xnu-1699.22.81.tar.gz

[apple/xnu.git] / security / mac_process.c

diff --git a/security/mac_process.c b/security/mac_process.c
index c0f3120497d4ccee2974f17ddcdb2ef29a37e3c9..631b468a90ad1614bf202b57ec39fc8d161a235c 100644 (file)
--- a/security/mac_process.c
+++ b/security/mac_process.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * Copyright (c) 2007 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2010 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_START@
  * 
@@ -205,12 +205,15 @@ mac_execve_enter(user_addr_t mac_p, struct image_params *imgp)
                return (0);
 
        if (IS_64BIT_PROCESS(current_proc())) {
-               error = copyin(mac_p, &mac, sizeof(mac));
+               struct user64_mac mac64;
+               error = copyin(mac_p, &mac64, sizeof(mac64));
+               mac.m_buflen = mac64.m_buflen;
+               mac.m_string = mac64.m_string;
        } else {
-               struct mac mac32;
+               struct user32_mac mac32;
                error = copyin(mac_p, &mac32, sizeof(mac32));
                mac.m_buflen = mac32.m_buflen;
-               mac.m_string = CAST_USER_ADDR_T(mac32.m_string);
+               mac.m_string = mac32.m_string;
        }
        if (error)
                return (error);
@@ -241,13 +244,17 @@ out:
  * When the subject's label changes, it may require revocation of privilege
  * to mapped objects.  This can't be done on-the-fly later with a unified
  * buffer cache.
+ *
+ * XXX:                CRF_MAC_ENFORCE should be in a kauth_cred_t field, rather
+ * XXX:                than a posix_cred_t field.
  */
 void
 mac_cred_label_update(kauth_cred_t cred, struct label *newlabel)
 {
+       posix_cred_t pcred = posix_cred_get(cred);
 
        /* force label to be part of "matching" for credential */
-       cred->cr_flags |= CRF_MAC_ENFORCE;
+       pcred->cr_flags |= CRF_MAC_ENFORCE;
 
        /* inform the policies of the update */
        MAC_PERFORM(cred_label_update, cred, newlabel);
@@ -348,6 +355,29 @@ mac_proc_check_get_task(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *p)
        return (error);
 }
 
+/*
+ * The type of maxprot in proc_check_map_anon must be equivalent to vm_prot_t
+ * (defined in <mach/vm_prot.h>). mac_policy.h does not include any header
+ * files, so cannot use the typedef itself.
+ */
+int
+mac_proc_check_map_anon(proc_t proc, user_addr_t u_addr,
+    user_size_t u_size, int prot, int flags, int *maxprot)
+{
+       kauth_cred_t cred;
+       int error;
+
+       if (!mac_vm_enforce ||
+           !mac_proc_check_enforce(proc, MAC_VM_ENFORCE))
+               return (0);
+
+       cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(proc);
+       MAC_CHECK(proc_check_map_anon, proc, cred, u_addr, u_size, prot, flags, maxprot);
+       kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
+
+       return (error);
+}
+
 int
 mac_proc_check_mprotect(proc_t proc,
     user_addr_t addr, user_size_t size, int prot)
@@ -544,11 +574,19 @@ mac_lctx_check_label_update(struct lctx *l, struct label *newlabel)
 }
 #endif /* LCTX */
 
-
-void
-mac_thread_userret(int code, int error, struct thread *thread)
+int
+mac_proc_check_suspend_resume(proc_t curp, int sr)
 {
+       kauth_cred_t cred;
+       int error;
 
-       if (mac_late)
-               MAC_PERFORM(thread_userret, code, error, thread);
+       if (!mac_proc_enforce ||
+           !mac_proc_check_enforce(curp, MAC_PROC_ENFORCE))
+               return (0);
+
+       cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
+       MAC_CHECK(proc_check_suspend_resume, cred, curp, sr);
+       kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
+
+       return (error);
 }