+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2008-2016 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_START@
+ *
+ * This file contains Original Code and/or Modifications of Original Code
+ * as defined in and that are subject to the Apple Public Source License
+ * Version 2.0 (the 'License'). You may not use this file except in
+ * compliance with the License. The rights granted to you under the License
+ * may not be used to create, or enable the creation or redistribution of,
+ * unlawful or unlicensed copies of an Apple operating system, or to
+ * circumvent, violate, or enable the circumvention or violation of, any
+ * terms of an Apple operating system software license agreement.
+ *
+ * Please obtain a copy of the License at
+ * http://www.opensource.apple.com/apsl/ and read it before using this file.
+ *
+ * The Original Code and all software distributed under the License are
+ * distributed on an 'AS IS' basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AND APPLE HEREBY DISCLAIMS ALL SUCH WARRANTIES,
+ * INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, QUIET ENJOYMENT OR NON-INFRINGEMENT.
+ * Please see the License for the specific language governing rights and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ *
+ * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_END@
+ */
+
/* $FreeBSD: src/sys/netinet6/esp_rijndael.c,v 1.1.2.1 2001/07/03 11:01:50 ume Exp $ */
/* $KAME: esp_rijndael.c,v 1.4 2001/03/02 05:53:05 itojun Exp $ */
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/queue.h>
+#include <sys/syslog.h>
+#include <sys/mbuf.h>
+#include <sys/mcache.h>
+
+#include <kern/locks.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <net/route.h>
#include <netinet6/esp.h>
#include <netinet6/esp_rijndael.h>
-#include <crypto/rijndael/rijndael.h>
+#include <libkern/crypto/aes.h>
+
+#include <netkey/key.h>
#include <net/net_osdep.h>
-/* as rijndael uses assymetric scheduled keys, we need to do it twice. */
+#define MAX_REALIGN_LEN 2000
+#define AES_BLOCKLEN 16
+#define ESP_GCM_SALT_LEN 4 // RFC 4106 Section 4
+#define ESP_GCM_IVLEN 8
+#define ESP_GCM_ALIGN 16
+
+extern lck_mtx_t *sadb_mutex;
+
+typedef struct {
+ ccgcm_ctx *decrypt;
+ ccgcm_ctx *encrypt;
+ ccgcm_ctx ctxt[0];
+} aes_gcm_ctx;
+
+int
+esp_aes_schedlen(
+ __unused const struct esp_algorithm *algo)
+{
+
+ return sizeof(aes_ctx);
+}
+
+int
+esp_aes_schedule(
+ __unused const struct esp_algorithm *algo,
+ struct secasvar *sav)
+{
+
+ lck_mtx_assert(sadb_mutex, LCK_MTX_ASSERT_OWNED);
+ aes_ctx *ctx = (aes_ctx*)sav->sched;
+
+ aes_decrypt_key((const unsigned char *) _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc), _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc), &ctx->decrypt);
+ aes_encrypt_key((const unsigned char *) _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc), _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc), &ctx->encrypt);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* The following 2 functions decrypt or encrypt the contents of
+ * the mbuf chain passed in keeping the IP and ESP header's in place,
+ * along with the IV.
+ * The code attempts to call the crypto code with the largest chunk
+ * of data it can based on the amount of source data in
+ * the current source mbuf and the space remaining in the current
+ * destination mbuf. The crypto code requires data to be a multiples
+ * of 16 bytes. A separate buffer is used when a 16 byte block spans
+ * mbufs.
+ *
+ * m = mbuf chain
+ * off = offset to ESP header
+ *
+ * local vars for source:
+ * soff = offset from beginning of the chain to the head of the
+ * current mbuf.
+ * scut = last mbuf that contains headers to be retained
+ * scutoff = offset to end of the headers in scut
+ * s = the current mbuf
+ * sn = current offset to data in s (next source data to process)
+ *
+ * local vars for dest:
+ * d0 = head of chain
+ * d = current mbuf
+ * dn = current offset in d (next location to store result)
+ */
+
+
int
-esp_rijndael_schedlen(algo)
- const struct esp_algorithm *algo;
+esp_cbc_decrypt_aes(
+ struct mbuf *m,
+ size_t off,
+ struct secasvar *sav,
+ const struct esp_algorithm *algo,
+ int ivlen)
{
+ struct mbuf *s;
+ struct mbuf *d, *d0, *dp;
+ int soff; /* offset from the head of chain, to head of this mbuf */
+ int sn, dn; /* offset from the head of the mbuf, to meat */
+ size_t ivoff, bodyoff;
+ u_int8_t iv[AES_BLOCKLEN] __attribute__((aligned(4))), *dptr;
+ u_int8_t sbuf[AES_BLOCKLEN] __attribute__((aligned(4))), *sp, *sp_unaligned, *sp_aligned = NULL;
+ struct mbuf *scut;
+ int scutoff;
+ int i, len;
+
+
+ if (ivlen != AES_BLOCKLEN) {
+ ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_cbc_decrypt %s: "
+ "unsupported ivlen %d\n", algo->name, ivlen));
+ m_freem(m);
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) {
+ /* RFC 1827 */
+ ivoff = off + sizeof(struct esp);
+ bodyoff = off + sizeof(struct esp) + ivlen;
+ } else {
+ ivoff = off + sizeof(struct newesp);
+ bodyoff = off + sizeof(struct newesp) + ivlen;
+ }
+
+ if (m->m_pkthdr.len < bodyoff) {
+ ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_cbc_decrypt %s: bad len %d/%lu\n",
+ algo->name, m->m_pkthdr.len, (u_int32_t)bodyoff));
+ m_freem(m);
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+ if ((m->m_pkthdr.len - bodyoff) % AES_BLOCKLEN) {
+ ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_cbc_decrypt %s: "
+ "payload length must be multiple of %d\n",
+ algo->name, AES_BLOCKLEN));
+ m_freem(m);
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* grab iv */
+ m_copydata(m, ivoff, ivlen, (caddr_t) iv);
- return sizeof(keyInstance) * 2;
+ s = m;
+ soff = sn = dn = 0;
+ d = d0 = dp = NULL;
+ sp = dptr = NULL;
+
+ /* skip header/IV offset */
+ while (soff < bodyoff) {
+ if (soff + s->m_len > bodyoff) {
+ sn = bodyoff - soff;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ soff += s->m_len;
+ s = s->m_next;
+ }
+ scut = s;
+ scutoff = sn;
+
+ /* skip over empty mbuf */
+ while (s && s->m_len == 0)
+ s = s->m_next;
+
+ while (soff < m->m_pkthdr.len) {
+ /* source */
+ if (sn + AES_BLOCKLEN <= s->m_len) {
+ /* body is continuous */
+ sp = mtod(s, u_int8_t *) + sn;
+ len = s->m_len - sn;
+ len -= len % AES_BLOCKLEN; // full blocks only
+ } else {
+ /* body is non-continuous */
+ m_copydata(s, sn, AES_BLOCKLEN, (caddr_t) sbuf);
+ sp = sbuf;
+ len = AES_BLOCKLEN; // 1 block only in sbuf
+ }
+
+ /* destination */
+ if (!d || dn + AES_BLOCKLEN > d->m_len) {
+ if (d)
+ dp = d;
+ MGET(d, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA);
+ i = m->m_pkthdr.len - (soff + sn);
+ if (d && i > MLEN) {
+ MCLGET(d, M_DONTWAIT);
+ if ((d->m_flags & M_EXT) == 0) {
+ d = m_mbigget(d, M_DONTWAIT);
+ if ((d->m_flags & M_EXT) == 0) {
+ m_free(d);
+ d = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (!d) {
+ m_freem(m);
+ if (d0)
+ m_freem(d0);
+ return ENOBUFS;
+ }
+ if (!d0)
+ d0 = d;
+ if (dp)
+ dp->m_next = d;
+
+ // try to make mbuf data aligned
+ if (!IPSEC_IS_P2ALIGNED(d->m_data)) {
+ m_adj(d, IPSEC_GET_P2UNALIGNED_OFS(d->m_data));
+ }
+
+ d->m_len = M_TRAILINGSPACE(d);
+ d->m_len -= d->m_len % AES_BLOCKLEN;
+ if (d->m_len > i)
+ d->m_len = i;
+ dptr = mtod(d, u_int8_t *);
+ dn = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* adjust len if greater than space available in dest */
+ if (len > d->m_len - dn)
+ len = d->m_len - dn;
+
+ /* decrypt */
+ // check input pointer alignment and use a separate aligned buffer (if sp is unaligned on 4-byte boundary).
+ if (IPSEC_IS_P2ALIGNED(sp)) {
+ sp_unaligned = NULL;
+ } else {
+ sp_unaligned = sp;
+ if (len > MAX_REALIGN_LEN) {
+ return ENOBUFS;
+ }
+ if (sp_aligned == NULL) {
+ sp_aligned = (u_int8_t *)_MALLOC(MAX_REALIGN_LEN, M_SECA, M_DONTWAIT);
+ if (sp_aligned == NULL)
+ return ENOMEM;
+ }
+ sp = sp_aligned;
+ memcpy(sp, sp_unaligned, len);
+ }
+ // no need to check output pointer alignment
+ aes_decrypt_cbc(sp, iv, len >> 4, dptr + dn,
+ (aes_decrypt_ctx*)(&(((aes_ctx*)sav->sched)->decrypt)));
+
+ // update unaligned pointers
+ if (!IPSEC_IS_P2ALIGNED(sp_unaligned)) {
+ sp = sp_unaligned;
+ }
+
+ /* udpate offsets */
+ sn += len;
+ dn += len;
+
+ // next iv
+ bcopy(sp + len - AES_BLOCKLEN, iv, AES_BLOCKLEN);
+
+ /* find the next source block */
+ while (s && sn >= s->m_len) {
+ sn -= s->m_len;
+ soff += s->m_len;
+ s = s->m_next;
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ /* free un-needed source mbufs and add dest mbufs to chain */
+ m_freem(scut->m_next);
+ scut->m_len = scutoff;
+ scut->m_next = d0;
+
+ // free memory
+ if (sp_aligned != NULL) {
+ FREE(sp_aligned, M_SECA);
+ sp_aligned = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* just in case */
+ bzero(iv, sizeof(iv));
+ bzero(sbuf, sizeof(sbuf));
+
+ return 0;
}
int
-esp_rijndael_schedule(algo, sav)
- const struct esp_algorithm *algo;
- struct secasvar *sav;
+esp_cbc_encrypt_aes(
+ struct mbuf *m,
+ size_t off,
+ __unused size_t plen,
+ struct secasvar *sav,
+ const struct esp_algorithm *algo,
+ int ivlen)
{
- keyInstance *k;
-
- k = (keyInstance *)sav->sched;
- if (rijndael_makeKey(&k[0], DIR_DECRYPT, _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc) * 8,
- _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc)) < 0)
- return -1;
- if (rijndael_makeKey(&k[1], DIR_ENCRYPT, _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc) * 8,
- _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc)) < 0)
- return -1;
+ struct mbuf *s;
+ struct mbuf *d, *d0, *dp;
+ int soff; /* offset from the head of chain, to head of this mbuf */
+ int sn, dn; /* offset from the head of the mbuf, to meat */
+ size_t ivoff, bodyoff;
+ u_int8_t *ivp, *dptr, *ivp_unaligned;
+ u_int8_t sbuf[AES_BLOCKLEN] __attribute__((aligned(4))), *sp, *sp_unaligned, *sp_aligned = NULL;
+ u_int8_t ivp_aligned_buf[AES_BLOCKLEN] __attribute__((aligned(4)));
+ struct mbuf *scut;
+ int scutoff;
+ int i, len;
+
+ if (ivlen != AES_BLOCKLEN) {
+ ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_cbc_encrypt %s: "
+ "unsupported ivlen %d\n", algo->name, ivlen));
+ m_freem(m);
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) {
+ /* RFC 1827 */
+ ivoff = off + sizeof(struct esp);
+ bodyoff = off + sizeof(struct esp) + ivlen;
+ } else {
+ ivoff = off + sizeof(struct newesp);
+ bodyoff = off + sizeof(struct newesp) + ivlen;
+ }
+
+ /* put iv into the packet */
+ m_copyback(m, ivoff, ivlen, sav->iv);
+ ivp = (u_int8_t *) sav->iv;
+
+ if (m->m_pkthdr.len < bodyoff) {
+ ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_cbc_encrypt %s: bad len %d/%lu\n",
+ algo->name, m->m_pkthdr.len, (u_int32_t)bodyoff));
+ m_freem(m);
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+ if ((m->m_pkthdr.len - bodyoff) % AES_BLOCKLEN) {
+ ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_cbc_encrypt %s: "
+ "payload length must be multiple of %lu\n",
+ algo->name, AES_BLOCKLEN));
+ m_freem(m);
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ s = m;
+ soff = sn = dn = 0;
+ d = d0 = dp = NULL;
+ sp = dptr = NULL;
+
+ /* skip headers/IV */
+ while (soff < bodyoff) {
+ if (soff + s->m_len > bodyoff) {
+ sn = bodyoff - soff;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ soff += s->m_len;
+ s = s->m_next;
+ }
+ scut = s;
+ scutoff = sn;
+
+ /* skip over empty mbuf */
+ while (s && s->m_len == 0)
+ s = s->m_next;
+
+ while (soff < m->m_pkthdr.len) {
+ /* source */
+ if (sn + AES_BLOCKLEN <= s->m_len) {
+ /* body is continuous */
+ sp = mtod(s, u_int8_t *) + sn;
+ len = s->m_len - sn;
+ len -= len % AES_BLOCKLEN; // full blocks only
+ } else {
+ /* body is non-continuous */
+ m_copydata(s, sn, AES_BLOCKLEN, (caddr_t) sbuf);
+ sp = sbuf;
+ len = AES_BLOCKLEN; // 1 block only in sbuf
+ }
+
+ /* destination */
+ if (!d || dn + AES_BLOCKLEN > d->m_len) {
+ if (d)
+ dp = d;
+ MGET(d, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA);
+ i = m->m_pkthdr.len - (soff + sn);
+ if (d && i > MLEN) {
+ MCLGET(d, M_DONTWAIT);
+ if ((d->m_flags & M_EXT) == 0) {
+ d = m_mbigget(d, M_DONTWAIT);
+ if ((d->m_flags & M_EXT) == 0) {
+ m_free(d);
+ d = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (!d) {
+ m_freem(m);
+ if (d0)
+ m_freem(d0);
+ return ENOBUFS;
+ }
+ if (!d0)
+ d0 = d;
+ if (dp)
+ dp->m_next = d;
+
+ // try to make mbuf data aligned
+ if (!IPSEC_IS_P2ALIGNED(d->m_data)) {
+ m_adj(d, IPSEC_GET_P2UNALIGNED_OFS(d->m_data));
+ }
+
+ d->m_len = M_TRAILINGSPACE(d);
+ d->m_len -= d->m_len % AES_BLOCKLEN;
+ if (d->m_len > i)
+ d->m_len = i;
+ dptr = mtod(d, u_int8_t *);
+ dn = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* adjust len if greater than space available */
+ if (len > d->m_len - dn)
+ len = d->m_len - dn;
+
+ /* encrypt */
+ // check input pointer alignment and use a separate aligned buffer (if sp is not aligned on 4-byte boundary).
+ if (IPSEC_IS_P2ALIGNED(sp)) {
+ sp_unaligned = NULL;
+ } else {
+ sp_unaligned = sp;
+ if (len > MAX_REALIGN_LEN) {
+ return ENOBUFS;
+ }
+ if (sp_aligned == NULL) {
+ sp_aligned = (u_int8_t *)_MALLOC(MAX_REALIGN_LEN, M_SECA, M_DONTWAIT);
+ if (sp_aligned == NULL)
+ return ENOMEM;
+ }
+ sp = sp_aligned;
+ memcpy(sp, sp_unaligned, len);
+ }
+ // check ivp pointer alignment and use a separate aligned buffer (if ivp is not aligned on 4-byte boundary).
+ if (IPSEC_IS_P2ALIGNED(ivp)) {
+ ivp_unaligned = NULL;
+ } else {
+ ivp_unaligned = ivp;
+ ivp = ivp_aligned_buf;
+ memcpy(ivp, ivp_unaligned, AES_BLOCKLEN);
+ }
+ // no need to check output pointer alignment
+ aes_encrypt_cbc(sp, ivp, len >> 4, dptr + dn,
+ (aes_encrypt_ctx*)(&(((aes_ctx*)sav->sched)->encrypt)));
+
+ // update unaligned pointers
+ if (!IPSEC_IS_P2ALIGNED(sp_unaligned)) {
+ sp = sp_unaligned;
+ }
+ if (!IPSEC_IS_P2ALIGNED(ivp_unaligned)) {
+ ivp = ivp_unaligned;
+ }
+
+ /* update offsets */
+ sn += len;
+ dn += len;
+
+ /* next iv */
+ ivp = dptr + dn - AES_BLOCKLEN; // last block encrypted
+
+ /* find the next source block and skip empty mbufs */
+ while (s && sn >= s->m_len) {
+ sn -= s->m_len;
+ soff += s->m_len;
+ s = s->m_next;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* free un-needed source mbufs and add dest mbufs to chain */
+ m_freem(scut->m_next);
+ scut->m_len = scutoff;
+ scut->m_next = d0;
+
+ // free memory
+ if (sp_aligned != NULL) {
+ FREE(sp_aligned, M_SECA);
+ sp_aligned = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* just in case */
+ bzero(sbuf, sizeof(sbuf));
+ key_sa_stir_iv(sav);
+
return 0;
}
int
-esp_rijndael_blockdecrypt(algo, sav, s, d)
- const struct esp_algorithm *algo;
- struct secasvar *sav;
- u_int8_t *s;
- u_int8_t *d;
+esp_gcm_schedlen(
+ __unused const struct esp_algorithm *algo)
+{
+ return (sizeof(aes_gcm_ctx) + aes_decrypt_get_ctx_size_gcm() + aes_encrypt_get_ctx_size_gcm() + ESP_GCM_ALIGN);
+}
+
+int
+esp_gcm_schedule( __unused const struct esp_algorithm *algo,
+ struct secasvar *sav)
+{
+ lck_mtx_assert(sadb_mutex, LCK_MTX_ASSERT_OWNED);
+ aes_gcm_ctx *ctx = (aes_gcm_ctx*)P2ROUNDUP(sav->sched, ESP_GCM_ALIGN);
+ u_int ivlen = sav->ivlen;
+ unsigned char nonce[ESP_GCM_SALT_LEN+ivlen];
+ int rc;
+
+ ctx->decrypt = &ctx->ctxt[0];
+ ctx->encrypt = &ctx->ctxt[aes_decrypt_get_ctx_size_gcm() / sizeof(ccgcm_ctx)];
+
+ rc = aes_decrypt_key_gcm((const unsigned char *) _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc), _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc)-ESP_GCM_SALT_LEN, ctx->decrypt);
+ if (rc) {
+ return (rc);
+ }
+
+ bzero(nonce, ESP_GCM_SALT_LEN + ivlen);
+ memcpy(nonce, _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc)+_KEYLEN(sav->key_enc)-ESP_GCM_SALT_LEN, ESP_GCM_SALT_LEN);
+ memcpy(nonce+ESP_GCM_SALT_LEN, sav->iv, ivlen);
+
+ rc = aes_encrypt_key_with_iv_gcm((const unsigned char *) _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc), _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc)-ESP_GCM_SALT_LEN, nonce, ctx->encrypt);
+ if (rc) {
+ return (rc);
+ }
+
+ rc = aes_encrypt_reset_gcm(ctx->encrypt);
+ if (rc) {
+ return (rc);
+ }
+
+ return (rc);
+}
+
+int
+esp_gcm_encrypt_finalize(struct secasvar *sav,
+ unsigned char *tag, unsigned int tag_bytes)
+{
+ aes_gcm_ctx *ctx = (aes_gcm_ctx*)P2ROUNDUP(sav->sched, ESP_GCM_ALIGN);
+ return (aes_encrypt_finalize_gcm(tag, tag_bytes, ctx->encrypt));
+}
+
+int
+esp_gcm_decrypt_finalize(struct secasvar *sav,
+ unsigned char *tag, unsigned int tag_bytes)
{
- cipherInstance c;
- keyInstance *p;
-
- /* does not take advantage of CBC mode support */
- bzero(&c, sizeof(c));
- if (rijndael_cipherInit(&c, MODE_ECB, NULL) < 0)
- return -1;
- p = (keyInstance *)sav->sched;
- if (rijndael_blockDecrypt(&c, &p[0], s, algo->padbound * 8, d) < 0)
- return -1;
+ aes_gcm_ctx *ctx = (aes_gcm_ctx*)P2ROUNDUP(sav->sched, ESP_GCM_ALIGN);
+ return (aes_decrypt_finalize_gcm(tag, tag_bytes, ctx->decrypt));
+}
+
+int
+esp_gcm_encrypt_aes(
+ struct mbuf *m,
+ size_t off,
+ __unused size_t plen,
+ struct secasvar *sav,
+ const struct esp_algorithm *algo __unused,
+ int ivlen)
+{
+ struct mbuf *s;
+ struct mbuf *d, *d0, *dp;
+ int soff; /* offset from the head of chain, to head of this mbuf */
+ int sn, dn; /* offset from the head of the mbuf, to meat */
+ size_t ivoff, bodyoff;
+ u_int8_t *dptr, *sp, *sp_unaligned, *sp_aligned = NULL;
+ aes_gcm_ctx *ctx;
+ struct mbuf *scut;
+ int scutoff;
+ int i, len;
+ unsigned char nonce[ESP_GCM_SALT_LEN+ivlen];
+
+ if (ivlen != ESP_GCM_IVLEN) {
+ ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "%s: unsupported ivlen %d\n", __FUNCTION__, ivlen));
+ m_freem(m);
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) {
+ /* RFC 1827 */
+ ivoff = off + sizeof(struct esp);
+ bodyoff = off + sizeof(struct esp) + ivlen;
+ } else {
+ ivoff = off + sizeof(struct newesp);
+ bodyoff = off + sizeof(struct newesp) + ivlen;
+ }
+
+ bzero(nonce, ESP_GCM_SALT_LEN+ivlen);
+ /* generate new iv */
+ ctx = (aes_gcm_ctx *)P2ROUNDUP(sav->sched, ESP_GCM_ALIGN);
+
+ if (aes_encrypt_reset_gcm(ctx->encrypt)) {
+ ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "%s: gcm reset failure\n", __FUNCTION__));
+ m_freem(m);
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (aes_encrypt_inc_iv_gcm((unsigned char *)nonce, ctx->encrypt)) {
+ ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "%s: iv generation failure\n", __FUNCTION__));
+ m_freem(m);
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The IV is now generated within corecrypto and
+ * is provided to ESP using aes_encrypt_inc_iv_gcm().
+ * This makes the sav->iv redundant and is no longer
+ * used in GCM operations. But we still copy the IV
+ * back to sav->iv to ensure that any future code reading
+ * this value will get the latest IV.
+ */
+ memcpy(sav->iv, (nonce + ESP_GCM_SALT_LEN), ivlen);
+ m_copyback(m, ivoff, ivlen, sav->iv);
+ bzero(nonce, ESP_GCM_SALT_LEN+ivlen);
+
+ if (m->m_pkthdr.len < bodyoff) {
+ ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "%s: bad len %d/%lu\n", __FUNCTION__,
+ m->m_pkthdr.len, (u_int32_t)bodyoff));
+ m_freem(m);
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* Set Additional Authentication Data */
+ if (!(sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD)) {
+ struct newesp esp;
+ m_copydata(m, off, sizeof(esp), (caddr_t) &esp);
+ if (aes_encrypt_aad_gcm((unsigned char*)&esp, sizeof(esp), ctx->encrypt)) {
+ ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "%s: packet decryption AAD failure\n", __FUNCTION__));
+ m_freem(m);
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ s = m;
+ soff = sn = dn = 0;
+ d = d0 = dp = NULL;
+ sp = dptr = NULL;
+
+ /* skip headers/IV */
+ while (soff < bodyoff) {
+ if (soff + s->m_len > bodyoff) {
+ sn = bodyoff - soff;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ soff += s->m_len;
+ s = s->m_next;
+ }
+ scut = s;
+ scutoff = sn;
+
+ /* skip over empty mbuf */
+ while (s && s->m_len == 0)
+ s = s->m_next;
+
+ while (soff < m->m_pkthdr.len) {
+ /* source */
+ sp = mtod(s, u_int8_t *) + sn;
+ len = s->m_len - sn;
+
+ /* destination */
+ if (!d || (dn + len > d->m_len)) {
+ if (d)
+ dp = d;
+ MGET(d, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA);
+ i = m->m_pkthdr.len - (soff + sn);
+ if (d && i > MLEN) {
+ MCLGET(d, M_DONTWAIT);
+ if ((d->m_flags & M_EXT) == 0) {
+ d = m_mbigget(d, M_DONTWAIT);
+ if ((d->m_flags & M_EXT) == 0) {
+ m_free(d);
+ d = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (!d) {
+ m_freem(m);
+ if (d0)
+ m_freem(d0);
+ return ENOBUFS;
+ }
+ if (!d0)
+ d0 = d;
+ if (dp)
+ dp->m_next = d;
+
+ // try to make mbuf data aligned
+ if (!IPSEC_IS_P2ALIGNED(d->m_data)) {
+ m_adj(d, IPSEC_GET_P2UNALIGNED_OFS(d->m_data));
+ }
+
+ d->m_len = M_TRAILINGSPACE(d);
+
+ if (d->m_len > i)
+ d->m_len = i;
+
+ dptr = mtod(d, u_int8_t *);
+ dn = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* adjust len if greater than space available */
+ if (len > d->m_len - dn)
+ len = d->m_len - dn;
+
+ /* encrypt */
+ // check input pointer alignment and use a separate aligned buffer (if sp is not aligned on 4-byte boundary).
+ if (IPSEC_IS_P2ALIGNED(sp)) {
+ sp_unaligned = NULL;
+ } else {
+ sp_unaligned = sp;
+ if (len > MAX_REALIGN_LEN) {
+ return ENOBUFS;
+ }
+ if (sp_aligned == NULL) {
+ sp_aligned = (u_int8_t *)_MALLOC(MAX_REALIGN_LEN, M_SECA, M_DONTWAIT);
+ if (sp_aligned == NULL)
+ return ENOMEM;
+ }
+ sp = sp_aligned;
+ memcpy(sp, sp_unaligned, len);
+ }
+
+ if (aes_encrypt_gcm(sp, len, dptr+dn, ctx->encrypt)) {
+ ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "%s: failed to encrypt\n", __FUNCTION__));
+ m_freem(m);
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ // update unaligned pointers
+ if (!IPSEC_IS_P2ALIGNED(sp_unaligned)) {
+ sp = sp_unaligned;
+ }
+
+ /* update offsets */
+ sn += len;
+ dn += len;
+
+ /* find the next source block and skip empty mbufs */
+ while (s && sn >= s->m_len) {
+ sn -= s->m_len;
+ soff += s->m_len;
+ s = s->m_next;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* free un-needed source mbufs and add dest mbufs to chain */
+ m_freem(scut->m_next);
+ scut->m_len = scutoff;
+ scut->m_next = d0;
+
+ // free memory
+ if (sp_aligned != NULL) {
+ FREE(sp_aligned, M_SECA);
+ sp_aligned = NULL;
+ }
+
return 0;
}
int
-esp_rijndael_blockencrypt(algo, sav, s, d)
- const struct esp_algorithm *algo;
- struct secasvar *sav;
- u_int8_t *s;
- u_int8_t *d;
+esp_gcm_decrypt_aes(
+ struct mbuf *m,
+ size_t off,
+ struct secasvar *sav,
+ const struct esp_algorithm *algo __unused,
+ int ivlen)
{
- cipherInstance c;
- keyInstance *p;
-
- /* does not take advantage of CBC mode support */
- bzero(&c, sizeof(c));
- if (rijndael_cipherInit(&c, MODE_ECB, NULL) < 0)
- return -1;
- p = (keyInstance *)sav->sched;
- if (rijndael_blockEncrypt(&c, &p[1], s, algo->padbound * 8, d) < 0)
- return -1;
+ struct mbuf *s;
+ struct mbuf *d, *d0, *dp;
+ int soff; /* offset from the head of chain, to head of this mbuf */
+ int sn, dn; /* offset from the head of the mbuf, to meat */
+ size_t ivoff, bodyoff;
+ u_int8_t iv[ESP_GCM_IVLEN] __attribute__((aligned(4))), *dptr;
+ u_int8_t *sp, *sp_unaligned, *sp_aligned = NULL;
+ aes_gcm_ctx *ctx;
+ struct mbuf *scut;
+ int scutoff;
+ int i, len;
+ unsigned char nonce[ESP_GCM_SALT_LEN+ivlen];
+
+ if (ivlen != ESP_GCM_IVLEN) {
+ ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "%s: unsupported ivlen %d\n", __FUNCTION__, ivlen));
+ m_freem(m);
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) {
+ /* RFC 1827 */
+ ivoff = off + sizeof(struct esp);
+ bodyoff = off + sizeof(struct esp) + ivlen;
+ } else {
+ ivoff = off + sizeof(struct newesp);
+ bodyoff = off + sizeof(struct newesp) + ivlen;
+ }
+
+ if (m->m_pkthdr.len < bodyoff) {
+ ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "%s: bad len %d/%lu\n", __FUNCTION__,
+ m->m_pkthdr.len, (u_int32_t)bodyoff));
+ m_freem(m);
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* grab iv */
+ m_copydata(m, ivoff, ivlen, (caddr_t) iv);
+
+ /* Set IV */
+ memcpy(nonce, _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc)+_KEYLEN(sav->key_enc)-ESP_GCM_SALT_LEN, ESP_GCM_SALT_LEN);
+ memcpy(nonce+ESP_GCM_SALT_LEN, iv, ivlen);
+
+ ctx = (aes_gcm_ctx *)P2ROUNDUP(sav->sched, ESP_GCM_ALIGN);
+ if (aes_decrypt_set_iv_gcm(nonce, sizeof(nonce), ctx->decrypt)) {
+ ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "%s: failed to set IV\n", __FUNCTION__));
+ m_freem(m);
+ bzero(nonce, sizeof(nonce));
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+ bzero(nonce, sizeof(nonce));
+
+ /* Set Additional Authentication Data */
+ if (!(sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD)) {
+ struct newesp esp;
+ m_copydata(m, off, sizeof(esp), (caddr_t) &esp);
+ if (aes_decrypt_aad_gcm((unsigned char*)&esp, sizeof(esp), ctx->decrypt)) {
+ ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "%s: packet decryption AAD failure\n", __FUNCTION__));
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ s = m;
+ soff = sn = dn = 0;
+ d = d0 = dp = NULL;
+ sp = dptr = NULL;
+
+ /* skip header/IV offset */
+ while (soff < bodyoff) {
+ if (soff + s->m_len > bodyoff) {
+ sn = bodyoff - soff;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ soff += s->m_len;
+ s = s->m_next;
+ }
+ scut = s;
+ scutoff = sn;
+
+ /* skip over empty mbuf */
+ while (s && s->m_len == 0)
+ s = s->m_next;
+
+ while (soff < m->m_pkthdr.len) {
+ /* source */
+ sp = mtod(s, u_int8_t *) + sn;
+ len = s->m_len - sn;
+
+ /* destination */
+ if (!d || (dn + len > d->m_len)) {
+ if (d)
+ dp = d;
+ MGET(d, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA);
+ i = m->m_pkthdr.len - (soff + sn);
+ if (d && i > MLEN) {
+ MCLGET(d, M_DONTWAIT);
+ if ((d->m_flags & M_EXT) == 0) {
+ d = m_mbigget(d, M_DONTWAIT);
+ if ((d->m_flags & M_EXT) == 0) {
+ m_free(d);
+ d = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (!d) {
+ m_freem(m);
+ if (d0)
+ m_freem(d0);
+ return ENOBUFS;
+ }
+ if (!d0)
+ d0 = d;
+ if (dp)
+ dp->m_next = d;
+
+ // try to make mbuf data aligned
+ if (!IPSEC_IS_P2ALIGNED(d->m_data)) {
+ m_adj(d, IPSEC_GET_P2UNALIGNED_OFS(d->m_data));
+ }
+
+ d->m_len = M_TRAILINGSPACE(d);
+
+ if (d->m_len > i)
+ d->m_len = i;
+
+ dptr = mtod(d, u_int8_t *);
+ dn = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* adjust len if greater than space available in dest */
+ if (len > d->m_len - dn)
+ len = d->m_len - dn;
+
+ /* Decrypt */
+ // check input pointer alignment and use a separate aligned buffer (if sp is unaligned on 4-byte boundary).
+ if (IPSEC_IS_P2ALIGNED(sp)) {
+ sp_unaligned = NULL;
+ } else {
+ sp_unaligned = sp;
+ if (len > MAX_REALIGN_LEN) {
+ return ENOBUFS;
+ }
+ if (sp_aligned == NULL) {
+ sp_aligned = (u_int8_t *)_MALLOC(MAX_REALIGN_LEN, M_SECA, M_DONTWAIT);
+ if (sp_aligned == NULL)
+ return ENOMEM;
+ }
+ sp = sp_aligned;
+ memcpy(sp, sp_unaligned, len);
+ }
+ // no need to check output pointer alignment
+
+ if (aes_decrypt_gcm(sp, len, dptr + dn, ctx->decrypt)) {
+ ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "%s: failed to decrypt\n", __FUNCTION__));
+ m_freem(m);
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ // update unaligned pointers
+ if (!IPSEC_IS_P2ALIGNED(sp_unaligned)) {
+ sp = sp_unaligned;
+ }
+
+ /* udpate offsets */
+ sn += len;
+ dn += len;
+
+ /* find the next source block */
+ while (s && sn >= s->m_len) {
+ sn -= s->m_len;
+ soff += s->m_len;
+ s = s->m_next;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* free un-needed source mbufs and add dest mbufs to chain */
+ m_freem(scut->m_next);
+ scut->m_len = scutoff;
+ scut->m_next = d0;
+
+ // free memory
+ if (sp_aligned != NULL) {
+ FREE(sp_aligned, M_SECA);
+ sp_aligned = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* just in case */
+ bzero(iv, sizeof(iv));
+
return 0;
}