* the terms and conditions for use and redistribution.
*/
-#include <cputypes.h>
-
/*-
* Copyright (c) 1982, 1986, 1991, 1993
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
* Version 2.0.
*/
#include <machine/reg.h>
+#include <machine/cpu_capabilities.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/ubc_internal.h> /* ubc_map() */
#include <sys/spawn.h>
#include <sys/spawn_internal.h>
+#include <sys/process_policy.h>
#include <sys/codesign.h>
#include <crypto/sha1.h>
+#include <libkern/libkern.h>
+
#include <security/audit/audit.h>
#include <ipc/ipc_types.h>
#include <kern/sched_prim.h> /* thread_wakeup() */
#include <kern/affinity.h>
#include <kern/assert.h>
+#include <kern/task.h>
+#include <kern/coalition.h>
#if CONFIG_MACF
#include <security/mac.h>
#include <vm/vm_kern.h>
#include <vm/vm_protos.h>
#include <vm/vm_kern.h>
+#include <vm/vm_fault.h>
+#include <vm/vm_pageout.h>
+
+#include <kdp/kdp_dyld.h>
#include <machine/pal_routines.h>
+#include <pexpert/pexpert.h>
+
+#if CONFIG_MEMORYSTATUS
+#include <sys/kern_memorystatus.h>
+#endif
+
#if CONFIG_DTRACE
/* Do not include dtrace.h, it redefines kmem_[alloc/free] */
extern void (*dtrace_fasttrap_exec_ptr)(proc_t);
+extern void (*dtrace_proc_waitfor_exec_ptr)(proc_t);
extern void (*dtrace_helpers_cleanup)(proc_t);
extern void dtrace_lazy_dofs_destroy(proc_t);
+/*
+ * Since dtrace_proc_waitfor_exec_ptr can be added/removed in dtrace_subr.c,
+ * we will store its value before actually calling it.
+ */
+static void (*dtrace_proc_waitfor_hook)(proc_t) = NULL;
+
#include <sys/dtrace_ptss.h>
#endif
/* support for child creation in exec after vfork */
-thread_t fork_create_child(task_t parent_task, proc_t child_proc, int inherit_memory, int is64bit);
+thread_t fork_create_child(task_t parent_task, coalition_t parent_coalition, proc_t child_proc, int inherit_memory, int is64bit);
void vfork_exit(proc_t p, int rv);
int setsigvec(proc_t, thread_t, int, struct __kern_sigaction *, boolean_t in_sigstart);
-extern void proc_apply_task_networkbg_internal(proc_t);
+extern void proc_apply_task_networkbg_internal(proc_t, thread_t);
/*
* Mach things for which prototypes are unavailable from Mach headers
ipc_object_t *objectp);
void ipc_port_release_send(ipc_port_t);
+#if DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG
+void task_importance_update_owner_info(task_t);
+#endif
+
extern struct savearea *get_user_regs(thread_t);
+__attribute__((noinline)) int __EXEC_WAITING_ON_TASKGATED_CODE_SIGNATURE_UPCALL__(mach_port_t task_access_port, int32_t new_pid);
#include <kern/thread.h>
#include <kern/task.h>
#define IS_EOL(ch) ((ch == '#') || (ch == '\n'))
extern vm_map_t bsd_pageable_map;
-extern struct fileops vnops;
+extern const struct fileops vnops;
#define ROUND_PTR(type, addr) \
(type *)( ( (uintptr_t)(addr) + 16 - 1) \
static int exec_handle_sugid(struct image_params *imgp);
static int sugid_scripts = 0;
SYSCTL_INT (_kern, OID_AUTO, sugid_scripts, CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_LOCKED, &sugid_scripts, 0, "");
-static kern_return_t create_unix_stack(vm_map_t map, user_addr_t user_stack,
- int customstack, proc_t p);
+static kern_return_t create_unix_stack(vm_map_t map, load_result_t* load_result, proc_t p);
static int copyoutptr(user_addr_t ua, user_addr_t ptr, int ptr_size);
static void exec_resettextvp(proc_t, struct image_params *);
static int check_for_signature(proc_t, struct image_params *);
-
-/* We don't want this one exported */
-__private_extern__
-int open1(vfs_context_t, struct nameidata *, int, struct vnode_attr *, int32_t *);
+static void exec_prefault_data(proc_t, struct image_params *, load_result_t *);
+static errno_t exec_handle_port_actions(struct image_params *imgp, short psa_flags, boolean_t * portwatch_present, ipc_port_t * portwatch_ports);
+static errno_t exec_handle_spawnattr_policy(proc_t p, int psa_apptype, uint64_t psa_qos_clamp,
+ ipc_port_t * portwatch_ports, int portwatch_count);
/*
* exec_add_user_string
return (0);
}
-#ifdef IMGPF_POWERPC
-/*
- * exec_powerpc32_imgact
- *
- * Implicitly invoke the PowerPC handler for a byte-swapped image magic
- * number. This may happen either as a result of an attempt to invoke a
- * PowerPC image directly, or indirectly as the interpreter used in an
- * interpreter script.
- *
- * Parameters; struct image_params * image parameter block
- *
- * Returns: -1 not an PowerPC image (keep looking)
- * -3 Success: exec_archhandler_ppc: relookup
- * >0 Failure: exec_archhandler_ppc: error number
- *
- * Note: This image activator does not handle the case of a direct
- * invocation of the exec_archhandler_ppc, since in that case, the
- * exec_archhandler_ppc itself is not a PowerPC binary; instead,
- * binary image activators must recognize the exec_archhandler_ppc;
- * This is managed in exec_check_permissions().
- *
- * Note: This image activator is limited to 32 bit powerpc images;
- * if support for 64 bit powerpc images is desired, it would
- * be more in line with this design to write a separate 64 bit
- * image activator.
- */
-static int
-exec_powerpc32_imgact(struct image_params *imgp)
-{
- struct mach_header *mach_header = (struct mach_header *)imgp->ip_vdata;
- int error;
- size_t len = 0;
-
- /*
- * Make sure it's a PowerPC binary. If we've already redirected
- * from an interpreted file once, don't do it again.
- */
- if (mach_header->magic != MH_CIGAM) {
- /*
- * If it's a cross-architecture 64 bit binary, then claim
- * it, but refuse to run it.
- */
- if (mach_header->magic == MH_CIGAM_64)
- return (EBADARCH);
- return (-1);
- }
-
- /* If there is no exec_archhandler_ppc, we can't run it */
- if (exec_archhandler_ppc.path[0] == 0)
- return (EBADARCH);
-
- /* Remember the type of the original file for later grading */
- if (!imgp->ip_origcputype) {
- imgp->ip_origcputype =
- OSSwapBigToHostInt32(mach_header->cputype);
- imgp->ip_origcpusubtype =
- OSSwapBigToHostInt32(mach_header->cpusubtype);
- }
-
- /*
- * The PowerPC flag will be set by the exec_check_permissions()
- * call anyway; however, we set this flag here so that the relookup
- * in execve() does not follow symbolic links, as a side effect.
- */
- imgp->ip_flags |= IMGPF_POWERPC;
-
- /* impute an interpreter */
- error = copystr(exec_archhandler_ppc.path, imgp->ip_interp_buffer,
- IMG_SHSIZE, &len);
- if (error)
- return (error);
-
- exec_reset_save_path(imgp);
- exec_save_path(imgp, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(imgp->ip_interp_buffer),
- UIO_SYSSPACE);
-
- /*
- * provide a replacement string for p->p_comm; we have to use an
- * alternate buffer for this, rather than replacing it directly,
- * since the exec may fail and return to the parent. In that case,
- * we would have erroneously changed the parent p->p_comm instead.
- */
- strlcpy(imgp->ip_p_comm, imgp->ip_ndp->ni_cnd.cn_nameptr, MAXCOMLEN+1);
- /* +1 to allow MAXCOMLEN characters to be copied */
-
- return (-3);
-}
-#endif /* IMGPF_POWERPC */
-
-
/*
* exec_shell_imgact
*
return (-1);
}
-#ifdef IMGPF_POWERPC
- if ((imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_POWERPC) != 0)
- return (EBADARCH);
-#endif /* IMGPF_POWERPC */
-
imgp->ip_flags |= IMGPF_INTERPRET;
imgp->ip_interp_sugid_fd = -1;
imgp->ip_interp_buffer[0] = '\0';
return(error);
fp->f_fglob->fg_flag = FREAD;
- fp->f_fglob->fg_type = DTYPE_VNODE;
fp->f_fglob->fg_ops = &vnops;
fp->f_fglob->fg_data = (caddr_t)imgp->ip_vp;
goto bad;
}
+#if DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG
+ if (cpu_type() == CPU_TYPE_ARM64) {
+ uint32_t fat_nfat_arch = OSSwapBigToHostInt32(fat_header->nfat_arch);
+ struct fat_arch *archs;
+ int vfexec = (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_VFORK_EXEC);
+ int spawn = (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_SPAWN);
+
+ archs = (struct fat_arch *)(imgp->ip_vdata + sizeof(struct fat_header));
+
+ /* ip_vdata always has PAGE_SIZE of data */
+ if (PAGE_SIZE >= (sizeof(struct fat_header) + (fat_nfat_arch + 1) * sizeof(struct fat_arch))) {
+ if (fat_nfat_arch > 0
+ && OSSwapBigToHostInt32(archs[fat_nfat_arch].cputype) == CPU_TYPE_ARM64) {
+
+ /* rdar://problem/15001727 */
+ printf("Attempt to execute malformed binary %s\n", imgp->ip_strings);
+
+ proc_lock(p);
+ p->p_csflags |= CS_KILLED;
+ proc_unlock(p);
+
+ /*
+ * We can't stop the system call, so make sure the child never executes
+ * For vfork exec, the current implementation has not set up the thread in the
+ * child process, so we cannot signal it. Return an error code in that case.
+ */
+ if (!vfexec && !spawn) {
+ psignal(p, SIGKILL);
+ error = 0;
+ } else {
+ error = EBADEXEC;
+ }
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
/* If posix_spawn binprefs exist, respect those prefs. */
psa = (struct _posix_spawnattr *) imgp->ip_px_sa;
if (psa != NULL && psa->psa_binprefs[0] != 0) {
struct mach_header *mach_header = (struct mach_header *)imgp->ip_vdata;
proc_t p = vfs_context_proc(imgp->ip_vfs_context);
int error = 0;
- int vfexec = 0;
task_t task;
task_t new_task = NULL; /* protected by vfexec */
thread_t thread;
load_return_t lret;
load_result_t load_result;
struct _posix_spawnattr *psa = NULL;
- int spawn = (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_SPAWN);
- int apptype = 0;
+ int spawn = (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_SPAWN);
+ int vfexec = (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_VFORK_EXEC);
/*
* make sure it's a Mach-O 1.0 or Mach-O 2.0 binary; the difference
* is a reserved field on the end, so for the most part, we can
- * treat them as if they were identical.
- */
+ * treat them as if they were identical. Reverse-endian Mach-O
+ * binaries are recognized but not compatible.
+ */
+ if ((mach_header->magic == MH_CIGAM) ||
+ (mach_header->magic == MH_CIGAM_64)) {
+ error = EBADARCH;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
if ((mach_header->magic != MH_MAGIC) &&
(mach_header->magic != MH_MAGIC_64)) {
error = -1;
thread = current_thread();
uthread = get_bsdthread_info(thread);
- /*
- * Save off the vfexec state up front; we have to do this, because
- * we need to know if we were in this state initially subsequent to
- * creating the backing task, thread, and uthread for the child
- * process (from the vfs_context_t from in img_parms).
- */
- if (uthread->uu_flag & UT_VFORK)
- vfexec = 1; /* Mark in exec */
-
if ((mach_header->cputype & CPU_ARCH_ABI64) == CPU_ARCH_ABI64)
imgp->ip_flags |= IMGPF_IS_64BIT;
goto bad;
}
grade:
- if (!grade_binary(imgp->ip_origcputype & ~CPU_SUBTYPE_LIB64,
- imgp->ip_origcpusubtype & ~CPU_SUBTYPE_MASK)) {
+ if (!grade_binary(imgp->ip_origcputype, imgp->ip_origcpusubtype & ~CPU_SUBTYPE_MASK)) {
error = EBADARCH;
goto bad;
}
AUDIT_ARG(envv, imgp->ip_endargv, imgp->ip_envc,
imgp->ip_endenvv - imgp->ip_endargv);
-#ifdef IMGPF_POWERPC
- /*
- * XXX
- *
- * Should be factored out; this is here because we might be getting
- * invoked this way as the result of a shell script, and the check
- * in exec_check_permissions() is not interior to the jump back up
- * to the "encapsulated_binary:" label in exec_activate_image().
- */
- if (imgp->ip_vattr->va_fsid == exec_archhandler_ppc.fsid &&
- imgp->ip_vattr->va_fileid == exec_archhandler_ppc.fileid) {
- imgp->ip_flags |= IMGPF_POWERPC;
- }
-#endif /* IMGPF_POWERPC */
-
/*
* We are being called to activate an image subsequent to a vfork()
* operation; in this case, we know that our task, thread, and
*/
if (vfexec || spawn) {
if (vfexec) {
- imgp->ip_new_thread = fork_create_child(task, p, FALSE, (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_IS_64BIT));
+ imgp->ip_new_thread = fork_create_child(task, COALITION_NULL, p, FALSE, (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_IS_64BIT));
if (imgp->ip_new_thread == NULL) {
error = ENOMEM;
goto bad;
* NOTE: An error after this point indicates we have potentially
* destroyed or overwritten some process state while attempting an
* execve() following a vfork(), which is an unrecoverable condition.
+ * We send the new process an immediate SIGKILL to avoid it executing
+ * any instructions in the mutated address space. For true spawns,
+ * this is not the case, and "too late" is still not too late to
+ * return an error code to the parent process.
*/
/*
goto badtoolate;
}
+ proc_lock(p);
+ p->p_cputype = imgp->ip_origcputype;
+ p->p_cpusubtype = imgp->ip_origcpusubtype;
+ proc_unlock(p);
+
vm_map_set_user_wire_limit(get_task_map(task), p->p_rlimit[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur);
/*
* requested them on exec.
*/
if (load_result.csflags & CS_VALID) {
- imgp->ip_csflags |= load_result.csflags &
+ imgp->ip_csflags |= load_result.csflags &
(CS_VALID|
- CS_HARD|CS_KILL|CS_EXEC_SET_HARD|CS_EXEC_SET_KILL);
+ CS_HARD|CS_KILL|CS_ENFORCEMENT|CS_REQUIRE_LV|CS_DYLD_PLATFORM|
+ CS_EXEC_SET_HARD|CS_EXEC_SET_KILL|CS_EXEC_SET_ENFORCEMENT);
} else {
imgp->ip_csflags &= ~CS_VALID;
}
imgp->ip_csflags |= CS_HARD;
if (p->p_csflags & CS_EXEC_SET_KILL)
imgp->ip_csflags |= CS_KILL;
+ if (p->p_csflags & CS_EXEC_SET_ENFORCEMENT)
+ imgp->ip_csflags |= CS_ENFORCEMENT;
+ if (p->p_csflags & CS_EXEC_SET_INSTALLER)
+ imgp->ip_csflags |= CS_INSTALLER;
/*
vm_map_exec(get_task_map(task),
task,
(void *) p->p_fd->fd_rdir,
-#ifdef IMGPF_POWERPC
- imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_POWERPC ?
- CPU_TYPE_POWERPC :
-#endif
cpu_type());
/*
* deal with set[ug]id.
*/
error = exec_handle_sugid(imgp);
+ if (error) {
+ goto badtoolate;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * deal with voucher on exec-calling thread.
+ */
+ if (imgp->ip_new_thread == NULL)
+ thread_set_mach_voucher(current_thread(), IPC_VOUCHER_NULL);
/* Make sure we won't interrupt ourself signalling a partial process */
if (!vfexec && !spawn && (p->p_lflag & P_LTRACED))
psignal(p, SIGTRAP);
- if (error) {
- goto badtoolate;
- }
-
if (load_result.unixproc &&
create_unix_stack(get_task_map(task),
- load_result.user_stack,
- load_result.customstack,
+ &load_result,
p) != KERN_SUCCESS) {
error = load_return_to_errno(LOAD_NOSPACE);
goto badtoolate;
error = copyoutptr(load_result.mach_header, ap, new_ptr_size);
if (error) {
- if (vfexec || spawn)
- vm_map_switch(old_map);
+ if (vfexec || spawn)
+ vm_map_switch(old_map);
goto badtoolate;
}
task_set_dyld_info(task, load_result.all_image_info_addr,
load_result.all_image_info_size);
}
+ /* Avoid immediate VM faults back into kernel */
+ exec_prefault_data(p, imgp, &load_result);
+
if (vfexec || spawn) {
vm_map_switch(old_map);
}
pal_dbg_set_task_name( p->task );
+#if DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG
+ /*
+ * Update the pid an proc name for importance base if any
+ */
+ task_importance_update_owner_info(p->task);
+#endif
+
memcpy(&p->p_uuid[0], &load_result.uuid[0], sizeof(p->p_uuid));
// <rdar://6598155> dtrace code cleanup needed
*/
proc_lock(p);
if (p->p_dtrace_probes && dtrace_fasttrap_exec_ptr) {
- (*dtrace_fasttrap_exec_ptr)(p);
- }
+ (*dtrace_fasttrap_exec_ptr)(p);
+ }
proc_unlock(p);
#endif
}
}
-#ifdef IMGPF_POWERPC
/*
- * Mark the process as powerpc or not. If powerpc, set the affinity
- * flag, which will be used for grading binaries in future exec's
- * from the process.
+ * Ensure the 'translated' and 'affinity' flags are cleared, since we
+ * no longer run PowerPC binaries.
*/
- if (((imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_POWERPC) != 0))
- OSBitOrAtomic(P_TRANSLATED, &p->p_flag);
- else
-#endif /* IMGPF_POWERPC */
- OSBitAndAtomic(~((uint32_t)P_TRANSLATED), &p->p_flag);
- OSBitAndAtomic(~((uint32_t)P_AFFINITY), &p->p_flag);
+ OSBitAndAtomic(~((uint32_t)(P_TRANSLATED | P_AFFINITY)), &p->p_flag);
/*
* If posix_spawned with the START_SUSPENDED flag, stop the
proc_unlock(p);
(void) task_suspend(p->task);
}
- if ((psa->psa_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_OSX_TALAPP_START) || (psa->psa_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_OSX_DBCLIENT_START) || (psa->psa_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_IOS_APP_START)) {
- if ((psa->psa_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_OSX_TALAPP_START))
- apptype = PROC_POLICY_OSX_APPTYPE_TAL;
- else if (psa->psa_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_OSX_DBCLIENT_START)
- apptype = PROC_POLICY_OSX_APPTYPE_DBCLIENT;
- else if (psa->psa_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_IOS_APP_START)
- apptype = PROC_POLICY_IOS_APPTYPE;
- else
- apptype = 0;
- proc_set_task_apptype(p->task, apptype);
- if ((apptype == PROC_POLICY_OSX_APPTYPE_TAL) ||
- (apptype == PROC_POLICY_OSX_APPTYPE_DBCLIENT)) {
-
- proc_apply_task_networkbg_internal(p);
- }
- }
}
/*
psignal_vfork(p, new_task, thread, SIGTRAP);
}
+ goto done;
+
badtoolate:
-if (!spawn)
- proc_knote(p, NOTE_EXEC);
+ /* Don't allow child process to execute any instructions */
+ if (!spawn) {
+ if (vfexec) {
+ psignal_vfork(p, new_task, thread, SIGKILL);
+ } else {
+ psignal(p, SIGKILL);
+ }
- if (vfexec || spawn) {
+ /* We can't stop this system call at this point, so just pretend we succeeded */
+ error = 0;
+ }
+
+done:
+ if (!spawn) {
+ /* notify only if it has not failed due to FP Key error */
+ if ((p->p_lflag & P_LTERM_DECRYPTFAIL) == 0)
+ proc_knote(p, NOTE_EXEC);
+ }
+
+ /* Drop extra references for cases where we don't expect the caller to clean up */
+ if (vfexec || (spawn && error == 0)) {
task_deallocate(new_task);
thread_deallocate(thread);
- if (error)
- error = 0;
}
bad:
} execsw[] = {
{ exec_mach_imgact, "Mach-o Binary" },
{ exec_fat_imgact, "Fat Binary" },
-#ifdef IMGPF_POWERPC
- { exec_powerpc32_imgact, "PowerPC binary" },
-#endif /* IMGPF_POWERPC */
{ exec_shell_imgact, "Interpreter Script" },
{ NULL, NULL}
};
static int
exec_activate_image(struct image_params *imgp)
{
- struct nameidata nd;
+ struct nameidata *ndp = NULL;
int error;
int resid;
int once = 1; /* save SGUID-ness for interpreted files */
error = execargs_alloc(imgp);
if (error)
- goto bad;
+ goto bad_notrans;
error = exec_save_path(imgp, imgp->ip_user_fname, imgp->ip_seg);
if (error) {
/* Use imgp->ip_strings, which contains the copyin-ed exec path */
DTRACE_PROC1(exec, uintptr_t, imgp->ip_strings);
- NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, OP_LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF | AUDITVNPATH1,
+ MALLOC(ndp, struct nameidata *, sizeof(*ndp), M_TEMP, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
+ if (ndp == NULL) {
+ error = ENOMEM;
+ goto bad_notrans;
+ }
+
+ NDINIT(ndp, LOOKUP, OP_LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF | AUDITVNPATH1,
UIO_SYSSPACE, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(imgp->ip_strings), imgp->ip_vfs_context);
again:
- error = namei(&nd);
+ error = namei(ndp);
if (error)
goto bad_notrans;
- imgp->ip_ndp = &nd; /* successful namei(); call nameidone() later */
- imgp->ip_vp = nd.ni_vp; /* if set, need to vnode_put() at some point */
+ imgp->ip_ndp = ndp; /* successful namei(); call nameidone() later */
+ imgp->ip_vp = ndp->ni_vp; /* if set, need to vnode_put() at some point */
/*
* Before we start the transition from binary A to binary B, make
proc_unlock(p);
goto bad_notrans;
}
- error = proc_transstart(p, 1);
+ error = proc_transstart(p, 1, 0);
proc_unlock(p);
if (error)
goto bad_notrans;
}
mac_vnode_label_copy(imgp->ip_vp->v_label,
imgp->ip_scriptlabelp);
+
+ /*
+ * Take a ref of the script vnode for later use.
+ */
+ if (imgp->ip_scriptvp)
+ vnode_put(imgp->ip_scriptvp);
+ if (vnode_getwithref(imgp->ip_vp) == 0)
+ imgp->ip_scriptvp = imgp->ip_vp;
#endif
- nameidone(&nd);
+ nameidone(ndp);
vnode_put(imgp->ip_vp);
imgp->ip_vp = NULL; /* already put */
imgp->ip_ndp = NULL; /* already nameidone */
/* Use imgp->ip_strings, which exec_shell_imgact reset to the interpreter */
- NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, OP_LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF,
+ NDINIT(ndp, LOOKUP, OP_LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF,
UIO_SYSSPACE, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(imgp->ip_strings), imgp->ip_vfs_context);
-#ifdef IMGPF_POWERPC
- /*
- * PowerPC does not follow symlinks because the
- * code which sets exec_archhandler_ppc.fsid and
- * exec_archhandler_ppc.fileid doesn't follow them.
- */
- if (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_POWERPC)
- nd.ni_cnd.cn_flags &= ~FOLLOW;
-#endif /* IMGPF_POWERPC */
-
proc_transend(p, 0);
goto again;
if (error == 0 && kauth_authorize_fileop_has_listeners()) {
kauth_authorize_fileop(vfs_context_ucred(imgp->ip_vfs_context),
KAUTH_FILEOP_EXEC,
- (uintptr_t)nd.ni_vp, 0);
+ (uintptr_t)ndp->ni_vp, 0);
}
bad:
execargs_free(imgp);
if (imgp->ip_ndp)
nameidone(imgp->ip_ndp);
+ if (ndp)
+ FREE(ndp, M_TEMP);
return (error);
}
+
+/*
+ * exec_handle_spawnattr_policy
+ *
+ * Description: Decode and apply the posix_spawn apptype, qos clamp, and watchport ports to the task.
+ *
+ * Parameters: proc_t p process to apply attributes to
+ * int psa_apptype posix spawn attribute apptype
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 Success
+ */
+static errno_t
+exec_handle_spawnattr_policy(proc_t p, int psa_apptype, uint64_t psa_qos_clamp,
+ ipc_port_t * portwatch_ports, int portwatch_count)
+{
+ int apptype = TASK_APPTYPE_NONE;
+ int qos_clamp = THREAD_QOS_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ if ((psa_apptype & POSIX_SPAWN_PROC_TYPE_MASK) != 0) {
+ int proctype = psa_apptype & POSIX_SPAWN_PROC_TYPE_MASK;
+
+ switch(proctype) {
+ case POSIX_SPAWN_PROC_TYPE_DAEMON_INTERACTIVE:
+ apptype = TASK_APPTYPE_DAEMON_INTERACTIVE;
+ break;
+ case POSIX_SPAWN_PROC_TYPE_DAEMON_STANDARD:
+ apptype = TASK_APPTYPE_DAEMON_STANDARD;
+ break;
+ case POSIX_SPAWN_PROC_TYPE_DAEMON_ADAPTIVE:
+ apptype = TASK_APPTYPE_DAEMON_ADAPTIVE;
+ break;
+ case POSIX_SPAWN_PROC_TYPE_DAEMON_BACKGROUND:
+ apptype = TASK_APPTYPE_DAEMON_BACKGROUND;
+ break;
+ case POSIX_SPAWN_PROC_TYPE_APP_DEFAULT:
+ apptype = TASK_APPTYPE_APP_DEFAULT;
+ break;
+ case POSIX_SPAWN_PROC_TYPE_APP_TAL:
+ apptype = TASK_APPTYPE_APP_TAL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ apptype = TASK_APPTYPE_NONE;
+ /* TODO: Should an invalid value here fail the spawn? */
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (psa_qos_clamp != POSIX_SPAWN_PROC_CLAMP_NONE) {
+ switch (psa_qos_clamp) {
+ case POSIX_SPAWN_PROC_CLAMP_UTILITY:
+ qos_clamp = THREAD_QOS_UTILITY;
+ break;
+ case POSIX_SPAWN_PROC_CLAMP_BACKGROUND:
+ qos_clamp = THREAD_QOS_BACKGROUND;
+ break;
+ case POSIX_SPAWN_PROC_CLAMP_MAINTENANCE:
+ qos_clamp = THREAD_QOS_MAINTENANCE;
+ break;
+ default:
+ qos_clamp = THREAD_QOS_UNSPECIFIED;
+ /* TODO: Should an invalid value here fail the spawn? */
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (psa_apptype != TASK_APPTYPE_NONE || qos_clamp != THREAD_QOS_UNSPECIFIED) {
+ proc_set_task_spawnpolicy(p->task, apptype, qos_clamp,
+ portwatch_ports, portwatch_count);
+ }
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+
/*
* exec_handle_port_actions
*
* ENOTSUP Illegal posix_spawn attr flag was set
*/
static errno_t
-exec_handle_port_actions(struct image_params *imgp, short psa_flags)
+exec_handle_port_actions(struct image_params *imgp, short psa_flags, boolean_t * portwatch_present, ipc_port_t * portwatch_ports)
{
_posix_spawn_port_actions_t pacts = imgp->ip_px_spa;
proc_t p = vfs_context_proc(imgp->ip_vfs_context);
_ps_port_action_t *act = NULL;
task_t task = p->task;
ipc_port_t port = NULL;
- errno_t ret = KERN_SUCCESS;
+ errno_t ret = 0;
int i;
+ *portwatch_present = FALSE;
+
for (i = 0; i < pacts->pspa_count; i++) {
act = &pacts->pspa_actions[i];
if (ipc_object_copyin(get_task_ipcspace(current_task()),
- CAST_MACH_PORT_TO_NAME(act->new_port),
- MACH_MSG_TYPE_COPY_SEND,
- (ipc_object_t *) &port) != KERN_SUCCESS)
- return EINVAL;
-
- if (ret)
- return ret;
+ act->new_port, MACH_MSG_TYPE_COPY_SEND,
+ (ipc_object_t *) &port) != KERN_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = EINVAL;
+ goto done;
+ }
switch (act->port_type) {
- case PSPA_SPECIAL:
- /* Only allowed when not under vfork */
- if (!(psa_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_SETEXEC))
- return ENOTSUP;
- ret = (task_set_special_port(task,
- act->which,
- port) == KERN_SUCCESS) ? 0 : EINVAL;
- break;
- case PSPA_EXCEPTION:
- /* Only allowed when not under vfork */
- if (!(psa_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_SETEXEC))
- return ENOTSUP;
- ret = (task_set_exception_ports(task,
- act->mask,
- port,
- act->behavior,
- act->flavor) == KERN_SUCCESS) ? 0 : EINVAL;
- break;
+ case PSPA_SPECIAL:
+ /* Only allowed when not under vfork */
+ if (!(psa_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_SETEXEC))
+ ret = ENOTSUP;
+ else if (task_set_special_port(task,
+ act->which, port) != KERN_SUCCESS)
+ ret = EINVAL;
+ break;
+
+ case PSPA_EXCEPTION:
+ /* Only allowed when not under vfork */
+ if (!(psa_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_SETEXEC))
+ ret = ENOTSUP;
+ else if (task_set_exception_ports(task,
+ act->mask, port, act->behavior,
+ act->flavor) != KERN_SUCCESS)
+ ret = EINVAL;
+ break;
#if CONFIG_AUDIT
- case PSPA_AU_SESSION:
- ret = audit_session_spawnjoin(p,
- port);
- break;
+ case PSPA_AU_SESSION:
+ ret = audit_session_spawnjoin(p, port);
+ break;
#endif
- default:
- ret = EINVAL;
+ case PSPA_IMP_WATCHPORTS:
+ if (portwatch_ports != NULL) {
+ *portwatch_present = TRUE;
+ /* hold on to this till end of spawn */
+ portwatch_ports[i] = port;
+ ret = 0;
+ } else
+ ipc_port_release_send(port);
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = EINVAL;
+ break;
}
+
/* action failed, so release port resources */
+
if (ret) {
ipc_port_release_send(port);
- return ret;
+ break;
}
}
- return ret;
+done:
+ if (0 != ret)
+ DTRACE_PROC1(spawn__port__failure, mach_port_name_t, act->new_port);
+ return (ret);
}
/*
* context of UIO_SYSSPACE, and casts the address
* argument to a user_addr_t.
*/
- struct vnode_attr va;
- struct nameidata nd;
+ char *bufp = NULL;
+ struct vnode_attr *vap;
+ struct nameidata *ndp;
int mode = psfa->psfaa_openargs.psfao_mode;
struct dup2_args dup2a;
struct close_nocancel_args ca;
int origfd;
- VATTR_INIT(&va);
+ MALLOC(bufp, char *, sizeof(*vap) + sizeof(*ndp), M_TEMP, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
+ if (bufp == NULL) {
+ error = ENOMEM;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ vap = (struct vnode_attr *) bufp;
+ ndp = (struct nameidata *) (bufp + sizeof(*vap));
+
+ VATTR_INIT(vap);
/* Mask off all but regular access permissions */
mode = ((mode &~ p->p_fd->fd_cmask) & ALLPERMS) & ~S_ISTXT;
- VATTR_SET(&va, va_mode, mode & ACCESSPERMS);
+ VATTR_SET(vap, va_mode, mode & ACCESSPERMS);
- NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, OP_OPEN, FOLLOW | AUDITVNPATH1, UIO_SYSSPACE,
+ NDINIT(ndp, LOOKUP, OP_OPEN, FOLLOW | AUDITVNPATH1, UIO_SYSSPACE,
CAST_USER_ADDR_T(psfa->psfaa_openargs.psfao_path),
imgp->ip_vfs_context);
error = open1(imgp->ip_vfs_context,
- &nd,
+ ndp,
psfa->psfaa_openargs.psfao_oflag,
- &va,
+ vap,
+ fileproc_alloc_init, NULL,
ival);
+ FREE(bufp, M_TEMP);
+
/*
* If there's an error, or we get the right fd by
* accident, then drop out here. This is easier than
break;
case PSFA_INHERIT: {
- struct fileproc *fp;
- int fd = psfa->psfaa_filedes;
+ struct fcntl_nocancel_args fcntla;
/*
* Check to see if the descriptor exists, and
* ensure it's -not- marked as close-on-exec.
- * [Less code than the equivalent F_GETFD/F_SETFD.]
+ *
+ * Attempting to "inherit" a guarded fd will
+ * result in a error.
*/
- proc_fdlock(p);
- if ((error = fp_lookup(p, fd, &fp, 1)) == 0) {
- *fdflags(p, fd) &= ~UF_EXCLOSE;
- (void) fp_drop(p, fd, fp, 1);
+ fcntla.fd = psfa->psfaa_filedes;
+ fcntla.cmd = F_GETFD;
+ if ((error = fcntl_nocancel(p, &fcntla, ival)) != 0)
+ break;
+
+ if ((ival[0] & FD_CLOEXEC) == FD_CLOEXEC) {
+ fcntla.fd = psfa->psfaa_filedes;
+ fcntla.cmd = F_SETFD;
+ fcntla.arg = ival[0] & ~FD_CLOEXEC;
+ error = fcntl_nocancel(p, &fcntla, ival);
}
- proc_fdunlock(p);
+
}
break;
/* All file actions failures are considered fatal, per POSIX */
- if (error)
+ if (error) {
+ if (PSFA_OPEN == psfa->psfaa_type) {
+ DTRACE_PROC1(spawn__open__failure, uintptr_t,
+ psfa->psfaa_openargs.psfao_path);
+ } else {
+ DTRACE_PROC1(spawn__fd__failure, int, psfa->psfaa_filedes);
+ }
break;
+ }
}
if (error != 0 || (psa_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_CLOEXEC_DEFAULT) == 0)
return (0);
}
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+/*
+ * exec_spawnattr_getmacpolicyinfo
+ */
+void *
+exec_spawnattr_getmacpolicyinfo(const void *macextensions, const char *policyname, size_t *lenp)
+{
+ const struct _posix_spawn_mac_policy_extensions *psmx = macextensions;
+ int i;
+
+ if (psmx == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < psmx->psmx_count; i++) {
+ const _ps_mac_policy_extension_t *extension = &psmx->psmx_extensions[i];
+ if (strncmp(extension->policyname, policyname, sizeof(extension->policyname)) == 0) {
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = extension->datalen;
+ return extension->datap;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = 0;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+spawn_copyin_macpolicyinfo(const struct user__posix_spawn_args_desc *px_args, _posix_spawn_mac_policy_extensions_t *psmxp)
+{
+ _posix_spawn_mac_policy_extensions_t psmx = NULL;
+ int error = 0;
+ int copycnt = 0;
+ int i = 0;
+
+ *psmxp = NULL;
+
+ if (px_args->mac_extensions_size < PS_MAC_EXTENSIONS_SIZE(1) ||
+ px_args->mac_extensions_size > PAGE_SIZE) {
+ error = EINVAL;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ MALLOC(psmx, _posix_spawn_mac_policy_extensions_t, px_args->mac_extensions_size, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
+ if ((error = copyin(px_args->mac_extensions, psmx, px_args->mac_extensions_size)) != 0)
+ goto bad;
+
+ if (PS_MAC_EXTENSIONS_SIZE(psmx->psmx_count) > px_args->mac_extensions_size) {
+ error = EINVAL;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < psmx->psmx_count; i++) {
+ _ps_mac_policy_extension_t *extension = &psmx->psmx_extensions[i];
+ if (extension->datalen == 0 || extension->datalen > PAGE_SIZE) {
+ error = EINVAL;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (copycnt = 0; copycnt < psmx->psmx_count; copycnt++) {
+ _ps_mac_policy_extension_t *extension = &psmx->psmx_extensions[copycnt];
+ void *data = NULL;
+
+ MALLOC(data, void *, extension->datalen, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
+ if ((error = copyin(extension->data, data, extension->datalen)) != 0) {
+ FREE(data, M_TEMP);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ extension->datap = data;
+ }
+
+ *psmxp = psmx;
+ return 0;
+
+bad:
+ if (psmx != NULL) {
+ for (i = 0; i < copycnt; i++)
+ FREE(psmx->psmx_extensions[i].datap, M_TEMP);
+ FREE(psmx, M_TEMP);
+ }
+ return error;
+}
+
+static void
+spawn_free_macpolicyinfo(_posix_spawn_mac_policy_extensions_t psmx)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (psmx == NULL)
+ return;
+ for (i = 0; i < psmx->psmx_count; i++)
+ FREE(psmx->psmx_extensions[i].datap, M_TEMP);
+ FREE(psmx, M_TEMP);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_MACF */
/*
* posix_spawn
boolean_t spawn_no_exec = FALSE;
boolean_t proc_transit_set = TRUE;
boolean_t exec_done = FALSE;
+ int portwatch_count = 0;
+ ipc_port_t * portwatch_ports = NULL;
+ vm_size_t px_sa_offset = offsetof(struct _posix_spawnattr, psa_ports);
/*
* Allocate a big chunk for locals instead of using stack since these
imgp->ip_flags = (is_64 ? IMGPF_WAS_64BIT : IMGPF_NONE);
imgp->ip_p_comm = alt_p_comm; /* for PowerPC */
imgp->ip_seg = (is_64 ? UIO_USERSPACE64 : UIO_USERSPACE32);
+ imgp->ip_mac_return = 0;
if (uap->adesc != USER_ADDR_NULL) {
if(is_64) {
px_args.file_actions = CAST_USER_ADDR_T(px_args32.file_actions);
px_args.port_actions_size = px_args32.port_actions_size;
px_args.port_actions = CAST_USER_ADDR_T(px_args32.port_actions);
+ px_args.mac_extensions_size = px_args32.mac_extensions_size;
+ px_args.mac_extensions = CAST_USER_ADDR_T(px_args32.mac_extensions);
}
if (error)
goto bad;
if (px_args.attr_size != 0) {
/*
- * This could lose some of the port_actions pointer,
- * but we already have it from px_args.
+ * We are not copying the port_actions pointer,
+ * because we already have it from px_args.
+ * This is a bit fragile: <rdar://problem/16427422>
*/
- if ((error = copyin(px_args.attrp, &px_sa, sizeof(px_sa))) != 0)
+
+ if ((error = copyin(px_args.attrp, &px_sa, px_sa_offset) != 0))
goto bad;
+
+ bzero( (void *)( (unsigned long) &px_sa + px_sa_offset), sizeof(px_sa) - px_sa_offset );
imgp->ip_px_sa = &px_sa;
}
if ((error = copyin(px_args.file_actions, px_sfap,
px_args.file_actions_size)) != 0)
goto bad;
+
+ /* Verify that the action count matches the struct size */
+ if (PSF_ACTIONS_SIZE(px_sfap->psfa_act_count) != px_args.file_actions_size) {
+ error = EINVAL;
+ goto bad;
+ }
}
if (px_args.port_actions_size != 0) {
/* Limit port_actions to one page of data */
if ((error = copyin(px_args.port_actions, px_spap,
px_args.port_actions_size)) != 0)
goto bad;
+
+ /* Verify that the action count matches the struct size */
+ if (PS_PORT_ACTIONS_SIZE(px_spap->pspa_count) != px_args.port_actions_size) {
+ error = EINVAL;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ }
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+ if (px_args.mac_extensions_size != 0) {
+ if ((error = spawn_copyin_macpolicyinfo(&px_args, (_posix_spawn_mac_policy_extensions_t *)&imgp->ip_px_smpx)) != 0)
+ goto bad;
}
+#endif /* CONFIG_MACF */
}
/* set uthread to parent */
* and execve().
*/
if (imgp->ip_px_sa == NULL || !(px_sa.psa_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_SETEXEC)){
- if ((error = fork1(p, &imgp->ip_new_thread, PROC_CREATE_SPAWN)) != 0)
+
+ /*
+ * Set the new task's coalition, if it is requested.
+ * TODO: privilege check - 15365900
+ */
+ coalition_t coal = COALITION_NULL;
+#if CONFIG_COALITIONS
+ if (imgp->ip_px_sa) {
+ uint64_t cid = px_sa.psa_coalitionid;
+ if (cid != 0) {
+#if COALITION_DEBUG
+ printf("%s: searching for coalition ID %llu\n", __func__, cid);
+#endif
+ coal = coalition_find_and_activate_by_id(cid);
+ if (coal == COALITION_NULL) {
+#if COALITION_DEBUG
+ printf("%s: could not find coalition ID %llu (perhaps it has been terminated or reaped)\n", __func__, cid);
+#endif
+ error = ESRCH;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* CONFIG_COALITIONS */
+
+ error = fork1(p, &imgp->ip_new_thread, PROC_CREATE_SPAWN, coal);
+
+ if (error != 0) {
+ if (coal != COALITION_NULL) {
+#if CONFIG_COALITIONS
+ coalition_remove_active(coal);
+ coalition_release(coal);
+#endif /* CONFIG_COALITIONS */
+ }
goto bad;
+ }
imgp->ip_flags |= IMGPF_SPAWN; /* spawn w/o exec */
spawn_no_exec = TRUE; /* used in later tests */
+
+ if (coal != COALITION_NULL) {
+#if CONFIG_COALITIONS
+ coalition_remove_active(coal);
+ coalition_release(coal);
+#endif /* CONFIG_COALITIONS */
+ }
}
- if (spawn_no_exec)
+ if (spawn_no_exec) {
p = (proc_t)get_bsdthreadtask_info(imgp->ip_new_thread);
+
+ /*
+ * We had to wait until this point before firing the
+ * proc:::create probe, otherwise p would not point to the
+ * child process.
+ */
+ DTRACE_PROC1(create, proc_t, p);
+ }
assert(p != NULL);
/* By default, the thread everyone plays with is the parent */
}
/* Has spawn port actions? */
- if (imgp->ip_px_spa != NULL) {
- /*
- * The check for the POSIX_SPAWN_SETEXEC flag is done in
- * exec_handle_port_actions().
+ if (imgp->ip_px_spa != NULL) {
+ boolean_t is_adaptive = FALSE;
+ boolean_t portwatch_present = FALSE;
+
+ /* Will this process become adaptive? The apptype isn't ready yet, so we can't look there. */
+ if (imgp->ip_px_sa != NULL && px_sa.psa_apptype == POSIX_SPAWN_PROC_TYPE_DAEMON_ADAPTIVE)
+ is_adaptive = TRUE;
+
+ /*
+ * portwatch only:
+ * Allocate a place to store the ports we want to bind to the new task
+ * We can't bind them until after the apptype is set.
*/
+ if (px_spap->pspa_count != 0 && is_adaptive) {
+ portwatch_count = px_spap->pspa_count;
+ MALLOC(portwatch_ports, ipc_port_t *, (sizeof(ipc_port_t) * portwatch_count), M_TEMP, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
+ } else {
+ portwatch_ports = NULL;
+ }
+
if ((error = exec_handle_port_actions(imgp,
- imgp->ip_px_sa != NULL ? px_sa.psa_flags : 0)) != 0)
+ imgp->ip_px_sa != NULL ? px_sa.psa_flags : 0, &portwatch_present, portwatch_ports)) != 0)
goto bad;
+
+ if (portwatch_present == FALSE && portwatch_ports != NULL) {
+ FREE(portwatch_ports, M_TEMP);
+ portwatch_ports = NULL;
+ portwatch_count = 0;
+ }
}
/* Has spawn attr? */
/*
* Disable ASLR for the spawned process.
*/
+ /*
+ * But only do so if we are not embedded; embedded allows for a
+ * boot-arg (-disable_aslr) to deal with this (which itself is
+ * only honored on DEVELOPMENT or DEBUG builds of xnu).
+ */
if (px_sa.psa_flags & _POSIX_SPAWN_DISABLE_ASLR)
OSBitOrAtomic(P_DISABLE_ASLR, &p->p_flag);
* Activate the image
*/
error = exec_activate_image(imgp);
-
+
if (error == 0) {
/* process completed the exec */
exec_done = TRUE;
error = setsigvec(p, child_thread, sig + 1, &vec, spawn_no_exec);
}
}
+
+ /*
+ * Activate the CPU usage monitor, if requested. This is done via a task-wide, per-thread CPU
+ * usage limit, which will generate a resource exceeded exception if any one thread exceeds the
+ * limit.
+ *
+ * Userland gives us interval in seconds, and the kernel SPI expects nanoseconds.
+ */
+ if (px_sa.psa_cpumonitor_percent != 0) {
+ /*
+ * Always treat a CPU monitor activation coming from spawn as entitled. Requiring
+ * an entitlement to configure the monitor a certain way seems silly, since
+ * whomever is turning it on could just as easily choose not to do so.
+ *
+ * XXX - Ignore the parameters that we get from userland. The spawnattr method of
+ * activating the monitor always gets the system default parameters. Once we have
+ * an explicit spawn SPI for configuring the defaults, we can revert this to
+ * respect the params passed in from userland.
+ */
+ error = proc_set_task_ruse_cpu(p->task,
+ TASK_POLICY_RESOURCE_ATTRIBUTE_NOTIFY_EXC,
+ PROC_POLICY_CPUMON_DEFAULTS, 0,
+ 0, TRUE);
+ }
}
bad:
+
if (error == 0) {
+ /* reset delay idle sleep status if set */
+ if ((p->p_flag & P_DELAYIDLESLEEP) == P_DELAYIDLESLEEP)
+ OSBitAndAtomic(~((uint32_t)P_DELAYIDLESLEEP), &p->p_flag);
/* upon successful spawn, re/set the proc control state */
if (imgp->ip_px_sa != NULL) {
switch (px_sa.psa_pcontrol) {
};
}
exec_resettextvp(p, imgp);
+
+#if CONFIG_MEMORYSTATUS && CONFIG_JETSAM
+ /* Has jetsam attributes? */
+ if (imgp->ip_px_sa != NULL && (px_sa.psa_jetsam_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_JETSAM_SET)) {
+ memorystatus_update(p, px_sa.psa_priority, 0, (px_sa.psa_jetsam_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_JETSAM_USE_EFFECTIVE_PRIORITY),
+ TRUE, px_sa.psa_high_water_mark, (px_sa.psa_jetsam_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_JETSAM_HIWATER_BACKGROUND),
+ (px_sa.psa_jetsam_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_JETSAM_MEMLIMIT_FATAL));
+ }
+#endif
}
/*
/* flag the 'fork' has occurred */
proc_knote(p->p_pptr, NOTE_FORK | p->p_pid);
/* then flag exec has occurred */
- proc_knote(p, NOTE_EXEC);
- DTRACE_PROC1(create, proc_t, p);
+ /* notify only if it has not failed due to FP Key error */
+ if ((p->p_lflag & P_LTERM_DECRYPTFAIL) == 0)
+ proc_knote(p, NOTE_EXEC);
+ } else {
+ /* reset the importance attribute from our previous life */
+ task_importance_reset(p->task);
+
+ /* reset atm context from task */
+ task_atm_reset(p->task);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Apply the spawnattr policy, apptype (which primes the task for importance donation),
+ * and bind any portwatch ports to the new task.
+ * This must be done after the exec so that the child's thread is ready,
+ * and after the in transit state has been released, because priority is
+ * dropped here so we need to be prepared for a potentially long preemption interval
+ *
+ * TODO: Consider splitting this up into separate phases
+ */
+ if (error == 0 && imgp->ip_px_sa != NULL) {
+ struct _posix_spawnattr *psa = (struct _posix_spawnattr *) imgp->ip_px_sa;
+
+ exec_handle_spawnattr_policy(p, psa->psa_apptype, psa->psa_qos_clamp,
+ portwatch_ports, portwatch_count);
+ }
+
+ /* Apply the main thread qos */
+ if (error == 0) {
+ thread_t main_thread = (imgp->ip_new_thread != NULL) ? imgp->ip_new_thread : current_thread();
+
+ task_set_main_thread_qos(p->task, main_thread);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Release any ports we kept around for binding to the new task
+ * We need to release the rights even if the posix_spawn has failed.
+ */
+ if (portwatch_ports != NULL) {
+ for (int i = 0; i < portwatch_count; i++) {
+ ipc_port_t port = NULL;
+ if ((port = portwatch_ports[i]) != NULL) {
+ ipc_port_release_send(port);
+ }
+ }
+ FREE(portwatch_ports, M_TEMP);
+ portwatch_ports = NULL;
+ portwatch_count = 0;
}
/*
if (imgp != NULL) {
if (imgp->ip_vp)
vnode_put(imgp->ip_vp);
+ if (imgp->ip_scriptvp)
+ vnode_put(imgp->ip_scriptvp);
if (imgp->ip_strings)
execargs_free(imgp);
if (imgp->ip_px_sfa != NULL)
FREE(imgp->ip_px_spa, M_TEMP);
#if CONFIG_MACF
+ if (imgp->ip_px_smpx != NULL)
+ spawn_free_macpolicyinfo(imgp->ip_px_smpx);
if (imgp->ip_execlabelp)
mac_cred_label_free(imgp->ip_execlabelp);
if (imgp->ip_scriptlabelp)
#endif
}
- if (error) {
- DTRACE_PROC1(exec__failure, int, error);
+#if CONFIG_DTRACE
+ if (spawn_no_exec) {
+ /*
+ * In the original DTrace reference implementation,
+ * posix_spawn() was a libc routine that just
+ * did vfork(2) then exec(2). Thus the proc::: probes
+ * are very fork/exec oriented. The details of this
+ * in-kernel implementation of posix_spawn() is different
+ * (while producing the same process-observable effects)
+ * particularly w.r.t. errors, and which thread/process
+ * is constructing what on behalf of whom.
+ */
+ if (error) {
+ DTRACE_PROC1(spawn__failure, int, error);
+ } else {
+ DTRACE_PROC(spawn__success);
+ /*
+ * Some DTrace scripts, e.g. newproc.d in
+ * /usr/bin, rely on the the 'exec-success'
+ * probe being fired in the child after the
+ * new process image has been constructed
+ * in order to determine the associated pid.
+ *
+ * So, even though the parent built the image
+ * here, for compatibility, mark the new thread
+ * so 'exec-success' fires on it as it leaves
+ * the kernel.
+ */
+ dtrace_thread_didexec(imgp->ip_new_thread);
+ }
} else {
- /*
- * <rdar://6609474> temporary - so dtrace call to current_proc()
- * returns the child process instead of the parent.
- */
- if (imgp != NULL && imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_SPAWN) {
- p->p_lflag |= P_LINVFORK;
- p->p_vforkact = current_thread();
- uthread->uu_proc = p;
- uthread->uu_flag |= UT_VFORK;
- }
-
- DTRACE_PROC(exec__success);
-
- /*
- * <rdar://6609474> temporary - so dtrace call to current_proc()
- * returns the child process instead of the parent.
- */
- if (imgp != NULL && imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_SPAWN) {
- p->p_lflag &= ~P_LINVFORK;
- p->p_vforkact = NULL;
- uthread->uu_proc = PROC_NULL;
- uthread->uu_flag &= ~UT_VFORK;
- }
+ if (error) {
+ DTRACE_PROC1(exec__failure, int, error);
+ } else {
+ DTRACE_PROC(exec__success);
+ }
}
+ if ((dtrace_proc_waitfor_hook = dtrace_proc_waitfor_exec_ptr) != NULL)
+ (*dtrace_proc_waitfor_hook)(p);
+#endif
+
/* Return to both the parent and the child? */
if (imgp != NULL && spawn_no_exec) {
/*
} else {
/*
- * Return" to the child
+ * Return to the child
*
* Note: the image activator earlier dropped the
* task/thread references to the newly spawned
struct __mac_execve_args muap;
int err;
+ memoryshot(VM_EXECVE, DBG_FUNC_NONE);
+
muap.fname = uap->fname;
muap.argp = uap->argp;
muap.envp = uap->envp;
char alt_p_comm[sizeof(p->p_comm)] = {0}; /* for PowerPC */
int is_64 = IS_64BIT_PROCESS(p);
struct vfs_context context;
+ struct uthread *uthread;
context.vc_thread = current_thread();
context.vc_ucred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p); /* XXX must NOT be kauth_cred_get() */
imgp->ip_flags = (is_64 ? IMGPF_WAS_64BIT : IMGPF_NONE) | ((p->p_flag & P_DISABLE_ASLR) ? IMGPF_DISABLE_ASLR : IMGPF_NONE);
imgp->ip_p_comm = alt_p_comm; /* for PowerPC */
imgp->ip_seg = (is_64 ? UIO_USERSPACE64 : UIO_USERSPACE32);
+ imgp->ip_mac_return = 0;
+
+ uthread = get_bsdthread_info(current_thread());
+ if (uthread->uu_flag & UT_VFORK) {
+ imgp->ip_flags |= IMGPF_VFORK_EXEC;
+ }
#if CONFIG_MACF
if (uap->mac_p != USER_ADDR_NULL) {
}
if (imgp->ip_vp != NULLVP)
vnode_put(imgp->ip_vp);
+ if (imgp->ip_scriptvp != NULLVP)
+ vnode_put(imgp->ip_scriptvp);
if (imgp->ip_strings)
execargs_free(imgp);
#if CONFIG_MACF
mac_vnode_label_free(imgp->ip_scriptlabelp);
#endif
if (!error) {
- struct uthread *uthread;
-
/* Sever any extant thread affinity */
thread_affinity_exec(current_thread());
+ thread_t main_thread = (imgp->ip_new_thread != NULL) ? imgp->ip_new_thread : current_thread();
+
+ task_set_main_thread_qos(p->task, main_thread);
+
+ /* reset task importance */
+ task_importance_reset(p->task);
+
+ /* reset atm context from task */
+ task_atm_reset(p->task);
+
DTRACE_PROC(exec__success);
- uthread = get_bsdthread_info(current_thread());
- if (uthread->uu_flag & UT_VFORK) {
+
+#if CONFIG_DTRACE
+ if ((dtrace_proc_waitfor_hook = dtrace_proc_waitfor_exec_ptr) != NULL)
+ (*dtrace_proc_waitfor_hook)(p);
+#endif
+
+ if (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_VFORK_EXEC) {
vfork_return(p, retval, p->p_pid);
(void)thread_resume(imgp->ip_new_thread);
}
}
static char *
-random_hex_str(char *str, int len)
+random_hex_str(char *str, int len, boolean_t embedNUL)
{
uint64_t low, high, value;
int idx;
high = random();
value = high << 32 | low;
+ if (embedNUL) {
+ /*
+ * Zero a byte to protect against C string vulnerabilities
+ * e.g. for userland __stack_chk_guard.
+ */
+ value &= ~(0xffull << 8);
+ }
+
str[0] = '0';
str[1] = 'x';
for (idx = 2; idx < len - 1; idx++) {
#define ENTROPY_VALUES 2
#define ENTROPY_KEY "malloc_entropy="
+/*
+ * System malloc engages nanozone for UIAPP.
+ */
+#define NANO_ENGAGE_KEY "MallocNanoZone=1"
+
+#define PFZ_KEY "pfz="
+extern user32_addr_t commpage_text32_location;
+extern user64_addr_t commpage_text64_location;
/*
* Build up the contents of the apple[] string vector
*/
exec_add_apple_strings(struct image_params *imgp)
{
int i, error;
- int new_ptr_size = (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_IS_64BIT) ? 8 : 4;
+ int new_ptr_size=4;
char guard[19];
char guard_vec[strlen(GUARD_KEY) + 19 * GUARD_VALUES + 1];
char entropy[19];
char entropy_vec[strlen(ENTROPY_KEY) + 19 * ENTROPY_VALUES + 1];
+ char pfz_string[strlen(PFZ_KEY) + 16 + 4 +1];
+
+ if( imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_IS_64BIT) {
+ new_ptr_size = 8;
+ snprintf(pfz_string, sizeof(pfz_string),PFZ_KEY "0x%llx",commpage_text64_location);
+ } else {
+ snprintf(pfz_string, sizeof(pfz_string),PFZ_KEY "0x%x",commpage_text32_location);
+ }
+
/* exec_save_path stored the first string */
imgp->ip_applec = 1;
+ /* adding the pfz string */
+ error = exec_add_user_string(imgp, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(pfz_string),UIO_SYSSPACE,FALSE);
+ if(error)
+ goto bad;
+ imgp->ip_applec++;
+
+ /* adding the NANO_ENGAGE_KEY key */
+ if (imgp->ip_px_sa) {
+ int proc_flags = (((struct _posix_spawnattr *) imgp->ip_px_sa)->psa_flags);
+
+ if ((proc_flags & _POSIX_SPAWN_NANO_ALLOCATOR) == _POSIX_SPAWN_NANO_ALLOCATOR) {
+ char uiapp_string[strlen(NANO_ENGAGE_KEY) + 1];
+
+ snprintf(uiapp_string, sizeof(uiapp_string), NANO_ENGAGE_KEY);
+ error = exec_add_user_string(imgp, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(uiapp_string),UIO_SYSSPACE,FALSE);
+ if (error)
+ goto bad;
+ imgp->ip_applec++;
+ }
+ }
+
/*
* Supply libc with a collection of random values to use when
* implementing -fstack-protector.
+ *
+ * (The first random string always contains an embedded NUL so that
+ * __stack_chk_guard also protects against C string vulnerabilities)
*/
(void)strlcpy(guard_vec, GUARD_KEY, sizeof (guard_vec));
for (i = 0; i < GUARD_VALUES; i++) {
- random_hex_str(guard, sizeof (guard));
+ random_hex_str(guard, sizeof (guard), i == 0);
if (i)
(void)strlcat(guard_vec, ",", sizeof (guard_vec));
(void)strlcat(guard_vec, guard, sizeof (guard_vec));
*/
(void)strlcpy(entropy_vec, ENTROPY_KEY, sizeof(entropy_vec));
for (i = 0; i < ENTROPY_VALUES; i++) {
- random_hex_str(entropy, sizeof (entropy));
+ random_hex_str(entropy, sizeof (entropy), FALSE);
if (i)
(void)strlcat(entropy_vec, ",", sizeof (entropy_vec));
(void)strlcat(entropy_vec, entropy, sizeof (entropy_vec));
if ((vp->v_mount->mnt_flag & MNT_NOSUID) || (p->p_lflag & P_LTRACED))
vap->va_mode &= ~(VSUID | VSGID);
+ /*
+ * Disable _POSIX_SPAWN_ALLOW_DATA_EXEC and _POSIX_SPAWN_DISABLE_ASLR
+ * flags for setuid/setgid binaries.
+ */
+ if (vap->va_mode & (VSUID | VSGID))
+ imgp->ip_flags &= ~(IMGPF_ALLOW_DATA_EXEC | IMGPF_DISABLE_ASLR);
+
#if CONFIG_MACF
error = mac_vnode_check_exec(imgp->ip_vfs_context, vp, imgp);
if (error)
#endif
-#ifdef IMGPF_POWERPC
- /*
- * If the file we are about to attempt to load is the exec_handler_ppc,
- * which is determined by matching the vattr fields against previously
- * cached values, then we set the PowerPC environment flag.
- */
- if (vap->va_fsid == exec_archhandler_ppc.fsid &&
- vap->va_fileid == exec_archhandler_ppc.fileid) {
- imgp->ip_flags |= IMGPF_POWERPC;
- }
-#endif /* IMGPF_POWERPC */
-
/* XXX May want to indicate to underlying FS that vnode is open */
return (error);
proc_t p = vfs_context_proc(imgp->ip_vfs_context);
int i;
int leave_sugid_clear = 0;
+ int mac_reset_ipc = 0;
int error = 0;
#if CONFIG_MACF
- int mac_transition;
+ int mac_transition, disjoint_cred = 0;
+ int label_update_return = 0;
/*
* Determine whether a call to update the MAC label will result in the
mac_transition = mac_cred_check_label_update_execve(
imgp->ip_vfs_context,
imgp->ip_vp,
+ imgp->ip_arch_offset,
+ imgp->ip_scriptvp,
imgp->ip_scriptlabelp,
- imgp->ip_execlabelp, p);
+ imgp->ip_execlabelp,
+ p,
+ imgp->ip_px_smpx);
#endif
OSBitAndAtomic(~((uint32_t)P_SUGID), &p->p_flag);
* modifying any others sharing it.
*/
if (mac_transition) {
- kauth_cred_t my_cred;
- if (kauth_proc_label_update_execve(p,
+ kauth_proc_label_update_execve(p,
imgp->ip_vfs_context,
imgp->ip_vp,
+ imgp->ip_arch_offset,
+ imgp->ip_scriptvp,
imgp->ip_scriptlabelp,
- imgp->ip_execlabelp)) {
+ imgp->ip_execlabelp,
+ &imgp->ip_csflags,
+ imgp->ip_px_smpx,
+ &disjoint_cred, /* will be non zero if disjoint */
+ &label_update_return);
+
+ if (disjoint_cred) {
/*
* If updating the MAC label resulted in a
* disjoint credential, flag that we need to
*/
leave_sugid_clear = 0;
}
-
- my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
- mac_task_label_update_cred(my_cred, p->task);
- kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
+
+ imgp->ip_mac_return = label_update_return;
}
-#endif /* CONFIG_MACF */
+
+ mac_reset_ipc = mac_proc_check_inherit_ipc_ports(p, p->p_textvp, p->p_textoff, imgp->ip_vp, imgp->ip_arch_offset, imgp->ip_scriptvp);
- /*
- * Have mach reset the task and thread ports.
- * We don't want anyone who had the ports before
- * a setuid exec to be able to access/control the
- * task/thread after.
- */
- ipc_task_reset(p->task);
- ipc_thread_reset((imgp->ip_new_thread != NULL) ?
- imgp->ip_new_thread : current_thread());
+#endif /* CONFIG_MACF */
/*
* If 'leave_sugid_clear' is non-zero, then we passed the
* the previous cred was a member of the VSGID group, but
* that it was not the default at the time of the execve,
* and that the post-labelling credential was not disjoint.
- * So we don't set the P_SUGID on the basis of simply
- * running this code.
- */
- if (!leave_sugid_clear)
- OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);
-
- /*
- * Radar 2261856; setuid security hole fix
- * XXX For setuid processes, attempt to ensure that
- * stdin, stdout, and stderr are already allocated.
- * We do not want userland to accidentally allocate
- * descriptors in this range which has implied meaning
- * to libc.
+ * So we don't set the P_SUGID or reset mach ports and fds
+ * on the basis of simply running this code.
*/
- for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+ if (mac_reset_ipc || !leave_sugid_clear) {
+ /*
+ * Have mach reset the task and thread ports.
+ * We don't want anyone who had the ports before
+ * a setuid exec to be able to access/control the
+ * task/thread after.
+ */
+ ipc_task_reset(p->task);
+ ipc_thread_reset((imgp->ip_new_thread != NULL) ?
+ imgp->ip_new_thread : current_thread());
+ }
- if (p->p_fd->fd_ofiles[i] != NULL)
- continue;
+ if (!leave_sugid_clear) {
+ /*
+ * Flag the process as setuid.
+ */
+ OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);
/*
- * Do the kernel equivalent of
- *
- * (void) open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY);
+ * Radar 2261856; setuid security hole fix
+ * XXX For setuid processes, attempt to ensure that
+ * stdin, stdout, and stderr are already allocated.
+ * We do not want userland to accidentally allocate
+ * descriptors in this range which has implied meaning
+ * to libc.
*/
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
- struct fileproc *fp;
- int indx;
+ if (p->p_fd->fd_ofiles[i] != NULL)
+ continue;
- if ((error = falloc(p,
- &fp, &indx, imgp->ip_vfs_context)) != 0)
- continue;
+ /*
+ * Do the kernel equivalent of
+ *
+ * if i == 0
+ * (void) open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY);
+ * else
+ * (void) open("/dev/null", O_WRONLY);
+ */
- struct nameidata nd1;
+ struct fileproc *fp;
+ int indx;
+ int flag;
+ struct nameidata *ndp = NULL;
- NDINIT(&nd1, LOOKUP, OP_OPEN, FOLLOW, UIO_SYSSPACE,
- CAST_USER_ADDR_T("/dev/null"),
- imgp->ip_vfs_context);
+ if (i == 0)
+ flag = FREAD;
+ else
+ flag = FWRITE;
- if ((error = vn_open(&nd1, FREAD, 0)) != 0) {
- fp_free(p, indx, fp);
- break;
- }
+ if ((error = falloc(p,
+ &fp, &indx, imgp->ip_vfs_context)) != 0)
+ continue;
+
+ MALLOC(ndp, struct nameidata *, sizeof(*ndp), M_TEMP, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
+ if (ndp == NULL) {
+ error = ENOMEM;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ NDINIT(ndp, LOOKUP, OP_OPEN, FOLLOW, UIO_SYSSPACE,
+ CAST_USER_ADDR_T("/dev/null"),
+ imgp->ip_vfs_context);
- struct fileglob *fg = fp->f_fglob;
+ if ((error = vn_open(ndp, flag, 0)) != 0) {
+ fp_free(p, indx, fp);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ struct fileglob *fg = fp->f_fglob;
+
+ fg->fg_flag = flag;
+ fg->fg_ops = &vnops;
+ fg->fg_data = ndp->ni_vp;
- fg->fg_flag = FREAD;
- fg->fg_type = DTYPE_VNODE;
- fg->fg_ops = &vnops;
- fg->fg_data = nd1.ni_vp;
+ vnode_put(ndp->ni_vp);
- vnode_put(nd1.ni_vp);
+ proc_fdlock(p);
+ procfdtbl_releasefd(p, indx, NULL);
+ fp_drop(p, indx, fp, 1);
+ proc_fdunlock(p);
- proc_fdlock(p);
- procfdtbl_releasefd(p, indx, NULL);
- fp_drop(p, indx, fp, 1);
- proc_fdunlock(p);
+ FREE(ndp, M_TEMP);
+ }
}
}
#if CONFIG_MACF
goto handle_mac_transition;
}
}
+
#endif /* CONFIG_MACF */
/*
* limits on stack growth, if they end up being needed.
*
* Parameters: p Process to set stack on
- * user_stack Address to set stack for process to
- * customstack FALSE if no custom stack in binary
- * map Address map in which to allocate the
- * new stack, if 'customstack' is FALSE
+ * load_result Information from mach-o load commands
+ * map Address map in which to allocate the new stack
*
* Returns: KERN_SUCCESS Stack successfully created
* !KERN_SUCCESS Mach failure code
*/
static kern_return_t
-create_unix_stack(vm_map_t map, user_addr_t user_stack, int customstack,
+create_unix_stack(vm_map_t map, load_result_t* load_result,
proc_t p)
{
mach_vm_size_t size, prot_size;
mach_vm_offset_t addr, prot_addr;
kern_return_t kr;
+ mach_vm_address_t user_stack = load_result->user_stack;
+
proc_lock(p);
p->user_stack = user_stack;
proc_unlock(p);
- if (!customstack) {
+ if (!load_result->prog_allocated_stack) {
/*
* Allocate enough space for the maximum stack size we
* will ever authorize and an extra page to act as
- * a guard page for stack overflows.
+ * a guard page for stack overflows. For default stacks,
+ * vm_initial_limit_stack takes care of the extra guard page.
+ * Otherwise we must allocate it ourselves.
*/
- size = mach_vm_round_page(MAXSSIZ);
-#if STACK_GROWTH_UP
- addr = mach_vm_trunc_page(user_stack);
-#else /* STACK_GROWTH_UP */
- addr = mach_vm_trunc_page(user_stack - size);
-#endif /* STACK_GROWTH_UP */
+
+ size = mach_vm_round_page(load_result->user_stack_size);
+ if (load_result->prog_stack_size)
+ size += PAGE_SIZE;
+ addr = mach_vm_trunc_page(load_result->user_stack - size);
kr = mach_vm_allocate(map, &addr, size,
VM_MAKE_TAG(VM_MEMORY_STACK) |
- VM_FLAGS_FIXED);
+ VM_FLAGS_FIXED);
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
- return kr;
+ /* If can't allocate at default location, try anywhere */
+ addr = 0;
+ kr = mach_vm_allocate(map, &addr, size,
+ VM_MAKE_TAG(VM_MEMORY_STACK) |
+ VM_FLAGS_ANYWHERE);
+ if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS)
+ return kr;
+
+ user_stack = addr + size;
+ load_result->user_stack = user_stack;
+
+ proc_lock(p);
+ p->user_stack = user_stack;
+ proc_unlock(p);
}
+
/*
* And prevent access to what's above the current stack
* size limit for this process.
*/
prot_addr = addr;
-#if STACK_GROWTH_UP
- prot_addr += unix_stack_size(p);
-#endif /* STACK_GROWTH_UP */
- prot_addr = mach_vm_round_page(prot_addr);
- prot_size = mach_vm_trunc_page(size - unix_stack_size(p));
+ if (load_result->prog_stack_size)
+ prot_size = PAGE_SIZE;
+ else
+ prot_size = mach_vm_trunc_page(size - unix_stack_size(p));
kr = mach_vm_protect(map,
- prot_addr,
- prot_size,
- FALSE,
- VM_PROT_NONE);
+ prot_addr,
+ prot_size,
+ FALSE,
+ VM_PROT_NONE);
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
(void) mach_vm_deallocate(map, addr, size);
return kr;
}
}
+
return KERN_SUCCESS;
}
#include <sys/reboot.h>
-static char init_program_name[128] = "/sbin/launchd";
-
-struct execve_args init_exec_args;
+static const char * init_programs[] = {
+#if DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG
+ "/usr/local/sbin/launchd.development",
+#endif
+ "/sbin/launchd",
+};
/*
* load_init_program
void
load_init_program(proc_t p)
{
- vm_offset_t init_addr;
- int argc = 0;
+ vm_offset_t init_addr, addr;
+ int argc;
uint32_t argv[3];
+ unsigned int i;
int error;
int retval[2];
-
- /*
- * Copy out program name.
- */
+ const char *init_program_name;
+ struct execve_args init_exec_args;
init_addr = VM_MIN_ADDRESS;
- (void) vm_allocate(current_map(), &init_addr, PAGE_SIZE,
- VM_FLAGS_ANYWHERE);
+ (void) vm_allocate(current_map(), &init_addr, PAGE_SIZE, VM_FLAGS_ANYWHERE);
if (init_addr == 0)
init_addr++;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(init_programs)/sizeof(init_programs[0]); i++) {
+
+ init_program_name = init_programs[i];
+ addr = init_addr;
+ argc = 0;
- (void) copyout((caddr_t) init_program_name, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(init_addr),
- (unsigned) sizeof(init_program_name)+1);
-
- argv[argc++] = (uint32_t)init_addr;
- init_addr += sizeof(init_program_name);
- init_addr = (vm_offset_t)ROUND_PTR(char, init_addr);
+ /*
+ * Copy out program name.
+ */
+ (void) copyout(init_program_name, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(addr), strlen(init_program_name)+1);
- /*
- * Put out first (and only) argument, similarly.
- * Assumes everything fits in a page as allocated
- * above.
- */
- if (boothowto & RB_SINGLE) {
- const char *init_args = "-s";
+ argv[argc++] = (uint32_t)addr;
+ addr += strlen(init_program_name)+1;
+ addr = (vm_offset_t)ROUND_PTR(char, addr);
- copyout(init_args, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(init_addr),
- strlen(init_args));
+ /*
+ * Put out first (and only) argument, similarly.
+ * Assumes everything fits in a page as allocated above.
+ */
+ if (boothowto & RB_SINGLE) {
+ const char *init_args = "-s";
- argv[argc++] = (uint32_t)init_addr;
- init_addr += strlen(init_args);
- init_addr = (vm_offset_t)ROUND_PTR(char, init_addr);
+ copyout(init_args, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(addr), strlen(init_args)+1);
- }
+ argv[argc++] = (uint32_t)addr;
+ addr += strlen(init_args)+1;
+ addr = (vm_offset_t)ROUND_PTR(char, addr);
+ }
- /*
- * Null-end the argument list
- */
- argv[argc] = 0;
-
- /*
- * Copy out the argument list.
- */
+ /*
+ * Null-end the argument list
+ */
+ argv[argc] = 0;
- (void) copyout((caddr_t) argv, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(init_addr),
- (unsigned) sizeof(argv));
-
- /*
- * Set up argument block for fake call to execve.
- */
+ /*
+ * Copy out the argument list.
+ */
+ (void) copyout(argv, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(addr), sizeof(argv));
- init_exec_args.fname = CAST_USER_ADDR_T(argv[0]);
- init_exec_args.argp = CAST_USER_ADDR_T((char **)init_addr);
- init_exec_args.envp = CAST_USER_ADDR_T(0);
+ /*
+ * Set up argument block for fake call to execve.
+ */
+ init_exec_args.fname = CAST_USER_ADDR_T(argv[0]);
+ init_exec_args.argp = CAST_USER_ADDR_T((char **)addr);
+ init_exec_args.envp = CAST_USER_ADDR_T(0);
- /*
- * So that mach_init task is set with uid,gid 0 token
- */
- set_security_token(p);
+ /*
+ * So that init task is set with uid,gid 0 token
+ */
+ set_security_token(p);
- error = execve(p,&init_exec_args,retval);
- if (error)
- panic("Process 1 exec of %s failed, errno %d",
- init_program_name, error);
+ error = execve(p, &init_exec_args, retval);
+ if (!error)
+ return;
+ }
+
+ panic("Process 1 exec of %s failed, errno %d", init_program_name, error);
}
/*
case LOAD_IOERROR:
return EIO;
case LOAD_FAILURE:
+ case LOAD_DECRYPTFAIL:
default:
return EBADEXEC;
}
lck_mtx_unlock(execargs_cache_lock);
}
-static void
+static wait_result_t
execargs_lock_sleep(void) {
- lck_mtx_sleep(execargs_cache_lock, LCK_SLEEP_DEFAULT, &execargs_free_count, THREAD_UNINT);
+ return(lck_mtx_sleep(execargs_cache_lock, LCK_SLEEP_DEFAULT, &execargs_free_count, THREAD_INTERRUPTIBLE));
}
static kern_return_t
execargs_alloc(struct image_params *imgp)
{
kern_return_t kret;
+ wait_result_t res;
int i, cache_index = -1;
execargs_lock_lock();
while (execargs_free_count == 0) {
execargs_waiters++;
- execargs_lock_sleep();
+ res = execargs_lock_sleep();
execargs_waiters--;
+ if (res != THREAD_AWAKENED) {
+ execargs_lock_unlock();
+ return (EINTR);
+ }
}
execargs_free_count--;
}
-static int
+/*
+ * If the process is not signed or if it contains entitlements, we
+ * need to communicate through the task_access_port to taskgated.
+ *
+ * taskgated will provide a detached code signature if present, and
+ * will enforce any restrictions on entitlements.
+ */
+
+static boolean_t
+taskgated_required(proc_t p, boolean_t *require_success)
+{
+ size_t length;
+ void *blob;
+ int error;
+
+ if ((p->p_csflags & CS_VALID) == 0) {
+ *require_success = FALSE;
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+
+ error = cs_entitlements_blob_get(p, &blob, &length);
+ if (error == 0 && blob != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * fatal on the desktop when entitlements are present,
+ * unless we started in single-user mode
+ */
+ if ((boothowto & RB_SINGLE) == 0)
+ *require_success = TRUE;
+ /*
+ * Allow initproc to run without causing taskgated to launch
+ */
+ if (p == initproc) {
+ *require_success = FALSE;
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+
+ *require_success = FALSE;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * __EXEC_WAITING_ON_TASKGATED_CODE_SIGNATURE_UPCALL__
+ *
+ * Description: Waits for the userspace daemon to respond to the request
+ * we made. Function declared non inline to be visible in
+ * stackshots and spindumps as well as debugging.
+ */
+__attribute__((noinline)) int
+__EXEC_WAITING_ON_TASKGATED_CODE_SIGNATURE_UPCALL__(mach_port_t task_access_port, int32_t new_pid)
+{
+ return find_code_signature(task_access_port, new_pid);
+}
+
+static int
check_for_signature(proc_t p, struct image_params *imgp)
{
- void *blob = NULL;
- size_t length = 0;
mach_port_t port = NULL;
kern_return_t kr = KERN_FAILURE;
int error = EACCES;
+ boolean_t unexpected_failure = FALSE;
unsigned char hash[SHA1_RESULTLEN];
+ boolean_t require_success = FALSE;
+ int spawn = (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_SPAWN);
+ int vfexec = (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_VFORK_EXEC);
/*
* Override inherited code signing flags with the
if(p->p_csflags & (CS_HARD|CS_KILL)) {
vm_map_switch_protect(get_task_map(p->task), TRUE);
}
-
- /* If the process is not signed or if it contains
- * entitlements, we need to communicate through the
- * task_access_port to taskgated. taskgated will provide a
- * detached code signature if present, and will enforce any
- * restrictions on entitlements. taskgated returns
- * KERN_SUCCESS if it has completed its work and the exec
- * should continue, or KERN_FAILURE if the exec should fail.
+
+ /*
+ * image activation may be failed due to policy
+ * which is unexpected but security framework does not
+ * approve of exec, kill and return immediately.
*/
- error = cs_entitlements_blob_get(p, &blob, &length);
+ if (imgp->ip_mac_return != 0) {
+ error = imgp->ip_mac_return;
+ unexpected_failure = TRUE;
+ goto done;
+ }
- /* if signed and no entitlements, then we're done here */
- if ((p->p_csflags & CS_VALID) && NULL == blob) {
+ /* check if callout to taskgated is needed */
+ if (!taskgated_required(p, &require_success)) {
error = 0;
goto done;
}
kr = task_get_task_access_port(p->task, &port);
if (KERN_SUCCESS != kr || !IPC_PORT_VALID(port)) {
error = 0;
-#if !CONFIG_EMBEDDED
- /* fatal on the desktop when entitlements are present */
- if (NULL != blob)
+ if (require_success)
error = EACCES;
-#endif
goto done;
}
- kr = find_code_signature(port, p->p_pid);
- if (KERN_SUCCESS != kr) {
+ /*
+ * taskgated returns KERN_SUCCESS if it has completed its work
+ * and the exec should continue, KERN_FAILURE if the exec should
+ * fail, or it may error out with different error code in an
+ * event of mig failure (e.g. process was signalled during the
+ * rpc call, taskgated died, mig server died etc.).
+ */
+
+ kr = __EXEC_WAITING_ON_TASKGATED_CODE_SIGNATURE_UPCALL__(port, p->p_pid);
+ switch (kr) {
+ case KERN_SUCCESS:
+ error = 0;
+ break;
+ case KERN_FAILURE:
+ error = EACCES;
+ goto done;
+ default:
error = EACCES;
+ unexpected_failure = TRUE;
goto done;
}
}
done:
- if (0 != error)
+ if (0 != error) {
+ if (!unexpected_failure)
+ p->p_csflags |= CS_KILLED;
/* make very sure execution fails */
- psignal(p, SIGKILL);
+ if (vfexec || spawn) {
+ psignal_vfork(p, p->task, imgp->ip_new_thread, SIGKILL);
+ error = 0;
+ } else {
+ psignal(p, SIGKILL);
+ }
+ }
return error;
}
+/*
+ * Typically as soon as we start executing this process, the
+ * first instruction will trigger a VM fault to bring the text
+ * pages (as executable) into the address space, followed soon
+ * thereafter by dyld data structures (for dynamic executable).
+ * To optimize this, as well as improve support for hardware
+ * debuggers that can only access resident pages present
+ * in the process' page tables, we prefault some pages if
+ * possible. Errors are non-fatal.
+ */
+static void exec_prefault_data(proc_t p __unused, struct image_params *imgp, load_result_t *load_result)
+{
+ int ret;
+ size_t expected_all_image_infos_size;
+
+ /*
+ * Prefault executable or dyld entry point.
+ */
+ vm_fault(current_map(),
+ vm_map_trunc_page(load_result->entry_point,
+ vm_map_page_mask(current_map())),
+ VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_EXECUTE,
+ FALSE,
+ THREAD_UNINT, NULL, 0);
+
+ if (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_IS_64BIT) {
+ expected_all_image_infos_size = sizeof(struct user64_dyld_all_image_infos);
+ } else {
+ expected_all_image_infos_size = sizeof(struct user32_dyld_all_image_infos);
+ }
+
+ /* Decode dyld anchor structure from <mach-o/dyld_images.h> */
+ if (load_result->dynlinker &&
+ load_result->all_image_info_addr &&
+ load_result->all_image_info_size >= expected_all_image_infos_size) {
+ union {
+ struct user64_dyld_all_image_infos infos64;
+ struct user32_dyld_all_image_infos infos32;
+ } all_image_infos;
+
+ /*
+ * Pre-fault to avoid copyin() going through the trap handler
+ * and recovery path.
+ */
+ vm_fault(current_map(),
+ vm_map_trunc_page(load_result->all_image_info_addr,
+ vm_map_page_mask(current_map())),
+ VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_WRITE,
+ FALSE,
+ THREAD_UNINT, NULL, 0);
+ if ((load_result->all_image_info_addr & PAGE_MASK) + expected_all_image_infos_size > PAGE_SIZE) {
+ /* all_image_infos straddles a page */
+ vm_fault(current_map(),
+ vm_map_trunc_page(load_result->all_image_info_addr + expected_all_image_infos_size - 1,
+ vm_map_page_mask(current_map())),
+ VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_WRITE,
+ FALSE,
+ THREAD_UNINT, NULL, 0);
+ }
+
+ ret = copyin(load_result->all_image_info_addr,
+ &all_image_infos,
+ expected_all_image_infos_size);
+ if (ret == 0 && all_image_infos.infos32.version >= 9) {
+
+ user_addr_t notification_address;
+ user_addr_t dyld_image_address;
+ user_addr_t dyld_version_address;
+ user_addr_t dyld_all_image_infos_address;
+ user_addr_t dyld_slide_amount;
+
+ if (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_IS_64BIT) {
+ notification_address = all_image_infos.infos64.notification;
+ dyld_image_address = all_image_infos.infos64.dyldImageLoadAddress;
+ dyld_version_address = all_image_infos.infos64.dyldVersion;
+ dyld_all_image_infos_address = all_image_infos.infos64.dyldAllImageInfosAddress;
+ } else {
+ notification_address = all_image_infos.infos32.notification;
+ dyld_image_address = all_image_infos.infos32.dyldImageLoadAddress;
+ dyld_version_address = all_image_infos.infos32.dyldVersion;
+ dyld_all_image_infos_address = all_image_infos.infos32.dyldAllImageInfosAddress;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * dyld statically sets up the all_image_infos in its Mach-O
+ * binary at static link time, with pointers relative to its default
+ * load address. Since ASLR might slide dyld before its first
+ * instruction is executed, "dyld_slide_amount" tells us how far
+ * dyld was loaded compared to its default expected load address.
+ * All other pointers into dyld's image should be adjusted by this
+ * amount. At some point later, dyld will fix up pointers to take
+ * into account the slide, at which point the all_image_infos_address
+ * field in the structure will match the runtime load address, and
+ * "dyld_slide_amount" will be 0, if we were to consult it again.
+ */
+
+ dyld_slide_amount = load_result->all_image_info_addr - dyld_all_image_infos_address;
+
+#if 0
+ kprintf("exec_prefault: 0x%016llx 0x%08x 0x%016llx 0x%016llx 0x%016llx 0x%016llx\n",
+ (uint64_t)load_result->all_image_info_addr,
+ all_image_infos.infos32.version,
+ (uint64_t)notification_address,
+ (uint64_t)dyld_image_address,
+ (uint64_t)dyld_version_address,
+ (uint64_t)dyld_all_image_infos_address);
+#endif
+
+ vm_fault(current_map(),
+ vm_map_trunc_page(notification_address + dyld_slide_amount,
+ vm_map_page_mask(current_map())),
+ VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_EXECUTE,
+ FALSE,
+ THREAD_UNINT, NULL, 0);
+ vm_fault(current_map(),
+ vm_map_trunc_page(dyld_image_address + dyld_slide_amount,
+ vm_map_page_mask(current_map())),
+ VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_EXECUTE,
+ FALSE,
+ THREAD_UNINT, NULL, 0);
+ vm_fault(current_map(),
+ vm_map_trunc_page(dyld_version_address + dyld_slide_amount,
+ vm_map_page_mask(current_map())),
+ VM_PROT_READ,
+ FALSE,
+ THREAD_UNINT, NULL, 0);
+ vm_fault(current_map(),
+ vm_map_trunc_page(dyld_all_image_infos_address + dyld_slide_amount,
+ vm_map_page_mask(current_map())),
+ VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_WRITE,
+ FALSE,
+ THREAD_UNINT, NULL, 0);
+ }
+ }
+}
projects / apple / xnu.git / blobdiff