/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 Apple Computer, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2007 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
*
- * @APPLE_LICENSE_HEADER_START@
- *
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Apple Computer, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_START@
*
* This file contains Original Code and/or Modifications of Original Code
* as defined in and that are subject to the Apple Public Source License
* Version 2.0 (the 'License'). You may not use this file except in
- * compliance with the License. Please obtain a copy of the License at
- * http://www.opensource.apple.com/apsl/ and read it before using this
- * file.
+ * compliance with the License. The rights granted to you under the License
+ * may not be used to create, or enable the creation or redistribution of,
+ * unlawful or unlicensed copies of an Apple operating system, or to
+ * circumvent, violate, or enable the circumvention or violation of, any
+ * terms of an Apple operating system software license agreement.
+ *
+ * Please obtain a copy of the License at
+ * http://www.opensource.apple.com/apsl/ and read it before using this file.
*
* The Original Code and all software distributed under the License are
* distributed on an 'AS IS' basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER
* Please see the License for the specific language governing rights and
* limitations under the License.
*
- * @APPLE_LICENSE_HEADER_END@
+ * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_END@
*/
/* Copyright (c) 1995 NeXT Computer, Inc. All Rights Reserved */
/*
*
* from: @(#)kern_exec.c 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/10/93
*/
+/*
+ * NOTICE: This file was modified by SPARTA, Inc. in 2005 to introduce
+ * support for mandatory and extensible security protections. This notice
+ * is included in support of clause 2.2 (b) of the Apple Public License,
+ * Version 2.0.
+ */
#include <machine/reg.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/filedesc.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
-#include <sys/proc.h>
+#include <sys/proc_internal.h>
+#include <sys/kauth.h>
#include <sys/user.h>
-#include <sys/buf.h>
#include <sys/socketvar.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/namei.h>
-#include <sys/mount.h>
-#include <sys/vnode.h>
-#include <sys/file.h>
+#include <sys/mount_internal.h>
+#include <sys/vnode_internal.h>
+#include <sys/file_internal.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <sys/uio_internal.h>
#include <sys/acct.h>
#include <sys/exec.h>
#include <sys/kdebug.h>
#include <sys/signal.h>
+#include <sys/aio_kern.h>
+#include <sys/sysproto.h>
+#if SYSV_SHM
+#include <sys/shm_internal.h> /* shmexec() */
+#endif
+#include <sys/ubc_internal.h> /* ubc_map() */
+#include <sys/spawn.h>
+#include <sys/spawn_internal.h>
+#include <sys/codesign.h>
+
+#include <bsm/audit_kernel.h>
+#include <ipc/ipc_types.h>
+
+#include <mach/mach_types.h>
+#include <mach/task.h>
+#include <mach/thread_act.h>
+#include <mach/vm_map.h>
+#include <mach/mach_vm.h>
#include <mach/vm_param.h>
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+#include <security/mac.h>
+#include <security/mac_mach_internal.h>
+#endif
+
#include <vm/vm_map.h>
#include <vm/vm_kern.h>
-#include <vm/vm_shared_memory_server.h>
+#include <vm/vm_protos.h>
+#include <vm/vm_kern.h>
+
+#if CONFIG_DTRACE
+/* Do not include dtrace.h, it redefines kmem_[alloc/free] */
+extern void (*dtrace_fasttrap_exec_ptr)(proc_t);
+extern void (*dtrace_helpers_cleanup)(proc_t);
+extern void dtrace_lazy_dofs_destroy(proc_t);
+
+#include <sys/dtrace_ptss.h>
+#endif
+
+/* support for child creation in exec after vfork */
+thread_t fork_create_child(task_t parent_task, proc_t child_proc, int inherit_memory, int is64bit);
+void vfork_exit(proc_t p, int rv);
+int setsigvec(proc_t, int, struct __user_sigaction *);
+
+/*
+ * Mach things for which prototypes are unavailable from Mach headers
+ */
+void ipc_task_reset(
+ task_t task);
+void ipc_thread_reset(
+ thread_t thread);
+kern_return_t ipc_object_copyin(
+ ipc_space_t space,
+ mach_port_name_t name,
+ mach_msg_type_name_t msgt_name,
+ ipc_object_t *objectp);
+void ipc_port_release_send(ipc_port_t);
+
+extern struct savearea *get_user_regs(thread_t);
+
#include <kern/thread.h>
#include <kern/task.h>
-
#include <kern/ast.h>
#include <kern/mach_loader.h>
#include <mach-o/fat.h>
#include <mach-o/loader.h>
#include <machine/vmparam.h>
-#if KTRACE
-#include <sys/ktrace.h>
-#endif
+#include <sys/imgact.h>
+
+#include <sys/sdt.h>
+
-int app_profile = 0;
+/*
+ * SIZE_MAXPTR The maximum size of a user space pointer, in bytes
+ * SIZE_IMG_STRSPACE The available string space, minus two pointers; we
+ * define it interms of the maximum, since we don't
+ * know the pointer size going in, until after we've
+ * parsed the executable image.
+ */
+#define SIZE_MAXPTR 8 /* 64 bits */
+#define SIZE_IMG_STRSPACE (NCARGS - 2 * SIZE_MAXPTR)
+
+/*
+ * EAI_ITERLIMIT The maximum number of times to iterate an image
+ * activator in exec_activate_image() before treating
+ * it as malformed/corrupt.
+ */
+#define EAI_ITERLIMIT 10
extern vm_map_t bsd_pageable_map;
+extern struct fileops vnops;
#define ROUND_PTR(type, addr) \
(type *)( ( (unsigned)(addr) + 16 - 1) \
& ~(16 - 1) )
+struct image_params; /* Forward */
+static int exec_activate_image(struct image_params *imgp);
+static int exec_copyout_strings(struct image_params *imgp, user_addr_t *stackp);
static int load_return_to_errno(load_return_t lrtn);
-int execve(struct proc *p, struct execve_args *uap, register_t *retval);
-static int execargs_alloc(vm_offset_t *addrp);
-static int execargs_free(vm_offset_t addr);
+static int execargs_alloc(struct image_params *imgp);
+static int execargs_free(struct image_params *imgp);
+static int exec_check_permissions(struct image_params *imgp);
+static int exec_extract_strings(struct image_params *imgp);
+static int exec_handle_sugid(struct image_params *imgp);
+static int sugid_scripts = 0;
+SYSCTL_INT (_kern, OID_AUTO, sugid_scripts, CTLFLAG_RW, &sugid_scripts, 0, "");
+static kern_return_t create_unix_stack(vm_map_t map, user_addr_t user_stack,
+ int customstack, proc_t p);
+static int copyoutptr(user_addr_t ua, user_addr_t ptr, int ptr_size);
+static void exec_resettextvp(proc_t, struct image_params *);
+
+/* We don't want this one exported */
+__private_extern__
+int open1(vfs_context_t, struct nameidata *, int, struct vnode_attr *, register_t *);
-int
-execv(p, args, retval)
- struct proc *p;
- void *args;
- int *retval;
+/*
+ * exec_add_string
+ *
+ * Add the requested string to the string space area.
+ *
+ * Parameters; struct image_params * image parameter block
+ * user_addr_t string to add to strings area
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 Success
+ * !0 Failure errno from copyinstr()
+ *
+ * Implicit returns:
+ * (imgp->ip_strendp) updated location of next add, if any
+ * (imgp->ip_strspace) updated byte count of space remaining
+ */
+static int
+exec_add_string(struct image_params *imgp, user_addr_t str)
{
- ((struct execve_args *)args)->envp = NULL;
- return (execve(p, args, retval));
+ int error = 0;
+
+ do {
+ size_t len = 0;
+ if (imgp->ip_strspace <= 0) {
+ error = E2BIG;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (IS_UIO_SYS_SPACE(imgp->ip_seg)) {
+ char *kstr = CAST_DOWN(char *,str); /* SAFE */
+ error = copystr(kstr, imgp->ip_strendp, imgp->ip_strspace, &len);
+ } else {
+ error = copyinstr(str, imgp->ip_strendp, imgp->ip_strspace,
+ &len);
+ }
+ imgp->ip_strendp += len;
+ imgp->ip_strspace -= len;
+ } while (error == ENAMETOOLONG);
+
+ return error;
}
-/* ARGSUSED */
-int
-execve(p, uap, retval)
- register struct proc *p;
- register struct execve_args *uap;
- register_t *retval;
+/*
+ * exec_save_path
+ *
+ * To support new app package launching for Mac OS X, the dyld needs the
+ * first argument to execve() stored on the user stack.
+ *
+ * Save the executable path name at the top of the strings area and set
+ * the argument vector pointer to the location following that to indicate
+ * the start of the argument and environment tuples, setting the remaining
+ * string space count to the size of the string area minus the path length
+ * and a reserve for two pointers.
+ *
+ * Parameters; struct image_params * image parameter block
+ * char * path used to invoke program
+ * int segment from which path comes
+ *
+ * Returns: int 0 Success
+ * EFAULT Bad address
+ * copy[in]str:EFAULT Bad address
+ * copy[in]str:ENAMETOOLONG Filename too long
+ *
+ * Implicit returns:
+ * (imgp->ip_strings) saved path
+ * (imgp->ip_strspace) space remaining in ip_strings
+ * (imgp->ip_argv) beginning of argument list
+ * (imgp->ip_strendp) start of remaining copy area
+ *
+ * Note: We have to do this before the initial namei() since in the
+ * path contains symbolic links, namei() will overwrite the
+ * original path buffer contents. If the last symbolic link
+ * resolved was a relative pathname, we would lose the original
+ * "path", which could be an absolute pathname. This might be
+ * unacceptable for dyld.
+ */
+static int
+exec_save_path(struct image_params *imgp, user_addr_t path, int seg)
{
- register struct ucred *cred = p->p_ucred;
- register struct filedesc *fdp = p->p_fd;
- register nc;
- register char *cp;
- int na, ne, ucp, ap, cc;
- unsigned len;
- int indir;
- char *sharg;
- char *execnamep;
- struct vnode *vp;
- struct vattr vattr;
- struct vattr origvattr;
- vm_offset_t execargs;
- struct nameidata nd;
- struct ps_strings ps;
-#define SHSIZE 512
- char cfarg[SHSIZE];
- boolean_t is_fat;
- kern_return_t ret;
- struct mach_header *mach_header;
- struct fat_header *fat_header;
- struct fat_arch fat_arch;
- load_return_t lret;
- load_result_t load_result;
- struct uthread *uthread;
- vm_map_t old_map;
- vm_map_t map;
- int i;
- boolean_t clean_regions = FALSE;
- union {
- /* #! and name of interpreter */
- char ex_shell[SHSIZE];
- /* Mach-O executable */
- struct mach_header mach_header;
- /* Fat executable */
- struct fat_header fat_header;
- char pad[512];
- } exdata;
- int resid, error;
- char *savedpath;
- int savedpathlen = 0;
- vm_offset_t *execargsp;
- char *cpnospace;
- task_t task;
- task_t new_task;
- thread_act_t thr_act;
- int numthreads;
- int vfexec=0;
- unsigned long arch_offset =0;
- unsigned long arch_size = 0;
- char *ws_cache_name = NULL; /* used for pre-heat */
-
- task = current_task();
- thr_act = current_act();
- uthread = get_bsdthread_info(thr_act);
+ int error;
+ size_t len;
+ char *kpath = CAST_DOWN(char *,path); /* SAFE */
+
+ imgp->ip_strendp = imgp->ip_strings;
+ imgp->ip_strspace = SIZE_IMG_STRSPACE;
+
+ len = MIN(MAXPATHLEN, imgp->ip_strspace);
+
+ switch(seg) {
+ case UIO_USERSPACE32:
+ case UIO_USERSPACE64: /* Same for copyin()... */
+ error = copyinstr(path, imgp->ip_strings, len, &len);
+ break;
+ case UIO_SYSSPACE32:
+ error = copystr(kpath, imgp->ip_strings, len, &len);
+ break;
+ default:
+ error = EFAULT;
+ break;
+ }
- if (uthread->uu_flag & P_VFORK) {
- vfexec = 1; /* Mark in exec */
- } else {
- if (task != kernel_task) {
- numthreads = get_task_numacts(task);
- if (numthreads <= 0 )
- return(EINVAL);
- if (numthreads > 1) {
- return(EOPNOTSUPP);
- }
- }
+ if (!error) {
+ imgp->ip_strendp += len;
+ imgp->ip_strspace -= len;
+ imgp->ip_argv = imgp->ip_strendp;
}
- error = execargs_alloc(&execargs);
- if (error)
- return(error);
+ return(error);
+}
- savedpath = execargs;
+#ifdef IMGPF_POWERPC
+/*
+ * exec_powerpc32_imgact
+ *
+ * Implicitly invoke the PowerPC handler for a byte-swapped image magic
+ * number. This may happen either as a result of an attempt to invoke a
+ * PowerPC image directly, or indirectly as the interpreter used in an
+ * interpreter script.
+ *
+ * Parameters; struct image_params * image parameter block
+ *
+ * Returns: -1 not an PowerPC image (keep looking)
+ * -3 Success: exec_archhandler_ppc: relookup
+ * >0 Failure: exec_archhandler_ppc: error number
+ *
+ * Note: This image activator does not handle the case of a direct
+ * invocation of the exec_archhandler_ppc, since in that case, the
+ * exec_archhandler_ppc itself is not a PowerPC binary; instead,
+ * binary image activators must recognize the exec_archhandler_ppc;
+ * This is managed in exec_check_permissions().
+ *
+ * Note: This image activator is limited to 32 bit powerpc images;
+ * if support for 64 bit powerpc images is desired, it would
+ * be more in line with this design to write a separate 64 bit
+ * image activator.
+ */
+static int
+exec_powerpc32_imgact(struct image_params *imgp)
+{
+ struct mach_header *mach_header = (struct mach_header *)imgp->ip_vdata;
+ int error;
+ size_t len = 0;
/*
- * To support new app package launching for Mac OS X, the dyld
- * needs the first argument to execve() stored on the user stack.
- * Copyin the "path" at the begining of the "execargs" buffer
- * allocated above.
- *
- * We have to do this before namei() because in case of
- * symbolic links, namei() would overwrite the original "path".
- * In case the last symbolic link resolved was a relative pathname
- * we would lose the original "path", which could be an
- * absolute pathname. This might be unacceptable for dyld.
- */
- /* XXX We could optimize to avoid copyinstr in the namei() */
-
- error = copyinstr(uap->fname, savedpath, MAXPATHLEN, &savedpathlen);
- if (error)
- return (error);
- /*
- * copyinstr will put in savedpathlen, the count of
- * characters (including NULL) in the path.
+ * Make sure it's a PowerPC binary. If we've already redirected
+ * from an interpreted file once, don't do it again.
*/
-
- if(app_profile != 0) {
-
- /* grab the name of the file out of its path */
- /* we will need this for lookup within the */
- /* name file */
- ws_cache_name = savedpath + savedpathlen;
- while (ws_cache_name[0] != '/') {
- if(ws_cache_name == savedpath) {
- ws_cache_name--;
- break;
- }
- ws_cache_name--;
- }
- ws_cache_name++;
+ if (mach_header->magic != MH_CIGAM) {
+ /*
+ * If it's a cross-architecture 64 bit binary, then claim
+ * it, but refuse to run it.
+ */
+ if (mach_header->magic == MH_CIGAM_64)
+ return (EBADARCH);
+ return (-1);
}
-
- /* Save the name aside for future use */
- execargsp = (vm_offset_t *)((char *)(execargs) + savedpathlen);
-
- NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF | SAVENAME,
- UIO_USERSPACE, uap->fname, p);
- if ((error = namei(&nd)))
- goto bad1;
- vp = nd.ni_vp;
- VOP_LEASE(vp, p, p->p_ucred, LEASE_READ);
-
- if ((error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &origvattr, p->p_ucred, p)))
- goto bad;
- /* Check mount point */
- if (vp->v_mount->mnt_flag & MNT_NOEXEC) {
- error = EACCES;
- goto bad;
+ /* If there is no exec_archhandler_ppc, we can't run it */
+ if (exec_archhandler_ppc.path[0] == 0)
+ return (EBADARCH);
+
+ /* Remember the type of the original file for later grading */
+ if (!imgp->ip_origcputype) {
+ imgp->ip_origcputype =
+ OSSwapBigToHostInt32(mach_header->cputype);
+ imgp->ip_origcpusubtype =
+ OSSwapBigToHostInt32(mach_header->cpusubtype);
}
- indir = 0;
- if ((vp->v_mount->mnt_flag & MNT_NOSUID) || (p->p_flag & P_TRACED))
- origvattr.va_mode &= ~(VSUID | VSGID);
-
- *(&vattr) = *(&origvattr);
+ /*
+ * The PowerPC flag will be set by the exec_check_permissions()
+ * call anyway; however, we set this flag here so that the relookup
+ * in execve() does not follow symbolic links, as a side effect.
+ */
+ imgp->ip_flags |= IMGPF_POWERPC;
-again:
- error = check_exec_access(p, vp, &vattr);
+ /* impute an interpreter */
+ error = copystr(exec_archhandler_ppc.path, imgp->ip_interp_name,
+ IMG_SHSIZE, &len);
if (error)
- goto bad;
+ return (error);
/*
- * Read in first few bytes of file for segment sizes, magic number:
- * 407 = plain executable
- * 410 = RO text
- * 413 = demand paged RO text
- * Also an ASCII line beginning with #! is
- * the file name of a ``shell'' and arguments may be prepended
- * to the argument list if given here.
- *
- * SHELL NAMES ARE LIMITED IN LENGTH.
- *
- * ONLY ONE ARGUMENT MAY BE PASSED TO THE SHELL FROM
- * THE ASCII LINE.
+ * provide a replacement string for p->p_comm; we have to use an
+ * an alternate buffer for this, rather than replacing it directly,
+ * since the exec may fail and return to the parent. In that case,
+ * we would have erroneously changed the parent p->p_comm instead.
*/
+ strlcpy(imgp->ip_p_comm, imgp->ip_ndp->ni_cnd.cn_nameptr, MAXCOMLEN);
- exdata.ex_shell[0] = '\0'; /* for zero length files */
+ return (-3);
+}
+#endif /* IMGPF_POWERPC */
- error = vn_rdwr(UIO_READ, vp, (caddr_t)&exdata, sizeof (exdata), 0,
- UIO_SYSSPACE, IO_NODELOCKED, p->p_ucred, &resid, p);
- if (error)
- goto bad;
+/*
+ * exec_shell_imgact
+ *
+ * Image activator for interpreter scripts. If the image begins with the
+ * characters "#!", then it is an interpreter script. Verify that we are
+ * not already executing in PowerPC mode, and that the length of the script
+ * line indicating the interpreter is not in excess of the maximum allowed
+ * size. If this is the case, then break out the arguments, if any, which
+ * are separated by white space, and copy them into the argument save area
+ * as if they were provided on the command line before all other arguments.
+ * The line ends when we encounter a comment character ('#') or newline.
+ *
+ * Parameters; struct image_params * image parameter block
+ *
+ * Returns: -1 not an interpreter (keep looking)
+ * -3 Success: interpreter: relookup
+ * >0 Failure: interpreter: error number
+ *
+ * A return value other than -1 indicates subsequent image activators should
+ * not be given the opportunity to attempt to activate the image.
+ */
+static int
+exec_shell_imgact(struct image_params *imgp)
+{
+ char *vdata = imgp->ip_vdata;
+ char *ihp;
+ char *line_endp;
+ char *interp;
+ char temp[16];
+ proc_t p;
+ struct fileproc *fp;
+ int fd;
+ int error;
+ size_t len;
-#ifndef lint
- if (resid > sizeof(exdata) - min(sizeof(exdata.mach_header),
- sizeof(exdata.fat_header))
- && exdata.ex_shell[0] != '#') {
- error = ENOEXEC;
- goto bad;
+ /*
+ * Make sure it's a shell script. If we've already redirected
+ * from an interpreted file once, don't do it again.
+ *
+ * Note: We disallow PowerPC, since the expectation is that we
+ * may run a PowerPC interpreter, but not an interpret a PowerPC
+ * image. This is consistent with historical behaviour.
+ */
+ if (vdata[0] != '#' ||
+ vdata[1] != '!' ||
+ (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_INTERPRET) != 0) {
+ return (-1);
}
-#endif /* lint */
- mach_header = &exdata.mach_header;
- fat_header = &exdata.fat_header;
- if (mach_header->magic == MH_MAGIC)
- is_fat = FALSE;
- else if (fat_header->magic == FAT_MAGIC ||
- fat_header->magic == FAT_CIGAM)
- is_fat = TRUE;
- else if (mach_header->magic == MH_CIGAM) {
- error = EBADARCH;
- goto bad;
- } else {
- if (exdata.ex_shell[0] != '#' ||
- exdata.ex_shell[1] != '!' ||
- indir) {
- error = ENOEXEC;
- goto bad;
- }
- cp = &exdata.ex_shell[2]; /* skip "#!" */
- while (cp < &exdata.ex_shell[SHSIZE]) {
- if (*cp == '\t')
- *cp = ' ';
- else if (*cp == '\n') {
- *cp = '\0';
- break;
- }
- cp++;
- }
- if (*cp != '\0') {
- error = ENOEXEC;
- goto bad;
- }
- cp = &exdata.ex_shell[2];
- while (*cp == ' ')
- cp++;
- execnamep = cp;
- while (*cp && *cp != ' ')
- cp++;
- cfarg[0] = '\0';
- cpnospace = cp;
- if (*cp) {
- *cp++ = '\0';
- while (*cp == ' ')
- cp++;
- if (*cp)
- bcopy((caddr_t)cp, (caddr_t)cfarg, SHSIZE);
- }
- /*
- * Support for new app package launching for Mac OS X.
- * We are about to retry the execve() by changing the path to the
- * interpreter name. Need to re-initialize the savedpath and
- * savedpathlen. +1 for NULL.
- */
- savedpathlen = (cpnospace - execnamep + 1);
- error = copystr(execnamep, savedpath, savedpathlen, &savedpathlen);
- if (error)
- goto bad;
+#ifdef IMGPF_POWERPC
+ if ((imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_POWERPC) != 0)
+ return (EBADARCH);
+#endif /* IMGPF_POWERPC */
- /* Save the name aside for future use */
- execargsp = (vm_offset_t *)((char *)(execargs) + savedpathlen);
-
- indir = 1;
- vput(vp);
- nd.ni_cnd.cn_nameiop = LOOKUP;
- nd.ni_cnd.cn_flags = (nd.ni_cnd.cn_flags & HASBUF) |
- (FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF | SAVENAME);
- nd.ni_segflg = UIO_SYSSPACE;
- nd.ni_dirp = execnamep;
- if ((error = namei(&nd)))
- goto bad1;
- vp = nd.ni_vp;
- VOP_LEASE(vp, p, cred, LEASE_READ);
- if ((error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vattr, p->p_ucred, p)))
- goto bad;
- goto again;
+ imgp->ip_flags |= IMGPF_INTERPRET;
+
+ /* Check to see if SUGID scripts are permitted. If they aren't then
+ * clear the SUGID bits.
+ * imgp->ip_vattr is known to be valid.
+ */
+ if (sugid_scripts == 0) {
+ imgp->ip_origvattr->va_mode &= ~(VSUID | VSGID);
}
- /*
- * Collect arguments on "file" in swap space.
- */
- na = 0;
- ne = 0;
- nc = 0;
- cc = 0;
- /*
- * Support for new app package launching for Mac OS X allocates
- * the "path" at the begining.
- * execargs get allocated after that
- */
- cp = (char *) execargsp; /* running pointer for copy */
- /*
- * size of execargs less sizeof "path",
- * a pointer to "path" and a NULL poiter
- */
- cc = NCARGS - savedpathlen - 2*NBPW;
- /*
- * Copy arguments into file in argdev area.
- */
- if (uap->argp) for (;;) {
- ap = NULL;
- sharg = NULL;
- if (indir && na == 0) {
- sharg = nd.ni_cnd.cn_nameptr;
- ap = (int)sharg;
- uap->argp++; /* ignore argv[0] */
- } else if (indir && (na == 1 && cfarg[0])) {
- sharg = cfarg;
- ap = (int)sharg;
- } else if (indir && (na == 1 || (na == 2 && cfarg[0])))
- ap = (int)uap->fname;
- else if (uap->argp) {
- ap = fuword((caddr_t)uap->argp);
- uap->argp++;
- }
- if (ap == NULL && uap->envp) {
- uap->argp = NULL;
- if ((ap = fuword((caddr_t)uap->envp)) != NULL)
- uap->envp++, ne++;
- }
- if (ap == NULL)
- break;
- na++;
- if (ap == -1) {
- error = EFAULT;
- break;
- }
- do {
- if (nc >= (NCARGS - savedpathlen - 2*NBPW -1)) {
- error = E2BIG;
- break;
- }
- if (sharg) {
- error = copystr(sharg, cp, (unsigned)cc, &len);
- sharg += len;
- } else {
- error = copyinstr((caddr_t)ap, cp, (unsigned)cc,
- &len);
- ap += len;
- }
- cp += len;
- nc += len;
- cc -= len;
- } while (error == ENAMETOOLONG);
- if (error) {
- goto bad;
- }
+ /* Find the nominal end of the interpreter line */
+ for( ihp = &vdata[2]; *ihp != '\n' && *ihp != '#'; ihp++) {
+ if (ihp >= &vdata[IMG_SHSIZE])
+ return (ENOEXEC);
}
- nc = (nc + NBPW-1) & ~(NBPW-1);
+
+ line_endp = ihp;
+ ihp = &vdata[2];
+ /* Skip over leading spaces - until the interpreter name */
+ while ( ihp < line_endp && ((*ihp == ' ') || (*ihp == '\t')))
+ ihp++;
/*
- * If we have a fat file, find "our" executable.
+ * Find the last non-whitespace character before the end of line or
+ * the beginning of a comment; this is our new end of line.
*/
- if (is_fat) {
- /*
- * Look up our architecture in the fat file.
- */
- lret = fatfile_getarch(vp, (vm_offset_t)fat_header, &fat_arch);
- if (lret != LOAD_SUCCESS) {
- error = load_return_to_errno(lret);
- goto bad;
- }
- /* Read the Mach-O header out of it */
- error = vn_rdwr(UIO_READ, vp, (caddr_t)&exdata.mach_header,
- sizeof (exdata.mach_header),
- fat_arch.offset,
- UIO_SYSSPACE, (IO_UNIT|IO_NODELOCKED), cred, &resid, p);
+ for (;line_endp > ihp && ((*line_endp == ' ') || (*line_endp == '\t')); line_endp--)
+ continue;
- if (error) {
- goto bad;
- }
+ /* Empty? */
+ if (line_endp == ihp)
+ return (ENOEXEC);
- /* Did we read a complete header? */
- if (resid) {
- error = EBADEXEC;
- goto bad;
- }
+ /* copy the interpreter name */
+ interp = imgp->ip_interp_name;
+ while ((ihp < line_endp) && (*ihp != ' ') && (*ihp != '\t'))
+ *interp++ = *ihp++;
+ *interp = '\0';
- /* Is what we found a Mach-O executable */
- if (mach_header->magic != MH_MAGIC) {
- error = ENOEXEC;
- goto bad;
- }
+ exec_save_path(imgp, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(imgp->ip_interp_name),
+ UIO_SYSSPACE32);
- arch_offset = fat_arch.offset;
- arch_size = fat_arch.size;
- } else {
- /*
- * Load the Mach-O file.
- */
- arch_offset = 0;
- arch_size = (u_long)vattr.va_size;
- }
+ ihp = &vdata[2];
+ while (ihp < line_endp) {
+ /* Skip leading whitespace before each argument */
+ while ((*ihp == ' ') || (*ihp == '\t'))
+ ihp++;
- if (vfexec) {
- kern_return_t result;
-
- result = task_create_local(task, FALSE, FALSE, &new_task);
- if (result != KERN_SUCCESS)
- printf("execve: task_create failed. Code: 0x%x\n", result);
- p->task = new_task;
- set_bsdtask_info(new_task, p);
- if (p->p_nice != 0)
- resetpriority(p);
- task = new_task;
- map = get_task_map(new_task);
- result = thread_create(new_task, &thr_act);
- if (result != KERN_SUCCESS)
- printf("execve: thread_create failed. Code: 0x%x\n", result);
- uthread = get_bsdthread_info(thr_act);
- } else {
- map = VM_MAP_NULL;
+ if (ihp >= line_endp)
+ break;
+ /* We have an argument; copy it */
+ while ((ihp < line_endp) && (*ihp != ' ') && (*ihp != '\t')) {
+ *imgp->ip_strendp++ = *ihp++;
+ imgp->ip_strspace--;
+ }
+ *imgp->ip_strendp++ = 0;
+ imgp->ip_strspace--;
+ imgp->ip_argc++;
}
/*
- * Load the Mach-O file.
+ * If we have a SUID oder SGID script, create a file descriptor
+ * from the vnode and pass /dev/fd/%d instead of the actual
+ * path name so that the script does not get opened twice
*/
- VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, p);
- if(ws_cache_name) {
- tws_handle_startup_file(task, cred->cr_uid,
- ws_cache_name, vp, &clean_regions);
+ if (imgp->ip_origvattr->va_mode & (VSUID | VSGID)) {
+ p = vfs_context_proc(imgp->ip_vfs_context);
+ error = falloc(p, &fp, &fd, imgp->ip_vfs_context);
+ if (error)
+ return(error);
+
+ fp->f_fglob->fg_flag = FREAD;
+ fp->f_fglob->fg_type = DTYPE_VNODE;
+ fp->f_fglob->fg_ops = &vnops;
+ fp->f_fglob->fg_data = (caddr_t)imgp->ip_vp;
+
+ proc_fdlock(p);
+ procfdtbl_releasefd(p, fd, NULL);
+ fp_drop(p, fd, fp, 1);
+ proc_fdunlock(p);
+ vnode_ref(imgp->ip_vp);
+
+ snprintf(temp, sizeof(temp), "/dev/fd/%d", fd);
+ error = copyoutstr(temp, imgp->ip_user_fname, sizeof(temp), &len);
+ if (error)
+ return(error);
}
- lret = load_machfile(vp, mach_header, arch_offset,
- arch_size, &load_result, thr_act, map, clean_regions);
+ return (-3);
+}
+
- if (lret != LOAD_SUCCESS) {
- error = load_return_to_errno(lret);
- goto badtoolate;
- }
- /* load_machfile() maps the vnode */
- ubc_map(vp);
+/*
+ * exec_fat_imgact
+ *
+ * Image activator for fat 1.0 binaries. If the binary is fat, then we
+ * need to select an image from it internally, and make that the image
+ * we are going to attempt to execute. At present, this consists of
+ * reloading the first page for the image with a first page from the
+ * offset location indicated by the fat header.
+ *
+ * Parameters; struct image_params * image parameter block
+ *
+ * Returns: -1 not a fat binary (keep looking)
+ * -2 Success: encapsulated binary: reread
+ * >0 Failure: error number
+ *
+ * Important: This image activator is byte order neutral.
+ *
+ * Note: A return value other than -1 indicates subsequent image
+ * activators should not be given the opportunity to attempt
+ * to activate the image.
+ *
+ * If we find an encapsulated binary, we make no assertions
+ * about its validity; instead, we leave that up to a rescan
+ * for an activator to claim it, and, if it is claimed by one,
+ * that activator is responsible for determining validity.
+ */
+static int
+exec_fat_imgact(struct image_params *imgp)
+{
+ proc_t p = vfs_context_proc(imgp->ip_vfs_context);
+ kauth_cred_t cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
+ struct fat_header *fat_header = (struct fat_header *)imgp->ip_vdata;
+ struct _posix_spawnattr *psa = NULL;
+ struct fat_arch fat_arch;
+ int resid, error;
+ load_return_t lret;
- /*
- * deal with set[ug]id.
- */
- p->p_flag &= ~P_SUGID;
- if (((origvattr.va_mode & VSUID) != 0 &&
- p->p_ucred->cr_uid != origvattr.va_uid)
- || (origvattr.va_mode & VSGID) != 0 &&
- p->p_ucred->cr_gid != origvattr.va_gid) {
- p->p_ucred = crcopy(cred);
-#if KTRACE
- /*
- * If process is being ktraced, turn off - unless
- * root set it.
- */
- if (p->p_tracep && !(p->p_traceflag & KTRFAC_ROOT)) {
- struct vnode *tvp = p->p_tracep;
- p->p_tracep = NULL;
- p->p_traceflag = 0;
- vrele(tvp);
- }
-#endif
- if (origvattr.va_mode & VSUID)
- p->p_ucred->cr_uid = origvattr.va_uid;
- if (origvattr.va_mode & VSGID)
- p->p_ucred->cr_gid = origvattr.va_gid;
+ /* Make sure it's a fat binary */
+ if ((fat_header->magic != FAT_MAGIC) &&
+ (fat_header->magic != FAT_CIGAM)) {
+ error = -1;
+ goto bad;
+ }
- set_security_token(p);
- p->p_flag |= P_SUGID;
+ /* If posix_spawn binprefs exist, respect those prefs. */
+ psa = (struct _posix_spawnattr *) imgp->ip_px_sa;
+ if (psa != NULL && psa->psa_binprefs[0] != 0) {
+ struct fat_arch *arches = (struct fat_arch *) (fat_header + 1);
+ int nfat_arch = 0, pr = 0, f = 0;
+
+ nfat_arch = OSSwapBigToHostInt32(fat_header->nfat_arch);
+ /* Check each preference listed against all arches in header */
+ for (pr = 0; pr < NBINPREFS; pr++) {
+ cpu_type_t pref = psa->psa_binprefs[pr];
+ if (pref == 0) {
+ /* No suitable arch in the pref list */
+ error = EBADARCH;
+ goto bad;
+ }
- /* Radar 2261856; setuid security hole fix */
- /* Patch from OpenBSD: A. Ramesh */
- /*
- * XXX For setuid processes, attempt to ensure that
- * stdin, stdout, and stderr are already allocated.
- * We do not want userland to accidentally allocate
- * descriptors in this range which has implied meaning
- * to libc.
- */
- for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
- extern struct fileops vnops;
- struct nameidata nd1;
- struct file *fp;
- int indx;
+ if (pref == CPU_TYPE_ANY) {
+ /* Fall through to regular grading */
+ break;
+ }
- if (p->p_fd->fd_ofiles[i] == NULL) {
- if ((error = falloc(p, &fp, &indx)) != 0)
- continue;
- NDINIT(&nd1, LOOKUP, FOLLOW, UIO_SYSSPACE,
- "/dev/null", p);
- if ((error = vn_open(&nd1, FREAD, 0)) != 0) {
- ffree(fp);
- p->p_fd->fd_ofiles[indx] = NULL;
- break;
+ for (f = 0; f < nfat_arch; f++) {
+ cpu_type_t archtype = OSSwapBigToHostInt32(
+ arches[f].cputype);
+ cpu_type_t archsubtype = OSSwapBigToHostInt32(
+ arches[f].cpusubtype) & ~CPU_SUBTYPE_MASK;
+ if (pref == archtype &&
+ grade_binary(archtype, archsubtype)) {
+ /* We have a winner! */
+ fat_arch.cputype = archtype;
+ fat_arch.cpusubtype = archsubtype;
+ fat_arch.offset = OSSwapBigToHostInt32(
+ arches[f].offset);
+ fat_arch.size = OSSwapBigToHostInt32(
+ arches[f].size);
+ fat_arch.align = OSSwapBigToHostInt32(
+ arches[f].align);
+ goto use_arch;
}
- fp->f_flag = FREAD;
- fp->f_type = DTYPE_VNODE;
- fp->f_ops = &vnops;
- fp->f_data = (caddr_t)nd1.ni_vp;
- VOP_UNLOCK(nd1.ni_vp, 0, p);
}
}
}
- p->p_cred->p_svuid = p->p_ucred->cr_uid;
- p->p_cred->p_svgid = p->p_ucred->cr_gid;
- if (!vfexec && (p->p_flag & P_TRACED))
- psignal(p, SIGTRAP);
+ /* Look up our preferred architecture in the fat file. */
+ lret = fatfile_getarch_affinity(imgp->ip_vp,
+ (vm_offset_t)fat_header,
+ &fat_arch,
+ (p->p_flag & P_AFFINITY));
+ if (lret != LOAD_SUCCESS) {
+ error = load_return_to_errno(lret);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+use_arch:
+ /* Read the Mach-O header out of fat_arch */
+ error = vn_rdwr(UIO_READ, imgp->ip_vp, imgp->ip_vdata,
+ PAGE_SIZE, fat_arch.offset,
+ UIO_SYSSPACE32, (IO_UNIT|IO_NODELOCKED),
+ cred, &resid, p);
if (error) {
- goto badtoolate;
- }
- VOP_LOCK(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, p);
- vput(vp);
- vp = NULL;
-
- if (load_result.unixproc &&
- create_unix_stack(get_task_map(task),
- load_result.user_stack, load_result.customstack, p)) {
- error = load_return_to_errno(LOAD_NOSPACE);
- goto badtoolate;
+ goto bad;
}
- if (vfexec) {
- uthread->uu_ar0 = (void *)get_user_regs(thr_act);
+ /* Did we read a complete header? */
+ if (resid) {
+ error = EBADEXEC;
+ goto bad;
}
- /*
- * Copy back arglist if necessary.
- */
+ /* Success. Indicate we have identified an encapsulated binary */
+ error = -2;
+ imgp->ip_arch_offset = (user_size_t)fat_arch.offset;
+ imgp->ip_arch_size = (user_size_t)fat_arch.size;
+bad:
+ kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
+ return (error);
+}
- ucp = p->user_stack;
- if (vfexec) {
- old_map = vm_map_switch(get_task_map(task));
- }
- if (load_result.unixproc) {
- int pathptr;
-
- ucp = ucp - nc - NBPW; /* begining of the STRING AREA */
+/*
+ * exec_mach_imgact
+ *
+ * Image activator for mach-o 1.0 binaries.
+ *
+ * Parameters; struct image_params * image parameter block
+ *
+ * Returns: -1 not a fat binary (keep looking)
+ * -2 Success: encapsulated binary: reread
+ * >0 Failure: error number
+ * EBADARCH Mach-o binary, but with an unrecognized
+ * architecture
+ * ENOMEM No memory for child process after -
+ * can only happen after vfork()
+ *
+ * Important: This image activator is NOT byte order neutral.
+ *
+ * Note: A return value other than -1 indicates subsequent image
+ * activators should not be given the opportunity to attempt
+ * to activate the image.
+ *
+ * TODO: More gracefully handle failures after vfork
+ */
+static int
+exec_mach_imgact(struct image_params *imgp)
+{
+ struct mach_header *mach_header = (struct mach_header *)imgp->ip_vdata;
+ proc_t p = vfs_context_proc(imgp->ip_vfs_context);
+ int error = 0;
+ int vfexec = 0;
+ task_t task;
+ task_t new_task = NULL; /* protected by vfexec */
+ thread_t thread;
+ struct uthread *uthread;
+ vm_map_t old_map = VM_MAP_NULL;
+ vm_map_t map;
+ load_return_t lret;
+ load_result_t load_result;
+ struct _posix_spawnattr *psa = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * make sure it's a Mach-O 1.0 or Mach-O 2.0 binary; the difference
+ * is a reserved field on the end, so for the most part, we can
+ * treat them as if they were identical.
+ */
+ if ((mach_header->magic != MH_MAGIC) &&
+ (mach_header->magic != MH_MAGIC_64)) {
+ error = -1;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ switch (mach_header->filetype) {
+ case MH_DYLIB:
+ case MH_BUNDLE:
+ error = -1;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ if (!imgp->ip_origcputype) {
+ imgp->ip_origcputype = mach_header->cputype;
+ imgp->ip_origcpusubtype = mach_header->cpusubtype;
+ }
+
+ task = current_task();
+ thread = current_thread();
+ uthread = get_bsdthread_info(thread);
+
+ if (uthread->uu_flag & UT_VFORK)
+ vfexec = 1; /* Mark in exec */
+
+ if ((mach_header->cputype & CPU_ARCH_ABI64) == CPU_ARCH_ABI64)
+ imgp->ip_flags |= IMGPF_IS_64BIT;
+
+ /* If posix_spawn binprefs exist, respect those prefs. */
+ psa = (struct _posix_spawnattr *) imgp->ip_px_sa;
+ if (psa != NULL && psa->psa_binprefs[0] != 0) {
+ int pr = 0;
+ for (pr = 0; pr < NBINPREFS; pr++) {
+ cpu_type_t pref = psa->psa_binprefs[pr];
+ if (pref == 0) {
+ /* No suitable arch in the pref list */
+ error = EBADARCH;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ if (pref == CPU_TYPE_ANY) {
+ /* Jump to regular grading */
+ goto grade;
+ }
+
+ if (pref == imgp->ip_origcputype) {
+ /* We have a match! */
+ goto grade;
+ }
+ }
+ error = EBADARCH;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+grade:
+ if (!grade_binary(imgp->ip_origcputype & ~CPU_SUBTYPE_LIB64,
+ imgp->ip_origcpusubtype & ~CPU_SUBTYPE_MASK)) {
+ error = EBADARCH;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy in arguments/environment from the old process */
+ error = exec_extract_strings(imgp);
+ if (error)
+ goto bad;
+
+ /*
+ * Hack for binary compatability; put three NULs on the end of the
+ * string area, and round it up to the next word boundary. This
+ * ensures padding with NULs to the boundary.
+ */
+ imgp->ip_strendp[0] = 0;
+ imgp->ip_strendp[1] = 0;
+ imgp->ip_strendp[2] = 0;
+ imgp->ip_strendp += (((imgp->ip_strendp - imgp->ip_strings) + NBPW-1) & ~(NBPW-1));
+
+#ifdef IMGPF_POWERPC
+ /*
+ * XXX
+ *
+ * Should be factored out; this is here because we might be getting
+ * invoked this way as the result of a shell script, and the check
+ * in exec_check_permissions() is not interior to the jump back up
+ * to the "encapsulated_binary:" label in exec_activate_image().
+ */
+ if (imgp->ip_vattr->va_fsid == exec_archhandler_ppc.fsid &&
+ imgp->ip_vattr->va_fileid == (uint64_t)((u_long)exec_archhandler_ppc.fileid)) {
+ imgp->ip_flags |= IMGPF_POWERPC;
+ }
+#endif /* IMGPF_POWERPC */
+
+ if (vfexec) {
+ imgp->ip_vfork_thread = fork_create_child(task, p, FALSE, (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_IS_64BIT));
+ if (imgp->ip_vfork_thread == NULL) {
+ error = ENOMEM;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ /* reset local idea of thread, uthread, task */
+ thread = imgp->ip_vfork_thread;
+ uthread = get_bsdthread_info(thread);
+ task = new_task = get_threadtask(thread);
+ map = get_task_map(task);
+ } else {
+ map = VM_MAP_NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We set these flags here; this is OK, since if we fail after
+ * this point, we have already destroyed the parent process anyway.
+ */
+ if (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_IS_64BIT) {
+ task_set_64bit(task, TRUE);
+ OSBitOrAtomic(P_LP64, (UInt32 *)&p->p_flag);
+ } else {
+ task_set_64bit(task, FALSE);
+ OSBitAndAtomic(~((uint32_t)P_LP64), (UInt32 *)&p->p_flag);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Load the Mach-O file.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * NOTE: An error after this point indicates we have potentially
+ * destroyed or overwrote some process state while attempting an
+ * execve() following a vfork(), which is an unrecoverable condition.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * We reset the task to 64-bit (or not) here. It may have picked up
+ * a new map, and we need that to reflect its true 64-bit nature.
+ */
+
+ task_set_64bit(task,
+ ((imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_IS_64BIT) == IMGPF_IS_64BIT));
+
+ /*
+ * Actually load the image file we previously decided to load.
+ */
+ lret = load_machfile(imgp, mach_header, thread, map, &load_result);
+
+ if (lret != LOAD_SUCCESS) {
+ error = load_return_to_errno(lret);
+ goto badtoolate;
+ }
+
+ vm_map_set_user_wire_limit(get_task_map(task), p->p_rlimit[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur);
+
+ /*
+ * Set code-signing flags if this binary is signed, or if parent has
+ * requested them on exec.
+ */
+ if (load_result.csflags & CS_VALID) {
+ imgp->ip_csflags |= load_result.csflags &
+ (CS_VALID|
+ CS_HARD|CS_KILL|CS_EXEC_SET_HARD|CS_EXEC_SET_KILL);
+ } else {
+ imgp->ip_csflags &= ~CS_VALID;
+ }
+
+ if (p->p_csflags & CS_EXEC_SET_HARD)
+ imgp->ip_csflags |= CS_HARD;
+ if (p->p_csflags & CS_EXEC_SET_KILL)
+ imgp->ip_csflags |= CS_KILL;
+
+
+ /* load_machfile() maps the vnode */
+ (void)ubc_map(imgp->ip_vp, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC);
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the system reserved areas in the new address space.
+ */
+ vm_map_exec(get_task_map(task),
+ task,
+ (void *) p->p_fd->fd_rdir,
+#ifdef IMGPF_POWERPC
+ imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_POWERPC ?
+ CPU_TYPE_POWERPC :
+#endif
+ cpu_type());
+
+ /*
+ * Close file descriptors
+ * which specify close-on-exec.
+ */
+ fdexec(p);
+
+ /*
+ * deal with set[ug]id.
+ */
+ error = exec_handle_sugid(imgp);
+
+ proc_knote(p, NOTE_EXEC);
+
+ if (!vfexec && (p->p_lflag & P_LTRACED))
+ psignal(p, SIGTRAP);
+
+ if (error) {
+ goto badtoolate;
+ }
+
+ if (load_result.unixproc &&
+ create_unix_stack(get_task_map(task),
+ load_result.user_stack,
+ load_result.customstack,
+ p) != KERN_SUCCESS) {
+ error = load_return_to_errno(LOAD_NOSPACE);
+ goto badtoolate;
+ }
+
+ if (vfexec) {
+ old_map = vm_map_switch(get_task_map(task));
+ }
+
+ if (load_result.unixproc) {
+ user_addr_t ap;
/*
- * Support for new app package launching for Mac OS X allocates
- * the "path" at the begining of the execargs buffer.
- * copy it just before the string area.
+ * Copy the strings area out into the new process address
+ * space.
*/
- savedpathlen = (savedpathlen + NBPW-1) & ~(NBPW-1);
- len = 0;
- pathptr = ucp - savedpathlen;
- error = copyoutstr(savedpath, (caddr_t)pathptr,
- (unsigned)savedpathlen, &len);
+ ap = p->user_stack;
+ error = exec_copyout_strings(imgp, &ap);
if (error) {
if (vfexec)
vm_map_switch(old_map);
goto badtoolate;
}
+ /* Set the stack */
+ thread_setuserstack(thread, ap);
+ }
+
+ if (load_result.dynlinker) {
+ uint64_t ap;
+
+ /* Adjust the stack */
+ if (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_IS_64BIT) {
+ ap = thread_adjuserstack(thread, -8);
+ error = copyoutptr(load_result.mach_header, ap, 8);
+ } else {
+ ap = thread_adjuserstack(thread, -4);
+ error = suword(ap, load_result.mach_header);
+ }
+ if (error) {
+ if (vfexec)
+ vm_map_switch(old_map);
+ goto badtoolate;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (vfexec) {
+ vm_map_switch(old_map);
+ }
+ /* Set the entry point */
+ thread_setentrypoint(thread, load_result.entry_point);
+
+ /* Stop profiling */
+ stopprofclock(p);
+
+ /*
+ * Reset signal state.
+ */
+ execsigs(p, thread);
+
+ /*
+ * need to cancel async IO requests that can be cancelled and wait for those
+ * already active. MAY BLOCK!
+ */
+ _aio_exec( p );
+
+#if SYSV_SHM
+ /* FIXME: Till vmspace inherit is fixed: */
+ if (!vfexec && p->vm_shm)
+ shmexec(p);
+#endif
+#if SYSV_SEM
+ /* Clean up the semaphores */
+ semexit(p);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Remember file name for accounting.
+ */
+ p->p_acflag &= ~AFORK;
+ /* If the translated name isn't NULL, then we want to use
+ * that translated name as the name we show as the "real" name.
+ * Otherwise, use the name passed into exec.
+ */
+ if (0 != imgp->ip_p_comm[0]) {
+ bcopy((caddr_t)imgp->ip_p_comm, (caddr_t)p->p_comm,
+ sizeof(p->p_comm));
+ } else {
+ if (imgp->ip_ndp->ni_cnd.cn_namelen > MAXCOMLEN)
+ imgp->ip_ndp->ni_cnd.cn_namelen = MAXCOMLEN;
+ bcopy((caddr_t)imgp->ip_ndp->ni_cnd.cn_nameptr, (caddr_t)p->p_comm,
+ (unsigned)imgp->ip_ndp->ni_cnd.cn_namelen);
+ p->p_comm[imgp->ip_ndp->ni_cnd.cn_namelen] = '\0';
+ }
+
+#if CONFIG_DTRACE
+ /*
+ * Invalidate any predicate evaluation already cached for this thread by DTrace.
+ * That's because we've just stored to p_comm and DTrace refers to that when it
+ * evaluates the "execname" special variable. uid and gid may have changed as well.
+ */
+ dtrace_set_thread_predcache(current_thread(), 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Free any outstanding lazy dof entries. It is imperative we
+ * always call dtrace_lazy_dofs_destroy, rather than null check
+ * and call if !NULL. If we NULL test, during lazy dof faulting
+ * we can race with the faulting code and proceed from here to
+ * beyond the helpers cleanup. The lazy dof faulting will then
+ * install new helpers which no longer belong to this process!
+ */
+ dtrace_lazy_dofs_destroy(p);
+
+
+ /*
+ * Clean up any DTrace helpers for the process.
+ */
+ if (p->p_dtrace_helpers != NULL && dtrace_helpers_cleanup) {
+ (*dtrace_helpers_cleanup)(p);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Cleanup the DTrace provider associated with this process.
+ */
+ proc_lock(p);
+ if (p->p_dtrace_probes && dtrace_fasttrap_exec_ptr) {
+ (*dtrace_fasttrap_exec_ptr)(p);
+ }
+ proc_unlock(p);
+#endif
+
+ if (kdebug_enable) {
+ long dbg_arg1, dbg_arg2, dbg_arg3, dbg_arg4;
+
+ /*
+ * Collect the pathname for tracing
+ */
+ kdbg_trace_string(p, &dbg_arg1, &dbg_arg2, &dbg_arg3, &dbg_arg4);
+
+ if (vfexec) {
+ KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT1((TRACEDBG_CODE(DBG_TRACE_DATA, 2)) | DBG_FUNC_NONE,
+ p->p_pid ,0,0,0, (unsigned int)thread);
+ KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT1((TRACEDBG_CODE(DBG_TRACE_STRING, 2)) | DBG_FUNC_NONE,
+ dbg_arg1, dbg_arg2, dbg_arg3, dbg_arg4, (unsigned int)thread);
+ } else {
+ KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT((TRACEDBG_CODE(DBG_TRACE_DATA, 2)) | DBG_FUNC_NONE,
+ p->p_pid ,0,0,0,0);
+ KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT((TRACEDBG_CODE(DBG_TRACE_STRING, 2)) | DBG_FUNC_NONE,
+ dbg_arg1, dbg_arg2, dbg_arg3, dbg_arg4, 0);
+ }
+ }
+
+#ifdef IMGPF_POWERPC
+ /*
+ * Mark the process as powerpc or not. If powerpc, set the affinity
+ * flag, which will be used for grading binaries in future exec's
+ * from the process.
+ */
+ if (((imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_POWERPC) != 0))
+ OSBitOrAtomic(P_TRANSLATED, (UInt32 *)&p->p_flag);
+ else
+#endif /* IMGPF_POWERPC */
+ OSBitAndAtomic(~((uint32_t)P_TRANSLATED), (UInt32 *)&p->p_flag);
+ OSBitAndAtomic(~((uint32_t)P_AFFINITY), (UInt32 *)&p->p_flag);
+
+ /*
+ * If posix_spawned with the START_SUSPENDED flag, stop the
+ * process before it runs.
+ */
+ if (imgp->ip_px_sa != NULL) {
+ psa = (struct _posix_spawnattr *) imgp->ip_px_sa;
+ if (psa->psa_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_START_SUSPENDED) {
+ proc_lock(p);
+ p->p_stat = SSTOP;
+ proc_unlock(p);
+ (void) task_suspend(p->task);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * mark as execed, wakeup the process that vforked (if any) and tell
+ * it that it now has it's own resources back
+ */
+ OSBitOrAtomic(P_EXEC, (UInt32 *)&p->p_flag);
+ if (p->p_pptr && (p->p_lflag & P_LPPWAIT)) {
+ proc_lock(p);
+ p->p_lflag &= ~P_LPPWAIT;
+ proc_unlock(p);
+ wakeup((caddr_t)p->p_pptr);
+ }
+
+ if (vfexec && (p->p_lflag & P_LTRACED)) {
+ psignal_vfork(p, new_task, thread, SIGTRAP);
+ }
+
+badtoolate:
+ if (vfexec) {
+ task_deallocate(new_task);
+ thread_deallocate(thread);
+ if (error)
+ error = 0;
+ }
+
+bad:
+ return(error);
+}
+
+
+
+
+/*
+ * Our image activator table; this is the table of the image types we are
+ * capable of loading. We list them in order of preference to ensure the
+ * fastest image load speed.
+ *
+ * XXX hardcoded, for now; should use linker sets
+ */
+struct execsw {
+ int (*ex_imgact)(struct image_params *);
+ const char *ex_name;
+} execsw[] = {
+ { exec_mach_imgact, "Mach-o Binary" },
+ { exec_fat_imgact, "Fat Binary" },
+#ifdef IMGPF_POWERPC
+ { exec_powerpc32_imgact, "PowerPC binary" },
+#endif /* IMGPF_POWERPC */
+ { exec_shell_imgact, "Interpreter Script" },
+ { NULL, NULL}
+};
+
+
+/*
+ * exec_activate_image
+ *
+ * Description: Iterate through the available image activators, and activate
+ * the image associated with the imgp structure. We start with
+ * the
+ *
+ * Parameters: struct image_params * Image parameter block
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 Success
+ * EBADEXEC The executable is corrupt/unknown
+ * execargs_alloc:EINVAL Invalid argument
+ * execargs_alloc:EACCES Permission denied
+ * execargs_alloc:EINTR Interrupted function
+ * execargs_alloc:ENOMEM Not enough space
+ * exec_save_path:EFAULT Bad address
+ * exec_save_path:ENAMETOOLONG Filename too long
+ * exec_check_permissions:EACCES Permission denied
+ * exec_check_permissions:ENOEXEC Executable file format error
+ * exec_check_permissions:ETXTBSY Text file busy [misuse of error code]
+ * exec_check_permissions:???
+ * namei:???
+ * vn_rdwr:??? [anything vn_rdwr can return]
+ * <ex_imgact>:??? [anything an imgact can return]
+ */
+static int
+exec_activate_image(struct image_params *imgp)
+{
+ struct nameidata nd;
+ int error;
+ int resid;
+ int once = 1; /* save SGUID-ness for interpreted files */
+ int i;
+ int iterlimit = EAI_ITERLIMIT;
+
+ error = execargs_alloc(imgp);
+ if (error)
+ goto bad;
+
+ /*
+ * XXXAUDIT: Note: the double copyin introduces an audit
+ * race. To correct this race, we must use a single
+ * copyin(), e.g. by passing a flag to namei to indicate an
+ * external path buffer is being used.
+ */
+ error = exec_save_path(imgp, imgp->ip_user_fname, imgp->ip_seg);
+ if (error) {
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ DTRACE_PROC1(exec, uintptr_t, imgp->ip_strings);
+
+ NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF | AUDITVNPATH1,
+ imgp->ip_seg, imgp->ip_user_fname, imgp->ip_vfs_context);
+
+again:
+ error = namei(&nd);
+ if (error)
+ goto bad;
+ imgp->ip_ndp = &nd; /* successful namei(); call nameidone() later */
+ imgp->ip_vp = nd.ni_vp; /* if set, need to vnode_put() at some point */
+
+ error = exec_check_permissions(imgp);
+ if (error)
+ goto bad;
+
+ /* Copy; avoid invocation of an interpreter overwriting the original */
+ if (once) {
+ once = 0;
+ *imgp->ip_origvattr = *imgp->ip_vattr;
+ }
+
+ error = vn_rdwr(UIO_READ, imgp->ip_vp, imgp->ip_vdata, PAGE_SIZE, 0,
+ UIO_SYSSPACE32, IO_NODELOCKED,
+ vfs_context_ucred(imgp->ip_vfs_context),
+ &resid, vfs_context_proc(imgp->ip_vfs_context));
+ if (error)
+ goto bad;
- /* Save a NULL pointer below it */
- (void) suword((caddr_t)(pathptr - NBPW), 0);
+encapsulated_binary:
+ /* Limit the number of iterations we will attempt on each binary */
+ if (--iterlimit == 0) {
+ error = EBADEXEC;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ error = -1;
+ for(i = 0; error == -1 && execsw[i].ex_imgact != NULL; i++) {
+
+ error = (*execsw[i].ex_imgact)(imgp);
+
+ switch (error) {
+ /* case -1: not claimed: continue */
+ case -2: /* Encapsulated binary */
+ goto encapsulated_binary;
+
+ case -3: /* Interpreter */
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+ /*
+ * Copy the script label for later use. Note that
+ * the label can be different when the script is
+ * actually read by the interpreter.
+ */
+ if (imgp->ip_scriptlabelp)
+ mac_vnode_label_free(imgp->ip_scriptlabelp);
+ imgp->ip_scriptlabelp = mac_vnode_label_alloc();
+ if (imgp->ip_scriptlabelp == NULL) {
+ error = ENOMEM;
+ break;
+ }
+ mac_vnode_label_copy(imgp->ip_vp->v_label,
+ imgp->ip_scriptlabelp);
+#endif
+ vnode_put(imgp->ip_vp);
+ imgp->ip_vp = NULL; /* already put */
+ nd.ni_cnd.cn_nameiop = LOOKUP;
+ nd.ni_cnd.cn_flags = (nd.ni_cnd.cn_flags & HASBUF) |
+ (FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF);
+
+#ifdef IMGPF_POWERPC
+ /*
+ * PowerPC does not follow symlinks because the
+ * code which sets exec_archhandler_ppc.fsid and
+ * exec_archhandler_ppc.fileid doesn't follow them.
+ */
+ if (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_POWERPC)
+ nd.ni_cnd.cn_flags &= ~FOLLOW;
+#endif /* IMGPF_POWERPC */
+
+ nd.ni_segflg = UIO_SYSSPACE32;
+ nd.ni_dirp = CAST_USER_ADDR_T(imgp->ip_interp_name);
+ goto again;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Call out to allow 3rd party notification of exec.
+ * Ignore result of kauth_authorize_fileop call.
+ */
+ if (error == 0 && kauth_authorize_fileop_has_listeners()) {
+ kauth_authorize_fileop(vfs_context_ucred(imgp->ip_vfs_context),
+ KAUTH_FILEOP_EXEC,
+ (uintptr_t)nd.ni_vp, 0);
+ }
+
+bad:
+ if (imgp->ip_strings)
+ execargs_free(imgp);
+ if (imgp->ip_ndp)
+ nameidone(imgp->ip_ndp);
+
+ return (error);
+}
+
+/*
+ * exec_handle_port_actions
+ *
+ * Description: Go through the _posix_port_actions_t contents,
+ * calling task_set_special_port and task_set_exception_ports
+ * for the current task.
+ *
+ * Parameters: struct image_params * Image parameter block
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 Success
+ * KERN_FAILURE Failure
+ */
+static int
+exec_handle_port_actions(struct image_params *imgp)
+{
+ _posix_spawn_port_actions_t pacts = imgp->ip_px_spa;
+ proc_t p = vfs_context_proc(imgp->ip_vfs_context);
+ _ps_port_action_t *act = NULL;
+ task_t task = p->task;
+ ipc_port_t port = NULL;
+ kern_return_t ret = KERN_SUCCESS;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < pacts->pspa_count; i++) {
+ act = &pacts->pspa_actions[i];
+
+ ret = ipc_object_copyin(get_task_ipcspace(current_task()),
+ (mach_port_name_t) act->new_port,
+ MACH_MSG_TYPE_COPY_SEND,
+ (ipc_object_t *) &port);
+
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ switch (act->port_type) {
+ case PSPA_SPECIAL:
+ ret = task_set_special_port(task,
+ act->which,
+ port);
+ break;
+ case PSPA_EXCEPTION:
+ ret = task_set_exception_ports(task,
+ act->mask,
+ port,
+ act->behavior,
+ act->flavor);
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = KERN_FAILURE;
+ }
+ /* action failed, so release port resources */
+ if (ret) {
+ ipc_port_release_send(port);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * exec_handle_file_actions
+ *
+ * Description: Go through the _posix_file_actions_t contents applying the
+ * open, close, and dup2 operations to the open file table for
+ * the current process.
+ *
+ * Parameters: struct image_params * Image parameter block
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 Success
+ * ???
+ *
+ * Note: Actions are applied in the order specified, with the credential
+ * of the parent process. This is done to permit the parent
+ * process to utilize POSIX_SPAWN_RESETIDS to drop privilege in
+ * the child following operations the child may in fact not be
+ * normally permitted to perform.
+ */
+static int
+exec_handle_file_actions(struct image_params *imgp)
+{
+ int error = 0;
+ int action;
+ proc_t p = vfs_context_proc(imgp->ip_vfs_context);
+ _posix_spawn_file_actions_t px_sfap = imgp->ip_px_sfa;
+ register_t ival[2]; /* dummy retval for system calls) */
+
+ for (action = 0; action < px_sfap->psfa_act_count; action++) {
+ _psfa_action_t *psfa = &px_sfap->psfa_act_acts[ action];
+
+ switch(psfa->psfaa_type) {
+ case PSFA_OPEN: {
+ /*
+ * Open is different, in that it requires the use of
+ * a path argument, which is normally copied in from
+ * user space; because of this, we have to support an
+ * open from kernel space that passes an address space
+ * context oof UIO_SYSSPACE, and casts the address
+ * argument to a user_addr_t.
+ */
+ struct vnode_attr va;
+ struct nameidata nd;
+ int mode = psfa->psfaa_openargs.psfao_mode;
+ struct dup2_args dup2a;
+ struct close_nocancel_args ca;
+ int origfd;
+
+ VATTR_INIT(&va);
+ /* Mask off all but regular access permissions */
+ mode = ((mode &~ p->p_fd->fd_cmask) & ALLPERMS) & ~S_ISTXT;
+ VATTR_SET(&va, va_mode, mode & ACCESSPERMS);
+
+ NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | AUDITVNPATH1, UIO_SYSSPACE,
+ CAST_USER_ADDR_T(psfa->psfaa_openargs.psfao_path),
+ imgp->ip_vfs_context);
+
+ error = open1(imgp->ip_vfs_context,
+ &nd,
+ psfa->psfaa_openargs.psfao_oflag,
+ &va,
+ ival);
+
+ /*
+ * If there's an error, or we get the right fd by
+ * accident, then drop out here. This is easier that
+ * rearchitecting all the open code to preallocate fd
+ * slots, and internally taking one as an argument.
+ */
+ if (error || ival[0] == psfa->psfaa_filedes)
+ break;
+
+ origfd = ival[0];
+ /*
+ * If we didn't fall out from an error, we ended up
+ * with the wrong fd; so now we've got to try to dup2
+ * it to the right one.
+ */
+ dup2a.from = origfd;
+ dup2a.to = psfa->psfaa_filedes;
+
+ /*
+ * The dup2() system call implementation sets
+ * ival to newfd in the success case, but we
+ * can ignore that, since if we didn't get the
+ * fd we wanted, the error will stop us.
+ */
+ error = dup2(p, &dup2a, ival);
+ if (error)
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * Finally, close the original fd.
+ */
+ ca.fd = origfd;
+
+ error = close_nocancel(p, &ca, ival);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case PSFA_DUP2: {
+ struct dup2_args dup2a;
+
+ dup2a.from = psfa->psfaa_filedes;
+ dup2a.to = psfa->psfaa_openargs.psfao_oflag;
+
+ /*
+ * The dup2() system call implementation sets
+ * ival to newfd in the success case, but we
+ * can ignore that, since if we didn't get the
+ * fd we wanted, the error will stop us.
+ */
+ error = dup2(p, &dup2a, ival);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case PSFA_CLOSE: {
+ struct close_nocancel_args ca;
+
+ ca.fd = psfa->psfaa_filedes;
+
+ error = close_nocancel(p, &ca, ival);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ error = EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* All file actions failures are considered fatal, per POSIX */
+ if (error)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return (error);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * posix_spawn
+ *
+ * Parameters: uap->pid Pointer to pid return area
+ * uap->fname File name to exec
+ * uap->argp Argument list
+ * uap->envp Environment list
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 Success
+ * EINVAL Invalid argument
+ * ENOTSUP Not supported
+ * ENOEXEC Executable file format error
+ * exec_activate_image:EINVAL Invalid argument
+ * exec_activate_image:EACCES Permission denied
+ * exec_activate_image:EINTR Interrupted function
+ * exec_activate_image:ENOMEM Not enough space
+ * exec_activate_image:EFAULT Bad address
+ * exec_activate_image:ENAMETOOLONG Filename too long
+ * exec_activate_image:ENOEXEC Executable file format error
+ * exec_activate_image:ETXTBSY Text file busy [misuse of error code]
+ * exec_activate_image:EBADEXEC The executable is corrupt/unknown
+ * exec_activate_image:???
+ * mac_execve_enter:???
+ *
+ * TODO: More gracefully handle failures after vfork
+ * Expect to need __mac_posix_spawn() at some point...
+ * Handle posix_spawnattr_t
+ * Handle posix_spawn_file_actions_t
+ */
+int
+posix_spawn(proc_t ap, struct posix_spawn_args *uap, register_t *retval)
+{
+ proc_t p = ap; /* quiet bogus GCC vfork() warning */
+ user_addr_t pid = uap->pid;
+ register_t ival[2]; /* dummy retval for vfork() */
+ struct image_params image_params, *imgp;
+ struct vnode_attr va;
+ struct vnode_attr origva;
+ struct uthread *uthread = 0; /* compiler complains if not set to 0*/
+ int error, sig;
+ task_t task;
+ int numthreads;
+ char alt_p_comm[sizeof(p->p_comm)] = {0}; /* for PowerPC */
+ int is_64 = IS_64BIT_PROCESS(p);
+ int undo_vfork = 0;
+ struct vfs_context context;
+ struct user__posix_spawn_args_desc px_args;
+ struct _posix_spawnattr px_sa;
+ _posix_spawn_file_actions_t px_sfap = NULL;
+ _posix_spawn_port_actions_t px_spap = NULL;
+ struct __user_sigaction vec;
+
+ imgp = &image_params;
+
+ /* Initialize the common data in the image_params structure */
+ bzero(imgp, sizeof(*imgp));
+ imgp->ip_user_fname = uap->path;
+ imgp->ip_user_argv = uap->argv;
+ imgp->ip_user_envv = uap->envp;
+ imgp->ip_vattr = &va;
+ imgp->ip_origvattr = &origva;
+ imgp->ip_vfs_context = &context;
+ imgp->ip_flags = (is_64 ? IMGPF_WAS_64BIT : IMGPF_NONE);
+ imgp->ip_p_comm = alt_p_comm; /* for PowerPC */
+ imgp->ip_seg = (is_64 ? UIO_USERSPACE64 : UIO_USERSPACE32);
+
+ if (uap->adesc != USER_ADDR_NULL) {
+ if(is_64) {
+ error = copyin(uap->adesc, &px_args, sizeof(px_args));
+ } else {
+ struct _posix_spawn_args_desc px_args32;
+
+ error = copyin(uap->adesc, &px_args32, sizeof(px_args32));
+
+ /*
+ * Convert arguments descriptor from external 32 bit
+ * representation to internal 64 bit representation
+ */
+ px_args.attr_size = px_args32.attr_size;
+ px_args.attrp = CAST_USER_ADDR_T(px_args32.attrp);
+ px_args.file_actions_size = px_args32.file_actions_size;
+ px_args.file_actions = CAST_USER_ADDR_T(px_args32.file_actions);
+ px_args.port_actions_size = px_args32.port_actions_size;
+ px_args.port_actions = CAST_USER_ADDR_T(px_args32.port_actions);
+ }
+ if (error)
+ goto bad;
+
+ if (px_args.attr_size != 0) {
+ /*
+ * This could lose some of the port_actions pointer,
+ * but we already have it from px_args.
+ */
+ if ((error = copyin(px_args.attrp, &px_sa, sizeof(px_sa))) != 0)
+ goto bad;
+
+ imgp->ip_px_sa = &px_sa;
+ }
+ if (px_args.file_actions_size != 0) {
+ /* Limit file_actions to allowed number of open files */
+ int maxfa = (p->p_limit ? p->p_rlimit[RLIMIT_NOFILE].rlim_cur : NOFILE);
+ if (px_args.file_actions_size < PSF_ACTIONS_SIZE(1) ||
+ px_args.file_actions_size > PSF_ACTIONS_SIZE(maxfa)) {
+ error = EINVAL;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ MALLOC(px_sfap, _posix_spawn_file_actions_t, px_args.file_actions_size, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
+ if (px_sfap == NULL) {
+ error = ENOMEM;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ imgp->ip_px_sfa = px_sfap;
+
+ if ((error = copyin(px_args.file_actions, px_sfap,
+ px_args.file_actions_size)) != 0)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ if (px_args.port_actions_size != 0) {
+ /* Limit port_actions to one page of data */
+ if (px_args.port_actions_size < PS_PORT_ACTIONS_SIZE(1) ||
+ px_args.port_actions_size > PAGE_SIZE) {
+ error = EINVAL;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ MALLOC(px_spap, _posix_spawn_port_actions_t,
+ px_args.port_actions_size, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
+ if (px_spap == NULL) {
+ error = ENOMEM;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ imgp->ip_px_spa = px_spap;
+
+ if ((error = copyin(px_args.port_actions, px_spap,
+ px_args.port_actions_size)) != 0)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (imgp->ip_px_sa == NULL || !(px_sa.psa_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_SETEXEC)){
+ if ((error = vfork(p, NULL, ival)) != 0)
+ goto bad;
+ undo_vfork = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* "reenter the kernel" on a new vfork()'ed process */
+ uthread = get_bsdthread_info(current_thread());
+ if (undo_vfork)
+ p = uthread->uu_proc;
+
+ context.vc_thread = current_thread();
+ context.vc_ucred = p->p_ucred; /* XXX must NOT be kauth_cred_get() */
+
+ /*
+ * Post fdcopy(), pre exec_handle_sugid() - this is where we want
+ * to handle the file_actions. Since vfork() also ends up setting
+ * us into the parent process group, and saved off the signal flags,
+ * this is also where we want to handle the spawn flags.
+ */
+ /* Has spawn file actions? */
+ if (imgp->ip_px_sfa != NULL &&
+ (error = exec_handle_file_actions(imgp)) != 0) {
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ /* Has spawn port actions? */
+ if (imgp->ip_px_spa != NULL) {
+ /* Only allowed when not under vfork */
+ if (!(px_sa.psa_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_SETEXEC)) {
+ error = ENOTSUP;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ if((error = exec_handle_port_actions(imgp)) != 0)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ /* Has spawn attr? */
+ if (imgp->ip_px_sa != NULL) {
+ /* Set the process group ID of the child process */
+ if (px_sa.psa_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_SETPGROUP) {
+ struct setpgid_args spga;
+ spga.pid = p->p_pid;
+ spga.pgid = px_sa.psa_pgroup;
+ /*
+ * Effectively, call setpgid() system call; works
+ * because there are no pointer arguments.
+ */
+ if((error = setpgid(p, &spga, ival)) != 0)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Reset UID/GID to parent's RUID/RGID; This works only
+ * because the operation occurs *after* the vfork() and
+ * before the call to exec_handle_sugid() by the image
+ * activator called from exec_activate_image().
+ *
+ * The use of p_ucred is safe, since we are acting on the
+ * new process, and it has no threads other than the one
+ * we are creating for it.
+ */
+ if (px_sa.psa_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_RESETIDS) {
+ kauth_cred_t my_cred = p->p_ucred;
+ kauth_cred_t my_new_cred = kauth_cred_setuidgid(my_cred, my_cred->cr_ruid, my_cred->cr_rgid);
+ if (my_new_cred != my_cred)
+ p->p_ucred = my_new_cred;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Mask a list of signals, instead of them being unmasked, if
+ * they were unmasked in the parent; note that some signals
+ * are not maskable.
+ */
+ if (px_sa.psa_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_SETSIGMASK)
+ uthread->uu_sigmask = (px_sa.psa_sigmask & ~sigcantmask);
+ /*
+ * Default a list of signals instead of ignoring them, if
+ * they were ignored in the parent.
+ */
+ if (px_sa.psa_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_SETSIGDEF) {
+ vec.sa_handler = SIG_DFL;
+ vec.sa_tramp = 0;
+ vec.sa_mask = 0;
+ vec.sa_flags = 0;
+ for (sig = 0; sig < NSIG; sig++)
+ if (px_sa.psa_sigdefault && 1 << sig) {
+ error = setsigvec(p, sig, &vec);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * XXXAUDIT: Currently, we only audit the pathname of the binary.
+ * There may also be poor interaction with dyld.
+ */
+
+ task = current_task();
+
+ /* If we're not in vfork, don't permit a mutithreaded task to exec */
+ if (!(uthread->uu_flag & UT_VFORK)) {
+ if (task != kernel_task) {
+ numthreads = get_task_numacts(task);
+ if (numthreads <= 0 ) {
+ error = EINVAL;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ if (numthreads > 1) {
+ error = ENOTSUP;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+#if MAC_SPAWN /* XXX */
+ if (uap->mac_p != USER_ADDR_NULL) {
+ error = mac_execve_enter(uap->mac_p, imgp);
+ if (error)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if ((error = exec_activate_image(imgp)) != 0)
+ goto bad;
+bad:
+ /* Image not claimed by any activator? */
+ if (error == -1)
+ error = ENOEXEC;
+ if (error == 0) {
+ exec_resettextvp(p, imgp);
+ }
+ if (imgp->ip_vp)
+ vnode_put(imgp->ip_vp);
+ if (imgp->ip_strings)
+ execargs_free(imgp);
+ if (imgp->ip_px_sfa != NULL)
+ FREE(imgp->ip_px_sfa, M_TEMP);
+ if (imgp->ip_px_spa != NULL)
+ FREE(imgp->ip_px_spa, M_TEMP);
+
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+ if (imgp->ip_execlabelp)
+ mac_cred_label_free(imgp->ip_execlabelp);
+ if (imgp->ip_scriptlabelp)
+ mac_vnode_label_free(imgp->ip_scriptlabelp);
+#endif
+ if (undo_vfork) {
+ if (error) {
+ DTRACE_PROC1(exec__failure, int, error);
+ vfork_exit(p, W_EXITCODE(-1, 0));
+ } else {
+ DTRACE_PROC(exec__success);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Returning to the parent process...
+ *
+ * If the parent wants the pid, copy it out
+ */
+ if (pid != USER_ADDR_NULL)
+ (void)suword(pid, p->p_pid);
+ retval[0] = error;
+ /*
+ * Override inherited code signing flags with the
+ * ones for the process that is being successfully
+ * loaded
+ */
+ proc_lock(p);
+ p->p_csflags = imgp->ip_csflags;
+ proc_unlock(p);
+ vfork_return(p, NULL, error);
+ (void)thread_resume(imgp->ip_vfork_thread);
+ }
+
+ if (!error) {
+ /*
+ * Override inherited code signing flags with the
+ * ones for the process that is being successfully
+ * loaded
+ */
+ proc_lock(p);
+ p->p_csflags = imgp->ip_csflags;
+ proc_unlock(p);
+ DTRACE_PROC(exec__success);
+ } else {
+ DTRACE_PROC1(exec__failure, int, error);
+ }
+
+ return(error);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * execve
+ *
+ * Parameters: uap->fname File name to exec
+ * uap->argp Argument list
+ * uap->envp Environment list
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 Success
+ * __mac_execve:EINVAL Invalid argument
+ * __mac_execve:ENOTSUP Invalid argument
+ * __mac_execve:EACCES Permission denied
+ * __mac_execve:EINTR Interrupted function
+ * __mac_execve:ENOMEM Not enough space
+ * __mac_execve:EFAULT Bad address
+ * __mac_execve:ENAMETOOLONG Filename too long
+ * __mac_execve:ENOEXEC Executable file format error
+ * __mac_execve:ETXTBSY Text file busy [misuse of error code]
+ * __mac_execve:???
+ *
+ * TODO: Dynamic linker header address on stack is copied via suword()
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+execve(proc_t p, struct execve_args *uap, register_t *retval)
+{
+ struct __mac_execve_args muap;
+ int err;
+
+ muap.fname = uap->fname;
+ muap.argp = uap->argp;
+ muap.envp = uap->envp;
+ muap.mac_p = USER_ADDR_NULL;
+ err = __mac_execve(p, &muap, retval);
+
+ return(err);
+}
+
+/*
+ * __mac_execve
+ *
+ * Parameters: uap->fname File name to exec
+ * uap->argp Argument list
+ * uap->envp Environment list
+ * uap->mac_p MAC label supplied by caller
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 Success
+ * EINVAL Invalid argument
+ * ENOTSUP Not supported
+ * ENOEXEC Executable file format error
+ * exec_activate_image:EINVAL Invalid argument
+ * exec_activate_image:EACCES Permission denied
+ * exec_activate_image:EINTR Interrupted function
+ * exec_activate_image:ENOMEM Not enough space
+ * exec_activate_image:EFAULT Bad address
+ * exec_activate_image:ENAMETOOLONG Filename too long
+ * exec_activate_image:ENOEXEC Executable file format error
+ * exec_activate_image:ETXTBSY Text file busy [misuse of error code]
+ * exec_activate_image:EBADEXEC The executable is corrupt/unknown
+ * exec_activate_image:???
+ * mac_execve_enter:???
+ *
+ * TODO: Dynamic linker header address on stack is copied via suword()
+ */
+int
+__mac_execve(proc_t p, struct __mac_execve_args *uap, register_t *retval)
+{
+ struct image_params image_params, *imgp;
+ struct vnode_attr va;
+ struct vnode_attr origva;
+ struct uthread *uthread;
+ int error;
+ task_t task;
+ int numthreads;
+ char alt_p_comm[sizeof(p->p_comm)] = {0}; /* for PowerPC */
+ int is_64 = IS_64BIT_PROCESS(p);
+ struct vfs_context context;
+
+ context.vc_thread = current_thread();
+ context.vc_ucred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p); /* XXX must NOT be kauth_cred_get() */
+
+ imgp = &image_params;
+
+ /* Initialize the common data in the image_params structure */
+ bzero(imgp, sizeof(*imgp));
+ imgp->ip_user_fname = uap->fname;
+ imgp->ip_user_argv = uap->argp;
+ imgp->ip_user_envv = uap->envp;
+ imgp->ip_vattr = &va;
+ imgp->ip_origvattr = &origva;
+ imgp->ip_vfs_context = &context;
+ imgp->ip_flags = (is_64 ? IMGPF_WAS_64BIT : IMGPF_NONE);
+ imgp->ip_p_comm = alt_p_comm; /* for PowerPC */
+ imgp->ip_seg = (is_64 ? UIO_USERSPACE64 : UIO_USERSPACE32);
+
+ /*
+ * XXXAUDIT: Currently, we only audit the pathname of the binary.
+ * There may also be poor interaction with dyld.
+ */
+
+ task = current_task();
+ uthread = get_bsdthread_info(current_thread());
+
+ /* If we're not in vfork, don't permit a mutithreaded task to exec */
+ if (!(uthread->uu_flag & UT_VFORK)) {
+ if (task != kernel_task) {
+ proc_lock(p);
+ numthreads = get_task_numacts(task);
+ if (numthreads <= 0 ) {
+ proc_unlock(p);
+ kauth_cred_unref(&context.vc_ucred);
+ return(EINVAL);
+ }
+ if (numthreads > 1) {
+ proc_unlock(p);
+ kauth_cred_unref(&context.vc_ucred);
+ return(ENOTSUP);
+ }
+ proc_unlock(p);
+ }
+ }
+
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+ if (uap->mac_p != USER_ADDR_NULL) {
+ error = mac_execve_enter(uap->mac_p, imgp);
+ if (error) {
+ kauth_cred_unref(&context.vc_ucred);
+ return (error);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ proc_transstart(p, 0);
+ error = exec_activate_image(imgp);
+ proc_transend(p, 0);
+
+ kauth_cred_unref(&context.vc_ucred);
+
+ /* Image not claimed by any activator? */
+ if (error == -1)
+ error = ENOEXEC;
+
+ if (error == 0) {
+ exec_resettextvp(p, imgp);
+ }
+ if (imgp->ip_vp != NULLVP)
+ vnode_put(imgp->ip_vp);
+ if (imgp->ip_strings)
+ execargs_free(imgp);
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+ if (imgp->ip_execlabelp)
+ mac_cred_label_free(imgp->ip_execlabelp);
+ if (imgp->ip_scriptlabelp)
+ mac_vnode_label_free(imgp->ip_scriptlabelp);
+#endif
+ if (!error) {
+ /*
+ * Override inherited code signing flags with the
+ * ones for the process that is being successfully
+ * loaded
+ */
+ proc_lock(p);
+ p->p_csflags = imgp->ip_csflags;
+ proc_unlock(p);
+ DTRACE_PROC(exec__success);
+
+ if (uthread->uu_flag & UT_VFORK) {
+ vfork_return(p, retval, p->p_pid);
+ (void)thread_resume(imgp->ip_vfork_thread);
+ }
+ } else {
+ DTRACE_PROC1(exec__failure, int, error);
+ }
+
+ return(error);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * copyinptr
+ *
+ * Description: Copy a pointer in from user space to a user_addr_t in kernel
+ * space, based on 32/64 bitness of the user space
+ *
+ * Parameters: froma User space address
+ * toptr Address of kernel space user_addr_t
+ * ptr_size 4/8, based on 'froma' address space
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 Success
+ * EFAULT Bad 'froma'
+ *
+ * Implicit returns:
+ * *ptr_size Modified
+ */
+static int
+copyinptr(user_addr_t froma, user_addr_t *toptr, int ptr_size)
+{
+ int error;
+
+ if (ptr_size == 4) {
+ /* 64 bit value containing 32 bit address */
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ error = copyin(froma, &i, 4);
+ *toptr = CAST_USER_ADDR_T(i); /* SAFE */
+ } else {
+ error = copyin(froma, toptr, 8);
+ }
+ return (error);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * copyoutptr
+ *
+ * Description: Copy a pointer out from a user_addr_t in kernel space to
+ * user space, based on 32/64 bitness of the user space
+ *
+ * Parameters: ua User space address to copy to
+ * ptr Address of kernel space user_addr_t
+ * ptr_size 4/8, based on 'ua' address space
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 Success
+ * EFAULT Bad 'ua'
+ *
+ * Implicit returns:
+ * *ptr_size Modified
+ */
+static int
+copyoutptr(user_addr_t ua, user_addr_t ptr, int ptr_size)
+{
+ int error;
+
+ if (ptr_size == 4) {
+ /* 64 bit value containing 32 bit address */
+ unsigned int i = CAST_DOWN(unsigned int,ua); /* SAFE */
+
+ error = copyout(&i, ptr, 4);
+ } else {
+ error = copyout(&ua, ptr, 8);
+ }
+ return (error);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * exec_copyout_strings
+ *
+ * Copy out the strings segment to user space. The strings segment is put
+ * on a preinitialized stack frame.
+ *
+ * Parameters: struct image_params * the image parameter block
+ * int * a pointer to the stack offset variable
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 Success
+ * !0 Faiure: errno
+ *
+ * Implicit returns:
+ * (*stackp) The stack offset, modified
+ *
+ * Note: The strings segment layout is backward, from the beginning
+ * of the top of the stack to consume the minimal amount of
+ * space possible; the returned stack pointer points to the
+ * end of the area consumed (stacks grow upward).
+ *
+ * argc is an int; arg[i] are pointers; env[i] are pointers;
+ * exec_path is a pointer; the 0's are (void *)NULL's
+ *
+ * The stack frame layout is:
+ *
+ * +-------------+
+ * sp-> | argc |
+ * +-------------+
+ * | arg[0] |
+ * +-------------+
+ * :
+ * :
+ * +-------------+
+ * | arg[argc-1] |
+ * +-------------+
+ * | 0 |
+ * +-------------+
+ * | env[0] |
+ * +-------------+
+ * :
+ * :
+ * +-------------+
+ * | env[n] |
+ * +-------------+
+ * | 0 |
+ * +-------------+
+ * | exec_path | In MacOS X PR2 Beaker2E the path passed to exec() is
+ * +-------------+ passed on the stack just after the trailing 0 of the
+ * | 0 | the envp[] array as a pointer to a string.
+ * +-------------+
+ * | PATH AREA |
+ * +-------------+
+ * | STRING AREA |
+ * :
+ * :
+ * | | <- p->user_stack
+ * +-------------+
+ *
+ * Although technically a part of the STRING AREA, we treat the PATH AREA as
+ * a separate entity. This allows us to align the beginning of the PATH AREA
+ * to a pointer boundary so that the exec_path, env[i], and argv[i] pointers
+ * which preceed it on the stack are properly aligned.
+ *
+ * TODO: argc copied with suword(), which takes a 64 bit address
+ */
+static int
+exec_copyout_strings(struct image_params *imgp, user_addr_t *stackp)
+{
+ proc_t p = vfs_context_proc(imgp->ip_vfs_context);
+ int ptr_size = (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_IS_64BIT) ? 8 : 4;
+ char *argv = imgp->ip_argv; /* modifiable copy of argv */
+ user_addr_t string_area; /* *argv[], *env[] */
+ user_addr_t path_area; /* package launch path */
+ user_addr_t ptr_area; /* argv[], env[], exec_path */
+ user_addr_t stack;
+ int stringc = imgp->ip_argc + imgp->ip_envc;
+ int len;
+ int error;
+ int strspace;
+
+ stack = *stackp;
+
+ unsigned patharea_len = imgp->ip_argv - imgp->ip_strings;
+ int envc_add = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Set up pointers to the beginning of the string area, the beginning
+ * of the path area, and the beginning of the pointer area (actually,
+ * the location of argc, an int, which may be smaller than a pointer,
+ * but we use ptr_size worth of space for it, for alignment).
+ */
+ string_area = stack - (((imgp->ip_strendp - imgp->ip_strings) + ptr_size-1) & ~(ptr_size-1)) - ptr_size;
+ path_area = string_area - ((patharea_len + ptr_size-1) & ~(ptr_size-1));
+ ptr_area = path_area - ((imgp->ip_argc + imgp->ip_envc + 4 + envc_add) * ptr_size) - ptr_size /*argc*/;
+
+ /* Return the initial stack address: the location of argc */
+ *stackp = ptr_area;
+
+ /*
+ * Record the size of the arguments area so that sysctl_procargs()
+ * can return the argument area without having to parse the arguments.
+ */
+ proc_lock(p);
+ p->p_argc = imgp->ip_argc;
+ p->p_argslen = (int)(stack - path_area);
+ proc_unlock(p);
+
+
+ /*
+ * Support for new app package launching for Mac OS X allocates
+ * the "path" at the begining of the imgp->ip_strings buffer.
+ * copy it just before the string area.
+ */
+ len = 0;
+ error = copyoutstr(imgp->ip_strings, path_area,
+ patharea_len,
+ (size_t *)&len);
+ if (error)
+ goto bad;
+
+
+ /* Save a NULL pointer below it */
+ (void)copyoutptr(0LL, path_area - ptr_size, ptr_size);
+
+ /* Save the pointer to "path" just below it */
+ (void)copyoutptr(path_area, path_area - 2*ptr_size, ptr_size);
+
+ /*
+ * ptr_size for 2 NULL one each ofter arg[argc -1] and env[n]
+ * ptr_size for argc
+ * skip over saved path, ptr_size for pointer to path,
+ * and ptr_size for the NULL after pointer to path.
+ */
+
+ /* argc (int32, stored in a ptr_size area) */
+ (void)suword(ptr_area, imgp->ip_argc);
+ ptr_area += sizeof(int);
+ /* pad to ptr_size, if 64 bit image, to ensure user stack alignment */
+ if (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_IS_64BIT) {
+ (void)suword(ptr_area, 0); /* int, not long: ignored */
+ ptr_area += sizeof(int);
+ }
+
+#if CONFIG_DTRACE
+ p->p_dtrace_argv = ptr_area; /* user_addr_t &argv[0] for dtrace convenience */
+#endif /* CONFIG_DTRACE */
+
+ /*
+ * We use (string_area - path_area) here rather than the more
+ * intuitive (imgp->ip_argv - imgp->ip_strings) because we are
+ * interested in the length of the PATH_AREA in user space,
+ * rather than the actual length of the execution path, since
+ * it includes alignment padding of the PATH_AREA + STRING_AREA
+ * to a ptr_size boundary.
+ */
+ strspace = SIZE_IMG_STRSPACE - (string_area - path_area);
+ for (;;) {
+ if (stringc == imgp->ip_envc) {
+ /* argv[n] = NULL */
+ (void)copyoutptr(0LL, ptr_area, ptr_size);
+ ptr_area += ptr_size;
+#if CONFIG_DTRACE
+ p->p_dtrace_envp = ptr_area; /* user_addr_t &env[0] for dtrace convenience */
+#endif /* CONFIG_DTRACE */
+ }
+ if (--stringc < 0)
+ break;
+
+ /* pointer: argv[n]/env[n] */
+ (void)copyoutptr(string_area, ptr_area, ptr_size);
+
+ /* string : argv[n][]/env[n][] */
+ do {
+ if (strspace <= 0) {
+ error = E2BIG;
+ break;
+ }
+ error = copyoutstr(argv, string_area,
+ (unsigned)strspace,
+ (size_t *)&len);
+ string_area += len;
+ argv += len;
+ strspace -= len;
+ } while (error == ENAMETOOLONG);
+ if (error == EFAULT || error == E2BIG)
+ break; /* bad stack - user's problem */
+ ptr_area += ptr_size;
+ }
+ /* env[n] = NULL */
+ (void)copyoutptr(0LL, ptr_area, ptr_size);
+
+bad:
+ return(error);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * exec_extract_strings
+ *
+ * Copy arguments and environment from user space into work area; we may
+ * have already copied some early arguments into the work area, and if
+ * so, any arguments opied in are appended to those already there.
+ *
+ * Parameters: struct image_params * the image parameter block
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 Success
+ * !0 Failure: errno
+ *
+ * Implicit returns;
+ * (imgp->ip_argc) Count of arguments, updated
+ * (imgp->ip_envc) Count of environment strings, updated
+ *
+ *
+ * Note: The argument and environment vectors are user space pointers
+ * to arrays of user space pointers.
+ */
+static int
+exec_extract_strings(struct image_params *imgp)
+{
+ int error = 0;
+ int ptr_size = (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_WAS_64BIT) ? 8 : 4;
+ user_addr_t argv = imgp->ip_user_argv;
+ user_addr_t envv = imgp->ip_user_envv;
+
+ /*
+ * If the argument vector is NULL, this is the system startup
+ * bootstrap from load_init_program(), and there's nothing to do
+ */
+ if (imgp->ip_user_argv == 0LL)
+ goto bad;
+
+ /* Now, get rest of arguments */
+
+ /*
+ * If we are running an interpreter, replace the av[0] that was
+ * passed to execve() with the fully qualified path name that was
+ * passed to execve() for interpreters which do not use the PATH
+ * to locate their script arguments.
+ */
+ if((imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_INTERPRET) != 0 && argv != 0LL) {
+ user_addr_t arg;
+
+ error = copyinptr(argv, &arg, ptr_size);
+ if (error)
+ goto bad;
+ if (arg != 0LL && arg != (user_addr_t)-1) {
+ argv += ptr_size;
+ error = exec_add_string(imgp, imgp->ip_user_fname);
+ if (error)
+ goto bad;
+ imgp->ip_argc++;
+ }
+ }
- /* Save the pointer to "path" just below it */
- (void) suword((caddr_t)(pathptr - 2*NBPW), pathptr);
+ while (argv != 0LL) {
+ user_addr_t arg;
+ error = copyinptr(argv, &arg, ptr_size);
+ if (error)
+ goto bad;
+
+ argv += ptr_size;
+ if (arg == 0LL) {
+ break;
+ } else if (arg == (user_addr_t)-1) {
+ /* Um... why would it be -1? */
+ error = EFAULT;
+ goto bad;
+ }
/*
- * na includes arg[] and env[].
- * NBPW for 2 NULL one each ofter arg[argc -1] and env[n]
- * NBPW for argc
- * skip over saved path, NBPW for pointer to path,
- * and NBPW for the NULL after pointer to path.
- */
- ap = ucp - na*NBPW - 3*NBPW - savedpathlen - 2*NBPW;
-#if defined(ppc)
- thread_setuserstack(thr_act, ap); /* Set the stack */
-#else
- uthread->uu_ar0[SP] = ap;
-#endif
- (void) suword((caddr_t)ap, na-ne); /* argc */
- nc = 0;
- cc = 0;
-
- cp = (char *) execargsp;
- cc = NCARGS - savedpathlen - 2*NBPW;
- ps.ps_argvstr = (char *)ucp; /* first argv string */
- ps.ps_nargvstr = na - ne; /* argc */
- for (;;) {
- ap += NBPW;
- if (na == ne) {
- (void) suword((caddr_t)ap, 0);
- ap += NBPW;
- ps.ps_envstr = (char *)ucp;
- ps.ps_nenvstr = ne;
- }
- if (--na < 0)
- break;
- (void) suword((caddr_t)ap, ucp);
- do {
- error = copyoutstr(cp, (caddr_t)ucp,
- (unsigned)cc, &len);
- ucp += len;
- cp += len;
- nc += len;
- cc -= len;
- } while (error == ENAMETOOLONG);
- if (error == EFAULT)
- break; /* bad stack - user's problem */
+ * av[n...] = arg[n]
+ */
+ error = exec_add_string(imgp, arg);
+ if (error)
+ goto bad;
+ imgp->ip_argc++;
+ }
+
+ /* Now, get the environment */
+ while (envv != 0LL) {
+ user_addr_t env;
+
+ error = copyinptr(envv, &env, ptr_size);
+ if (error)
+ goto bad;
+
+ envv += ptr_size;
+ if (env == 0LL) {
+ break;
+ } else if (env == (user_addr_t)-1) {
+ error = EFAULT;
+ goto bad;
}
- (void) suword((caddr_t)ap, 0);
+ /*
+ * av[n...] = env[n]
+ */
+ error = exec_add_string(imgp, env);
+ if (error)
+ goto bad;
+ imgp->ip_envc++;
}
+bad:
+ return error;
+}
+
+
+#define unix_stack_size(p) (p->p_rlimit[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur)
+
+/*
+ * exec_check_permissions
+ *
+ * Decription: Verify that the file that is being attempted to be executed
+ * is in fact allowed to be executed based on it POSIX file
+ * permissions and other access control criteria
+ *
+ * Parameters: struct image_params * the image parameter block
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 Success
+ * EACCES Permission denied
+ * ENOEXEC Executable file format error
+ * ETXTBSY Text file busy [misuse of error code]
+ * vnode_getattr:???
+ * vnode_authorize:???
+ */
+static int
+exec_check_permissions(struct image_params *imgp)
+{
+ struct vnode *vp = imgp->ip_vp;
+ struct vnode_attr *vap = imgp->ip_vattr;
+ proc_t p = vfs_context_proc(imgp->ip_vfs_context);
+ int error;
+ kauth_action_t action;
+
+ /* Only allow execution of regular files */
+ if (!vnode_isreg(vp))
+ return (EACCES);
- if (load_result.dynlinker) {
-#if defined(ppc)
- ap = thread_adjuserstack(thr_act, -4); /* Adjust the stack */
-#else
- ap = uthread->uu_ar0[SP] -= 4;
+ /* Get the file attributes that we will be using here and elsewhere */
+ VATTR_INIT(vap);
+ VATTR_WANTED(vap, va_uid);
+ VATTR_WANTED(vap, va_gid);
+ VATTR_WANTED(vap, va_mode);
+ VATTR_WANTED(vap, va_fsid);
+ VATTR_WANTED(vap, va_fileid);
+ VATTR_WANTED(vap, va_data_size);
+ if ((error = vnode_getattr(vp, vap, imgp->ip_vfs_context)) != 0)
+ return (error);
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure that at least one execute bit is on - otherwise root
+ * will always succeed, and we don't want to happen unless the
+ * file really is executable.
+ */
+ if ((vap->va_mode & (S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH)) == 0)
+ return (EACCES);
+
+ /* Disallow zero length files */
+ if (vap->va_data_size == 0)
+ return (ENOEXEC);
+
+ imgp->ip_arch_offset = (user_size_t)0;
+ imgp->ip_arch_size = vap->va_data_size;
+
+ /* Disable setuid-ness for traced programs or if MNT_NOSUID */
+ if ((vp->v_mount->mnt_flag & MNT_NOSUID) || (p->p_lflag & P_LTRACED)) {
+ vap->va_mode &= ~(VSUID | VSGID);
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+ imgp->ip_no_trans = 1;
#endif
- (void) suword((caddr_t)ap, load_result.mach_header);
}
- if (vfexec) {
- vm_map_switch(old_map);
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+ error = mac_vnode_check_exec(imgp->ip_vfs_context, vp, imgp);
+ if (error)
+ return (error);
+#endif
+
+ /* Check for execute permission */
+ action = KAUTH_VNODE_EXECUTE;
+ /* Traced images must also be readable */
+ if (p->p_lflag & P_LTRACED)
+ action |= KAUTH_VNODE_READ_DATA;
+ if ((error = vnode_authorize(vp, NULL, action, imgp->ip_vfs_context)) != 0)
+ return (error);
+
+#if 0
+ /* Don't let it run if anyone had it open for writing */
+ vnode_lock(vp);
+ if (vp->v_writecount) {
+ panic("going to return ETXTBSY %x", vp);
+ vnode_unlock(vp);
+ return (ETXTBSY);
}
-#if defined(ppc)
- thread_setentrypoint(thr_act, load_result.entry_point); /* Set the entry point */
-#elif defined(i386)
- uthread->uu_ar0[PC] = load_result.entry_point;
-#else
-#error architecture not implemented!
-#endif
+ vnode_unlock(vp);
+#endif
- /* Stop profiling */
- stopprofclock(p);
+#ifdef IMGPF_POWERPC
/*
- * Reset signal state.
+ * If the file we are about to attempt to load is the exec_handler_ppc,
+ * which is determined by matching the vattr fields against previously
+ * cached values, then we set the PowerPC environment flag.
*/
- execsigs(p, thr_act);
+ if (vap->va_fsid == exec_archhandler_ppc.fsid &&
+ vap->va_fileid == (uint64_t)((u_long)exec_archhandler_ppc.fileid)) {
+ imgp->ip_flags |= IMGPF_POWERPC;
+ }
+#endif /* IMGPF_POWERPC */
- /*
- * Close file descriptors
- * which specify close-on-exec.
- */
- fdexec(p);
- /* FIXME: Till vmspace inherit is fixed: */
- if (!vfexec && p->vm_shm)
- shmexit(p);
- /* Clean up the semaphores */
- semexit(p);
+ /* XXX May want to indicate to underlying FS that vnode is open */
+
+ return (error);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * exec_handle_sugid
+ *
+ * Initially clear the P_SUGID in the process flags; if an SUGID process is
+ * exec'ing a non-SUGID image, then this is the point of no return.
+ *
+ * If the image being activated is SUGID, then replace the credential with a
+ * copy, disable tracing (unless the tracing process is root), reset the
+ * mach task port to revoke it, set the P_SUGID bit,
+ *
+ * If the saved user and group ID will be changing, then make sure it happens
+ * to a new credential, rather than a shared one.
+ *
+ * Set the security token (this is probably obsolete, given that the token
+ * should not technically be separate from the credential itself).
+ *
+ * Parameters: struct image_params * the image parameter block
+ *
+ * Returns: void No failure indication
+ *
+ * Implicit returns:
+ * <process credential> Potentially modified/replaced
+ * <task port> Potentially revoked
+ * <process flags> P_SUGID bit potentially modified
+ * <security token> Potentially modified
+ */
+static int
+exec_handle_sugid(struct image_params *imgp)
+{
+ kauth_cred_t cred = vfs_context_ucred(imgp->ip_vfs_context);
+ proc_t p = vfs_context_proc(imgp->ip_vfs_context);
+ int i;
+ int is_member = 0;
+ int error = 0;
+ struct vnode *dev_null = NULLVP;
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+ kauth_cred_t my_cred;
+#endif
+
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+ int mac_transition;
+ mac_transition = mac_cred_check_label_update_execve(imgp->ip_vfs_context, imgp->ip_vp,
+ imgp->ip_scriptlabelp, imgp->ip_execlabelp, p);
+#endif
+
+ OSBitAndAtomic(~((uint32_t)P_SUGID), (UInt32 *)&p->p_flag);
/*
- * Remember file name for accounting.
+ * Order of the following is important; group checks must go last,
+ * as we use the success of the 'is_member' check combined with the
+ * failure of the explicit match to indicate that we will be setting
+ * the egid of the process even though the new process did not
+ * require VSUID/VSGID bits in order for it to set the new group as
+ * its egid.
+ *
+ * Note: Technically, by this we are implying a call to
+ * setegid() in the new process, rather than implying
+ * it used its VSGID bit to set the effective group,
+ * even though there is no code in that process to make
+ * such a call.
*/
- p->p_acflag &= ~AFORK;
- if (nd.ni_cnd.cn_namelen > MAXCOMLEN)
- nd.ni_cnd.cn_namelen = MAXCOMLEN;
- bcopy((caddr_t)nd.ni_cnd.cn_nameptr, (caddr_t)p->p_comm,
- (unsigned)nd.ni_cnd.cn_namelen);
- p->p_comm[nd.ni_cnd.cn_namelen] = '\0';
-
- {
- /* This is for kdebug */
- long dbg_arg1, dbg_arg2, dbg_arg3, dbg_arg4;
-
- /* Collect the pathname for tracing */
- kdbg_trace_string(p, &dbg_arg1, &dbg_arg2, &dbg_arg3, &dbg_arg4);
-
- if (vfexec)
- KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT1((TRACEDBG_CODE(DBG_TRACE_STRING, 2)) | DBG_FUNC_NONE,
- dbg_arg1, dbg_arg2, dbg_arg3, dbg_arg4, getshuttle_thread(thr_act));
- else
- KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT((TRACEDBG_CODE(DBG_TRACE_STRING, 2)) | DBG_FUNC_NONE,
- dbg_arg1, dbg_arg2, dbg_arg3, dbg_arg4, 0);
+ if (((imgp->ip_origvattr->va_mode & VSUID) != 0 &&
+ kauth_cred_getuid(cred) != imgp->ip_origvattr->va_uid) ||
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+ mac_transition || /* A policy wants to transition */
+#endif
+ ((imgp->ip_origvattr->va_mode & VSGID) != 0 &&
+ ((kauth_cred_ismember_gid(cred, imgp->ip_origvattr->va_gid, &is_member) || !is_member) ||
+ (cred->cr_gid != imgp->ip_origvattr->va_gid)))) {
+
+ /*
+ * Replace the credential with a copy of itself if euid or
+ * egid change.
+ *
+ * Note: setuid binaries will automatically opt out of
+ * group resolver participation as a side effect
+ * of this operation. This is an intentional
+ * part of the security model, which requires a
+ * participating credential be established by
+ * escalating privilege, setting up all other
+ * aspects of the credential including whether
+ * or not to participate in external group
+ * membership resolution, then dropping their
+ * effective privilege to that of the desired
+ * final credential state.
+ */
+ if (imgp->ip_origvattr->va_mode & VSUID) {
+ p->p_ucred = kauth_cred_setresuid(p->p_ucred, KAUTH_UID_NONE, imgp->ip_origvattr->va_uid, imgp->ip_origvattr->va_uid, KAUTH_UID_NONE);
+ }
+ if (imgp->ip_origvattr->va_mode & VSGID) {
+ p->p_ucred = kauth_cred_setresgid(p->p_ucred, KAUTH_GID_NONE, imgp->ip_origvattr->va_gid, imgp->ip_origvattr->va_gid);
+ }
+
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+ /*
+ * XXXMAC: In FreeBSD, we set P_SUGID on a MAC transition
+ * to protect against debuggers being attached by an
+ * insufficiently privileged process onto the result of
+ * a transition to a more privileged credential. This is
+ * too conservative on FreeBSD, but we need to do
+ * something similar here, or risk vulnerability.
+ *
+ * Before we make the call into the MAC policies, get a new
+ * duplicate credential, so they can modify it without
+ * modifying any others sharing it.
+ */
+ if (mac_transition && !imgp->ip_no_trans) {
+ kauth_proc_label_update_execve(p,
+ imgp->ip_vfs_context,
+ imgp->ip_vp,
+ imgp->ip_scriptlabelp, imgp->ip_execlabelp);
+
+ my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
+ mac_task_label_update_cred(my_cred, p->task);
+ kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
+ }
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Have mach reset the task and thread ports.
+ * We don't want anyone who had the ports before
+ * a setuid exec to be able to access/control the
+ * task/thread after.
+ */
+ if (current_task() == p->task) {
+ ipc_task_reset(p->task);
+ ipc_thread_reset(current_thread());
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If 'is_member' is non-zero, then we passed the VSUID and
+ * MACF checks, and successfully determined that the previous
+ * cred was a member of the VSGID group, but that it was not
+ * the default at the time of the execve. So we don't set the
+ * P_SUGID on the basis of simply running this code.
+ */
+ if (!is_member)
+ OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, (UInt32 *)&p->p_flag);
+
+ /* Cache the vnode for /dev/null the first time around */
+ if (dev_null == NULLVP) {
+ struct nameidata nd1;
+
+ NDINIT(&nd1, LOOKUP, FOLLOW, UIO_SYSSPACE32,
+ CAST_USER_ADDR_T("/dev/null"),
+ imgp->ip_vfs_context);
+
+ if ((error = vn_open(&nd1, FREAD, 0)) == 0) {
+ dev_null = nd1.ni_vp;
+ /*
+ * vn_open returns with both a use_count
+ * and an io_count on the found vnode
+ * drop the io_count, but keep the use_count
+ */
+ vnode_put(nd1.ni_vp);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Radar 2261856; setuid security hole fix */
+ /* Patch from OpenBSD: A. Ramesh */
+ /*
+ * XXX For setuid processes, attempt to ensure that
+ * stdin, stdout, and stderr are already allocated.
+ * We do not want userland to accidentally allocate
+ * descriptors in this range which has implied meaning
+ * to libc.
+ */
+ if (dev_null != NULLVP) {
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+ struct fileproc *fp;
+ int indx;
+
+ if (p->p_fd->fd_ofiles[i] != NULL)
+ continue;
+
+ if ((error = falloc(p, &fp, &indx, imgp->ip_vfs_context)) != 0)
+ continue;
+
+ if ((error = vnode_ref_ext(dev_null, FREAD)) != 0) {
+ fp_free(p, indx, fp);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ fp->f_fglob->fg_flag = FREAD;
+ fp->f_fglob->fg_type = DTYPE_VNODE;
+ fp->f_fglob->fg_ops = &vnops;
+ fp->f_fglob->fg_data = (caddr_t)dev_null;
+
+ proc_fdlock(p);
+ procfdtbl_releasefd(p, indx, NULL);
+ fp_drop(p, indx, fp, 1);
+ proc_fdunlock(p);
+ }
+ /*
+ * for now we need to drop the reference immediately
+ * since we don't have any mechanism in place to
+ * release it before starting to unmount "/dev"
+ * during a reboot/shutdown
+ */
+ vnode_rele(dev_null);
+ dev_null = NULLVP;
+ }
}
/*
- * mark as execed, wakeup the process that vforked (if any) and tell
- * it that it now has it's own resources back
+ * Implement the semantic where the effective user and group become
+ * the saved user and group in exec'ed programs.
*/
- p->p_flag |= P_EXEC;
- if (p->p_pptr && (p->p_flag & P_PPWAIT)) {
- p->p_flag &= ~P_PPWAIT;
- wakeup((caddr_t)p->p_pptr);
- }
-
- if (vfexec && (p->p_flag & P_TRACED)) {
- psignal_vfork(p, new_task, thr_act, SIGTRAP);
- }
+ p->p_ucred = kauth_cred_setsvuidgid(p->p_ucred, kauth_cred_getuid(p->p_ucred), p->p_ucred->cr_gid);
+
+ /* XXX Obsolete; security token should not be separate from cred */
+ set_security_token(p);
-badtoolate:
- if (vfexec) {
- task_deallocate(new_task);
- act_deallocate(thr_act);
- if (error)
- error = 0;
- }
-bad:
- FREE_ZONE(nd.ni_cnd.cn_pnbuf, nd.ni_cnd.cn_pnlen, M_NAMEI);
- if (vp)
- vput(vp);
-bad1:
- if (execargs)
- execargs_free(execargs);
- if (!error && vfexec) {
- vfork_return(current_act(), p->p_pptr, p, retval);
- (void) thread_resume(thr_act);
- return(0);
- }
return(error);
}
-#define unix_stack_size(p) (p->p_rlimit[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur)
-
-kern_return_t
-create_unix_stack(map, user_stack, customstack, p)
- vm_map_t map;
- vm_offset_t user_stack;
- int customstack;
- struct proc *p;
+/*
+ * create_unix_stack
+ *
+ * Description: Set the user stack address for the process to the provided
+ * address. If a custom stack was not set as a result of the
+ * load process (i.e. as specified by the image file for the
+ * executable), then allocate the stack in the provided map and
+ * set up appropriate guard pages for enforcing administrative
+ * limits on stack growth, if they end up being needed.
+ *
+ * Parameters: p Process to set stack on
+ * user_stack Address to set stack for process to
+ * customstack FALSE if no custom stack in binary
+ * map Address map in which to allocate the
+ * new stack, if 'customstack' is FALSE
+ *
+ * Returns: KERN_SUCCESS Stack successfully created
+ * !KERN_SUCCESS Mach failure code
+ */
+static kern_return_t
+create_unix_stack(vm_map_t map, user_addr_t user_stack, int customstack,
+ proc_t p)
{
- vm_size_t size;
- vm_offset_t addr;
+ mach_vm_size_t size, prot_size;
+ mach_vm_offset_t addr, prot_addr;
+ kern_return_t kr;
+ proc_lock(p);
p->user_stack = user_stack;
+ proc_unlock(p);
+
if (!customstack) {
- size = round_page_64(unix_stack_size(p));
- addr = trunc_page_32(user_stack - size);
- return (vm_allocate(map,&addr, size, FALSE));
- } else
- return(KERN_SUCCESS);
+ /*
+ * Allocate enough space for the maximum stack size we
+ * will ever authorize and an extra page to act as
+ * a guard page for stack overflows.
+ */
+ size = mach_vm_round_page(MAXSSIZ);
+#if STACK_GROWTH_UP
+ addr = mach_vm_trunc_page(user_stack);
+#else /* STACK_GROWTH_UP */
+ addr = mach_vm_trunc_page(user_stack - size);
+#endif /* STACK_GROWTH_UP */
+ kr = mach_vm_allocate(map, &addr, size,
+ VM_MAKE_TAG(VM_MEMORY_STACK) |
+ VM_FLAGS_FIXED);
+ if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
+ return kr;
+ }
+ /*
+ * And prevent access to what's above the current stack
+ * size limit for this process.
+ */
+ prot_addr = addr;
+#if STACK_GROWTH_UP
+ prot_addr += unix_stack_size(p);
+#endif /* STACK_GROWTH_UP */
+ prot_addr = mach_vm_round_page(prot_addr);
+ prot_size = mach_vm_trunc_page(size - unix_stack_size(p));
+ kr = mach_vm_protect(map,
+ prot_addr,
+ prot_size,
+ FALSE,
+ VM_PROT_NONE);
+ if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
+ (void) mach_vm_deallocate(map, addr, size);
+ return kr;
+ }
+ }
+ return KERN_SUCCESS;
}
#include <sys/reboot.h>
-char init_program_name[128] = "/sbin/mach_init\0";
-
-char init_args[128] = "";
+static char init_program_name[128] = "/sbin/launchd";
struct execve_args init_exec_args;
-int init_attempts = 0;
-
+/*
+ * load_init_program
+ *
+ * Description: Load the "init" program; in most cases, this will be "launchd"
+ *
+ * Parameters: p Process to call execve() to create
+ * the "init" program
+ *
+ * Returns: (void)
+ *
+ * Notes: The process that is passed in is the first manufactured
+ * process on the system, and gets here via bsd_ast() firing
+ * for the first time. This is done to ensure that bsd_init()
+ * has run to completion.
+ */
void
-load_init_program(p)
- struct proc *p;
+load_init_program(proc_t p)
{
vm_offset_t init_addr;
- int *old_ap;
+ int argc = 0;
char *argv[3];
- int error;
- register_t retval[2];
- struct uthread * ut;
-
- error = 0;
-
- /* init_args are copied in string form directly from bootstrap */
-
- do {
- if (boothowto & RB_INITNAME) {
- printf("init program? ");
-#if FIXME /* [ */
- gets(init_program_name, init_program_name);
-#endif /* FIXME ] */
- }
-
- if (error && ((boothowto & RB_INITNAME) == 0) &&
- (init_attempts == 1)) {
- static char other_init[] = "/etc/mach_init";
- printf("Load of %s, errno %d, trying %s\n",
- init_program_name, error, other_init);
- error = 0;
- bcopy(other_init, init_program_name,
- sizeof(other_init));
- }
+ int error;
+ register_t retval[2];
- init_attempts++;
+ /*
+ * Copy out program name.
+ */
- if (error) {
- printf("Load of %s failed, errno %d\n",
- init_program_name, error);
- error = 0;
- boothowto |= RB_INITNAME;
- continue;
- }
+ init_addr = VM_MIN_ADDRESS;
+ (void) vm_allocate(current_map(), &init_addr, PAGE_SIZE,
+ VM_FLAGS_ANYWHERE);
+ if (init_addr == 0)
+ init_addr++;
- /*
- * Copy out program name.
- */
+ (void) copyout((caddr_t) init_program_name, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(init_addr),
+ (unsigned) sizeof(init_program_name)+1);
- init_addr = VM_MIN_ADDRESS;
- (void) vm_allocate(current_map(), &init_addr,
- PAGE_SIZE, TRUE);
- if (init_addr == 0)
- init_addr++;
- (void) copyout((caddr_t) init_program_name,
- (caddr_t) (init_addr),
- (unsigned) sizeof(init_program_name)+1);
-
- argv[0] = (char *) init_addr;
- init_addr += sizeof(init_program_name);
- init_addr = (vm_offset_t)ROUND_PTR(char, init_addr);
+ argv[argc++] = (char *) init_addr;
+ init_addr += sizeof(init_program_name);
+ init_addr = (vm_offset_t)ROUND_PTR(char, init_addr);
- /*
- * Put out first (and only) argument, similarly.
- * Assumes everything fits in a page as allocated
- * above.
- */
+ /*
+ * Put out first (and only) argument, similarly.
+ * Assumes everything fits in a page as allocated
+ * above.
+ */
+ if (boothowto & RB_SINGLE) {
+ const char *init_args = "-s";
- (void) copyout((caddr_t) init_args,
- (caddr_t) (init_addr),
- (unsigned) sizeof(init_args));
+ copyout(init_args, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(init_addr),
+ strlen(init_args));
- argv[1] = (char *) init_addr;
- init_addr += sizeof(init_args);
+ argv[argc++] = (char *)init_addr;
+ init_addr += strlen(init_args);
init_addr = (vm_offset_t)ROUND_PTR(char, init_addr);
- /*
- * Null-end the argument list
- */
+ }
- argv[2] = (char *) 0;
-
- /*
- * Copy out the argument list.
- */
-
- (void) copyout((caddr_t) argv,
- (caddr_t) (init_addr),
- (unsigned) sizeof(argv));
+ /*
+ * Null-end the argument list
+ */
+ argv[argc] = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Copy out the argument list.
+ */
+
+ (void) copyout((caddr_t) argv, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(init_addr),
+ (unsigned) sizeof(argv));
- /*
- * Set up argument block for fake call to execve.
- */
+ /*
+ * Set up argument block for fake call to execve.
+ */
- init_exec_args.fname = argv[0];
- init_exec_args.argp = (char **) init_addr;
- init_exec_args.envp = 0;
-
- /* So that mach_init task
- * is set with uid,gid 0 token
- */
- set_security_token(p);
+ init_exec_args.fname = CAST_USER_ADDR_T(argv[0]);
+ init_exec_args.argp = CAST_USER_ADDR_T((char **)init_addr);
+ init_exec_args.envp = CAST_USER_ADDR_T(0);
+
+ /*
+ * So that mach_init task is set with uid,gid 0 token
+ */
+ set_security_token(p);
- error = execve(p,&init_exec_args,retval);
- } while (error);
+ error = execve(p,&init_exec_args,retval);
+ if (error)
+ panic("Process 1 exec of %s failed, errno %d\n",
+ init_program_name, error);
}
/*
- * Convert a load_return_t to an errno.
+ * load_return_to_errno
+ *
+ * Description: Convert a load_return_t (Mach error) to an errno (BSD error)
+ *
+ * Parameters: lrtn Mach error number
+ *
+ * Returns: (int) BSD error number
+ * 0 Success
+ * EBADARCH Bad architecture
+ * EBADMACHO Bad Mach object file
+ * ESHLIBVERS Bad shared library version
+ * ENOMEM Out of memory/resource shortage
+ * EACCES Access denied
+ * ENOENT Entry not found (usually "file does
+ * does not exist")
+ * EIO An I/O error occurred
+ * EBADEXEC The executable is corrupt/unknown
*/
static int
load_return_to_errno(load_return_t lrtn)
{
switch (lrtn) {
- case LOAD_SUCCESS:
+ case LOAD_SUCCESS:
return 0;
- case LOAD_BADARCH:
- return EBADARCH;
- case LOAD_BADMACHO:
- return EBADMACHO;
- case LOAD_SHLIB:
- return ESHLIBVERS;
- case LOAD_NOSPACE:
- return ENOMEM;
- case LOAD_PROTECT:
- return EACCES;
- case LOAD_RESOURCE:
- case LOAD_FAILURE:
- default:
- return EBADEXEC;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * exec_check_access()
- */
-int
-check_exec_access(p, vp, vap)
- struct proc *p;
- struct vnode *vp;
- struct vattr *vap;
-{
- int flag;
- int error;
-
- if (error = VOP_ACCESS(vp, VEXEC, p->p_ucred, p))
- return (error);
- flag = p->p_flag;
- if (flag & P_TRACED) {
- if (error = VOP_ACCESS(vp, VREAD, p->p_ucred, p))
- return (error);
+ case LOAD_BADARCH:
+ return EBADARCH;
+ case LOAD_BADMACHO:
+ return EBADMACHO;
+ case LOAD_SHLIB:
+ return ESHLIBVERS;
+ case LOAD_NOSPACE:
+ case LOAD_RESOURCE:
+ return ENOMEM;
+ case LOAD_PROTECT:
+ return EACCES;
+ case LOAD_ENOENT:
+ return ENOENT;
+ case LOAD_IOERROR:
+ return EIO;
+ case LOAD_FAILURE:
+ default:
+ return EBADEXEC;
}
- if (vp->v_type != VREG ||
- (vap->va_mode & (S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH)) == 0)
- return (EACCES);
- return (0);
}
#include <mach/mach_types.h>
extern semaphore_t execve_semaphore;
+/*
+ * execargs_alloc
+ *
+ * Description: Allocate the block of memory used by the execve arguments.
+ * At the same time, we allocate a page so that we can read in
+ * the first page of the image.
+ *
+ * Parameters: struct image_params * the image parameter block
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 Success
+ * EINVAL Invalid argument
+ * EACCES Permission denied
+ * EINTR Interrupted function
+ * ENOMEM Not enough space
+ *
+ * Notes: This is a temporary allocation into the kernel address space
+ * to enable us to copy arguments in from user space. This is
+ * necessitated by not mapping the process calling execve() into
+ * the kernel address space during the execve() system call.
+ *
+ * We assemble the argument and environment, etc., into this
+ * region before copying it as a single block into the child
+ * process address space (at the top or bottom of the stack,
+ * depending on which way the stack grows; see the function
+ * exec_copyout_strings() for details).
+ *
+ * This ends up with a second (possibly unnecessary) copy compared
+ * with assembing the data directly into the child address space,
+ * instead, but since we cannot be guaranteed that the parent has
+ * not modified its environment, we can't really know that it's
+ * really a block there as well.
+ */
static int
-execargs_alloc(addrp)
- vm_offset_t *addrp;
+execargs_alloc(struct image_params *imgp)
{
kern_return_t kret;
return (EINTR);
}
- kret = kmem_alloc_pageable(bsd_pageable_map, addrp, NCARGS);
- if (kret != KERN_SUCCESS)
+ kret = kmem_alloc_pageable(bsd_pageable_map, (vm_offset_t *)&imgp->ip_strings, NCARGS + PAGE_SIZE);
+ imgp->ip_vdata = imgp->ip_strings + NCARGS;
+ if (kret != KERN_SUCCESS) {
+ semaphore_signal(execve_semaphore);
return (ENOMEM);
-
+ }
return (0);
}
+/*
+ * execargs_free
+ *
+ * Description: Free the block of memory used by the execve arguments and the
+ * first page of the executable by a previous call to the function
+ * execargs_alloc().
+ *
+ * Parameters: struct image_params * the image parameter block
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 Success
+ * EINVAL Invalid argument
+ * EINTR Oeration interrupted
+ */
static int
-execargs_free(addr)
- vm_offset_t addr;
+execargs_free(struct image_params *imgp)
{
kern_return_t kret;
- kmem_free(bsd_pageable_map, addr, NCARGS);
+ kmem_free(bsd_pageable_map, (vm_offset_t)imgp->ip_strings, NCARGS + PAGE_SIZE);
+ imgp->ip_strings = NULL;
kret = semaphore_signal(execve_semaphore);
switch (kret) {
}
}
+static void
+exec_resettextvp(proc_t p, struct image_params *imgp)
+{
+ vnode_t vp;
+ off_t offset;
+ vnode_t tvp = p->p_textvp;
+ int ret;
+
+ vp = imgp->ip_vp;
+ offset = imgp->ip_arch_offset;
+
+ if (vp == NULLVP)
+ panic("exec_resettextvp: expected valid vp");
+
+ ret = vnode_ref(vp);
+ proc_lock(p);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ p->p_textvp = vp;
+ p->p_textoff = offset;
+ } else {
+ p->p_textvp = NULLVP; /* this is paranoia */
+ p->p_textoff = 0;
+ }
+ proc_unlock(p);
+
+ if ( tvp != NULLVP) {
+ if (vnode_getwithref(tvp) == 0) {
+ vnode_rele(tvp);
+ vnode_put(tvp);
+ }
+ }
+
+}
+
projects / apple / xnu.git / blobdiff