/*
- * Copyright (c) 2003-2004 Apple Computer, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2003-2007 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
*
- * @APPLE_LICENSE_HEADER_START@
+ * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_START@
*
* This file contains Original Code and/or Modifications of Original Code
* as defined in and that are subject to the Apple Public Source License
* Version 2.0 (the 'License'). You may not use this file except in
- * compliance with the License. Please obtain a copy of the License at
- * http://www.opensource.apple.com/apsl/ and read it before using this
- * file.
+ * compliance with the License. The rights granted to you under the License
+ * may not be used to create, or enable the creation or redistribution of,
+ * unlawful or unlicensed copies of an Apple operating system, or to
+ * circumvent, violate, or enable the circumvention or violation of, any
+ * terms of an Apple operating system software license agreement.
+ *
+ * Please obtain a copy of the License at
+ * http://www.opensource.apple.com/apsl/ and read it before using this file.
*
* The Original Code and all software distributed under the License are
* distributed on an 'AS IS' basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER
* Please see the License for the specific language governing rights and
* limitations under the License.
*
- * @APPLE_LICENSE_HEADER_END@
+ * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_END@
+ */
+/*
+ * NOTICE: This file was modified by McAfee Research in 2004 to introduce
+ * support for mandatory and extensible security protections. This notice
+ * is included in support of clause 2.2 (b) of the Apple Public License,
+ * Version 2.0.
*/
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/fcntl.h>
#include <kern/wait_queue.h>
#include <kern/sched_prim.h>
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+#include <bsm/audit_record.h>
+#include <security/mac.h>
+#include <security/mac_framework.h>
+#include <security/mac_policy.h>
+#define MAC_ARG_PREFIX "arg: "
+#define MAC_ARG_PREFIX_LEN 5
+#endif
+
#include <net/route.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/in_pcb.h>
-#ifdef AUDIT
+#if AUDIT
/*
* The AUDIT_EXCESSIVELY_VERBOSE define enables a number of
#undef assert()
#endif
#define assert(cond) \
- ((void) ((cond) ? 0 : panic("%s:%d (%s)", __FILE__, __LINE__, # cond)))
+ ((void) ((cond) ? 0 : panic("Assert failed: %s", # cond)))
#else
#include <kern/assert.h>
#endif /* DIAGNOSTIC */
* Mutex to protect global variables shared between various threads and
* processes.
*/
-static mutex_t *audit_mtx;
+static lck_grp_t *audit_grp;
+static lck_attr_t *audit_attr;
+static lck_grp_attr_t *audit_grp_attr;
+static lck_mtx_t *audit_mtx;
/*
* Queue of audit records ready for delivery to disk. We insert new
static wait_queue_t audit_wait_queue;
static zone_t audit_zone;
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+static zone_t audit_mac_label_zone;
+#endif
/*
* Condition variable to signal to the worker that it has work to do:
*/
extern task_t kernel_task;
+extern zone_t mac_audit_data_zone;
static void
audit_free(struct kaudit_record *ar)
{
}
if (ar->k_udata != NULL) {
kfree(ar->k_udata, ar->k_ulen);
+ }
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+ if (ar->k_ar.ar_vnode1_mac_labels != NULL) {
+ zfree(audit_mac_label_zone, ar->k_ar.ar_vnode1_mac_labels);
+ }
+ if (ar->k_ar.ar_vnode2_mac_labels != NULL) {
+ zfree(audit_mac_label_zone, ar->k_ar.ar_vnode2_mac_labels);
+ }
+ if (ar->k_ar.ar_cred_mac_labels != NULL) {
+ zfree(audit_mac_label_zone, ar->k_ar.ar_cred_mac_labels);
}
+ if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_mac_string != NULL) {
+ kfree(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_mac_string,
+ MAC_MAX_LABEL_BUF_LEN + MAC_ARG_PREFIX_LEN);
+ }
+
+ /* Free the audit data from the MAC policies. */
+ do {
+ struct mac_audit_record *head, *next;
+
+ head = LIST_FIRST(ar->k_ar.ar_mac_records);
+ while (head != NULL) {
+ next = LIST_NEXT(head, records);
+ zfree(mac_audit_data_zone, head->data);
+ kfree(head, sizeof(*head));
+ head = next;
+ }
+
+ kfree(ar->k_ar.ar_mac_records,
+ sizeof(*ar->k_ar.ar_mac_records));
+ } while (0);
+#endif
+
zfree(audit_zone, ar);
}
+/*
+ * Converts an audit record into the BSM format before writing out to the
+ * audit logfile. Will perform it's own vnode iocounting.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * -1 if it could not get an ioreference on the vnode.
+ * EINVAL if the kaudit_record ar is not a valid audit record.
+ */
static int
-audit_write(struct vnode *vp, struct kaudit_record *ar, kauth_cred_t cred,
- struct proc *p)
+audit_write(struct vnode *vp, struct kaudit_record *ar, vfs_context_t ctx)
{
struct vfsstatfs *mnt_stat = &vp->v_mount->mnt_vfsstat;
- int ret;
+ int ret = 0;
struct au_record *bsm;
- /* KVV maybe we should take a context as a param to audit_write? */
- struct vfs_context context;
off_t file_size;
mach_port_t audit_port;
+ if (vnode_getwithref(vp))
+ return ENOENT;
+
/*
* First, gather statistics on the audit log file and file system
* so that we know how we're doing on space. In both cases,
* if we're unable to perform the operation, we drop the record
* and return. However, this is arguably an assertion failure.
*/
- context.vc_proc = p;
- context.vc_ucred = cred;
- ret = vfs_update_vfsstat(vp->v_mount, &context);
+ ret = vfs_update_vfsstat(vp->v_mount, ctx, VFS_KERNEL_EVENT);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* update the global stats struct */
- if ((ret = vnode_size(vp, &file_size, &context)) != 0)
+ if ((ret = vnode_size(vp, &file_size, ctx)) != 0)
goto out;
audit_fstat.af_currsz = file_size;
*/
if ((audit_fstat.af_filesz != 0) &&
(audit_file_rotate_wait == 0) &&
- (file_size >= audit_fstat.af_filesz)) {
+ (file_size >= (off_t)audit_fstat.af_filesz)) {
audit_file_rotate_wait = 1;
ret = audit_triggers(audit_port,
AUDIT_TRIGGER_FILE_FULL);
* we ignore errors.
*/
if (ar->k_ar_commit & AR_COMMIT_USER) {
- if (vnode_getwithref(vp) == 0) {
- ret = vn_rdwr(UIO_WRITE, vp, (void *)ar->k_udata, ar->k_ulen,
- (off_t)0, UIO_SYSSPACE32, IO_APPEND|IO_UNIT, cred, NULL, p);
- vnode_put(vp);
- if (ret)
- goto out;
- } else {
+ ret = vn_rdwr(UIO_WRITE, vp, (void *)ar->k_udata, ar->k_ulen,
+ (off_t)0, UIO_SYSSPACE32, IO_APPEND|IO_UNIT, vfs_context_ucred(ctx), NULL, vfs_context_proc(ctx));
+ if (ret)
goto out;
- }
}
/*
goto out;
}
- /* XXX This function can be called with the kernel funnel held,
- * which is not optimal. We should break the write functionality
+ /* XXX: We should break the write functionality
* away from the BSM record generation and have the BSM generation
* done before this function is called. This function will then
* take the BSM record as a parameter.
*/
- if ((ret = vnode_getwithref(vp)) == 0) {
- ret = (vn_rdwr(UIO_WRITE, vp, (void *)bsm->data, bsm->len,
- (off_t)0, UIO_SYSSPACE32, IO_APPEND|IO_UNIT, cred, NULL, p));
- vnode_put(vp);
- }
+ ret = (vn_rdwr(UIO_WRITE, vp, (void *)bsm->data, bsm->len,
+ (off_t)0, UIO_SYSSPACE32, IO_APPEND|IO_UNIT, vfs_context_ucred(ctx), NULL, vfs_context_proc(ctx)));
kau_free(bsm);
out:
*/
if (audit_in_failure &&
audit_q_len == 0 && audit_pre_q_len == 0) {
- (void)VNOP_FSYNC(vp, MNT_WAIT, &context);
+ (void)VNOP_FSYNC(vp, MNT_WAIT, ctx);
panic("Audit store overflow; record queue drained.");
}
+ vnode_put(vp);
return (ret);
}
static void
audit_worker(void)
{
- int do_replacement_signal, error, release_funnel;
+ int do_replacement_signal, error;
TAILQ_HEAD(, kaudit_record) ar_worklist;
struct kaudit_record *ar;
struct vnode *audit_vp, *old_vp;
kauth_cred_t audit_cred;
- kauth_cred_t old_cred;
- struct proc *audit_p;
+ proc_t audit_p;
AUDIT_PRINTF(("audit_worker starting\n"));
TAILQ_INIT(&ar_worklist);
- audit_cred = NULL;
+ audit_cred = NOCRED;
audit_p = current_proc();
audit_vp = NULL;
- /*
- * XXX: Presumably we can assume Mach threads are started without
- * holding the BSD kernel funnel?
- */
- thread_funnel_set(kernel_flock, FALSE);
- mutex_lock(audit_mtx);
+ lck_mtx_lock(audit_mtx);
while (1) {
+ struct vfs_context context;
+
/*
* First priority: replace the audit log target if requested.
- * As we actually close the vnode in the worker thread, we
- * need to grab the funnel, which means releasing audit_mtx.
- * In case another replacement was scheduled while the mutex
- * we released, we loop.
*
* XXX It could well be we should drain existing records
* first to ensure that the timestamps and ordering
*/
do_replacement_signal = 0;
while (audit_replacement_flag != 0) {
- old_cred = audit_cred;
+ kauth_cred_t old_cred = audit_cred;
+
old_vp = audit_vp;
audit_cred = audit_replacement_cred;
audit_vp = audit_replacement_vp;
- audit_replacement_cred = NULL;
+ audit_replacement_cred = NOCRED;
audit_replacement_vp = NULL;
audit_replacement_flag = 0;
audit_enabled = (audit_vp != NULL);
- if (old_vp != NULL || audit_vp != NULL) {
- mutex_unlock(audit_mtx);
- thread_funnel_set(kernel_flock, TRUE);
- release_funnel = 1;
- } else
- release_funnel = 0;
/*
* XXX: What to do about write failures here?
*/
if (old_vp != NULL) {
- AUDIT_PRINTF(("Closing old audit file\n"));
- vn_close(old_vp, audit_close_flags, old_cred,
- audit_p);
- kauth_cred_rele(old_cred);
- old_cred = NOCRED;
+ AUDIT_PRINTF(("Closing old audit file vnode %p\n", old_vp));
+ if (vnode_get(old_vp) == 0) {
+ vn_close(old_vp, audit_close_flags, vfs_context_kernel());
+ vnode_put(old_vp);
+ AUDIT_PRINTF(("Audit file closed\n"));
+ }
+ else
+ printf("audit_worker(): Couldn't close audit file.\n");
+ kauth_cred_unref(&old_cred);
old_vp = NULL;
- AUDIT_PRINTF(("Audit file closed\n"));
}
if (audit_vp != NULL) {
AUDIT_PRINTF(("Opening new audit file\n"));
}
- if (release_funnel) {
- thread_funnel_set(kernel_flock, FALSE);
- mutex_lock(audit_mtx);
- }
do_replacement_signal = 1;
}
/*
AUDIT_WORKER_EVENT,
THREAD_UNINT,
0);
- mutex_unlock(audit_mtx);
+ lck_mtx_unlock(audit_mtx);
assert(ret == THREAD_WAITING);
ret = thread_block(THREAD_CONTINUE_NULL);
AUDIT_PRINTF(("audit_worker: new vp = %p; value of flag %d\n",
audit_replacement_vp, audit_replacement_flag));
- mutex_lock(audit_mtx);
+ lck_mtx_lock(audit_mtx);
continue;
}
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&ar_worklist, ar, k_q);
}
- mutex_unlock(audit_mtx);
+ lck_mtx_unlock(audit_mtx);
while ((ar = TAILQ_FIRST(&ar_worklist))) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&ar_worklist, ar, k_q);
audit_free(ar);
}
- mutex_lock(audit_mtx);
+ lck_mtx_lock(audit_mtx);
continue;
}
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&ar_worklist, ar, k_q);
}
- mutex_unlock(audit_mtx);
- release_funnel = 0;
+ lck_mtx_unlock(audit_mtx);
+ context.vc_thread = current_thread();
+ context.vc_ucred = audit_cred;
while ((ar = TAILQ_FIRST(&ar_worklist))) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&ar_worklist, ar, k_q);
if (audit_vp != NULL) {
* XXX: What should happen if there's a write
* error here?
*/
- if (!release_funnel) {
- thread_funnel_set(kernel_flock, TRUE);
- release_funnel = 1;
- }
- error = audit_write(audit_vp, ar, audit_cred,
- audit_p);
+ error = audit_write(audit_vp, ar, &context);
if (error && audit_panic_on_write_fail) {
panic("audit_worker: write error %d\n",
error);
} else if (error) {
printf("audit_worker: write error %d\n",
error);
- }
+ }
}
audit_free(ar);
}
- if (release_funnel)
- thread_funnel_set(kernel_flock, FALSE);
- mutex_lock(audit_mtx);
+ lck_mtx_lock(audit_mtx);
}
}
void
audit_init(void)
{
-
- /* Verify that the syscall to audit event table is the same
- * size as the system call table.
- */
- if (nsys_au_event != nsysent) {
- printf("Security auditing service initialization failed, ");
- printf("audit event table doesn't match syscall table.\n");
- return;
- }
-
printf("Security auditing service present\n");
TAILQ_INIT(&audit_q);
audit_q_len = 0;
audit_qctrl.aq_bufsz = AQ_BUFSZ;
audit_qctrl.aq_minfree = AU_FS_MINFREE;
- audit_mtx = mutex_alloc(0);
+ audit_grp_attr = lck_grp_attr_alloc_init();
+ audit_grp = lck_grp_alloc_init("audit", audit_grp_attr);
+ audit_attr = lck_attr_alloc_init();
+ audit_mtx = lck_mtx_alloc_init(audit_grp, audit_attr);
+
audit_wait_queue = wait_queue_alloc(SYNC_POLICY_FIFO);
audit_zone = zinit(sizeof(struct kaudit_record),
AQ_HIWATER*sizeof(struct kaudit_record),
8192,
"audit_zone");
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+ /* Assume 3 MAC labels for each audit record: two for vnodes,
+ * one for creds.
+ */
+ audit_mac_label_zone = zinit(MAC_AUDIT_LABEL_LEN,
+ AQ_HIWATER * 3*MAC_AUDIT_LABEL_LEN,
+ 8192,
+ "audit_mac_label_zone");
+#endif
/* Initialize the BSM audit subsystem. */
kau_init();
* If other parallel log replacements have been requested, we wait
* until they've finished before continuing.
*/
- mutex_lock(audit_mtx);
+ lck_mtx_lock(audit_mtx);
while (audit_replacement_flag != 0) {
AUDIT_PRINTF(("audit_rotate_vnode: sleeping to wait for "
AUDIT_REPLACEMENT_EVENT,
THREAD_UNINT,
0);
- mutex_unlock(audit_mtx);
+ lck_mtx_unlock(audit_mtx);
assert(ret == THREAD_WAITING);
ret = thread_block(THREAD_CONTINUE_NULL);
AUDIT_PRINTF(("audit_rotate_vnode: woken up (flag %d)\n",
audit_replacement_flag));
- mutex_lock(audit_mtx);
+ lck_mtx_lock(audit_mtx);
}
audit_replacement_cred = cred;
audit_replacement_flag = 1;
AUDIT_REPLACEMENT_EVENT,
THREAD_UNINT,
0);
- mutex_unlock(audit_mtx);
+ lck_mtx_unlock(audit_mtx);
assert(ret == THREAD_WAITING);
ret = thread_block(THREAD_CONTINUE_NULL);
void
audit_shutdown(void)
{
- audit_rotate_vnode(NULL, NULL);
+ if (audit_mtx)
+ audit_rotate_vnode(NULL, NULL);
}
static __inline__ struct uthread *
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
int
-audit(struct proc *p, struct audit_args *uap, __unused register_t *retval)
+audit(proc_t p, struct audit_args *uap, __unused register_t *retval)
{
int error;
void * rec;
if (error)
return (error);
- if ((uap->length <= 0) || (uap->length > (int)audit_qctrl.aq_bufsz))
+ lck_mtx_lock(audit_mtx);
+ if ((uap->length <= 0) || (uap->length > (int)audit_qctrl.aq_bufsz)) {
+ lck_mtx_unlock(audit_mtx);
return (EINVAL);
+ }
+ lck_mtx_unlock(audit_mtx);
ar = currecord();
if (error)
goto free_out;
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+ error = mac_system_check_audit(kauth_cred_get(), rec, uap->length);
+ if (error)
+ goto free_out;
+#endif
+
/* Verify the record */
if (bsm_rec_verify(rec) == 0) {
error = EINVAL;
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
int
-auditon(struct proc *p, __unused struct auditon_args *uap, __unused register_t *retval)
+auditon(proc_t p, struct auditon_args *uap, __unused register_t *retval)
{
int ret;
int len;
union auditon_udata udata;
- struct proc *tp;
+ proc_t tp = PROC_NULL;
+ kauth_cred_t my_cred;
AUDIT_ARG(cmd, uap->cmd);
ret = suser(kauth_cred_get(), &p->p_acflag);
if (ret)
return (ret);
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+ ret = mac_system_check_auditon(kauth_cred_get(), uap->cmd);
+ if (ret)
+ return (ret);
+#endif
+
len = uap->length;
if ((len <= 0) || (len > (int)sizeof(union auditon_udata)))
return (EINVAL);
return (ret);
AUDIT_ARG(auditon, &udata);
break;
-}
+ }
/* XXX Need to implement these commands by accessing the global
* values associated with the commands.
*/
+ lck_mtx_lock(audit_mtx);
switch (uap->cmd) {
case A_GETPOLICY:
if (!audit_fail_stop)
udata.au_policy |= AUDIT_AHLT;
break;
case A_SETPOLICY:
- if (udata.au_policy & ~(AUDIT_CNT|AUDIT_AHLT))
- return (EINVAL);
-/*
+ if (udata.au_policy & ~(AUDIT_CNT|AUDIT_AHLT)) {
+ ret = EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ /*
* XXX - Need to wake up waiters if the policy relaxes?
- */
+ */
audit_fail_stop = ((udata.au_policy & AUDIT_CNT) == 0);
audit_panic_on_write_fail = (udata.au_policy & AUDIT_AHLT);
break;
(udata.au_qctrl.aq_lowater >= udata.au_qctrl.aq_hiwater) ||
(udata.au_qctrl.aq_bufsz > AQ_MAXBUFSZ) ||
(udata.au_qctrl.aq_minfree < 0) ||
- (udata.au_qctrl.aq_minfree > 100))
- return (EINVAL);
+ (udata.au_qctrl.aq_minfree > 100)) {
+ ret = EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
audit_qctrl = udata.au_qctrl;
/* XXX The queue delay value isn't used with the kernel. */
audit_qctrl.aq_delay = -1;
break;
case A_GETCWD:
- return (ENOSYS);
+ ret = ENOSYS;
break;
case A_GETCAR:
- return (ENOSYS);
+ ret = ENOSYS;
break;
case A_GETSTAT:
- return (ENOSYS);
+ ret = ENOSYS;
break;
case A_SETSTAT:
- return (ENOSYS);
+ ret = ENOSYS;
break;
case A_SETUMASK:
- return (ENOSYS);
+ ret = ENOSYS;
break;
case A_SETSMASK:
- return (ENOSYS);
+ ret = ENOSYS;
break;
case A_GETCOND:
if (audit_enabled && !audit_suspended)
udata.au_evclass.ec_class);
break;
case A_GETPINFO:
- if (udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid < 1)
- return (EINVAL);
- if ((tp = pfind(udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid)) == NULL)
- return (EINVAL);
+ if (udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid < 1) {
+ ret = EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ if ((tp = proc_find(udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid)) == NULL) {
+ ret = EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ lck_mtx_unlock(audit_mtx);
+ my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(tp);
- udata.au_aupinfo.ap_auid = tp->p_ucred->cr_au.ai_auid;
+ udata.au_aupinfo.ap_auid = my_cred->cr_au.ai_auid;
udata.au_aupinfo.ap_mask.am_success =
- tp->p_ucred->cr_au.ai_mask.am_success;
+ my_cred->cr_au.ai_mask.am_success;
udata.au_aupinfo.ap_mask.am_failure =
- tp->p_ucred->cr_au.ai_mask.am_failure;
+ my_cred->cr_au.ai_mask.am_failure;
udata.au_aupinfo.ap_termid.machine =
- tp->p_ucred->cr_au.ai_termid.machine;
+ my_cred->cr_au.ai_termid.machine;
udata.au_aupinfo.ap_termid.port =
- tp->p_ucred->cr_au.ai_termid.port;
- udata.au_aupinfo.ap_asid = tp->p_ucred->cr_au.ai_asid;
+ my_cred->cr_au.ai_termid.port;
+ udata.au_aupinfo.ap_asid = my_cred->cr_au.ai_asid;
+
+ kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
+
+ proc_rele(tp);
+ tp = PROC_NULL;
+ lck_mtx_lock(audit_mtx);
break;
case A_SETPMASK:
- if (udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid < 1)
- return (EINVAL);
- if ((tp = pfind(udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid)) == NULL)
- return (EINVAL);
+ if (udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid < 1) {
+ ret = EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ if ((tp = proc_find(udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid)) == NULL) {
+ ret = EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
/*
* we are modifying the audit info in a credential so we need a new
* credential is used as part of our hash key. Get current credential
* in the target process and take a reference while we muck with it.
*/
+ lck_mtx_unlock(audit_mtx);
for (;;) {
- kauth_cred_t my_cred, my_new_cred;
+ kauth_cred_t my_new_cred;
struct auditinfo temp_auditinfo;
my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(tp);
/*
- * set the credential with new info. If there is no change we get back
- * the same credential we passed in.
+ * Set the credential with new info. If there is no
+ * change, we get back the same credential we passed
+ * in; if there is a change, we drop the reference on
+ * the credential we passed in. The subsequent
+ * compare is safe, because it is a pointer compare
+ * rather than a contents compare.
*/
temp_auditinfo = my_cred->cr_au;
temp_auditinfo.ai_mask.am_success =
*/
if (tp->p_ucred != my_cred) {
proc_unlock(tp);
- kauth_cred_rele(my_cred);
- kauth_cred_rele(my_new_cred);
+ kauth_cred_unref(&my_new_cred);
/* try again */
continue;
}
tp->p_ucred = my_new_cred;
proc_unlock(tp);
}
- /* drop our extra reference */
- kauth_cred_rele(my_cred);
+ /* drop old proc reference or our extra reference */
+ kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
break;
}
+ proc_rele(tp);
+ lck_mtx_lock(audit_mtx);
break;
case A_SETFSIZE:
if ((udata.au_fstat.af_filesz != 0) &&
- (udata.au_fstat.af_filesz < MIN_AUDIT_FILE_SIZE))
- return (EINVAL);
+ (udata.au_fstat.af_filesz < MIN_AUDIT_FILE_SIZE)) {
+ ret = EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
audit_fstat.af_filesz = udata.au_fstat.af_filesz;
break;
case A_GETFSIZE:
udata.au_fstat.af_currsz = audit_fstat.af_currsz;
break;
case A_GETPINFO_ADDR:
- return (ENOSYS);
+ ret = ENOSYS;
break;
case A_GETKAUDIT:
- return (ENOSYS);
+ ret = ENOSYS;
break;
case A_SETKAUDIT:
- return (ENOSYS);
+ ret = ENOSYS;
break;
-}
+ }
/* Copy data back to userspace for the GET comands */
- switch (uap->cmd) {
- case A_GETPOLICY:
- case A_GETKMASK:
- case A_GETQCTRL:
- case A_GETCWD:
- case A_GETCAR:
- case A_GETSTAT:
- case A_GETCOND:
- case A_GETCLASS:
- case A_GETPINFO:
- case A_GETFSIZE:
- case A_GETPINFO_ADDR:
- case A_GETKAUDIT:
- ret = copyout((void *)&udata, uap->data, uap->length);
- if (ret)
- return (ret);
- break;
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ switch (uap->cmd) {
+ case A_GETPOLICY:
+ case A_GETKMASK:
+ case A_GETQCTRL:
+ case A_GETCWD:
+ case A_GETCAR:
+ case A_GETSTAT:
+ case A_GETCOND:
+ case A_GETCLASS:
+ case A_GETPINFO:
+ case A_GETFSIZE:
+ case A_GETPINFO_ADDR:
+ case A_GETKAUDIT:
+ ret = copyout((void *)&udata, uap->data, uap->length);
+ break;
+ }
}
- return (0);
+ lck_mtx_unlock(audit_mtx);
+ return (ret);
}
/*
* System calls to manage the user audit information.
- * XXXAUDIT May need to lock the proc structure.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
int
-getauid(struct proc *p, struct getauid_args *uap, __unused register_t *retval)
+getauid(__unused proc_t p, struct getauid_args *uap, __unused register_t *retval)
{
int error;
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+ error = mac_proc_check_getauid(p);
+ if (error)
+ return (error);
+#endif
+
error = copyout((void *)&kauth_cred_get()->cr_au.ai_auid,
uap->auid, sizeof(au_id_t));
if (error)
/* ARGSUSED */
int
-setauid(struct proc *p, struct setauid_args *uap, __unused register_t *retval)
+setauid(proc_t p, struct setauid_args *uap, __unused register_t *retval)
{
int error;
au_id_t temp_au_id;
sizeof(au_id_t));
if (error)
return (error);
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+ error = mac_proc_check_setauid(p, temp_au_id);
+ if (error)
+ return (error);
+#endif
/*
* we are modifying the audit info in a credential so we need a new
my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
/*
- * set the credential with new info. If there is no change we get back
- * the same credential we passed in.
+ * Set the credential with new info. If there is no change,
+ * we get back the same credential we passed in; if there is
+ * a change, we drop the reference on the credential we
+ * passed in. The subsequent compare is safe, because it is
+ * a pointer compare rather than a contents compare.
*/
temp_auditinfo = my_cred->cr_au;
temp_auditinfo.ai_auid = temp_au_id;
*/
if (p->p_ucred != my_cred) {
proc_unlock(p);
- kauth_cred_rele(my_cred);
- kauth_cred_rele(my_new_cred);
+ kauth_cred_unref(&my_new_cred);
/* try again */
continue;
}
p->p_ucred = my_new_cred;
proc_unlock(p);
}
- /* drop our extra reference */
- kauth_cred_rele(my_cred);
+ /* drop old proc reference or our extra reference */
+ kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
break;
}
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
int
-getaudit(struct proc *p, struct getaudit_args *uap, __unused register_t *retval)
+getaudit(proc_t p, struct getaudit_args *uap, __unused register_t *retval)
{
struct auditinfo ai;
int error;
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+ error = mac_proc_check_getaudit(p);
+ if (error)
+ return (error);
+#endif
+
ai = kauth_cred_get()->cr_au;
/* only superuser gets to see the real mask */
/* ARGSUSED */
int
-setaudit(struct proc *p, struct setaudit_args *uap, __unused register_t *retval)
+setaudit(proc_t p, struct setaudit_args *uap, __unused register_t *retval)
{
int error;
struct auditinfo temp_auditinfo;
+ kauth_cred_t safecred;
error = suser(kauth_cred_get(), &p->p_acflag);
if (error)
return (error);
-
error = copyin(uap->auditinfo,
(void *)&temp_auditinfo,
sizeof(temp_auditinfo));
if (error)
return (error);
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+ error = mac_proc_check_setaudit(p, &temp_auditinfo);
+ if (error)
+ return (error);
+
+#endif
+
/*
* we are modifying the audit info in a credential so we need a new
my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
/*
- * set the credential with new info. If there is no change we get back
- * the same credential we passed in.
+ * Set the credential with new info. If there is no change,
+ * we get back the same credential we passed in; if there is
+ * a change, we drop the reference on the credential we
+ * passed in. The subsequent compare is safe, because it is
+ * a pointer compare rather than a contents compare.
*/
my_new_cred = kauth_cred_setauditinfo(my_cred, &temp_auditinfo);
*/
if (p->p_ucred != my_cred) {
proc_unlock(p);
- kauth_cred_rele(my_cred);
- kauth_cred_rele(my_new_cred);
+ kauth_cred_unref(&my_new_cred);
/* try again */
continue;
}
p->p_ucred = my_new_cred;
proc_unlock(p);
}
- /* drop our extra reference */
- kauth_cred_rele(my_cred);
+ /* drop old proc reference or our extra reference */
+ kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
break;
}
/* propagate the change from the process to Mach task */
set_security_token(p);
- audit_arg_auditinfo(&p->p_ucred->cr_au);
+ safecred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
+ audit_arg_auditinfo(&safecred->cr_au);
+ kauth_cred_unref(&safecred);
return (0);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
int
-getaudit_addr(struct proc *p, __unused struct getaudit_addr_args *uap, __unused register_t *retval)
+getaudit_addr(__unused proc_t p, __unused struct getaudit_addr_args *uap, __unused register_t *retval)
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
int
-setaudit_addr(struct proc *p, __unused struct setaudit_addr_args *uap, __unused register_t *retval)
+setaudit_addr(proc_t p, __unused struct setaudit_addr_args *uap, __unused register_t *retval)
{
int error;
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
int
-auditctl(struct proc *p, struct auditctl_args *uap, __unused register_t *retval)
+auditctl(proc_t p, struct auditctl_args *uap, __unused register_t *retval)
{
struct nameidata nd;
kauth_cred_t cred;
struct vnode *vp;
- int error, flags;
- struct vfs_context context;
-
- context.vc_proc = p;
- context.vc_ucred = kauth_cred_get();
+ int error;
error = suser(kauth_cred_get(), &p->p_acflag);
if (error)
* validity checks, and grab another reference to the current
* credential.
*/
- if (uap->path != 0) {
+ if (uap->path != USER_ADDR_NULL) {
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF | AUDITVNPATH1,
(IS_64BIT_PROCESS(p) ? UIO_USERSPACE64 : UIO_USERSPACE32),
- uap->path, &context);
- flags = audit_open_flags;
- error = vn_open(&nd, flags, 0);
+ uap->path, vfs_context_current());
+ error = vn_open(&nd, audit_open_flags, 0);
if (error)
goto out;
vp = nd.ni_vp;
+
if (vp->v_type != VREG) {
- vn_close(vp, audit_close_flags, kauth_cred_get(), p);
+ vn_close(vp, audit_close_flags, vfs_context_current());
vnode_put(vp);
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+ /*
+ * Accessibility of the vnode was determined in
+ * vn_open; the mac_system_check_auditctl should only
+ * determine whether that vnode is appropriate for
+ * storing audit data, or that the caller was
+ * permitted to control the auditing system at all.
+ * For example, a confidentiality policy may want to
+ * ensure that audit files are always high
+ * sensitivity.
+ */
+
+ error = mac_system_check_auditctl(kauth_cred_get(), vp);
+ if (error) {
+ vn_close(vp, audit_close_flags, vfs_context_current());
+ vnode_put(vp);
+ goto out;
+ }
+#endif
cred = kauth_cred_get_with_ref();
+ lck_mtx_lock(audit_mtx);
audit_suspended = 0;
+ lck_mtx_unlock(audit_mtx);
+ }
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+ else {
+ error = mac_system_check_auditctl(kauth_cred_get(), NULL);
+ if (error)
+ return (error);
}
+#endif
+
/*
* a vp and cred of NULL is valid at this point
* and indicates we're to turn off auditing...
* MPSAFE
*/
struct kaudit_record *
-audit_new(int event, struct proc *p, __unused struct uthread *uthread)
+audit_new(int event, proc_t p, __unused struct uthread *uthread)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
int no_record;
+ kauth_cred_t safecred;
/*
* Eventually, there may be certain classes of events that
#if 0
if (event != AUDIT_EVENT_FILESTOP && event != AUDIT_EVENT_FILESTART) {
#endif
- mutex_lock(audit_mtx);
+ lck_mtx_lock(audit_mtx);
no_record = (audit_suspended || !audit_enabled);
- mutex_unlock(audit_mtx);
+ lck_mtx_unlock(audit_mtx);
if (no_record)
return (NULL);
#if 0
if (ar == NULL)
return NULL;
- mutex_lock(audit_mtx);
- audit_pre_q_len++;
- mutex_unlock(audit_mtx);
-
bzero(ar, sizeof(*ar));
ar->k_ar.ar_magic = AUDIT_RECORD_MAGIC;
ar->k_ar.ar_event = event;
nanotime(&ar->k_ar.ar_starttime);
+ safecred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
/* Export the subject credential. */
- cru2x(p->p_ucred, &ar->k_ar.ar_subj_cred);
- ar->k_ar.ar_subj_ruid = p->p_ucred->cr_ruid;
- ar->k_ar.ar_subj_rgid = p->p_ucred->cr_rgid;
- ar->k_ar.ar_subj_egid = p->p_ucred->cr_groups[0];
- ar->k_ar.ar_subj_auid = p->p_ucred->cr_au.ai_auid;
- ar->k_ar.ar_subj_asid = p->p_ucred->cr_au.ai_asid;
+ cru2x(safecred, &ar->k_ar.ar_subj_cred);
+
+ ar->k_ar.ar_subj_ruid = safecred->cr_ruid;
+ ar->k_ar.ar_subj_rgid = safecred->cr_rgid;
+ ar->k_ar.ar_subj_egid = safecred->cr_groups[0];
+ ar->k_ar.ar_subj_auid = safecred->cr_au.ai_auid;
+ ar->k_ar.ar_subj_asid = safecred->cr_au.ai_asid;
+ ar->k_ar.ar_subj_amask = safecred->cr_au.ai_mask;
+ ar->k_ar.ar_subj_term = safecred->cr_au.ai_termid;
+ kauth_cred_unref(&safecred);
+
ar->k_ar.ar_subj_pid = p->p_pid;
- ar->k_ar.ar_subj_amask = p->p_ucred->cr_au.ai_mask;
- ar->k_ar.ar_subj_term = p->p_ucred->cr_au.ai_termid;
bcopy(p->p_comm, ar->k_ar.ar_subj_comm, MAXCOMLEN);
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+ do {
+ struct mac mac;
+
+ /* Retrieve the MAC labels for the process. */
+ ar->k_ar.ar_cred_mac_labels =
+ (char *)zalloc(audit_mac_label_zone);
+ if (ar->k_ar.ar_cred_mac_labels == NULL) {
+ zfree(audit_zone, ar);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ mac.m_buflen = MAC_AUDIT_LABEL_LEN;
+ mac.m_string = ar->k_ar.ar_cred_mac_labels;
+ mac_cred_label_externalize_audit(p, &mac);
+
+ /*
+ * grab space for the reconds.
+ */
+ ar->k_ar.ar_mac_records = (struct mac_audit_record_list_t *)
+ kalloc(sizeof(*ar->k_ar.ar_mac_records));
+ if (ar->k_ar.ar_mac_records == NULL) {
+ zfree(audit_mac_label_zone,
+ ar->k_ar.ar_cred_mac_labels);
+ zfree(audit_zone, ar);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+
+ LIST_INIT(ar->k_ar.ar_mac_records);
+
+ ar->k_ar.ar_forced_by_mac = 0;
+
+ } while (0);
+#endif
+
+ lck_mtx_lock(audit_mtx);
+ audit_pre_q_len++;
+ lck_mtx_unlock(audit_mtx);
+
return (ar);
}
void
audit_abort(struct kaudit_record *ar)
{
- mutex_lock(audit_mtx);
+ lck_mtx_lock(audit_mtx);
audit_pre_q_len--;
- mutex_unlock(audit_mtx);
+ lck_mtx_unlock(audit_mtx);
audit_free(ar);
}
ar->k_ar_commit |= AR_COMMIT_KERNEL;
if ((ar->k_ar_commit & (AR_COMMIT_USER | AR_COMMIT_KERNEL)) == 0) {
- mutex_lock(audit_mtx);
+ lck_mtx_lock(audit_mtx);
audit_pre_q_len--;
- mutex_unlock(audit_mtx);
+ lck_mtx_unlock(audit_mtx);
audit_free(ar);
return;
}
*/
nanotime(&ar->k_ar.ar_endtime);
- mutex_lock(audit_mtx);
+ lck_mtx_lock(audit_mtx);
/*
* Note: it could be that some records initiated while audit was
* enabled should still be committed?
*/
if (audit_suspended || !audit_enabled) {
audit_pre_q_len--;
- mutex_unlock(audit_mtx);
+ lck_mtx_unlock(audit_mtx);
audit_free(ar);
return;
}
AUDIT_COMMIT_EVENT,
THREAD_UNINT,
0);
- mutex_unlock(audit_mtx);
+ lck_mtx_unlock(audit_mtx);
assert(ret == THREAD_WAITING);
ret = thread_block(THREAD_CONTINUE_NULL);
assert(ret == THREAD_AWAKENED);
- mutex_lock(audit_mtx);
+ lck_mtx_lock(audit_mtx);
}
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&audit_q, ar, k_q);
audit_q_len++;
audit_pre_q_len--;
wait_queue_wakeup_one(audit_wait_queue, AUDIT_WORKER_EVENT, THREAD_AWAKENED);
- mutex_unlock(audit_mtx);
+ lck_mtx_unlock(audit_mtx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * If we're out of space and need to suspend unprivileged
+ * processes, do that here rather than trying to allocate
+ * another audit record.
+ */
+static void
+audit_new_wait(int audit_event, proc_t proc, struct uthread *uthread)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (audit_in_failure &&
+ suser(kauth_cred_get(), &proc->p_acflag) != 0) {
+ ret = wait_queue_assert_wait(audit_wait_queue,
+ AUDIT_FAILURE_EVENT, THREAD_UNINT, 0);
+ assert(ret == THREAD_WAITING);
+ (void)thread_block(THREAD_CONTINUE_NULL);
+ panic("audit_failing_stop: thread continued");
+ }
+ uthread->uu_ar = audit_new(audit_event, proc, uthread);
}
/*
* each system call.
*/
void
-audit_syscall_enter(unsigned short code, struct proc *proc,
+audit_syscall_enter(unsigned short code, proc_t proc,
struct uthread *uthread)
{
int audit_event;
struct au_mask *aumask;
+ kauth_cred_t my_cred;
audit_event = sys_au_event[code];
if (audit_event == AUE_NULL)
/* Check which audit mask to use; either the kernel non-attributable
* event mask or the process audit mask.
*/
- if (proc->p_ucred->cr_au.ai_auid == AU_DEFAUDITID)
+ my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(proc);
+
+ if (my_cred->cr_au.ai_auid == AU_DEFAUDITID)
aumask = &audit_nae_mask;
else
- aumask = &proc->p_ucred->cr_au.ai_mask;
+ aumask = &my_cred->cr_au.ai_mask;
/*
* Allocate an audit record, if preselection allows it, and store
* in the BSD thread for later use.
*/
- if (au_preselect(audit_event, aumask,
- AU_PRS_FAILURE | AU_PRS_SUCCESS)) {
- /*
- * If we're out of space and need to suspend unprivileged
- * processes, do that here rather than trying to allocate
- * another audit record.
- */
- if (audit_in_failure &&
- suser(kauth_cred_get(), &proc->p_acflag) != 0) {
- int ret;
- assert(audit_worker_thread != THREAD_NULL);
- ret = wait_queue_assert_wait(audit_wait_queue,
- AUDIT_FAILURE_EVENT, THREAD_UNINT, 0);
- assert(ret == THREAD_WAITING);
- (void)thread_block(THREAD_CONTINUE_NULL);
- panic("audit_failing_stop: thread continued");
- }
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+ do {
+ int error;
+
+ error = mac_audit_check_preselect(my_cred, code,
+ (void *) uthread->uu_arg);
+
+ if (error == MAC_AUDIT_YES) {
uthread->uu_ar = audit_new(audit_event, proc, uthread);
- } else {
+ uthread->uu_ar->k_ar.ar_forced_by_mac = 1;
+ au_to_text("Forced by a MAC policy");
+ }
+ else if (error == MAC_AUDIT_NO) {
uthread->uu_ar = NULL;
}
+ else if (error == MAC_AUDIT_DEFAULT &&
+ au_preselect(audit_event, &my_cred->cr_au.ai_mask,
+ AU_PRS_FAILURE | AU_PRS_SUCCESS))
+ audit_new_wait(audit_event, proc, uthread);
+ } while (0);
+#else
+ if (au_preselect(audit_event, &my_cred->cr_au.ai_mask,
+ AU_PRS_FAILURE | AU_PRS_SUCCESS)) {
+ audit_new_wait(audit_event, proc, uthread);
+ } else {
+ uthread->uu_ar = NULL;
}
+#endif
+ kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
+}
+/*
+ * Note: The audit_syscall_exit() parameter list was modified to support
+ * mac_audit_check_postselect(), which requires the Darwin syscall number.
+ */
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+void
+audit_syscall_exit(unsigned short code, int error, AUDIT_PRINTF_ONLY proc_t proc, struct uthread *uthread)
+#else
void
-audit_syscall_exit(int error, AUDIT_PRINTF_ONLY struct proc *proc, struct uthread *uthread)
+audit_syscall_exit(int error, AUDIT_PRINTF_ONLY proc_t proc, struct uthread *uthread)
+#endif
{
int retval;
else
retval = uthread->uu_rval[0];
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+ do {
+ int mac_error;
+
+ if (uthread->uu_ar == NULL) /* syscall wasn't audited */
+ goto out;
+
+ /*
+ * Note, no other postselect mechanism exists. If
+ * mac_audit_check_postselect returns MAC_AUDIT_NO, the
+ * record will be suppressed. Other values at this
+ * point result in the audit record being committed.
+ * This suppression behavior will probably go away in
+ * the port to 10.3.4.
+ */
+ mac_error = mac_audit_check_postselect(kauth_cred_get(), code,
+ (void *) uthread->uu_arg, error, retval,
+ uthread->uu_ar->k_ar.ar_forced_by_mac);
+
+ if (mac_error == MAC_AUDIT_YES)
+ uthread->uu_ar->k_ar_commit |= AR_COMMIT_KERNEL;
+ else if (mac_error == MAC_AUDIT_NO) {
+ audit_free(uthread->uu_ar);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ } while (0);
+
+#endif
audit_commit(uthread->uu_ar, error, retval);
if (uthread->uu_ar != NULL) {
AUDIT_PRINTF(("audit record committed by pid %d\n", proc->p_pid));
}
+
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+out:
+#endif
uthread->uu_ar = NULL;
}
audit_mach_syscall_enter(unsigned short audit_event)
{
struct uthread *uthread;
- struct proc *proc;
+ proc_t proc;
struct au_mask *aumask;
+ kauth_cred_t my_cred;
if (audit_event == AUE_NULL)
return;
assert(uthread->uu_ar == NULL);
+ my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(proc);
+
/* Check which audit mask to use; either the kernel non-attributable
* event mask or the process audit mask.
*/
- if (proc->p_ucred->cr_au.ai_auid == AU_DEFAUDITID)
+ if (my_cred->cr_au.ai_auid == AU_DEFAUDITID)
aumask = &audit_nae_mask;
else
- aumask = &proc->p_ucred->cr_au.ai_mask;
+ aumask = &my_cred->cr_au.ai_mask;
+
+ kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
/*
* Allocate an audit record, if desired, and store in the BSD
if (ar == NULL)
return;
-#if 0
- /*
- * XXX: Add strlcpy() to Darwin for improved safety.
- */
strlcpy(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_login, login, MAXLOGNAME);
-#else
- strcpy(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_login, login);
-#endif
ar->k_ar.ar_valid_arg |= ARG_LOGIN;
}
}
void
-audit_arg_process(struct proc *p)
+audit_arg_process(proc_t p)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
+ kauth_cred_t my_cred;
ar = currecord();
if ((ar == NULL) || (p == NULL))
return;
- ar->k_ar.ar_arg_auid = p->p_ucred->cr_au.ai_auid;
- ar->k_ar.ar_arg_euid = p->p_ucred->cr_uid;
- ar->k_ar.ar_arg_egid = p->p_ucred->cr_groups[0];
- ar->k_ar.ar_arg_ruid = p->p_ucred->cr_ruid;
- ar->k_ar.ar_arg_rgid = p->p_ucred->cr_rgid;
- ar->k_ar.ar_arg_asid = p->p_ucred->cr_au.ai_asid;
- ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid = p->p_ucred->cr_au.ai_termid;
+ my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
+ ar->k_ar.ar_arg_auid = my_cred->cr_au.ai_auid;
+ ar->k_ar.ar_arg_euid = my_cred->cr_uid;
+ ar->k_ar.ar_arg_egid = my_cred->cr_groups[0];
+ ar->k_ar.ar_arg_ruid = my_cred->cr_ruid;
+ ar->k_ar.ar_arg_rgid = my_cred->cr_rgid;
+ ar->k_ar.ar_arg_asid = my_cred->cr_au.ai_asid;
+ ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid = my_cred->cr_au.ai_termid;
+ kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
ar->k_ar.ar_valid_arg |= ARG_AUID | ARG_EUID | ARG_EGID | ARG_RUID |
ARG_RGID | ARG_ASID | ARG_TERMID | ARG_PROCESS;
ar->k_ar.ar_valid_arg |= ARG_SOCKINFO;
}
+/*
+ * Note that the current working directory vp must be supplied at the audit
+ * call site to permit per thread current working directories, and that it
+ * must take a upath starting with '/' into account for chroot if the path
+ * is absolute. This results in the real (non-chroot) path being recorded
+ * in the audit record.
+ */
void
-audit_arg_sockaddr(struct proc *p, struct sockaddr *so)
+audit_arg_sockaddr(struct vnode *cwd_vp, struct sockaddr *so)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
- if (ar == NULL || p == NULL || so == NULL)
+ if (ar == NULL || cwd_vp == NULL || so == NULL)
return;
bcopy(so, &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockaddr, sizeof(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockaddr));
ar->k_ar.ar_valid_arg |= ARG_SADDRINET6;
break;
case AF_UNIX:
- audit_arg_upath(p, ((struct sockaddr_un *)so)->sun_path,
+ audit_arg_upath(cwd_vp, ((struct sockaddr_un *)so)->sun_path,
ARG_UPATH1);
ar->k_ar.ar_valid_arg |= ARG_SADDRUNIX;
break;
return;
}
- strncpy(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_text, text, MAXPATHLEN);
+ strlcpy(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_text, text, MAXPATHLEN);
ar->k_ar.ar_valid_arg |= ARG_TEXT;
}
}
void
-audit_arg_svipc_addr(void * addr)
+audit_arg_svipc_addr(user_addr_t addr)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
* socket address info.
*/
void
-audit_arg_file(__unused struct proc *p, const struct fileproc *fp)
+audit_arg_file(__unused proc_t p, const struct fileproc *fp)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
struct socket *so;
* Store a path as given by the user process for auditing into the audit
* record stored on the user thread. This function will allocate the memory to
* store the path info if not already available. This memory will be
- * freed when the audit record is freed.
+ * freed when the audit record is freed. Note that the current working
+ * directory vp must be supplied at the audit call site to permit per thread
+ * current working directories, and that it must take a upath starting with
+ * '/' into account for chroot if the path is absolute. This results in the
+ * real (non-chroot) path being recorded in the audit record.
*/
void
-audit_arg_upath(struct proc *p, char *upath, u_int64_t flags)
+audit_arg_upath(struct vnode *cwd_vp, char *upath, u_int64_t flags)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
char **pathp;
- if (p == NULL || upath == NULL)
+ if (cwd_vp == NULL || upath == NULL)
return; /* nothing to do! */
if ((flags & (ARG_UPATH1 | ARG_UPATH2)) == 0)
return;
}
- if (canon_path(p, upath, *pathp) == 0) {
+ if (canon_path(cwd_vp, upath, *pathp) == 0) {
if (flags & ARG_UPATH1)
ar->k_ar.ar_valid_arg |= ARG_UPATH1;
else
int len;
char **pathp;
struct vnode_au_info *vnp;
- struct proc *p;
- struct vfs_context context;
+ proc_t p;
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+ char **vnode_mac_labelp;
+ struct mac mac;
+#endif
if (vp == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_valid_arg &= (ARG_ALL ^ ARG_VNODE1);
pathp = &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_kpath1;
vnp = &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_vnode1;
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+ vnode_mac_labelp = &ar->k_ar.ar_vnode1_mac_labels;
+#endif
}
else {
ar->k_ar.ar_valid_arg &= (ARG_ALL ^ ARG_KPATH2);
ar->k_ar.ar_valid_arg &= (ARG_ALL ^ ARG_VNODE2);
pathp = &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_kpath2;
vnp = &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_vnode2;
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+ vnode_mac_labelp = &ar->k_ar.ar_vnode2_mac_labels;
+#endif
}
if (*pathp == NULL) {
*pathp = NULL;
}
- context.vc_proc = p;
- context.vc_ucred = kauth_cred_get();
-
VATTR_INIT(&va);
VATTR_WANTED(&va, va_mode);
VATTR_WANTED(&va, va_uid);
VATTR_WANTED(&va, va_fsid);
VATTR_WANTED(&va, va_fileid);
VATTR_WANTED(&va, va_gen);
- error = vnode_getattr(vp, &va, &context);
+ error = vnode_getattr(vp, &va, vfs_context_current());
if (error) {
/* XXX: How to handle this case? */
return;
}
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+ if (*vnode_mac_labelp == NULL) {
+ *vnode_mac_labelp = (char *)zalloc(audit_mac_label_zone);
+ if (*vnode_mac_labelp != NULL) {
+ mac.m_buflen = MAC_AUDIT_LABEL_LEN;
+ mac.m_string = *vnode_mac_labelp;
+ mac_vnode_label_externalize_audit(vp, &mac);
+ }
+
+
+
+ }
+#endif
+
/* XXX do we want to fall back here when these aren't supported? */
vnp->vn_mode = va.va_mode;
vnp->vn_uid = va.va_uid;
* within the system call itself.
*/
void
-audit_sysclose(struct proc *p, int fd)
+audit_sysclose(proc_t p, int fd)
{
struct fileproc *fp;
struct vnode *vp;
file_drop(fd);
}
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+/*
+ * This function is called by the MAC Framework to add audit data
+ * from a policy to the current audit record.
+ */
+int
+audit_mac_data(int type, int len, u_char *data) {
+ struct kaudit_record *cur;
+ struct mac_audit_record *record;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (audit_enabled == 0) {
+ ret = ENOTSUP;
+ goto out_fail;
+ }
+
+ cur = currecord();
+ if (cur == NULL) {
+ ret = ENOTSUP;
+ goto out_fail;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * XXX: Note that we silently drop the audit data if this
+ * allocation fails - this is consistent with the rest of the
+ * audit implementation.
+ */
+ record = (struct mac_audit_record *)kalloc(sizeof(*record));
+ if (record == NULL)
+ goto out_fail;
+
+ record->type = type;
+ record->length = len;
+ record->data = data;
+ LIST_INSERT_HEAD(cur->k_ar.ar_mac_records, record, records);
+
+ return (0);
+
+out_fail:
+ kfree(data, len);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_mac_string(const char *string)
+{
+ struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+ ar = currecord();
+ if (ar == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_mac_string == NULL) {
+ ar->k_ar.ar_arg_mac_string =
+ (char *)kalloc(MAC_MAX_LABEL_BUF_LEN + MAC_ARG_PREFIX_LEN);
+ /* This should be a rare event. If kalloc() returns NULL, the
+ * system is low on kernel virtual memory. To be consistent with the
+ * rest of audit, just return (may need to panic if required to for audit6).
+ */
+ if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_mac_string == NULL)
+ return;
+ }
+ strncpy(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_mac_string, MAC_ARG_PREFIX, MAC_ARG_PREFIX_LEN);
+ strncpy(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_mac_string + MAC_ARG_PREFIX_LEN, string, MAC_MAX_LABEL_BUF_LEN);
+ ar->k_ar.ar_valid_arg |= ARG_MAC_STRING;
+
+}
+#endif /* MAC */
+
+/*
+ * kau_will_audit can be used by a security policy to determine
+ * if an audit record will be stored, reducing wasted memory allocation
+ * and string handling.
+ */
+
+int
+kau_will_audit(void)
+{
+
+ return (audit_enabled && currecord() != NULL);
+}
+
#else /* !AUDIT */
void
}
int
-audit(struct proc *p, struct audit_args *uap, register_t *retval)
+audit(proc_t p, struct audit_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
int
-auditon(struct proc *p, struct auditon_args *uap, register_t *retval)
+auditon(proc_t p, struct auditon_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
int
-getauid(struct proc *p, struct getauid_args *uap, register_t *retval)
+getauid(proc_t p, struct getauid_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
int
-setauid(struct proc *p, struct setauid_args *uap, register_t *retval)
+setauid(proc_t p, struct setauid_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
int
-getaudit(struct proc *p, struct getaudit_args *uap, register_t *retval)
+getaudit(proc_t p, struct getaudit_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
int
-setaudit(struct proc *p, struct setaudit_args *uap, register_t *retval)
+setaudit(proc_t p, struct setaudit_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
int
-getaudit_addr(struct proc *p, struct getaudit_addr_args *uap, register_t *retval)
+getaudit_addr(proc_t p, struct getaudit_addr_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
int
-setaudit_addr(struct proc *p, struct setaudit_addr_args *uap, register_t *retval)
+setaudit_addr(proc_t p, struct setaudit_addr_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
int
-auditctl(struct proc *p, struct auditctl_args *uap, register_t *retval)
+auditctl(proc_t p, struct auditctl_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+void
+audit_mac_data(int type, int len, u_char *data)
+{
+}
+
+int
+kau_will_audit()
+{
+ return (0);
+}
+#endif
+
#endif /* AUDIT */
projects / apple / xnu.git / blobdiff