xnu-7195.81.3.tar.gz

[apple/xnu.git] / bsd / kern / kern_prot.c

diff --git a/bsd/kern/kern_prot.c b/bsd/kern/kern_prot.c
index 2cd41c3b1f1ade3b2a77bbbe0151afbc60d5fcd8..d689b70d57533a8fb2aa594c69b82f37823c3fef 100644 (file)
--- a/bsd/kern/kern_prot.c
+++ b/bsd/kern/kern_prot.c
@@ -1,17 +1,20 @@
 /*
 /*

- * Copyright (c) 2000-2002 Apple Computer, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2008 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_START@

  *
  *

- * @APPLE_LICENSE_HEADER_START@
- * 
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Apple Computer, Inc.  All Rights Reserved.
- * 

  * This file contains Original Code and/or Modifications of Original Code
  * as defined in and that are subject to the Apple Public Source License
  * Version 2.0 (the 'License'). You may not use this file except in
  * This file contains Original Code and/or Modifications of Original Code
  * as defined in and that are subject to the Apple Public Source License
  * Version 2.0 (the 'License'). You may not use this file except in

- * compliance with the License. Please obtain a copy of the License at
- * http://www.opensource.apple.com/apsl/ and read it before using this
- * file.
- * 
+ * compliance with the License. The rights granted to you under the License
+ * may not be used to create, or enable the creation or redistribution of,
+ * unlawful or unlicensed copies of an Apple operating system, or to
+ * circumvent, violate, or enable the circumvention or violation of, any
+ * terms of an Apple operating system software license agreement.
+ *
+ * Please obtain a copy of the License at
+ * http://www.opensource.apple.com/apsl/ and read it before using this file.
+ *

  * The Original Code and all software distributed under the License are
  * distributed on an 'AS IS' basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER
  * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AND APPLE HEREBY DISCLAIMS ALL SUCH WARRANTIES,
  * The Original Code and all software distributed under the License are
  * distributed on an 'AS IS' basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER
  * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AND APPLE HEREBY DISCLAIMS ALL SUCH WARRANTIES,


@@ -19,11 +22,13 @@
  * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, QUIET ENJOYMENT OR NON-INFRINGEMENT.
  * Please see the License for the specific language governing rights and
  * limitations under the License.
  * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, QUIET ENJOYMENT OR NON-INFRINGEMENT.
  * Please see the License for the specific language governing rights and
  * limitations under the License.

- * 
- * @APPLE_LICENSE_HEADER_END@
- */
-/* Copyright (c) 1995 NeXT Computer, Inc. All Rights Reserved */
-/*
+ *
+ * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_END@
+ *
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 NeXT Computer, Inc. All Rights Reserved
+ *
+ *

  * Copyright (c) 1982, 1986, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993
  *     The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
  * (c) UNIX System Laboratories, Inc.
  * Copyright (c) 1982, 1986, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993
  *     The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
  * (c) UNIX System Laboratories, Inc.


@@ -61,6 +66,19 @@
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
  *
  *     @(#)kern_prot.c 8.9 (Berkeley) 2/14/95
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
  *
  *     @(#)kern_prot.c 8.9 (Berkeley) 2/14/95

+ *
+ *
+ * NOTICE: This file was modified by McAfee Research in 2004 to introduce
+ * support for mandatory and extensible security protections.  This notice
+ * is included in support of clause 2.2 (b) of the Apple Public License,
+ * Version 2.0.
+ *
+ *
+ * NOTICE: This file was modified by SPARTA, Inc. in 2005 to introduce
+ * support for mandatory and extensible security protections.  This notice
+ * is included in support of clause 2.2 (b) of the Apple Public License,
+ * Version 2.0.
+ *

  */
 
 /*
  */
 
 /*


@@ -71,276 +89,614 @@
 #include <sys/acct.h>
 #include <sys/systm.h>
 #include <sys/ucred.h>
 #include <sys/acct.h>
 #include <sys/systm.h>
 #include <sys/ucred.h>

-#include <sys/proc.h>
+#include <sys/proc_internal.h>
+#include <sys/user.h>
+#include <sys/kauth.h>

 #include <sys/timeb.h>
 #include <sys/times.h>
 #include <sys/malloc.h>
 #include <sys/timeb.h>
 #include <sys/times.h>
 #include <sys/malloc.h>

+#include <sys/persona.h>
+
+#include <security/audit/audit.h>

 
 

-#include <sys/mount.h>
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+#include <security/mac_framework.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <sys/mount_internal.h>
+#include <sys/sysproto.h>

 #include <mach/message.h>
 #include <mach/host_security.h>
 
 #include <kern/host.h>
 #include <mach/message.h>
 #include <mach/host_security.h>
 
 #include <kern/host.h>

+#include <kern/task.h>          /* for current_task() */
+#include <kern/assert.h>
+
+
+/*
+ * Credential debugging; we can track entry into a function that might
+ * change a credential, and we can track actual credential changes that
+ * result.
+ *
+ * Note:       Does *NOT* currently include per-thread credential changes
+ *
+ *             We don't use kauth_cred_print() in current debugging, but it
+ *             can be used if needed when debugging is active.
+ */
+#if DEBUG_CRED
+#define DEBUG_CRED_ENTER                printf
+#define DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE               printf
+extern void kauth_cred_print(kauth_cred_t cred);
+#else   /* !DEBUG_CRED */
+#define DEBUG_CRED_ENTER(fmt, ...)      do {} while (0)
+#define DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE(fmt, ...)     do {} while (0)
+#endif  /* !DEBUG_CRED */
+
+#if DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG
+extern void task_importance_update_owner_info(task_t);
+#endif
+

 
 /*
 
 /*

- * setprivexec:  (dis)allow this process to hold
- * task, thread, or execption ports of processes about to exec.
+ * setprivexec
+ *
+ * Description:        (dis)allow this process to hold task, thread, or execption
+ *             ports of processes about to exec.
+ *
+ * Parameters: uap->flag                       New value for flag
+ *
+ * Returns:    int                             Previous value of flag
+ *
+ * XXX:                Belongs in kern_proc.c

  */
  */

-struct setprivexec_args {
-       int flag;
-}; 

 int
 int

-setprivexec(p, uap, retval)
-       struct proc *p;
-       register struct setprivexec_args *uap;
-       register_t *retval;
+setprivexec(proc_t p, struct setprivexec_args *uap, int32_t *retval)

 {
 {

+       AUDIT_ARG(value32, uap->flag);

        *retval = p->p_debugger;
        p->p_debugger = (uap->flag != 0);
        *retval = p->p_debugger;
        p->p_debugger = (uap->flag != 0);

-       return(0);
+       return 0;

 }
 
 }
 

-/* ARGSUSED */
-getpid(p, uap, retval)
-       struct proc *p;
-       void *uap;
-       register_t *retval;
-{

 
 

+/*
+ * getpid
+ *
+ * Description:        get the process ID
+ *
+ * Parameters: (void)
+ *
+ * Returns:    pid_t                           Current process ID
+ *
+ * XXX:                Belongs in kern_proc.c
+ */
+int
+getpid(proc_t p, __unused struct getpid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
+{

        *retval = p->p_pid;
        *retval = p->p_pid;

-#if COMPAT_43
-       retval[1] = p->p_pptr->p_pid;
-#endif
-       return (0);
+       return 0;

 }
 
 }
 

-/* ARGSUSED */
-getppid(p, uap, retval)
-       struct proc *p;
-       void *uap;
-       register_t *retval;
-{

 
 

-       *retval = p->p_pptr->p_pid;
-       return (0);
+/*
+ * getppid
+ *
+ * Description: get the parent process ID
+ *
+ * Parameters: (void)
+ *
+ * Returns:    pid_t                           Parent process ID
+ *
+ * XXX:                Belongs in kern_proc.c
+ */
+int
+getppid(proc_t p, __unused struct getppid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
+{
+       *retval = p->p_ppid;
+       return 0;

 }
 
 }
 

-/* Get process group ID; note that POSIX getpgrp takes no parameter */
-getpgrp(p, uap, retval)
-       struct proc *p;
-       void *uap;
-       register_t *retval;
-{

 
 

-       *retval = p->p_pgrp->pg_id;
-       return (0);
+/*
+ * getpgrp
+ *
+ * Description:        get the process group ID of the calling process
+ *
+ * Parameters: (void)
+ *
+ * Returns:    pid_t                           Process group ID
+ *
+ * XXX:                Belongs in kern_proc.c
+ */
+int
+getpgrp(proc_t p, __unused struct getpgrp_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
+{
+       *retval = p->p_pgrpid;
+       return 0;

 }
 
 }
 

-/* Get an arbitary pid's process group id */
-struct getpgid_args {
-       pid_t   pid;
-};

 
 

+/*
+ * getpgid
+ *
+ * Description: Get an arbitary pid's process group id
+ *
+ * Parameters: uap->pid                        The target pid
+ *
+ * Returns:    0                               Success
+ *             ESRCH                           No such process
+ *
+ * Notes:      We are permitted to return EPERM in the case that the target
+ *             process is not in the same session as the calling process,
+ *             which could be a security consideration
+ *
+ * XXX:                Belongs in kern_proc.c
+ */

 int
 int

-getpgid(p, uap, retval)
-       struct proc *p;
-       struct getpgid_args *uap;
-       register_t *retval;
+getpgid(proc_t p, struct getpgid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)

 {
 {

-       struct proc *pt;
+       proc_t pt;
+       int refheld = 0;

 
        pt = p;
 
        pt = p;

-       if (uap->pid == 0)
+       if (uap->pid == 0) {

                goto found;
                goto found;

+       }

 
 

-       if ((pt = pfind(uap->pid)) == 0)
-               return (ESRCH);
+       if ((pt = proc_find(uap->pid)) == 0) {
+               return ESRCH;
+       }
+       refheld = 1;

 found:
 found:

-       *retval = pt->p_pgrp->pg_id;
-       return (0);
+       *retval = pt->p_pgrpid;
+       if (refheld != 0) {
+               proc_rele(pt);
+       }
+       return 0;

 }
 
 }
 

+

 /*
 /*

- * Get an arbitary pid's session id.
+ * getsid
+ *
+ * Description:        Get an arbitary pid's session leaders process group ID
+ *
+ * Parameters: uap->pid                        The target pid
+ *
+ * Returns:    0                               Success
+ *             ESRCH                           No such process
+ *
+ * Notes:      We are permitted to return EPERM in the case that the target
+ *             process is not in the same session as the calling process,
+ *             which could be a security consideration
+ *
+ * XXX:                Belongs in kern_proc.c

  */
  */

-struct getsid_args {
-       pid_t   pid;
-};
-

 int
 int

-getsid(p, uap, retval)
-       struct proc *p;
-       struct getsid_args *uap;
-       register_t *retval;
+getsid(proc_t p, struct getsid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)

 {
 {

-       struct proc *pt;
+       proc_t pt;
+       int refheld = 0;
+       struct session * sessp;

 
        pt = p;
 
        pt = p;

-       if (uap->pid == 0)
+       if (uap->pid == 0) {

                goto found;
                goto found;

+       }

 
 

-       if ((pt = pfind(uap->pid)) == 0)
-               return (ESRCH);
+       if ((pt = proc_find(uap->pid)) == 0) {
+               return ESRCH;
+       }
+       refheld = 1;

 found:
 found:

-       *retval = pt->p_session->s_sid;
-       return (0);
+       sessp = proc_session(pt);
+       *retval = sessp->s_sid;
+       session_rele(sessp);
+
+       if (refheld != 0) {
+               proc_rele(pt);
+       }
+       return 0;

 }
 
 }
 

-/* ARGSUSED */
-getuid(p, uap, retval)
-       struct proc *p;
-       void *uap;
-       register_t *retval;
-{

 
 

-       *retval = p->p_cred->p_ruid;
-#if COMPAT_43
-       retval[1] = p->p_ucred->cr_uid;
-#endif
-       return (0);
+/*
+ * getuid
+ *
+ * Description:        get real user ID for caller
+ *
+ * Parameters: (void)
+ *
+ * Returns:    uid_t                           The real uid of the caller
+ */
+int
+getuid(__unused proc_t p, __unused struct getuid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
+{
+       *retval = kauth_getruid();
+       return 0;

 }
 
 }
 

-/* ARGSUSED */
-geteuid(p, uap, retval)
-       struct proc *p;
-       void *uap;
-       register_t *retval;
-{

 
 

-       *retval = p->p_ucred->cr_uid;
-       return (0);
+/*
+ * geteuid
+ *
+ * Description:        get effective user ID for caller
+ *
+ * Parameters: (void)
+ *
+ * Returns:    uid_t                           The effective uid of the caller
+ */
+int
+geteuid(__unused proc_t p, __unused struct geteuid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
+{
+       *retval = kauth_getuid();
+       return 0;

 }
 
 }
 

-/* ARGSUSED */
-getgid(p, uap, retval)
-       struct proc *p;
-       void *uap;
-       register_t *retval;
+
+/*
+ * gettid
+ *
+ * Description:        Return the per-thread override identity.
+ *
+ * Parameters: uap->uidp                       Address of uid_t to get uid
+ *             uap->gidp                       Address of gid_t to get gid
+ *
+ * Returns:    0                               Success
+ *             ESRCH                           No per thread identity active
+ */
+int
+gettid(__unused proc_t p, struct gettid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)

 {
 {

+       struct uthread *uthread = get_bsdthread_info(current_thread());
+       int     error;

 
 

-       *retval = p->p_cred->p_rgid;
-#if COMPAT_43
-       retval[1] = p->p_ucred->cr_groups[0];
-#endif
-       return (0);
+       /*
+        * If this thread is not running with an override identity, we can't
+        * return one to the caller, so return an error instead.
+        */
+       if (!(uthread->uu_flag & UT_SETUID)) {
+               return ESRCH;
+       }
+
+       if ((error = suword(uap->uidp, kauth_cred_getruid(uthread->uu_ucred)))) {
+               return error;
+       }
+       if ((error = suword(uap->gidp, kauth_cred_getrgid(uthread->uu_ucred)))) {
+               return error;
+       }
+
+       *retval = 0;
+       return 0;

 }
 
 }
 

+

 /*
 /*

- * Get effective group ID.  The "egid" is groups[0], and could be obtained
- * via getgroups.  This syscall exists because it is somewhat painful to do
- * correctly in a library function.
+ * getgid
+ *
+ * Description:        get the real group ID for the calling process
+ *
+ * Parameters: (void)
+ *
+ * Returns:    gid_t                           The real gid of the caller

  */
  */

-/* ARGSUSED */
-getegid(p, uap, retval)
-       struct proc *p;
-       void *uap;
-       register_t *retval;
+int
+getgid(__unused proc_t p, __unused struct getgid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)

 {
 {

+       *retval = kauth_getrgid();
+       return 0;
+}
+

 
 

-       *retval = p->p_ucred->cr_groups[0];
-       return (0);
+/*
+ * getegid
+ *
+ * Description:        get the effective group ID for the calling process
+ *
+ * Parameters: (void)
+ *
+ * Returns:    gid_t                           The effective gid of the caller
+ *
+ * Notes:      As an implementation detail, the effective gid is stored as
+ *             the first element of the supplementary group list.
+ *
+ *             This could be implemented in Libc instead because of the above
+ *             detail.
+ */
+int
+getegid(__unused proc_t p, __unused struct getegid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
+{
+       *retval = kauth_getgid();
+       return 0;

 }
 
 }
 

-struct getgroups_args {
-       u_int   gidsetsize;
-       gid_t   *gidset;
-};
-getgroups(p, uap, retval)
-       struct proc *p;
-       register struct getgroups_args *uap;
-       register_t *retval;
+
+/*
+ * getgroups
+ *
+ * Description:        get the list of supplementary groups for the calling process
+ *
+ * Parameters: uap->gidsetsize                 # of gid_t's in user buffer
+ *             uap->gidset                     Pointer to user buffer
+ *
+ * Returns:    0                               Success
+ *             EINVAL                          User buffer too small
+ *     copyout:EFAULT                          User buffer invalid
+ *
+ * Retval:     -1                              Error
+ *             !0                              # of groups
+ *
+ * Notes:      The caller may specify a 0 value for gidsetsize, and we will
+ *             then return how large a buffer is required (in gid_t's) to
+ *             contain the answer at the time of the call.  Otherwise, we
+ *             return the number of gid_t's catually copied to user space.
+ *
+ *             When called with a 0 gidsetsize from a multithreaded program,
+ *             there is no guarantee that another thread may not change the
+ *             number of supplementary groups, and therefore a subsequent
+ *             call could still fail, unless the maximum possible buffer
+ *             size is supplied by the user.
+ *
+ *             As an implementation detail, the effective gid is stored as
+ *             the first element of the supplementary group list, and will
+ *             be returned by this call.
+ */
+int
+getgroups(__unused proc_t p, struct getgroups_args *uap, int32_t *retval)

 {
 {

-       register struct pcred *pc = p->p_cred;
-       register u_int ngrp;
+       int ngrp;

        int error;
        int error;

+       kauth_cred_t cred;
+       posix_cred_t pcred;
+
+       /* grab reference while we muck around with the credential */
+       cred = kauth_cred_get_with_ref();
+       pcred = posix_cred_get(cred);

 
        if ((ngrp = uap->gidsetsize) == 0) {
 
        if ((ngrp = uap->gidsetsize) == 0) {

-               *retval = pc->pc_ucred->cr_ngroups;
-               return (0);
-       }
-       if (ngrp < pc->pc_ucred->cr_ngroups)
-               return (EINVAL);
-       pcred_readlock(p);
-       ngrp = pc->pc_ucred->cr_ngroups;
-       if (error = copyout((caddr_t)pc->pc_ucred->cr_groups,
-           (caddr_t)uap->gidset, ngrp * sizeof(gid_t))) {
-               pcred_unlock(p);
-               return (error);
-       }
-       pcred_unlock(p);
+               *retval = pcred->cr_ngroups;
+               kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
+               return 0;
+       }
+       if (ngrp < pcred->cr_ngroups) {
+               kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
+               return EINVAL;
+       }
+       ngrp = pcred->cr_ngroups;
+       if ((error = copyout((caddr_t)pcred->cr_groups,
+           uap->gidset,
+           ngrp * sizeof(gid_t)))) {
+               kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
+               return error;
+       }
+       kauth_cred_unref(&cred);

        *retval = ngrp;
        *retval = ngrp;

-       return (0);
+       return 0;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Return the per-thread/per-process supplementary groups list.
+ *
+ * XXX implement getsgroups
+ *
+ */
+
+int
+getsgroups(__unused proc_t p, __unused struct getsgroups_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
+{
+       return ENOTSUP;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the per-thread/per-process whiteout groups list.
+ *
+ * XXX implement getwgroups
+ *
+ */
+
+int
+getwgroups(__unused proc_t p, __unused struct getwgroups_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
+{
+       return ENOTSUP;

 }
 
 }
 

-/* ARGSUSED */
-setsid(p, uap, retval)
-       register struct proc *p;
-       void *uap;
-       register_t *retval;
+/*
+ * setsid_internal
+ *
+ * Description:        Core implementation of setsid().
+ */
+int
+setsid_internal(proc_t p)

 {
 {

+       struct pgrp * pg = PGRP_NULL;

 
 

-       if (p->p_pgid == p->p_pid || pgfind(p->p_pid)) {
-               return (EPERM);
+       if (p->p_pgrpid == p->p_pid || (pg = pgfind(p->p_pid)) || p->p_lflag & P_LINVFORK) {
+               if (pg != PGRP_NULL) {
+                       pg_rele(pg);
+               }
+               return EPERM;

        } else {
        } else {

+               /* enter pgrp works with its own pgrp refcount */

                (void)enterpgrp(p, p->p_pid, 1);
                (void)enterpgrp(p, p->p_pid, 1);

+               return 0;
+       }
+}
+
+/*
+ * setsid
+ *
+ * Description:        Create a new session and set the process group ID to the
+ *             session ID
+ *
+ * Parameters: (void)
+ *
+ * Returns:    0                               Success
+ *             EPERM                           Permission denied
+ *
+ * Notes:      If the calling process is not the process group leader; there
+ *             is no existing process group with its ID, and we are not
+ *             currently in vfork, then this function will create a new
+ *             session, a new process group, and put the caller in the
+ *             process group (as the sole member) and make it the session
+ *             leader (as the sole process in the session).
+ *
+ *             The existing controlling tty (if any) will be dissociated
+ *             from the process, and the next non-O_NOCTTY open of a tty
+ *             will establish a new controlling tty.
+ *
+ * XXX:                Belongs in kern_proc.c
+ */
+int
+setsid(proc_t p, __unused struct setsid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
+{
+       int rc = setsid_internal(p);
+       if (rc == 0) {

                *retval = p->p_pid;
                *retval = p->p_pid;

-               return (0);

        }
        }

+       return rc;

 }
 
 }
 

+

 /*
 /*

- * set process group (setpgid/old setpgrp)
+ * setpgid
+ *
+ * Description: set process group ID for job control
+ *
+ * Parameters: uap->pid                        Process to change
+ *             uap->pgid                       Process group to join or create
+ *
+ * Returns:    0                       Success
+ *             ESRCH                   pid is not the caller or a child of
+ *                                     the caller
+ *     enterpgrp:ESRCH                 No such process
+ *             EACCES                  Permission denied due to exec
+ *             EINVAL                  Invalid argument
+ *             EPERM                   The target process is not in the same
+ *                                     session as the calling process
+ *             EPERM                   The target process is a session leader
+ *             EPERM                   pid and pgid are not the same, and
+ *                                     there is no process in the calling
+ *                                     process whose process group ID matches
+ *                                     pgid
+ *
+ * Notes:      This function will cause the target process to either join
+ *             an existing process process group, or create a new process
+ *             group in the session of the calling process.  It cannot be
+ *             used to change the process group ID of a process which is
+ *             already a session leader.
+ *
+ *             If the target pid is 0, the pid of the calling process is
+ *             substituted as the new target; if pgid is 0, the target pid
+ *             is used as the target process group ID.

  *
  *

- * caller does setpgid(targpid, targpgid)
+ * Legacy:     This system call entry point is also used to implement the
+ *             legacy library routine setpgrp(), which under POSIX

  *
  *

- * pid must be caller or child of caller (ESRCH)
- * if a child
- *     pid must be in same session (EPERM)
- *     pid can't have done an exec (EACCES)
- * if pgid != pid
- *     there must exist some pid in same session having pgid (EPERM)
- * pid must not be session leader (EPERM)
+ * XXX:                Belongs in kern_proc.c

  */
  */

-struct setpgid_args {
-       int     pid;
-       int     pgid;
-};
-/* ARGSUSED */
-setpgid(curp, uap, retval)
-       struct proc *curp;
-       register struct setpgid_args *uap;
-       register_t *retval;
+int
+setpgid(proc_t curp, struct setpgid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)

 {
 {

-       register struct proc *targp;            /* target process */
-       register struct pgrp *pgrp;             /* target pgrp */
+       proc_t targp = PROC_NULL;       /* target process */
+       struct pgrp *pg = PGRP_NULL;    /* target pgrp */
+       int error = 0;
+       int refheld = 0;
+       int samesess = 0;
+       struct session * curp_sessp = SESSION_NULL;
+       struct session * targp_sessp = SESSION_NULL;
+
+       curp_sessp = proc_session(curp);

 
        if (uap->pid != 0 && uap->pid != curp->p_pid) {
 
        if (uap->pid != 0 && uap->pid != curp->p_pid) {

-               if ((targp = pfind(uap->pid)) == 0 || !inferior(targp))
-                       return (ESRCH);
-               if (targp->p_session != curp->p_session)
-                       return (EPERM);
-               if (targp->p_flag & P_EXEC)
-                       return (EACCES);
-       } else
+               if ((targp = proc_find(uap->pid)) == 0 || !inferior(targp)) {
+                       if (targp != PROC_NULL) {
+                               refheld = 1;
+                       }
+                       error = ESRCH;
+                       goto out;
+               }
+               refheld = 1;
+               targp_sessp = proc_session(targp);
+               if (targp_sessp != curp_sessp) {
+                       error = EPERM;
+                       goto out;
+               }
+               if (targp->p_flag & P_EXEC) {
+                       error = EACCES;
+                       goto out;
+               }
+       } else {

                targp = curp;
                targp = curp;

-       if (SESS_LEADER(targp))
-               return (EPERM);
-       if (uap->pgid == 0)
+               targp_sessp = proc_session(targp);
+       }
+
+       if (SESS_LEADER(targp, targp_sessp)) {
+               error = EPERM;
+               goto out;
+       }
+       if (targp_sessp != SESSION_NULL) {
+               session_rele(targp_sessp);
+               targp_sessp = SESSION_NULL;
+       }
+
+       if (uap->pgid < 0) {
+               error = EINVAL;
+               goto out;
+       }
+       if (uap->pgid == 0) {

                uap->pgid = targp->p_pid;
                uap->pgid = targp->p_pid;

-       else if (uap->pgid != targp->p_pid)
-               if ((pgrp = pgfind(uap->pgid)) == 0 ||
-                   pgrp->pg_session != curp->p_session)
-                       return (EPERM);
-       return (enterpgrp(targp, uap->pgid, 0));
+       } else if (uap->pgid != targp->p_pid) {
+               if ((pg = pgfind(uap->pgid)) == 0) {
+                       error = EPERM;
+                       goto out;
+               }
+               samesess = (pg->pg_session != curp_sessp);
+               pg_rele(pg);
+               if (samesess != 0) {
+                       error = EPERM;
+                       goto out;
+               }
+       }
+       error = enterpgrp(targp, uap->pgid, 0);
+out:
+       if (targp_sessp != SESSION_NULL) {
+               session_rele(targp_sessp);
+       }
+       if (curp_sessp != SESSION_NULL) {
+               session_rele(curp_sessp);
+       }
+       if (refheld != 0) {
+               proc_rele(targp);
+       }
+       return error;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * issetugid
+ *
+ * Description:        Is current process tainted by uid or gid changes system call
+ *
+ * Parameters: (void)
+ *
+ * Returns:    0                               Not tainted
+ *             1                               Tainted
+ *
+ * Notes:      A process is considered tainted if it was created as a retult
+ *             of an execve call from an imnage that had either the SUID or
+ *             SGID bit set on the executable, or if it has changed any of its
+ *             real, effective, or saved user or group IDs since beginning
+ *             execution.
+ */
+int
+proc_issetugid(proc_t p)
+{
+       return (p->p_flag & P_SUGID) ? 1 : 0;

 }
 
 }
 

-struct issetugid_args {
-       int dummy;
-};
-issetugid(p, uap, retval)
-       struct proc *p;
-       struct issetugid_args *uap;
-       register_t *retval;
+int
+issetugid(proc_t p, __unused struct issetugid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)

 {
        /*
         * Note: OpenBSD sets a P_SUGIDEXEC flag set at execve() time,
 {
        /*
         * Note: OpenBSD sets a P_SUGIDEXEC flag set at execve() time,


@@ -351,436 +707,1462 @@ issetugid(p, uap, retval)
         * that libc *might* have put in their data segment.
         */
 
         * that libc *might* have put in their data segment.
         */
 

-       *retval = (p->p_flag & P_SUGID) ? 1 : 0;
-       return (0);
+       *retval = proc_issetugid(p);
+       return 0;

 }
 
 }
 

-struct setuid_args {
-       uid_t   uid;
-};
-/* ARGSUSED */
-setuid(p, uap, retval)
-       struct proc *p;
-       struct setuid_args *uap;
-       register_t *retval;
+
+/*
+ * setuid
+ *
+ * Description:        Set user ID system call
+ *
+ * Parameters: uap->uid                        uid to set
+ *
+ * Returns:    0                               Success
+ *     suser:EPERM                             Permission denied
+ *
+ * Notes:      If called by a privileged process, this function will set the
+ *             real, effective, and saved uid to the requested value.
+ *
+ *             If called from an unprivileged process, but uid is equal to the
+ *             real or saved uid, then the effective uid will be set to the
+ *             requested value, but the real and saved uid will not change.
+ *
+ *             If the credential is changed as a result of this call, then we
+ *             flag the process as having set privilege since the last exec.
+ */
+int
+setuid(proc_t p, struct setuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)

 {
 {

-       register struct pcred *pc = p->p_cred;
-       register uid_t uid;
+       uid_t uid;
+       uid_t svuid = KAUTH_UID_NONE;
+       uid_t ruid = KAUTH_UID_NONE;
+       uid_t gmuid = KAUTH_UID_NONE;

        int error;
        int error;

+       kauth_cred_t my_cred, my_new_cred;
+       posix_cred_t my_pcred;

 
        uid = uap->uid;
 
        uid = uap->uid;

-       if (uid != pc->p_ruid &&
-           (error = suser(pc->pc_ucred, &p->p_acflag)))
-               return (error);
-       /*
-        * Everything's okay, do it.
-        * Transfer proc count to new user.
-        * Copy credentials so other references do not see our changes.
-        */

 
 

-       /* prepare app access profile files */
-       prepare_profile_database(uap->uid);
-       pcred_writelock(p);
-       (void)chgproccnt(pc->p_ruid, -1);
-       (void)chgproccnt(uid, 1);
-       pc->pc_ucred = crcopy(pc->pc_ucred);
-       pc->pc_ucred->cr_uid = uid;
-       pc->p_ruid = uid;
-       pc->p_svuid = uid;
-       pcred_unlock(p);
+       /* get current credential and take a reference while we muck with it */
+       my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
+       my_pcred = posix_cred_get(my_cred);
+
+       DEBUG_CRED_ENTER("setuid (%d/%d): %p %d\n", p->p_pid, (p->p_pptr ? p->p_pptr->p_pid : 0), my_cred, uap->uid);
+       AUDIT_ARG(uid, uid);
+
+       for (;;) {
+               if (uid != my_pcred->cr_ruid &&         /* allow setuid(getuid()) */
+                   uid != my_pcred->cr_svuid &&        /* allow setuid(saved uid) */
+                   (error = suser(my_cred, &p->p_acflag))) {
+                       kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
+                       return error;
+               }
+
+               /*
+                * If we are privileged, then set the saved and real UID too;
+                * otherwise, just set the effective UID
+                */
+               if (suser(my_cred, &p->p_acflag) == 0) {
+                       svuid = uid;
+                       ruid = uid;
+               } else {
+                       svuid = KAUTH_UID_NONE;
+                       ruid = KAUTH_UID_NONE;
+               }
+               /*
+                * Only set the gmuid if the current cred has not opt'ed out;
+                * this normally only happens when calling setgroups() instead
+                * of initgroups() to set an explicit group list, or one of the
+                * other group manipulation functions is invoked and results in
+                * a dislocation (i.e. the credential group membership changes
+                * to something other than the default list for the user, as
+                * in entering a group or leaving an exclusion group).
+                */
+               if (!(my_pcred->cr_flags & CRF_NOMEMBERD)) {
+                       gmuid = uid;
+               }
+
+               /*
+                * Set the credential with new info.  If there is no change,
+                * we get back the same credential we passed in; if there is
+                * a change, we drop the reference on the credential we
+                * passed in.  The subsequent compare is safe, because it is
+                * a pointer compare rather than a contents compare.
+                */
+               my_new_cred = kauth_cred_setresuid(my_cred, ruid, uid, svuid, gmuid);
+               if (my_cred != my_new_cred) {
+                       DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE("setuid CH(%d): %p/0x%08x -> %p/0x%08x\n", p->p_pid, my_cred, my_pcred->cr_flags, my_new_cred, posix_cred_get(my_new_cred)->cr_flags);
+
+                       /*
+                        * If we're changing the ruid from A to B, we might race with another thread that's setting ruid from B to A.
+                        * The current locking mechanisms don't allow us to make the entire credential switch operation atomic,
+                        * thus we may be able to change the process credentials from ruid A to B, but get preempted before incrementing the proc
+                        * count of B. If a second thread sees the new process credentials and switches back to ruid A, that other thread
+                        * may be able to decrement the proc count of B before we can increment it. This results in a panic.
+                        * Incrementing the proc count of the target ruid, B, before setting the process credentials prevents this race.
+                        */
+                       if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && !proc_has_persona(p)) {
+                               (void)chgproccnt(ruid, 1);
+                       }
+
+                       proc_ucred_lock(p);
+                       /*
+                        * We need to protect for a race where another thread
+                        * also changed the credential after we took our
+                        * reference.  If p_ucred has changed then we should
+                        * restart this again with the new cred.
+                        *
+                        * Note: the kauth_cred_setresuid has consumed a reference to my_cred, it p_ucred != my_cred, then my_cred must not be dereferenced!
+                        */
+                       if (p->p_ucred != my_cred) {
+                               proc_ucred_unlock(p);
+                               /*
+                                * We didn't successfully switch to the new ruid, so decrement
+                                * the procs/uid count that we incremented above.
+                                */
+                               if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && !proc_has_persona(p)) {
+                                       (void)chgproccnt(ruid, -1);
+                               }
+                               kauth_cred_unref(&my_new_cred);
+                               my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
+                               my_pcred = posix_cred_get(my_cred);
+                               /* try again */
+                               continue;
+                       }
+                       p->p_ucred = my_new_cred;
+                       /* update cred on proc */
+                       PROC_UPDATE_CREDS_ONPROC(p);
+
+                       OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);
+                       proc_ucred_unlock(p);
+                       /*
+                        * If we've updated the ruid, decrement the count of procs running
+                        * under the previous ruid
+                        */
+                       if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && !proc_has_persona(p)) {
+                               (void)chgproccnt(my_pcred->cr_ruid, -1);
+                       }
+               }
+               break;
+       }
+       /* Drop old proc reference or our extra reference */
+       kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
+

        set_security_token(p);
        set_security_token(p);

-       p->p_flag |= P_SUGID;
-       return (0);
+       return 0;

 }
 
 }
 

-struct seteuid_args {
+
+/*
+ * seteuid
+ *
+ * Description:        Set effective user ID system call
+ *
+ * Parameters: uap->euid                       effective uid to set
+ *
+ * Returns:    0                               Success
+ *     suser:EPERM                             Permission denied
+ *
+ * Notes:      If called by a privileged process, or called from an
+ *             unprivileged process but euid is equal to the real or saved
+ *             uid, then the effective uid will be set to the requested
+ *             value, but the real and saved uid will not change.
+ *
+ *             If the credential is changed as a result of this call, then we
+ *             flag the process as having set privilege since the last exec.
+ */
+int
+seteuid(proc_t p, struct seteuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
+{

        uid_t euid;
        uid_t euid;

-};
-/* ARGSUSED */
-seteuid(p, uap, retval)
-       struct proc *p;
-       struct seteuid_args *uap;
-       register_t *retval;
-{
-       register struct pcred *pc = p->p_cred;
-       register uid_t euid;

        int error;
        int error;

+       kauth_cred_t my_cred, my_new_cred;
+       posix_cred_t my_pcred;

 
 

-       euid = uap->euid;
-       if (euid != pc->p_ruid && euid != pc->p_svuid &&
-           (error = suser(pc->pc_ucred, &p->p_acflag)))
-               return (error);
-       /*
-        * Everything's okay, do it.  Copy credentials so other references do
-        * not see our changes.
-        */
-       pcred_writelock(p);
-       pc->pc_ucred = crcopy(pc->pc_ucred);
-       pc->pc_ucred->cr_uid = euid;
-       pcred_unlock(p);
-       set_security_token(p);
-       p->p_flag |= P_SUGID;
-       return (0);
-}
+       DEBUG_CRED_ENTER("seteuid: %d\n", uap->euid);

 
 

-struct setgid_args {
-       gid_t   gid;
-};
-/* ARGSUSED */
-setgid(p, uap, retval)
-       struct proc *p;
-       struct setgid_args *uap;
-       register_t *retval;
-{
-       register struct pcred *pc = p->p_cred;
-       register gid_t gid;
-       int error;
+       euid = uap->euid;
+       AUDIT_ARG(euid, euid);
+
+       my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
+       my_pcred = posix_cred_get(my_cred);
+
+       for (;;) {
+               if (euid != my_pcred->cr_ruid && euid != my_pcred->cr_svuid &&
+                   (error = suser(my_cred, &p->p_acflag))) {
+                       kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
+                       return error;
+               }
+
+               /*
+                * Set the credential with new info.  If there is no change,
+                * we get back the same credential we passed in; if there is
+                * a change, we drop the reference on the credential we
+                * passed in.  The subsequent compare is safe, because it is
+                * a pointer compare rather than a contents compare.
+                */
+               my_new_cred = kauth_cred_setresuid(my_cred, KAUTH_UID_NONE, euid, KAUTH_UID_NONE, my_pcred->cr_gmuid);
+
+               if (my_cred != my_new_cred) {
+                       DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE("seteuid CH(%d): %p/0x%08x -> %p/0x%08x\n", p->p_pid, my_cred, my_pcred->cr_flags, my_new_cred, posix_cred_get(my_new_cred)->cr_flags);
+
+                       proc_ucred_lock(p);
+                       /*
+                        * We need to protect for a race where another thread
+                        * also changed the credential after we took our
+                        * reference.  If p_ucred has changed then we
+                        * should restart this again with the new cred.
+                        */
+                       if (p->p_ucred != my_cred) {
+                               proc_ucred_unlock(p);
+                               kauth_cred_unref(&my_new_cred);
+                               my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
+                               my_pcred = posix_cred_get(my_cred);
+                               /* try again */
+                               continue;
+                       }
+                       p->p_ucred = my_new_cred;
+                       /* update cred on proc */
+                       PROC_UPDATE_CREDS_ONPROC(p);
+                       OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);
+                       proc_ucred_unlock(p);
+               }
+               break;
+       }
+       /* drop old proc reference or our extra reference */
+       kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);

 
 

-       gid = uap->gid;
-       if (gid != pc->p_rgid && (error = suser(pc->pc_ucred, &p->p_acflag)))
-               return (error);
-       pcred_writelock(p);
-       pc->pc_ucred = crcopy(pc->pc_ucred);
-       pc->pc_ucred->cr_groups[0] = gid;
-       pc->p_rgid = gid;
-       pc->p_svgid = gid;              /* ??? */
-       pcred_unlock(p);

        set_security_token(p);
        set_security_token(p);

-       p->p_flag |= P_SUGID;
-       return (0);
+       return 0;

 }
 
 }
 

-struct setegid_args {
-       gid_t   egid;
-};
-/* ARGSUSED */
-setegid(p, uap, retval)
-       struct proc *p;
-       struct setegid_args *uap;
-       register_t *retval;
+
+/*
+ * setreuid
+ *
+ * Description:        Set real and effective user ID system call
+ *
+ * Parameters: uap->ruid                       real uid to set
+ *             uap->euid                       effective uid to set
+ *
+ * Returns:    0                               Success
+ *     suser:EPERM                             Permission denied
+ *
+ * Notes:      A value of -1 is a special case indicating that the uid for
+ *             which that value is specified not be changed.  If both values
+ *             are specified as -1, no action is taken.
+ *
+ *             If called by a privileged process, the real and effective uid
+ *             will be set to the new value(s) specified.
+ *
+ *             If called from an unprivileged process, the real uid may be
+ *             set to the current value of the real uid, or to the current
+ *             value of the saved uid.  The effective uid may be set to the
+ *             current value of any of the effective, real, or saved uid.
+ *
+ *             If the newly requested real uid or effective uid does not
+ *             match the saved uid, then set the saved uid to the new
+ *             effective uid (potentially unrecoverably dropping saved
+ *             privilege).
+ *
+ *             If the credential is changed as a result of this call, then we
+ *             flag the process as having set privilege since the last exec.
+ */
+int
+setreuid(proc_t p, struct setreuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)

 {
 {

-       register struct pcred *pc = p->p_cred;
-       register gid_t egid;
+       uid_t ruid, euid;

        int error;
        int error;

+       kauth_cred_t my_cred, my_new_cred;
+       posix_cred_t my_pcred;
+
+       DEBUG_CRED_ENTER("setreuid %d %d\n", uap->ruid, uap->euid);
+
+       ruid = uap->ruid;
+       euid = uap->euid;
+       if (ruid == (uid_t)-1) {
+               ruid = KAUTH_UID_NONE;
+       }
+       if (euid == (uid_t)-1) {
+               euid = KAUTH_UID_NONE;
+       }
+       AUDIT_ARG(euid, euid);
+       AUDIT_ARG(ruid, ruid);
+
+       my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
+       my_pcred = posix_cred_get(my_cred);
+
+       for (;;) {
+               if (((ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE &&         /* allow no change of ruid */
+                   ruid != my_pcred->cr_ruid &&        /* allow ruid = ruid */
+                   ruid != my_pcred->cr_uid &&         /* allow ruid = euid */
+                   ruid != my_pcred->cr_svuid) ||      /* allow ruid = svuid */
+                   (euid != KAUTH_UID_NONE &&          /* allow no change of euid */
+                   euid != my_pcred->cr_uid &&         /* allow euid = euid */
+                   euid != my_pcred->cr_ruid &&        /* allow euid = ruid */
+                   euid != my_pcred->cr_svuid)) &&     /* allow euid = svuid */
+                   (error = suser(my_cred, &p->p_acflag))) { /* allow root user any */
+                       kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
+                       return error;
+               }
+
+               uid_t new_euid;
+               uid_t svuid = KAUTH_UID_NONE;
+
+               new_euid = my_pcred->cr_uid;
+               /*
+                * Set the credential with new info.  If there is no change,
+                * we get back the same credential we passed in; if there is
+                * a change, we drop the reference on the credential we
+                * passed in.  The subsequent compare is safe, because it is
+                * a pointer compare rather than a contents compare.
+                */
+               if (euid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && my_pcred->cr_uid != euid) {
+                       /* changing the effective UID */
+                       new_euid = euid;
+                       OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);
+               }
+               /*
+                * If the newly requested real uid or effective uid does
+                * not match the saved uid, then set the saved uid to the
+                * new effective uid.  We are protected from escalation
+                * by the prechecking.
+                */
+               if (my_pcred->cr_svuid != uap->ruid &&
+                   my_pcred->cr_svuid != uap->euid) {
+                       svuid = new_euid;
+                       OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);
+               }
+
+               my_new_cred = kauth_cred_setresuid(my_cred, ruid, euid, svuid, my_pcred->cr_gmuid);
+
+               if (my_cred != my_new_cred) {
+                       DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE("setreuid CH(%d): %p/0x%08x -> %p/0x%08x\n", p->p_pid, my_cred, my_pcred->cr_flags, my_new_cred, posix_cred_get(my_new_cred)->cr_flags);
+
+                       /*
+                        * If we're changing the ruid from A to B, we might race with another thread that's setting ruid from B to A.
+                        * The current locking mechanisms don't allow us to make the entire credential switch operation atomic,
+                        * thus we may be able to change the process credentials from ruid A to B, but get preempted before incrementing the proc
+                        * count of B. If a second thread sees the new process credentials and switches back to ruid A, that other thread
+                        * may be able to decrement the proc count of B before we can increment it. This results in a panic.
+                        * Incrementing the proc count of the target ruid, B, before setting the process credentials prevents this race.
+                        */
+                       if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && !proc_has_persona(p)) {
+                               (void)chgproccnt(ruid, 1);
+                       }
+
+                       proc_ucred_lock(p);
+                       /*
+                        * We need to protect for a race where another thread
+                        * also changed the credential after we took our
+                        * reference.  If p_ucred has changed then we should
+                        * restart this again with the new cred.
+                        *
+                        * Note: the kauth_cred_setresuid has consumed a reference to my_cred, it p_ucred != my_cred, then my_cred must not be dereferenced!
+                        */
+                       if (p->p_ucred != my_cred) {
+                               proc_ucred_unlock(p);
+                               if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && !proc_has_persona(p)) {
+                                       /*
+                                        * We didn't successfully switch to the new ruid, so decrement
+                                        * the procs/uid count that we incremented above.
+                                        */
+                                       (void)chgproccnt(ruid, -1);
+                               }
+                               kauth_cred_unref(&my_new_cred);
+                               my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
+                               my_pcred = posix_cred_get(my_cred);
+                               /* try again */
+                               continue;
+                       }
+
+                       p->p_ucred = my_new_cred;
+                       /* update cred on proc */
+                       PROC_UPDATE_CREDS_ONPROC(p);
+                       OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);
+                       proc_ucred_unlock(p);
+
+                       if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && !proc_has_persona(p)) {
+                               /*
+                                * We switched to a new ruid, so decrement the count of procs running
+                                * under the previous ruid
+                                */
+                               (void)chgproccnt(my_pcred->cr_ruid, -1);
+                       }
+               }
+               break;
+       }
+       /* drop old proc reference or our extra reference */
+       kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);

 
 

-       egid = uap->egid;
-       if (egid != pc->p_rgid && egid != pc->p_svgid &&
-           (error = suser(pc->pc_ucred, &p->p_acflag)))
-               return (error);
-       pcred_writelock(p);
-       pc->pc_ucred = crcopy(pc->pc_ucred);
-       pc->pc_ucred->cr_groups[0] = egid;
-       pcred_unlock(p);

        set_security_token(p);
        set_security_token(p);

-       p->p_flag |= P_SUGID;
-       return (0);
+       return 0;

 }
 
 }
 

-struct setgroups_args{
-       u_int   gidsetsize;
-       gid_t   *gidset;
-};

 
 

-/* ARGSUSED */
-setgroups(p, uap, retval)
-       struct proc *p;
-       struct setgroups_args *uap;
-       register_t *retval;
+/*
+ * setgid
+ *
+ * Description:        Set group ID system call
+ *
+ * Parameters: uap->gid                        gid to set
+ *
+ * Returns:    0                               Success
+ *     suser:EPERM                             Permission denied
+ *
+ * Notes:      If called by a privileged process, this function will set the
+ *             real, effective, and saved gid to the requested value.
+ *
+ *             If called from an unprivileged process, but gid is equal to the
+ *             real or saved gid, then the effective gid will be set to the
+ *             requested value, but the real and saved gid will not change.
+ *
+ *             If the credential is changed as a result of this call, then we
+ *             flag the process as having set privilege since the last exec.
+ *
+ *             As an implementation detail, the effective gid is stored as
+ *             the first element of the supplementary group list, and
+ *             therefore the effective group list may be reordered to keep
+ *             the supplementary group list unchanged.
+ */
+int
+setgid(proc_t p, struct setgid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)

 {
 {

-       register struct pcred *pc = p->p_cred;
-       struct ucred *new, *old;
-       register u_int ngrp;
+       gid_t gid;
+       gid_t rgid = KAUTH_GID_NONE;
+       gid_t svgid = KAUTH_GID_NONE;

        int error;
        int error;

+       kauth_cred_t my_cred, my_new_cred;
+       posix_cred_t my_pcred;

 
 

-       if (error = suser(pc->pc_ucred, &p->p_acflag))
-               return (error);
-       ngrp = uap->gidsetsize;
-       if (ngrp < 1 || ngrp > NGROUPS)
-               return (EINVAL);
-       new = crget();
-       error = copyin((caddr_t)uap->gidset,
-           (caddr_t)new->cr_groups, ngrp * sizeof(gid_t));
-       if (error) {
-               crfree(new);
-               return (error);
-       }
-       new->cr_ngroups = ngrp;
-       pcred_writelock(p);
-       old = pc->pc_ucred;
-       new->cr_uid = old->cr_uid;
-       pc->pc_ucred = new;
-       pcred_unlock(p);
-       set_security_token(p);
-       p->p_flag |= P_SUGID;
-       if (old != NOCRED)
-               crfree(old);
-       return (0);
-}
-
-#if COMPAT_43
-struct osetreuid_args{
-       int     ruid;
-       int     euid;
-};
-/* ARGSUSED */
-osetreuid(p, uap, retval)
-       register struct proc *p;
-       struct osetreuid_args *uap;
-       register_t *retval;
-{
-       struct seteuid_args seuidargs;
-       struct setuid_args suidargs;
+       DEBUG_CRED_ENTER("setgid(%d/%d): %d\n", p->p_pid, (p->p_pptr ? p->p_pptr->p_pid : 0), uap->gid);

 
 

-       /*
-        * There are five cases, and we attempt to emulate them in
-        * the following fashion:
-        * -1, -1: return 0. This is correct emulation.
-        * -1,  N: call seteuid(N). This is correct emulation.
-        *  N, -1: if we called setuid(N), our euid would be changed
-        *         to N as well. the theory is that we don't want to
-        *         revoke root access yet, so we call seteuid(N)
-        *         instead. This is incorrect emulation, but often
-        *         suffices enough for binary compatibility.
-        *  N,  N: call setuid(N). This is correct emulation.
-        *  N,  M: call setuid(N). This is close to correct emulation.
-        */
-       if (uap->ruid == (uid_t)-1) {
-               if (uap->euid == (uid_t)-1)
-                       return (0);                             /* -1, -1 */
-               seuidargs.euid = uap->euid;     /* -1,  N */
-               return (seteuid(p, &seuidargs, retval));
+       gid = uap->gid;
+       AUDIT_ARG(gid, gid);
+
+       /* get current credential and take a reference while we muck with it */
+       my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
+       my_pcred = posix_cred_get(my_cred);
+
+       for (;;) {
+               if (gid != my_pcred->cr_rgid &&         /* allow setgid(getgid()) */
+                   gid != my_pcred->cr_svgid &&        /* allow setgid(saved gid) */
+                   (error = suser(my_cred, &p->p_acflag))) {
+                       kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
+                       return error;
+               }
+
+               /*
+                * If we are privileged, then set the saved and real GID too;
+                * otherwise, just set the effective GID
+                */
+               if (suser(my_cred, &p->p_acflag) == 0) {
+                       svgid = gid;
+                       rgid = gid;
+               } else {
+                       svgid = KAUTH_GID_NONE;
+                       rgid = KAUTH_GID_NONE;
+               }
+
+               /*
+                * Set the credential with new info.  If there is no change,
+                * we get back the same credential we passed in; if there is
+                * a change, we drop the reference on the credential we
+                * passed in.  The subsequent compare is safe, because it is
+                * a pointer compare rather than a contents compare.
+                */
+               my_new_cred = kauth_cred_setresgid(my_cred, rgid, gid, svgid);
+               if (my_cred != my_new_cred) {
+                       DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE("setgid(CH)%d: %p/0x%08x->%p/0x%08x\n", p->p_pid, my_cred, my_cred->cr_flags, my_new_cred, my_new_cred->cr_flags);
+
+                       proc_ucred_lock(p);
+                       /*
+                        * We need to protect for a race where another thread
+                        * also changed the credential after we took our
+                        * reference.  If p_ucred has changed then we
+                        * should restart this again with the new cred.
+                        */
+                       if (p->p_ucred != my_cred) {
+                               proc_ucred_unlock(p);
+                               kauth_cred_unref(&my_new_cred);
+                               /* try again */
+                               my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
+                               my_pcred = posix_cred_get(my_cred);
+                               continue;
+                       }
+                       p->p_ucred = my_new_cred;
+                       /* update cred on proc */
+                       PROC_UPDATE_CREDS_ONPROC(p);
+                       OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);
+                       proc_ucred_unlock(p);
+               }
+               break;

        }
        }

-       if (uap->euid == (uid_t)-1) {
-               seuidargs.euid = uap->ruid;     /* N, -1 */
-               return (seteuid(p, &seuidargs, retval));
+       /* Drop old proc reference or our extra reference */
+       kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
+
+       set_security_token(p);
+       return 0;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * setegid
+ *
+ * Description:        Set effective group ID system call
+ *
+ * Parameters: uap->egid                       effective gid to set
+ *
+ * Returns:    0                               Success
+ *     suser:EPERM
+ *
+ * Notes:      If called by a privileged process, or called from an
+ *             unprivileged process but egid is equal to the real or saved
+ *             gid, then the effective gid will be set to the requested
+ *             value, but the real and saved gid will not change.
+ *
+ *             If the credential is changed as a result of this call, then we
+ *             flag the process as having set privilege since the last exec.
+ *
+ *             As an implementation detail, the effective gid is stored as
+ *             the first element of the supplementary group list, and
+ *             therefore the effective group list may be reordered to keep
+ *             the supplementary group list unchanged.
+ */
+int
+setegid(proc_t p, struct setegid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
+{
+       gid_t egid;
+       int error;
+       kauth_cred_t my_cred, my_new_cred;
+       posix_cred_t my_pcred;
+
+       DEBUG_CRED_ENTER("setegid %d\n", uap->egid);
+
+       egid = uap->egid;
+       AUDIT_ARG(egid, egid);
+
+       /* get current credential and take a reference while we muck with it */
+       my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
+       my_pcred = posix_cred_get(my_cred);
+
+
+       for (;;) {
+               if (egid != my_pcred->cr_rgid &&
+                   egid != my_pcred->cr_svgid &&
+                   (error = suser(my_cred, &p->p_acflag))) {
+                       kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
+                       return error;
+               }
+               /*
+                * Set the credential with new info.  If there is no change,
+                * we get back the same credential we passed in; if there is
+                * a change, we drop the reference on the credential we
+                * passed in.  The subsequent compare is safe, because it is
+                * a pointer compare rather than a contents compare.
+                */
+               my_new_cred = kauth_cred_setresgid(my_cred, KAUTH_GID_NONE, egid, KAUTH_GID_NONE);
+               if (my_cred != my_new_cred) {
+                       DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE("setegid(CH)%d: %p/0x%08x->%p/0x%08x\n", p->p_pid, my_cred, my_pcred->cr_flags, my_new_cred, posix_cred_get(my_new_cred)->cr_flags);
+
+                       proc_ucred_lock(p);
+                       /*
+                        * We need to protect for a race where another thread
+                        * also changed the credential after we took our
+                        * reference.  If p_ucred has changed then we
+                        * should restart this again with the new cred.
+                        */
+                       if (p->p_ucred != my_cred) {
+                               proc_ucred_unlock(p);
+                               kauth_cred_unref(&my_new_cred);
+                               /* try again */
+                               my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
+                               my_pcred = posix_cred_get(my_cred);
+                               continue;
+                       }
+                       p->p_ucred = my_new_cred;
+                       /* update cred on proc */
+                       PROC_UPDATE_CREDS_ONPROC(p);
+                       OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);
+                       proc_ucred_unlock(p);
+               }
+               break;

        }
        }

-       suidargs.uid = uap->ruid;       /* N, N and N, M */
-       return (setuid(p, &suidargs, retval));
+
+       /* Drop old proc reference or our extra reference */
+       kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
+
+       set_security_token(p);
+       return 0;

 }
 
 }
 

-struct osetregid_args {
-       int     rgid;
-       int egid;
-};
-/* ARGSUSED */
-osetregid(p, uap, retval)
-       register struct proc *p;
-       struct osetregid_args *uap;
-       register_t *retval;
+/*
+ * setregid
+ *
+ * Description:        Set real and effective group ID system call
+ *
+ * Parameters: uap->rgid                       real gid to set
+ *             uap->egid                       effective gid to set
+ *
+ * Returns:    0                               Success
+ *     suser:EPERM                             Permission denied
+ *
+ * Notes:      A value of -1 is a special case indicating that the gid for
+ *             which that value is specified not be changed.  If both values
+ *             are specified as -1, no action is taken.
+ *
+ *             If called by a privileged process, the real and effective gid
+ *             will be set to the new value(s) specified.
+ *
+ *             If called from an unprivileged process, the real gid may be
+ *             set to the current value of the real gid, or to the current
+ *             value of the saved gid.  The effective gid may be set to the
+ *             current value of any of the effective, real, or saved gid.
+ *
+ *             If the new real and effective gid will not be equal, or the
+ *             new real or effective gid is not the same as the saved gid,
+ *             then the saved gid will be updated to reflect the new
+ *             effective gid (potentially unrecoverably dropping saved
+ *             privilege).
+ *
+ *             If the credential is changed as a result of this call, then we
+ *             flag the process as having set privilege since the last exec.
+ *
+ *             As an implementation detail, the effective gid is stored as
+ *             the first element of the supplementary group list, and
+ *             therefore the effective group list may be reordered to keep
+ *             the supplementary group list unchanged.
+ */
+int
+setregid(proc_t p, struct setregid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)

 {
 {

-       struct setegid_args segidargs;
-       struct setgid_args sgidargs;
+       gid_t rgid, egid;
+       int error;
+       kauth_cred_t my_cred, my_new_cred;
+       posix_cred_t my_pcred;

 
 

-       /*
-        * There are five cases, described above in osetreuid()
-        */
-       if (uap->rgid == (gid_t)-1) {
-               if (uap->egid == (gid_t)-1)
-                       return (0);                             /* -1, -1 */
-               segidargs.egid = uap->egid;     /* -1,  N */
-               return (setegid(p, &segidargs, retval));
+       DEBUG_CRED_ENTER("setregid %d %d\n", uap->rgid, uap->egid);
+
+       rgid = uap->rgid;
+       egid = uap->egid;
+
+       if (rgid == (uid_t)-1) {
+               rgid = KAUTH_GID_NONE;
+       }
+       if (egid == (uid_t)-1) {
+               egid = KAUTH_GID_NONE;

        }
        }

-       if (uap->egid == (gid_t)-1) {
-               segidargs.egid = uap->rgid;     /* N, -1 */
-               return (setegid(p, &segidargs, retval));
+       AUDIT_ARG(egid, egid);
+       AUDIT_ARG(rgid, rgid);
+
+       /* get current credential and take a reference while we muck with it */
+       my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
+       my_pcred = posix_cred_get(my_cred);
+
+       for (;;) {
+               if (((rgid != KAUTH_UID_NONE &&         /* allow no change of rgid */
+                   rgid != my_pcred->cr_rgid &&        /* allow rgid = rgid */
+                   rgid != my_pcred->cr_gid &&         /* allow rgid = egid */
+                   rgid != my_pcred->cr_svgid) ||      /* allow rgid = svgid */
+                   (egid != KAUTH_UID_NONE &&          /* allow no change of egid */
+                   egid != my_pcred->cr_groups[0] &&   /* allow no change of egid */
+                   egid != my_pcred->cr_gid &&         /* allow egid = egid */
+                   egid != my_pcred->cr_rgid &&        /* allow egid = rgid */
+                   egid != my_pcred->cr_svgid)) &&     /* allow egid = svgid */
+                   (error = suser(my_cred, &p->p_acflag))) { /* allow root user any */
+                       kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
+                       return error;
+               }
+
+               uid_t new_egid = my_pcred->cr_gid;
+               uid_t new_rgid = my_pcred->cr_rgid;
+               uid_t svgid = KAUTH_UID_NONE;
+
+
+               /*
+                * Set the credential with new info.  If there is no change,
+                * we get back the same credential we passed in; if there is
+                * a change, we drop the reference on the credential we
+                * passed in.  The subsequent compare is safe, because it is
+                * a pointer compare rather than a contents compare.
+                */
+               if (egid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && my_pcred->cr_gid != egid) {
+                       /* changing the effective GID */
+                       new_egid = egid;
+                       OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);
+               }
+               if (rgid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && my_pcred->cr_rgid != rgid) {
+                       /* changing the real GID */
+                       new_rgid = rgid;
+                       OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);
+               }
+               /*
+                * If the newly requested real gid or effective gid does
+                * not match the saved gid, then set the saved gid to the
+                * new effective gid.  We are protected from escalation
+                * by the prechecking.
+                */
+               if (my_pcred->cr_svgid != uap->rgid &&
+                   my_pcred->cr_svgid != uap->egid) {
+                       svgid = new_egid;
+                       OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);
+               }
+
+               my_new_cred = kauth_cred_setresgid(my_cred, rgid, egid, svgid);
+               if (my_cred != my_new_cred) {
+                       DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE("setregid(CH)%d: %p/0x%08x->%p/0x%08x\n", p->p_pid, my_cred, my_pcred->cr_flags, my_new_cred, posix_cred_get(my_new_cred)->cr_flags);
+
+                       proc_ucred_lock(p);
+                       /* need to protect for a race where another thread
+                        * also changed the credential after we took our
+                        * reference.  If p_ucred has changed then we
+                        * should restart this again with the new cred.
+                        */
+                       if (p->p_ucred != my_cred) {
+                               proc_ucred_unlock(p);
+                               kauth_cred_unref(&my_new_cred);
+                               /* try again */
+                               my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
+                               my_pcred = posix_cred_get(my_cred);
+                               continue;
+                       }
+                       p->p_ucred = my_new_cred;
+                       /* update cred on proc */
+                       PROC_UPDATE_CREDS_ONPROC(p);
+                       OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag); /* XXX redundant? */
+                       proc_ucred_unlock(p);
+               }
+               break;

        }
        }

-       sgidargs.gid = uap->rgid;       /* N, N and N, M */
-       return (setgid(p, &sgidargs, retval));
+       /* Drop old proc reference or our extra reference */
+       kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
+
+       set_security_token(p);
+       return 0;

 }
 }

-#endif /* COMPAT_43 */
+

 
 /*
 
 /*

- * Check if gid is a member of the group set.
+ * Set the per-thread override identity.  The first parameter can be the
+ * current real UID, KAUTH_UID_NONE, or, if the caller is privileged, it
+ * can be any UID.  If it is KAUTH_UID_NONE, then as a special case, this
+ * means "revert to the per process credential"; otherwise, if permitted,
+ * it changes the effective, real, and saved UIDs and GIDs for the current
+ * thread to the requested UID and single GID, and clears all other GIDs.

  */
  */

-groupmember(gid, cred)
-       gid_t gid;
-       register struct ucred *cred;
+int
+settid(proc_t p, struct settid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)

 {
 {

-       register gid_t *gp;
-       gid_t *egp;
+       kauth_cred_t uc;
+       struct uthread *uthread = get_bsdthread_info(current_thread());
+       uid_t uid;
+       gid_t gid;

 
 

-       egp = &(cred->cr_groups[cred->cr_ngroups]);
-       for (gp = cred->cr_groups; gp < egp; gp++)
-               if (*gp == gid)
-                       return (1);
-       return (0);
+       uid = uap->uid;
+       gid = uap->gid;
+       AUDIT_ARG(uid, uid);
+       AUDIT_ARG(gid, gid);
+
+       if (proc_suser(p) != 0) {
+               return EPERM;
+       }
+
+       if (uid == KAUTH_UID_NONE) {
+               /* must already be assuming another identity in order to revert back */
+               if ((uthread->uu_flag & UT_SETUID) == 0) {
+                       return EPERM;
+               }
+
+               /* revert to delayed binding of process credential */
+               uc = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
+               kauth_cred_unref(&uthread->uu_ucred);
+               uthread->uu_ucred = uc;
+               uthread->uu_flag &= ~UT_SETUID;
+       } else {
+               kauth_cred_t my_cred, my_new_cred;
+
+               /* cannot already be assuming another identity */
+               if ((uthread->uu_flag & UT_SETUID) != 0) {
+                       return EPERM;
+               }
+
+               /*
+                * Get a new credential instance from the old if this one
+                * changes; otherwise kauth_cred_setuidgid() returns the
+                * same credential.  We take an extra reference on the
+                * current credential while we muck with it, so we can do
+                * the post-compare for changes by pointer.
+                */
+               kauth_cred_ref(uthread->uu_ucred);
+               my_cred = uthread->uu_ucred;
+               my_new_cred = kauth_cred_setuidgid(my_cred, uid, gid);
+               if (my_cred != my_new_cred) {
+                       uthread->uu_ucred = my_new_cred;
+               }
+               uthread->uu_flag |= UT_SETUID;
+
+               /* Drop old uthread reference or our extra reference */
+               kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
+       }
+       /*
+        * XXX should potentially set per thread security token (there is
+        * XXX none).
+        * XXX it is unclear whether P_SUGID should be st at this point;
+        * XXX in theory, it is being deprecated.
+        */
+       return 0;

 }
 
 }
 

+

 /*
 /*

- * Test whether the specified credentials imply "super-user"
- * privilege; if so, and we have accounting info, set the flag
- * indicating use of super-powers.
- * Returns 0 or error.
+ * Set the per-thread override identity.  Use this system call for a thread to
+ * assume the identity of another process or to revert back to normal identity
+ * of the current process.
+ *
+ * When the "assume" argument is non zero the current thread will assume the
+ * identity of the process represented by the pid argument.
+ *
+ * When the assume argument is zero we revert back to our normal identity.

  */
  */

-suser(cred, acflag)
-       struct ucred *cred;
-       u_short *acflag;
+int
+settid_with_pid(proc_t p, struct settid_with_pid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)

 {
 {

-#if DIAGNOSTIC
-       if (cred == NOCRED || cred == FSCRED)
-               panic("suser");
-#endif
-       if (cred->cr_uid == 0) {
-               if (acflag)
-                       *acflag |= ASU;
-               return (0);
+       proc_t target_proc;
+       struct uthread *uthread = get_bsdthread_info(current_thread());
+       kauth_cred_t my_cred, my_target_cred, my_new_cred;
+       posix_cred_t my_target_pcred;
+
+       AUDIT_ARG(pid, uap->pid);
+       AUDIT_ARG(value32, uap->assume);
+
+       if (proc_suser(p) != 0) {
+               return EPERM;
+       }
+
+       /*
+        * XXX should potentially set per thread security token (there is
+        * XXX none).
+        * XXX it is unclear whether P_SUGID should be st at this point;
+        * XXX in theory, it is being deprecated.
+        */
+
+       /*
+        * assume argument tells us to assume the identity of the process with the
+        * id passed in the pid argument.
+        */
+       if (uap->assume != 0) {
+               /* can't do this if we have already assumed an identity */
+               if ((uthread->uu_flag & UT_SETUID) != 0) {
+                       return EPERM;
+               }
+
+               target_proc = proc_find(uap->pid);
+               /* can't assume the identity of the kernel process */
+               if (target_proc == NULL || target_proc == kernproc) {
+                       if (target_proc != NULL) {
+                               proc_rele(target_proc);
+                       }
+                       return ESRCH;
+               }
+
+               /*
+                * Take a reference on the credential used in our target
+                * process then use it as the identity for our current
+                * thread.  We take an extra reference on the current
+                * credential while we muck with it, so we can do the
+                * post-compare for changes by pointer.
+                *
+                * The post-compare is needed for the case that our process
+                * credential has been changed to be identical to our thread
+                * credential following our assumption of a per-thread one,
+                * since the credential cache will maintain a unique instance.
+                */
+               kauth_cred_ref(uthread->uu_ucred);
+               my_cred = uthread->uu_ucred;
+               my_target_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(target_proc);
+               my_target_pcred = posix_cred_get(my_target_cred);
+               my_new_cred = kauth_cred_setuidgid(my_cred, my_target_pcred->cr_uid, my_target_pcred->cr_gid);
+               if (my_cred != my_new_cred) {
+                       uthread->uu_ucred = my_new_cred;
+               }
+
+               uthread->uu_flag |= UT_SETUID;
+
+               /* Drop old uthread reference or our extra reference */
+               proc_rele(target_proc);
+               kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
+               kauth_cred_unref(&my_target_cred);
+
+               return 0;
+       }
+
+       /*
+        * Otherwise, we are reverting back to normal mode of operation where
+        * delayed binding of the process credential sets the credential in
+        * the thread (uu_ucred)
+        */
+       if ((uthread->uu_flag & UT_SETUID) == 0) {
+               return EPERM;

        }
        }

-       return (EPERM);
+
+       /* revert to delayed binding of process credential */
+       my_new_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
+       kauth_cred_unref(&uthread->uu_ucred);
+       uthread->uu_ucred = my_new_cred;
+       uthread->uu_flag &= ~UT_SETUID;
+
+       return 0;

 }
 
 }
 

-int
-is_suser(void)
+
+/*
+ * setgroups1
+ *
+ * Description: Internal implementation for both the setgroups and initgroups
+ *             system calls
+ *
+ * Parameters: gidsetsize                      Number of groups in set
+ *             gidset                          Pointer to group list
+ *             gmuid                           Base gid (initgroups only!)
+ *
+ * Returns:    0                               Success
+ *     suser:EPERM                             Permision denied
+ *             EINVAL                          Invalid gidsetsize value
+ *     copyin:EFAULT                           Bad gidset or gidsetsize is
+ *                                             too large
+ *
+ * Notes:      When called from a thread running under an assumed per-thread
+ *             identity, this function will operate against the per-thread
+ *             credential, rather than against the process credential.  In
+ *             this specific case, the process credential is verified to
+ *             still be privileged at the time of the call, rather than the
+ *             per-thread credential for this operation to be permitted.
+ *
+ *             This effectively means that setgroups/initigroups calls in
+ *             a thread running a per-thread credential should occur *after*
+ *             the settid call that created it, not before (unlike setuid,
+ *             which must be called after, since it will result in privilege
+ *             being dropped).
+ *
+ *             When called normally (i.e. no per-thread assumed identity),
+ *             the per process credential is updated per POSIX.
+ *
+ *             If the credential is changed as a result of this call, then we
+ *             flag the process as having set privilege since the last exec.
+ */
+static int
+setgroups1(proc_t p, u_int ngrp, user_addr_t gidset, uid_t gmuid, __unused int32_t *retval)

 {
 {

-       struct proc *p = current_proc();
+       gid_t   newgroups[NGROUPS] = { 0 };
+       int     error;
+
+       DEBUG_CRED_ENTER("setgroups1 (%d/%d): %d 0x%016x %d\n", p->p_pid,
+           (p->p_pptr ? p->p_pptr->p_pid : 0), ngrp, gidset, gmuid);

 
 

-       if (!p)
-               return (0);
+       if (ngrp > NGROUPS) {
+               return EINVAL;
+       }

 
 

-       return (suser(p->p_ucred, &p->p_acflag) == 0);
+       if (ngrp >= 1) {
+               error = copyin(gidset,
+                   (caddr_t)newgroups, ngrp * sizeof(gid_t));
+               if (error) {
+                       return error;
+               }
+       }
+       return setgroups_internal(p, ngrp, newgroups, gmuid);

 }
 
 int
 }
 
 int

-is_suser1(void)
+setgroups_internal(proc_t p, u_int ngrp, gid_t *newgroups, uid_t gmuid)

 {
 {

-       struct proc *p = current_proc();
+       struct uthread *uthread = get_bsdthread_info(current_thread());
+       kauth_cred_t my_cred, my_new_cred;
+       int     error;
+
+       my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
+       if ((error = suser(my_cred, &p->p_acflag))) {
+               kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
+               return error;
+       }
+
+       if (ngrp < 1) {
+               ngrp = 1;
+               newgroups[0] = 0;
+       }

 
 

-       if (!p)
-               return (0);
+       if ((uthread->uu_flag & UT_SETUID) != 0) {
+#if DEBUG_CRED
+               int my_cred_flags = uthread->uu_ucred->cr_flags;
+#endif  /* DEBUG_CRED */
+               kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
+
+               /*
+                * If this thread is under an assumed identity, set the
+                * supplementary grouplist on the thread credential instead
+                * of the process one.  If we were the only reference holder,
+                * the credential is updated in place, otherwise, our reference
+                * is dropped and we get back a different cred with a reference
+                * already held on it.  Because this is per-thread, we don't
+                * need the referencing/locking/retry required for per-process.
+                */
+               my_cred = uthread->uu_ucred;
+               uthread->uu_ucred = kauth_cred_setgroups(my_cred, &newgroups[0], ngrp, gmuid);
+#if DEBUG_CRED
+               if (my_cred != uthread->uu_ucred) {
+                       DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE("setgroups1(CH)%d: %p/0x%08x->%p/0x%08x\n", p->p_pid, my_cred, my_cred_flags, uthread->uu_ucred, uthread->uu_ucred->cr_flags);
+               }
+#endif  /* DEBUG_CRED */
+       } else {
+               /*
+                * get current credential and take a reference while we muck
+                * with it
+                */
+               for (;;) {
+                       /*
+                        * Set the credential with new info.  If there is no
+                        * change, we get back the same credential we passed
+                        * in; if there is a change, we drop the reference on
+                        * the credential we passed in.  The subsequent
+                        * compare is safe, because it is a pointer compare
+                        * rather than a contents compare.
+                        */
+                       my_new_cred = kauth_cred_setgroups(my_cred, &newgroups[0], ngrp, gmuid);
+                       if (my_cred != my_new_cred) {
+                               DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE("setgroups1(CH)%d: %p/0x%08x->%p/0x%08x\n", p->p_pid, my_cred, my_cred->cr_flags, my_new_cred, my_new_cred->cr_flags);
+
+                               proc_ucred_lock(p);
+                               /*
+                                * We need to protect for a race where another
+                                * thread also changed the credential after we
+                                * took our reference.  If p_ucred has
+                                * changed then we should restart this again
+                                * with the new cred.
+                                */
+                               if (p->p_ucred != my_cred) {
+                                       proc_ucred_unlock(p);
+                                       kauth_cred_unref(&my_new_cred);
+                                       my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
+                                       /* try again */
+                                       continue;
+                               }
+                               p->p_ucred = my_new_cred;
+                               /* update cred on proc */
+                               PROC_UPDATE_CREDS_ONPROC(p);
+                               OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);
+                               proc_ucred_unlock(p);
+                       }
+                       break;
+               }
+               /* Drop old proc reference or our extra reference */
+               AUDIT_ARG(groupset, posix_cred_get(my_cred)->cr_groups, ngrp);
+               kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
+
+
+               set_security_token(p);
+       }

 
 

-       return (suser(p->p_ucred, &p->p_acflag) == 0 ||
-                       p->p_cred->p_ruid == 0 || p->p_cred->p_svuid == 0);
+       return 0;

 }
 
 }
 

+

 /*
 /*

- * Allocate a zeroed cred structure.
+ * initgroups
+ *
+ * Description: Initialize the default supplementary groups list and set the
+ *             gmuid for use by the external group resolver (if any)
+ *
+ * Parameters: uap->gidsetsize                 Number of groups in set
+ *             uap->gidset                     Pointer to group list
+ *             uap->gmuid                      Base gid
+ *
+ * Returns:    0                               Success
+ *     setgroups1:EPERM                        Permision denied
+ *     setgroups1:EINVAL                       Invalid gidsetsize value
+ *     setgroups1:EFAULT                       Bad gidset or gidsetsize is
+ *
+ * Notes:      This function opts *IN* to memberd participation
+ *
+ *             The normal purpose of this function is for a privileged
+ *             process to indicate supplementary groups and identity for
+ *             participation in extended group membership resolution prior
+ *             to dropping privilege by assuming a specific user identity.
+ *
+ *             It is the first half of the primary mechanism whereby user
+ *             identity is established to the system by programs such as
+ *             /usr/bin/login.  The second half is the drop of uid privilege
+ *             for a specific uid corresponding to the user.
+ *
+ * See also:   setgroups1()

  */
  */

-struct ucred *
-crget()
+int
+initgroups(proc_t p, struct initgroups_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)

 {
 {

-       register struct ucred *cr;
+       DEBUG_CRED_ENTER("initgroups\n");

 
 

-       MALLOC_ZONE(cr, struct ucred *, sizeof(*cr), M_CRED, M_WAITOK);
-       bzero((caddr_t)cr, sizeof(*cr));
-       cr->cr_ref = 1;
-       return (cr);
+       return setgroups1(p, uap->gidsetsize, uap->gidset, uap->gmuid, retval);

 }
 
 }
 

+

 /*
 /*

- * Free a cred structure.
- * Throws away space when ref count gets to 0.
+ * setgroups
+ *
+ * Description: Initialize the default supplementary groups list
+ *
+ * Parameters: gidsetsize                      Number of groups in set
+ *             gidset                          Pointer to group list
+ *
+ * Returns:    0                               Success
+ *     setgroups1:EPERM                        Permision denied
+ *     setgroups1:EINVAL                       Invalid gidsetsize value
+ *     setgroups1:EFAULT                       Bad gidset or gidsetsize is
+ *
+ * Notes:      This functions opts *OUT* of memberd participation.
+ *
+ *             This function exists for compatibility with POSIX.  Most user
+ *             programs should use initgroups() instead to ensure correct
+ *             participation in group membership resolution when utilizing
+ *             a directory service for authentication.
+ *
+ *             It is identical to an initgroups() call with a gmuid argument
+ *             of KAUTH_UID_NONE.
+ *
+ * See also:   setgroups1()

  */
  */

-void
-crfree(cr)
-       struct ucred *cr;
+int
+setgroups(proc_t p, struct setgroups_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)

 {
 {

-#if DIAGNOSTIC
-       if (cr == NOCRED || cr == FSCRED)
-               panic("crfree");
-#endif
-       if (--cr->cr_ref == 0)
-               FREE_ZONE((caddr_t)cr, sizeof *cr, M_CRED);
+       DEBUG_CRED_ENTER("setgroups\n");
+
+       return setgroups1(p, uap->gidsetsize, uap->gidset, KAUTH_UID_NONE, retval);

 }
 
 }
 

+

 /*
 /*

- * Copy cred structure to a new one and free the old one.
+ * Set the per-thread/per-process supplementary groups list.
+ *
+ * XXX implement setsgroups
+ *

  */
  */

-struct ucred *
-crcopy(cr)
-       struct ucred *cr;
+
+int
+setsgroups(__unused proc_t p, __unused struct setsgroups_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)

 {
 {

-       struct ucred *newcr;
+       return ENOTSUP;
+}

 
 

-#if DIAGNOSTIC
-       if (cr == NOCRED || cr == FSCRED)
-               panic("crcopy");
-#endif
-       if (cr->cr_ref == 1)
-               return (cr);
-       newcr = crget();
-       *newcr = *cr;
-       crfree(cr);
-       newcr->cr_ref = 1;
-       return (newcr);
+/*
+ * Set the per-thread/per-process whiteout groups list.
+ *
+ * XXX implement setwgroups
+ *
+ */
+
+int
+setwgroups(__unused proc_t p, __unused struct setwgroups_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
+{
+       return ENOTSUP;

 }
 
 }
 

+

 /*
 /*

- * Dup cred struct to a new held one.
+ * Check if gid is a member of the group set.
+ *
+ * XXX This interface is going away; use kauth_cred_ismember_gid() directly
+ * XXX instead.

  */
  */

-struct ucred *
-crdup(cr)
-       struct ucred *cr;
+int
+groupmember(gid_t gid, kauth_cred_t cred)

 {
 {

-       struct ucred *newcr;
+       int is_member;
+
+       if (kauth_cred_ismember_gid(cred, gid, &is_member) == 0 && is_member) {
+               return 1;
+       }
+       return 0;
+}

 
 

+
+/*
+ * Test whether the specified credentials imply "super-user"
+ * privilege; if so, and we have accounting info, set the flag
+ * indicating use of super-powers.
+ * Returns 0 or error.
+ *
+ * XXX This interface is going away; use kauth_cred_issuser() directly
+ * XXX instead.
+ *
+ * Note:       This interface exists to implement the "has used privilege"
+ *             bit (ASU) in the p_acflags field of the process, which is
+ *             only externalized via private sysctl and in process accounting
+ *             records.  The flag is technically not required in either case.
+ */
+int
+suser(kauth_cred_t cred, u_short *acflag)
+{

 #if DIAGNOSTIC
 #if DIAGNOSTIC

-       if (cr == NOCRED || cr == FSCRED)
-               panic("crdup");
+       if (!IS_VALID_CRED(cred)) {
+               panic("suser");
+       }

 #endif
 #endif

-       newcr = crget();
-       *newcr = *cr;
-       newcr->cr_ref = 1;
-       return (newcr);
+       if (kauth_cred_getuid(cred) == 0) {
+               if (acflag) {
+                       *acflag |= ASU;
+               }
+               return 0;
+       }
+       return EPERM;

 }
 
 }
 

+

 /*
 /*

- * Get login name, if available.
+ * getlogin
+ *
+ * Description:        Get login name, if available.
+ *
+ * Parameters: uap->namebuf                    User buffer for return
+ *             uap->namelen                    User buffer length
+ *
+ * Returns:    0                               Success
+ *     copyout:EFAULT
+ *
+ * Notes:      Intended to obtain a string containing the user name of the
+ *             user associated with the controlling terminal for the calling
+ *             process.
+ *
+ *             Not very useful on modern systems, due to inherent length
+ *             limitations for the static array in the session structure
+ *             which is used to store the login name.
+ *
+ *             Permitted to return NULL
+ *
+ * XXX:                Belongs in kern_proc.c

  */
  */

-struct getlogin_args {
-       char    *namebuf;
-       u_int   namelen;
-};
-/* ARGSUSED */
-getlogin(p, uap, retval)
-       struct proc *p;
-       struct getlogin_args *uap;
-       register_t *retval;
+int
+getlogin(proc_t p, struct getlogin_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)

 {
 {

+       char buffer[MAXLOGNAME + 1];
+       struct session * sessp;
+
+       bzero(buffer, MAXLOGNAME + 1);
+
+       sessp = proc_session(p);
+
+       if (uap->namelen > MAXLOGNAME) {
+               uap->namelen = MAXLOGNAME;
+       }

 
 

-       if (uap->namelen > sizeof (p->p_pgrp->pg_session->s_login))
-               uap->namelen = sizeof (p->p_pgrp->pg_session->s_login);
-       return (copyout((caddr_t) p->p_pgrp->pg_session->s_login,
-           (caddr_t)uap->namebuf, uap->namelen));
+       if (sessp != SESSION_NULL) {
+               session_lock(sessp);
+               bcopy( sessp->s_login, buffer, uap->namelen);
+               session_unlock(sessp);
+       }
+       session_rele(sessp);
+
+       return copyout((caddr_t)buffer, uap->namebuf, uap->namelen);
+}
+
+void
+setlogin_internal(proc_t p, const char login[static MAXLOGNAME])
+{
+       struct session *sessp = proc_session(p);
+
+       if (sessp != SESSION_NULL) {
+               session_lock(sessp);
+               bcopy(login, sessp->s_login, MAXLOGNAME);
+               session_unlock(sessp);
+               session_rele(sessp);
+       }

 }
 
 /*
 }
 
 /*

- * Set login name.
+ * setlogin
+ *
+ * Description:        Set login name.
+ *
+ * Parameters: uap->namebuf                    User buffer containing name
+ *
+ * Returns:    0                               Success
+ *     suser:EPERM                             Permission denied
+ *     copyinstr:EFAULT                        User buffer invalid
+ *     copyinstr:EINVAL                        Supplied name was too long
+ *
+ * Notes:      This is a utility system call to support getlogin().
+ *
+ * XXX:                Belongs in kern_proc.c

  */
  */

-struct setlogin_args {
-       char    *namebuf;
-};
-/* ARGSUSED */
-setlogin(p, uap, retval)
-       struct proc *p;
-       struct setlogin_args *uap;
-       register_t *retval;
+int
+setlogin(proc_t p, struct setlogin_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)

 {
        int error;
 {
        int error;

-       int dummy=0;
-
-       if (error = suser(p->p_ucred, &p->p_acflag))
-               return (error);
-        
-       error = copyinstr((caddr_t) uap->namebuf,
-           (caddr_t) p->p_pgrp->pg_session->s_login,
-           sizeof (p->p_pgrp->pg_session->s_login) - 1, (size_t *)&dummy);
-       if (error == ENAMETOOLONG)
+       size_t dummy = 0;
+       char buffer[MAXLOGNAME + 1];
+
+       if ((error = proc_suser(p))) {
+               return error;
+       }
+
+       bzero(&buffer[0], MAXLOGNAME + 1);
+
+
+       error = copyinstr(uap->namebuf,
+           (caddr_t) &buffer[0],
+           MAXLOGNAME - 1, (size_t *)&dummy);
+
+       setlogin_internal(p, buffer);
+
+       if (!error) {
+               AUDIT_ARG(text, buffer);
+       } else if (error == ENAMETOOLONG) {

                error = EINVAL;
                error = EINVAL;

-       return (error);
+       }
+       return error;

 }
 
 
 /* Set the secrity token of the task with current euid and eguid */
 }
 
 
 /* Set the secrity token of the task with current euid and eguid */

-kern_return_t
-set_security_token(struct proc * p)
+/*
+ * XXX This needs to change to give the task a reference and/or an opaque
+ * XXX identifier.
+ */
+int
+set_security_token(proc_t p)

 {
 {

+       return set_security_token_task_internal(p, p->task);
+}
+
+static void
+proc_calc_audit_token(proc_t p, kauth_cred_t my_cred, audit_token_t *audit_token)
+{
+       posix_cred_t my_pcred = posix_cred_get(my_cred);
+
+       /*
+        * The current layout of the Mach audit token explicitly
+        * adds these fields.  But nobody should rely on such
+        * a literal representation.  Instead, the BSM library
+        * provides a function to convert an audit token into
+        * a BSM subject.  Use of that mechanism will isolate
+        * the user of the trailer from future representation
+        * changes.
+        */
+       audit_token->val[0] = my_cred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_auid;
+       audit_token->val[1] = my_pcred->cr_uid;
+       audit_token->val[2] = my_pcred->cr_gid;
+       audit_token->val[3] = my_pcred->cr_ruid;
+       audit_token->val[4] = my_pcred->cr_rgid;
+       audit_token->val[5] = p->p_pid;
+       audit_token->val[6] = my_cred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_asid;
+       audit_token->val[7] = p->p_idversion;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the secrity token of the task with current euid and eguid
+ * The function takes a proc and a task, where proc->task might point to a
+ * different task if called from exec.
+ */
+
+int
+set_security_token_task_internal(proc_t p, void *t)
+{
+       kauth_cred_t my_cred;

        security_token_t sec_token;
        security_token_t sec_token;

+       audit_token_t    audit_token;
+       host_priv_t host_priv;
+       task_t task = t;
+
+       /*
+        * Don't allow a vfork child to override the parent's token settings
+        * (since they share a task).  Instead, the child will just have to
+        * suffer along using the parent's token until the exec().  It's all
+        * undefined behavior anyway, right?
+        */
+       if (task == current_task()) {
+               uthread_t        uthread;
+               uthread = (uthread_t)get_bsdthread_info(current_thread());
+               if (uthread->uu_flag & UT_VFORK) {
+                       return 1;
+               }
+       }
+
+       my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
+
+       proc_calc_audit_token(p, my_cred, &audit_token);
+
+       /* XXX mach_init doesn't have a p_ucred when it calls this function */
+       if (IS_VALID_CRED(my_cred)) {
+               sec_token.val[0] = kauth_cred_getuid(my_cred);
+               sec_token.val[1] = kauth_cred_getgid(my_cred);
+       } else {
+               sec_token.val[0] = 0;
+               sec_token.val[1] = 0;
+       }
+
+       host_priv = (sec_token.val[0]) ? HOST_PRIV_NULL : host_priv_self();
+#if CONFIG_MACF
+       if (host_priv != HOST_PRIV_NULL && mac_system_check_host_priv(my_cred)) {
+               host_priv = HOST_PRIV_NULL;
+       }
+#endif
+       kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
+
+#if DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG
+       /*
+        * Update the pid an proc name for importance base if any
+        */
+       task_importance_update_owner_info(task);
+#endif

 
 

-       sec_token.val[0] = p->p_ucred->cr_uid;
-       sec_token.val[1] = p->p_ucred->cr_gid;

        return host_security_set_task_token(host_security_self(),
        return host_security_set_task_token(host_security_self(),

-                                          p->task,
-                                          sec_token,
-                                          (sec_token.val[0]) ?
-                                               HOST_PRIV_NULL :
-                                               host_priv_self());
+                  task,
+                  sec_token,
+                  audit_token,
+                  host_priv) != KERN_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+void
+proc_parent_audit_token(proc_t p, audit_token_t *token_out)
+{
+       proc_t parent;
+       kauth_cred_t my_cred;
+
+       proc_list_lock();
+
+       parent = p->p_pptr;
+       my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(parent);
+       proc_calc_audit_token(parent, my_cred, token_out);
+       kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
+
+       proc_list_unlock();
+}
+
+
+int get_audit_token_pid(audit_token_t *audit_token);
+
+int
+get_audit_token_pid(audit_token_t *audit_token)
+{
+       /* keep in-sync with set_security_token (above) */
+       if (audit_token) {
+               return (int)audit_token->val[5];
+       }
+       return -1;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Fill in a struct xucred based on a kauth_cred_t.
+ */
+__private_extern__
+void
+cru2x(kauth_cred_t cr, struct xucred *xcr)
+{
+       posix_cred_t pcr = posix_cred_get(cr);
+
+       bzero(xcr, sizeof(*xcr));
+       xcr->cr_version = XUCRED_VERSION;
+       xcr->cr_uid = kauth_cred_getuid(cr);
+       xcr->cr_ngroups = pcr->cr_ngroups;
+       bcopy(pcr->cr_groups, xcr->cr_groups, sizeof(xcr->cr_groups));

 }
 }