstruct and
292 * CertGroupVerify. Populates a TP-style TPCertGroup for further processing.
293 * This only throws CSSM-style exceptions in the following cases:
294 *
295 * -- input parameter errors
296 * -- the first (leaf) cert is bad (doesn't parse, expired, not valid yet).
297 * -- root found but it doesn't self-verify
298 *
299 * All other cert-related errors simply result in the bad cert being ignored.
300 * Other exceptions are gross system errors like malloc failure.
301 */
302 void AppleTPSession::CertGroupConstructPriv(CSSM_CL_HANDLE clHand,
303 CSSM_CSP_HANDLE cspHand,
304 TPCertGroup &inCertGroup,
305 const CSSM_DL_DB_LIST *DBList, // optional here
306 const char *cssmTimeStr, // optional
307
308 /* trusted anchors, optional */
309 /* FIXME - maybe this should be a TPCertGroup */
310 uint32 numAnchorCerts,
311 const CSSM_DATA *anchorCerts,
312
313 /* CSSM_TP_ACTION_FETCH_CERT_FROM_NET, CSSM_TP_ACTION_TRUST_SETTINGS */
314 CSSM_APPLE_TP_ACTION_FLAGS actionFlags,
315
316 /* optional user trust parameters */
317 const CSSM_OID *policyOid,
318 const char *policyStr,
319 uint32 policyStrLen,
320 SecTrustSettingsKeyUsage keyUse,
321
322 /*
323 * Certs to be freed by caller (i.e., TPCertInfo which we allocate
324 * as a result of using a cert from anchorCerts or dbList) are added
325 * to this group.
326 */
327 TPCertGroup &certsToBeFreed,
328
329 /* returned */
330 CSSM_BOOL &verifiedToRoot, // end of chain self-verifies
331 CSSM_BOOL &verifiedToAnchor, // end of chain in anchors
332 CSSM_BOOL &verifiedViaTrustSetting, // chain ends per User Trust setting
333 TPCertGroup &outCertGroup) // RETURNED
334 {
335 TPCertInfo *subjectCert; // the one we're working on
336 CSSM_RETURN outErr = CSSM_OK;
337
338 /* this'll be the first subject cert in the main loop */
339 subjectCert = inCertGroup.certAtIndex(0);
340
341 /* Append leaf cert to outCertGroup */
342 outCertGroup.appendCert(subjectCert);
343 subjectCert->isLeaf(true);
344 subjectCert->isFromInputCerts(true);
345 outCertGroup.setAllUnused();
346 subjectCert->used(true);
347
348 outErr = outCertGroup.buildCertGroup(
349 *subjectCert,
350 &inCertGroup,
351 DBList,
352 clHand,
353 cspHand,
354 cssmTimeStr,
355 numAnchorCerts,
356 anchorCerts,
357 certsToBeFreed,
358 &certsToBeFreed, // gatheredCerts to accumulate net/DB fetches
359 CSSM_TRUE, // subjectIsInGroup - enables root check on
360 // subject cert
361 actionFlags,
362 policyOid,
363 policyStr,
364 policyStrLen,
365 keyUse,
366
367 verifiedToRoot,
368 verifiedToAnchor,
369 verifiedViaTrustSetting);
370 if(outErr) {
371 CssmError::throwMe(outErr);
372 }
373 }
374
375 /*
376 * Map a policy OID to one of the standard (non-revocation) policies.
377 * Returns true if it's a standard policy.
378 */
379 static bool checkPolicyOid(
380 const CSSM_OID &oid,
381 TPPolicy &tpPolicy) /* RETURNED */
382 {
383 if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_SSL)) {
384 tpPolicy = kTP_SSL;
385 return true;
386 }
387 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_X509_BASIC)) {
388 tpPolicy = kTPx509Basic;
389 return true;
390 }
391 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_SMIME)) {
392 tpPolicy = kTP_SMIME;
393 return true;
394 }
395 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_EAP)) {
396 tpPolicy = kTP_EAP;
397 return true;
398 }
399 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_SW_UPDATE_SIGNING)) {
400 /* note: this was CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_CODE_SIGN until 8/15/06 */
401 tpPolicy = kTP_SWUpdateSign;
402 return true;
403 }
404 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_RESOURCE_SIGN)) {
405 tpPolicy = kTP_ResourceSign;
406 return true;
407 }
408 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_IP_SEC)) {
409 tpPolicy = kTP_IPSec;
410 return true;
411 }
412 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_ICHAT)) {
413 tpPolicy = kTP_iChat;
414 return true;
415 }
416 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_ISIGN)) {
417 tpPolicy = kTPiSign;
418 return true;
419 }
420 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_PKINIT_CLIENT)) {
421 tpPolicy = kTP_PKINIT_Client;
422 return true;
423 }
424 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_PKINIT_SERVER)) {
425 tpPolicy = kTP_PKINIT_Server;
426 return true;
427 }
428 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_CODE_SIGNING)) {
429 tpPolicy = kTP_CodeSigning;
430 return true;
431 }
432 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_PACKAGE_SIGNING)) {
433 tpPolicy = kTP_PackageSigning;
434 return true;
435 }
436 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_MACAPPSTORE_RECEIPT)) {
437 tpPolicy = kTP_MacAppStoreRec;
438 return true;
439 }
440 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_APPLEID_SHARING)) {
441 tpPolicy = kTP_AppleIDSharing;
442 return true;
443 }
444 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_TIMESTAMPING)) {
445 tpPolicy = kTP_TimeStamping;
446 return true;
447 }
448 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_PASSBOOK_SIGNING)) {
449 tpPolicy = kTP_PassbookSigning;
450 return true;
451 }
452 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_MOBILE_STORE)) {
453 tpPolicy = kTP_MobileStore;
454 return true;
455 }
456 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_TEST_MOBILE_STORE)) {
457 tpPolicy = kTP_TestMobileStore;
458 return true;
459 }
460 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_ESCROW_SERVICE)) {
461 tpPolicy = kTP_EscrowService;
462 return true;
463 }
464 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_PROFILE_SIGNING)) {
465 tpPolicy = kTP_ProfileSigning;
466 return true;
467 }
468 else if(tpCompareOids(&oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_QA_PROFILE_SIGNING)) {
469 tpPolicy = kTP_QAProfileSigning;
470 return true;
471 }
472 return false;
473 }
474
475 /*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
476 * CertGroupVerify
477 *
478 * Description:
479 * -- Construct a cert chain using TP_CertGroupConstruct.
480 * -- Attempt to verify that cert chain against one of the known
481 * good certs passed in AnchorCerts.
482 * -- Optionally enforces additional policies (TBD) when verifying the cert chain.
483 * -- Optionally returns the entire cert chain constructed in
484 * TP_CertGroupConstruct and here, all the way to an anchor cert or as
485 * far as we were able to go, in *Evidence.
486 *
487 * Parameters:
488 * Two handles - to an open CL and CSP. The CSP must be capable of
489 * dealing with the signature algorithms used by the certs. The CL must be
490 * an X.509-savvy CL.
491 *
492 * RawCerts, an unordered array of raw certs in the form of a
493 * CSSM_CERTGROUP_PTR. The first cert of this list is the subject cert
494 * which is eventually to be verified. The other certs can be in any order
495 * and may not even have any relevance to the cert chain being constructed.
496 * They may also be invalid certs.
497 *
498 * DBList, a list of DB/DL handles which may contain certs necessary to
499 * complete the desired cert chain. (Currently not implemented.)
500 *
501 * AnchorCerts, a list of known trusted certs.
502 * NumberOfAnchorCerts, size of AnchorCerts array.
503 *
504 * PolicyIdentifiers, Optional policy OID. NULL indicates default
505 * X.509 trust policy.
506 *
507 * Supported Policies:
508 * CSSMOID_APPLE_ISIGN
509 * CSSMOID_APPLE_X509_BASIC
510 *
511 * For both of these, the associated FieldValue must be {0, NULL},
512 *
513 * NumberOfPolicyIdentifiers, size of PolicyIdentifiers array, must be
514 * zero or one.
515 *
516 * All other arguments must be zero/NULL.
517 *
518 * Returns:
519 * CSSM_OK : cert chain verified all the way back to an AnchorCert.
520 * CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_ANCHOR_CERT : In this case, the cert chain
521 * was validated back to a self-signed (root) cert found in either
522 * CertToBeVerified or in one of the DBs in DBList, but that root cert
523 * was *NOT* found in the AnchorCert list.
524 * CSSMERR_TP_NOT_TRUSTED: no root cert was found and no AnchorCert
525 * verified the end of the constructed cert chain.
526 * CSSMERR_TP_VERIFICATION_FAILURE: a root cert was found which does
527 * not self-verify.
528 * CSSMERR_TP_VERIFY_ACTION_FAILED: indicates a failure of the requested
529 * policy action.
530 * CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_CERTIFICATE: indicates a bad leaf cert.
531 * CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_REQUEST_INPUTS : no incoming VerifyContext.
532 * CSSMERR_TP_CERT_EXPIRED and CSSMERR_TP_CERT_NOT_VALID_YET: see comments
533 * for CertGroupConstruct.
534 * CSSMERR_TP_CERTIFICATE_CANT_OPERATE : issuer cert was found with a partial
535 * public key, rendering full verification impossible.
536 * CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_CERT_AUTHORITY : issuer cert was found with a partial
537 * public key and which failed to perform subsequent signature
538 * verification.
539 *---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
540
541 void AppleTPSession::CertGroupVerify(CSSM_CL_HANDLE clHand,
542 CSSM_CSP_HANDLE cspHand,
543 const CSSM_CERTGROUP &CertGroupToBeVerified,
544 const CSSM_TP_VERIFY_CONTEXT *VerifyContext,
545 CSSM_TP_VERIFY_CONTEXT_RESULT_PTR VerifyContextResult)
546 {
547 CSSM_BOOL verifiedToRoot = CSSM_FALSE;
548 CSSM_BOOL verifiedToAnchor = CSSM_FALSE;
549 CSSM_BOOL verifiedViaTrustSetting = CSSM_FALSE;
550 CSSM_RETURN constructReturn = CSSM_OK;
551 CSSM_RETURN policyReturn = CSSM_OK;
552 const CSSM_TP_CALLERAUTH_CONTEXT *cred;
553 /* declare volatile as compiler workaround to avoid caching in CR4 */
554 const CSSM_APPLE_TP_ACTION_DATA * volatile actionData = NULL;
555 CSSM_TIMESTRING cssmTimeStr;
556 CSSM_APPLE_TP_ACTION_FLAGS actionFlags = 0;
557 CSSM_TP_STOP_ON tpStopOn = 0;
558
559 /* keep track of whether we did policy checking; if not, we do defaults */
560 bool didCertPolicy = false;
561 bool didRevokePolicy = false;
562
563 /* user trust parameters */
564 CSSM_OID utNullPolicy = {0, NULL};
565 const CSSM_OID *utPolicyOid = NULL;
566 const char *utPolicyStr = NULL;
567 uint32 utPolicyStrLen = 0;
568 SecTrustSettingsKeyUsage utKeyUse = 0;
569 bool utTrustSettingEnabled = false;
570
571 if(VerifyContextResult) {
572 memset(VerifyContextResult, 0, sizeof(*VerifyContextResult));
573 }
574
575 /* verify input args, skipping the ones checked by CertGroupConstruct */
576 if((VerifyContext == NULL) || (VerifyContext->Cred == NULL)) {
577 /* the spec says that this is optional but we require it */
578 CssmError::throwMe(CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_REQUEST_INPUTS);
579 }
580 cred = VerifyContext->Cred;
581
582 /* Optional ActionData affecting all policies */
583 actionData = (CSSM_APPLE_TP_ACTION_DATA * volatile)VerifyContext->ActionData.Data;
584 if(actionData != NULL) {
585 switch(actionData->Version) {
586 case CSSM_APPLE_TP_ACTION_VERSION:
587 if(VerifyContext->ActionData.Length !=
588 sizeof(CSSM_APPLE_TP_ACTION_DATA)) {
589 CssmError::throwMe(CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_ACTION_DATA);
590 }
591 break;
592 /* handle backwards versions here if we ever go beyond version 0 */
593 default:
594 CssmError::throwMe(CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_ACTION_DATA);
595 }
596 actionFlags = actionData->ActionFlags;
597 if(actionFlags & CSSM_TP_ACTION_TRUST_SETTINGS) {
598 utTrustSettingEnabled = true;
599 }
600 }
601
602 /* optional, may be NULL */
603 cssmTimeStr = cred->VerifyTime;
604
605 tpStopOn = cred->VerificationAbortOn;
606 switch(tpStopOn) {
607 /* the only two we support */
608 case CSSM_TP_STOP_ON_NONE:
609 case CSSM_TP_STOP_ON_FIRST_FAIL:
610 break;
611 /* default maps to stop on first fail */
612 case CSSM_TP_STOP_ON_POLICY:
613 tpStopOn = CSSM_TP_STOP_ON_FIRST_FAIL;
614 break;
615 default:
616 CssmError::throwMe(CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_STOP_ON_POLICY);
617 }
618
619 /* now the args we can't deal with */
620 if(cred->CallerCredentials != NULL) {
621 CssmError::throwMe(CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_CALLERAUTH_CONTEXT_POINTER);
622 }
623 /* ...any others? */
624
625 /* set up for optional user trust evaluation */
626 if(utTrustSettingEnabled) {
627 const CSSM_TP_POLICYINFO *pinfo = &cred->Policy;
628 TPPolicy utPolicy = kTPx509Basic;
629
630 /* default policy OID in case caller hasn't specified one */
631 utPolicyOid = &utNullPolicy;
632 if(pinfo->NumberOfPolicyIds == 0) {
633 tpTrustSettingsDbg("CertGroupVerify: User trust enabled but no policies (1)");
634 /* keep going, I guess - no policy-specific info - use kTPx509Basic */
635 }
636 else {
637 CSSM_FIELD_PTR utPolicyField = &pinfo->PolicyIds[0];
638 utPolicyOid = &utPolicyField->FieldOid;
639 bool foundPolicy = checkPolicyOid(*utPolicyOid, utPolicy);
640 if(!foundPolicy) {
641 tpTrustSettingsDbg("CertGroupVerify: User trust enabled but no policies");
642 /* keep going, I guess - no policy-specific info - use kTPx509Basic */
643 }
644 else {
645 /* get policy-specific info */
646 tp_policyTrustSettingParams(utPolicy, &utPolicyField->FieldValue,
647 &utPolicyStr, &utPolicyStrLen, &utKeyUse);
648 }
649 }
650 }
651
652 /* get verified (possibly partial) outCertGroup - error is fatal */
653 /* BUT: we still return partial evidence if asked to...from now on. */
654 TPCertGroup outCertGroup(*this,
655 TGO_Caller); // certs are owned by inCertGroup
656 TPCertGroup inCertGroup(CertGroupToBeVerified, clHand, cspHand, *this,
657 cssmTimeStr, // optional 'this' time
658 true, // firstCertMustBeValid
659 TGO_Group);
660
661 /* set up for disposal of TPCertInfos created by CertGroupConstructPriv */
662 TPCertGroup gatheredCerts(*this, TGO_Group);
663
664 try {
665 CertGroupConstructPriv(
666 clHand,
667 cspHand,
668 inCertGroup,
669 cred->DBList,
670 cssmTimeStr,
671 cred->NumberOfAnchorCerts,
672 cred->AnchorCerts,
673 actionFlags,
674 utPolicyOid,
675 utPolicyStr,
676 utPolicyStrLen,
677 utKeyUse,
678 gatheredCerts,
679 verifiedToRoot,
680 verifiedToAnchor,
681 verifiedViaTrustSetting,
682 outCertGroup);
683 }
684 catch(const CssmError &cerr) {
685 constructReturn = cerr.error;
686 /* abort if no certs found */
687 if(outCertGroup.numCerts() == 0) {
688 CssmError::throwMe(constructReturn);
689 }
690 /* else press on, collecting as much info as we can */
691 }
692 /* others are way fatal */
693 assert(outCertGroup.numCerts() >= 1);
694
695 /* Infer interim status from return values */
696 switch(constructReturn) {
697 /* these values do not get overridden */
698 case CSSMERR_TP_CERTIFICATE_CANT_OPERATE:
699 case CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_CERT_AUTHORITY:
700 case CSSMERR_APPLETP_TRUST_SETTING_DENY:
701 case errSecInvalidTrustSettings:
702 break;
703 default:
704 /* infer status from these values... */
705 if(verifiedToAnchor || verifiedViaTrustSetting) {
706 /* full success; anchor doesn't have to be root */
707 constructReturn = CSSM_OK;
708 }
709 else if(verifiedToRoot) {
710 if(actionFlags & CSSM_TP_ACTION_IMPLICIT_ANCHORS) {
711 constructReturn = CSSM_OK;
712 }
713 else {
714 /* verified to root which is not an anchor */
715 constructReturn = CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_ANCHOR_CERT;
716 }
717 }
718 else {
719 /* partial chain, no root, not verifiable by anchor */
720 constructReturn = CSSMERR_TP_NOT_TRUSTED;
721 }
722
723 /*
724 * Those errors can be allowed, cert-chain-wide, per individual
725 * certs' allowedErrors
726 */
727 if((constructReturn != CSSM_OK) &&
728 outCertGroup.isAllowedError(constructReturn)) {
729 constructReturn = CSSM_OK;
730 }
731 break;
732 }
733
734 /*
735 * Parameters passed to tp_policyVerify() and which vary per policy
736 * in the loop below
737 */
738 TPPolicy tpPolicy;
739 const CSSM_APPLE_TP_SSL_OPTIONS *sslOpts;
740 CSSM_RETURN thisPolicyRtn = CSSM_OK; // returned from tp_policyVerify()
741
742 /* common CRL verify parameters */
743 TPCrlGroup *crlGroup = NULL;
744 try {
745 crlGroup = new TPCrlGroup(&VerifyContext->Crls,
746 clHand, cspHand,
747 *this, // alloc
748 NULL, // cssmTimeStr - we want CRLs that are valid 'now'
749 TGO_Group);
750 }
751 catch(const CssmError &cerr) {
752 CSSM_RETURN cr = cerr.error;
753 /* I don't see a straightforward way to report this error,
754 * other than adding it to the leaf cert's status... */
755 outCertGroup.certAtIndex(0)->addStatusCode(cr);
756 tpDebug("CertGroupVerify: error constructing CrlGroup; continuing\n");
757 }
758 /* others are way fatal */
759
760 TPVerifyContext revokeVfyContext(*this,
761 clHand,
762 cspHand,
763 cssmTimeStr,
764 cred->NumberOfAnchorCerts,
765 cred->AnchorCerts,
766 &inCertGroup,
767 crlGroup,
768 /*
769 * This may consist of certs gathered from the net (which is the purpose
770 * of this argument) and from DLDBs (a side-effect optimization).
771 */
772 gatheredCerts,
773 cred->DBList,
774 kRevokeNone, // policy
775 actionFlags,
776 NULL, // CRL options
777 NULL, // OCSP options
778 utPolicyOid,
779 utPolicyStr,
780 utPolicyStrLen,
781 utKeyUse);
782
783 /* true if we're to execute tp_policyVerify at end of loop */
784 bool doPolicyVerify;
785 /* true if we're to execute a revocation policy at end of loop */
786 bool doRevocationPolicy;
787
788 /* grind thru each policy */
789 for(uint32 polDex=0; polDex<cred->Policy.NumberOfPolicyIds; polDex++) {
790 if(cred->Policy.PolicyIds == NULL) {
791 policyReturn = CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_POLICY_IDENTIFIERS;
792 break;
793 }
794 CSSM_FIELD_PTR policyId = &cred->Policy.PolicyIds[polDex];
795 const CSSM_DATA *fieldVal = &policyId->FieldValue;
796 const CSSM_OID *oid = &policyId->FieldOid;
797 thisPolicyRtn = CSSM_OK;
798 doPolicyVerify = false;
799 doRevocationPolicy = false;
800 sslOpts = NULL;
801
802 /* first the basic cert policies */
803 doPolicyVerify = checkPolicyOid(*oid, tpPolicy);
804 if(doPolicyVerify) {
805 /* some basic checks... */
806 bool policyAbort = false;
807 switch(tpPolicy) {
808 case kTPx509Basic:
809 case kTPiSign:
810 case kTP_PKINIT_Client:
811 case kTP_PKINIT_Server:
812 if(fieldVal->Data != NULL) {
813 policyReturn = CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_POLICY_IDENTIFIERS;
814 policyAbort = true;
815 break;
816 }
817 break;
818 default:
819 break;
820 }
821 if(policyAbort) {
822 break;
823 }
824 #if TP_PKINIT_SERVER_HACK
825 if(tpPolicy == kTP_PKINIT_Server) {
826 /* possible override of "root not in anchors" */
827 if(constructReturn == CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_ANCHOR_CERT) {
828 if(tpCheckPkinitServerCert(outCertGroup)) {
829 constructReturn = CSSM_OK;
830 }
831 }
832 }
833 #endif /* TP_PKINIT_SERVER_HACK */
834 }
835
836 /*
837 * Now revocation policies. Note some fields in revokeVfyContext can
838 * accumulate across multiple policy calls, e.g., signerCerts.
839 */
840 else if(tpCompareOids(oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_REVOCATION_CRL)) {
841 /* CRL-specific options */
842 const CSSM_APPLE_TP_CRL_OPTIONS *crlOpts;
843 crlOpts = (CSSM_APPLE_TP_CRL_OPTIONS *)fieldVal->Data;
844 thisPolicyRtn = CSSM_OK;
845 if(crlOpts != NULL) {
846 switch(crlOpts->Version) {
847 case CSSM_APPLE_TP_CRL_OPTS_VERSION:
848 if(fieldVal->Length !=
849 sizeof(CSSM_APPLE_TP_CRL_OPTIONS)) {
850 thisPolicyRtn =
851 CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_POLICY_IDENTIFIERS;
852 break;
853 }
854 break;
855 /* handle backwards compatibility here if necessary */
856 default:
857 thisPolicyRtn = CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_POLICY_IDENTIFIERS;
858 break;
859 }
860 if(thisPolicyRtn != CSSM_OK) {
861 policyReturn = thisPolicyRtn;
862 break;
863 }
864 }
865 revokeVfyContext.policy = kRevokeCrlBasic;
866 revokeVfyContext.crlOpts = crlOpts;
867 doRevocationPolicy = true;
868 }
869 else if(tpCompareOids(oid, &CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_REVOCATION_OCSP)) {
870 /* OCSP-specific options */
871 const CSSM_APPLE_TP_OCSP_OPTIONS *ocspOpts;
872 ocspOpts = (CSSM_APPLE_TP_OCSP_OPTIONS *)fieldVal->Data;
873 thisPolicyRtn = CSSM_OK;
874 if(ocspOpts != NULL) {
875 switch(ocspOpts->Version) {
876 case CSSM_APPLE_TP_OCSP_OPTS_VERSION:
877 if(fieldVal->Length !=
878 sizeof(CSSM_APPLE_TP_OCSP_OPTIONS)) {
879 thisPolicyRtn =
880 CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_POLICY_IDENTIFIERS;
881 break;
882 }
883 break;
884 /* handle backwards compatibility here if necessary */
885 default:
886 thisPolicyRtn = CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_POLICY_IDENTIFIERS;
887 break;
888 }
889 if(thisPolicyRtn != CSSM_OK) {
890 policyReturn = thisPolicyRtn;
891 break;
892 }
893 }
894 revokeVfyContext.policy = kRevokeOcsp;
895 revokeVfyContext.ocspOpts = ocspOpts;
896 doRevocationPolicy = true;
897 }
898 /* etc. - add more policies here */
899 else {
900 /* unknown TP policy OID */
901 policyReturn = CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_POLICY_IDENTIFIERS;
902 break;
903 }
904
905 /* common cert policy call */
906 if(doPolicyVerify) {
907 assert(!doRevocationPolicy); // one at a time
908 thisPolicyRtn = tp_policyVerify(tpPolicy,
909 *this,
910 clHand,
911 cspHand,
912 &outCertGroup,
913 verifiedToRoot,
914 verifiedViaTrustSetting,
915 actionFlags,
916 fieldVal,
917 cred->Policy.PolicyControl); // not currently used
918 didCertPolicy = true;
919 }
920 /* common revocation policy call */
921 if(doRevocationPolicy) {
922 assert(!doPolicyVerify); // one at a time
923 thisPolicyRtn = tpRevocationPolicyVerify(revokeVfyContext, outCertGroup);
924 didRevokePolicy = true;
925 }
926 /* See if possible error is allowed, cert-chain-wide. */
927 if((thisPolicyRtn != CSSM_OK) &&
928 outCertGroup.isAllowedError(thisPolicyRtn)) {
929 thisPolicyRtn = CSSM_OK;
930 }
931 if(thisPolicyRtn) {
932 /* Now remember the error if it's the first policy
933 * error we've seen. */
934 if(policyReturn == CSSM_OK) {
935 policyReturn = thisPolicyRtn;
936 }
937 /* Keep going? */
938 if(tpStopOn == CSSM_TP_STOP_ON_FIRST_FAIL) {
939 /* Nope; we're done with policy evaluation */
940 break;
941 }
942 }
943 } /* for each policy */
944
945 /*
946 * Upon completion of the above loop, perform default policy ops if
947 * appropriate.
948 */
949 if((policyReturn == CSSM_OK) || (tpStopOn == CSSM_TP_STOP_ON_NONE)) {
950 if(!didCertPolicy) {
951 policyReturn = tp_policyVerify(kTPDefault,
952 *this,
953 clHand,
954 cspHand,
955 &outCertGroup,
956 verifiedToRoot,
957 verifiedViaTrustSetting,
958 actionFlags,
959 NULL, // policyFieldData
960 cred->Policy.PolicyControl); // not currently used
961 /* See if error is allowed, cert-chain-wide. */
962 if((policyReturn != CSSM_OK) &&
963 outCertGroup.isAllowedError(policyReturn)) {
964 policyReturn = CSSM_OK;
965 }
966 }
967 if( !didRevokePolicy && // no revoke policy yet
968 ( (policyReturn == CSSM_OK || // default cert policy OK
969 (tpStopOn == CSSM_TP_STOP_ON_NONE)) // keep going anyway
970 )
971 ) {
972 revokeVfyContext.policy = TP_CRL_POLICY_DEFAULT;
973 CSSM_RETURN thisPolicyRtn = tpRevocationPolicyVerify(revokeVfyContext,
974 outCertGroup);
975 if((thisPolicyRtn != CSSM_OK) &&
976 outCertGroup.isAllowedError(thisPolicyRtn)) {
977 thisPolicyRtn = CSSM_OK;
978 }
979 if((thisPolicyRtn != CSSM_OK) && (policyReturn == CSSM_OK)) {
980 policyReturn = thisPolicyRtn;
981 }
982
983 }
984 } /* default policy opts */
985
986 delete crlGroup;
987
988 /* return evidence - i.e., constructed chain - if asked to */
989 if(VerifyContextResult != NULL) {
990 /*
991 * VerifyContextResult->Evidence[0] : CSSM_TP_APPLE_EVIDENCE_HEADER
992 * VerifyContextResult->Evidence[1] : CSSM_CERTGROUP
993 * VerifyContextResult->Evidence[2] : CSSM_TP_APPLE_EVIDENCE_INFO
994 */
995 VerifyContextResult->NumberOfEvidences = 3;
996 VerifyContextResult->Evidence =
997 (CSSM_EVIDENCE_PTR)calloc(3, sizeof(CSSM_EVIDENCE));
998
999 CSSM_TP_APPLE_EVIDENCE_HEADER *hdr =
1000 (CSSM_TP_APPLE_EVIDENCE_HEADER *)malloc(
1001 sizeof(CSSM_TP_APPLE_EVIDENCE_HEADER));
1002 hdr->Version = CSSM_TP_APPLE_EVIDENCE_VERSION;
1003 CSSM_EVIDENCE_PTR ev = &VerifyContextResult->Evidence[0];
1004 ev->EvidenceForm = CSSM_EVIDENCE_FORM_APPLE_HEADER;
1005 ev->Evidence = hdr;
1006
1007 ev = &VerifyContextResult->Evidence[1];
1008 ev->EvidenceForm = CSSM_EVIDENCE_FORM_APPLE_CERTGROUP;
1009 ev->Evidence = outCertGroup.buildCssmCertGroup();
1010
1011 ev = &VerifyContextResult->Evidence[2];
1012 ev->EvidenceForm = CSSM_EVIDENCE_FORM_APPLE_CERT_INFO;
1013 ev->Evidence = outCertGroup.buildCssmEvidenceInfo();
1014 }
1015 else {
1016 /* caller responsible for freeing these if they are for evidence.... */
1017 outCertGroup.freeDbRecords();
1018 }
1019 CSSM_RETURN outErr = outCertGroup.getReturnCode(constructReturn, policyReturn,
1020 actionFlags);
1021
1022 if(outErr) {
1023 CssmError::throwMe(outErr);
1024 }
1025 }
1026
1027