#include <nfs/xdr_subs.h>
#include <nfs/nfsm_subs.h>
#include <nfs/nfs_gss.h>
-#include "nfs_gss_crypto.h"
#include <mach_assert.h>
#include <kern/assert.h>
#define NFS_GSS_DBG(...) NFS_DBG(NFS_FAC_GSS, 7, ## __VA_ARGS__)
#define NFS_GSS_ISDBG (NFS_DEBUG_FACILITY & NFS_FAC_GSS)
-typedef struct {
- int type;
- union {
- MD5_DESCBC_CTX m_ctx;
- HMAC_SHA1_DES3KD_CTX h_ctx;
- };
-} GSS_DIGEST_CTX;
-
-#define MAX_DIGEST SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
-#ifdef NFS_KERNEL_DEBUG
-#define HASHLEN(ki) (((ki)->hash_len > MAX_DIGEST) ? \
- (panic("nfs_gss.c:%d ki->hash_len is invalid = %d\n", __LINE__, (ki)->hash_len), MAX_DIGEST) : (ki)->hash_len)
-#else
-#define HASHLEN(ki) (((ki)->hash_len > MAX_DIGEST) ? \
- (printf("nfs_gss.c:%d ki->hash_len is invalid = %d\n", __LINE__, (ki)->hash_len), MAX_DIGEST) : (ki)->hash_len)
-#endif
#if NFSSERVER
u_long nfs_gss_svc_ctx_hash;
#if NFSCLIENT
lck_grp_t *nfs_gss_clnt_grp;
-int nfs_single_des;
#endif /* NFSCLIENT */
-/*
- * These octet strings are used to encode/decode ASN.1 tokens
- * in the RPCSEC_GSS verifiers.
- */
-static u_char krb5_tokhead[] __attribute__((unused)) = { 0x60, 0x23 };
- u_char krb5_mech[11] = { 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02 };
-static u_char krb5_mic[] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff };
-static u_char krb5_mic3[] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff };
-static u_char krb5_wrap[] = { 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff };
-static u_char krb5_wrap3[] = { 0x02, 0x01, 0x04, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff };
-static u_char iv0[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; // DES MAC Initialization Vector
-
-#define ALG_MIC(ki) (((ki)->type == NFS_GSS_1DES) ? krb5_mic : krb5_mic3)
-#define ALG_WRAP(ki) (((ki)->type == NFS_GSS_1DES) ? krb5_wrap : krb5_wrap3)
-
-/*
- * The size of the Kerberos v5 ASN.1 token
- * in the verifier.
- *
- * Note that the second octet of the krb5_tokhead (0x23) is a
- * DER-encoded size field that has variable length. If the size
- * is 128 bytes or greater, then it uses two bytes, three bytes
- * if 65536 or greater, and so on. Since the MIC tokens are
- * separate from the data, the size is always the same: 35 bytes (0x23).
- * However, the wrap token is different. Its size field includes the
- * size of the token + the encrypted data that follows. So the size
- * field may be two, three or four bytes.
- */
-#define KRB5_SZ_TOKHEAD sizeof(krb5_tokhead)
-#define KRB5_SZ_MECH sizeof(krb5_mech)
-#define KRB5_SZ_ALG sizeof(krb5_mic) // 8 - same as krb5_wrap
-#define KRB5_SZ_SEQ 8
-#define KRB5_SZ_EXTRA 3 // a wrap token may be longer by up to this many octets
-#define KRB5_SZ_TOKEN_NOSUM (KRB5_SZ_TOKHEAD + KRB5_SZ_MECH + KRB5_SZ_ALG + KRB5_SZ_SEQ)
-#define KRB5_SZ_TOKEN(cksumlen) ((cksumlen) + KRB5_SZ_TOKEN_NOSUM)
-#define KRB5_SZ_TOKMAX(cksumlen) (KRB5_SZ_TOKEN(cksumlen) + KRB5_SZ_EXTRA)
+#define KRB5_MAX_MIC_SIZE 128
+uint8_t krb5_mech_oid[11] = { 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02 };
+static uint8_t xdrpad[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00};
#if NFSCLIENT
static int nfs_gss_clnt_ctx_find(struct nfsreq *);
static int nfs_gss_clnt_ctx_init_retry(struct nfsreq *, struct nfs_gss_clnt_ctx *);
static int nfs_gss_clnt_ctx_callserver(struct nfsreq *, struct nfs_gss_clnt_ctx *);
static uint8_t *nfs_gss_clnt_svcname(struct nfsmount *, gssd_nametype *, uint32_t *);
-static int nfs_gss_clnt_gssd_upcall(struct nfsreq *, struct nfs_gss_clnt_ctx *);
+static int nfs_gss_clnt_gssd_upcall(struct nfsreq *, struct nfs_gss_clnt_ctx *, uint32_t);
void nfs_gss_clnt_ctx_neg_cache_reap(struct nfsmount *);
static void nfs_gss_clnt_ctx_clean(struct nfs_gss_clnt_ctx *);
-static int nfs_gss_clnt_ctx_copy(struct nfs_gss_clnt_ctx *, struct nfs_gss_clnt_ctx **, gss_key_info *);
+static int nfs_gss_clnt_ctx_copy(struct nfs_gss_clnt_ctx *, struct nfs_gss_clnt_ctx **);
static void nfs_gss_clnt_ctx_destroy(struct nfs_gss_clnt_ctx *);
static void nfs_gss_clnt_log_error(struct nfsreq *, struct nfs_gss_clnt_ctx *, uint32_t, uint32_t);
#endif /* NFSCLIENT */
static mach_port_t host_copy_special_port(mach_port_t);
static void nfs_gss_mach_alloc_buffer(u_char *, uint32_t, vm_map_copy_t *);
static int nfs_gss_mach_vmcopyout(vm_map_copy_t, uint32_t, u_char *);
-static int nfs_gss_token_get(gss_key_info *ki, u_char *, u_char *, int, uint32_t *, u_char *);
-static int nfs_gss_token_put(gss_key_info *ki, u_char *, u_char *, int, int, u_char *);
-static int nfs_gss_der_length_size(int);
-static void nfs_gss_der_length_put(u_char **, int);
-static int nfs_gss_der_length_get(u_char **);
+
static int nfs_gss_mchain_length(mbuf_t);
static int nfs_gss_append_chain(struct nfsm_chain *, mbuf_t);
static void nfs_gss_nfsm_chain(struct nfsm_chain *, mbuf_t);
-static void nfs_gss_cksum_mchain(gss_key_info *, mbuf_t, u_char *, int, int, u_char *);
-static void nfs_gss_cksum_chain(gss_key_info *, struct nfsm_chain *, u_char *, int, int, u_char *);
-static void nfs_gss_cksum_rep(gss_key_info *, uint32_t, u_char *);
-static void nfs_gss_encrypt_mchain(gss_key_info *, mbuf_t, int, int, int);
-static void nfs_gss_encrypt_chain(gss_key_info *, struct nfsm_chain *, int, int, int);
-
-static void gss_digest_Init(GSS_DIGEST_CTX *, gss_key_info *);
-static void gss_digest_Update(GSS_DIGEST_CTX *, void *, size_t);
-static void gss_digest_Final(GSS_DIGEST_CTX *, void *);
-static void gss_des_crypt(gss_key_info *, des_cblock *, des_cblock *,
- int32_t, des_cblock *, des_cblock *, int, int);
-static int gss_key_init(gss_key_info *, uint32_t);
#if NFSSERVER
thread_call_t nfs_gss_svc_ctx_timer_call;
#endif /* NFSSERVER */
}
+/*
+ * Common RPCSEC_GSS support routines
+ */
+
+static errno_t
+rpc_gss_prepend_32(mbuf_t *mb, uint32_t value)
+{
+ int error;
+ uint32_t *data;
+
+#if 0
+ data = mbuf_data(*mb);
+ /*
+ * If a wap token comes back and is not aligned
+ * get a new buffer (which should be aligned) to put the
+ * length in.
+ */
+ if ((uintptr_t)data & 0x3) {
+ mbuf_t nmb;
+
+ error = mbuf_get(MBUF_WAITOK, MBUF_TYPE_DATA, &nmb);
+ if (error)
+ return (error);
+ mbuf_setnext(nmb, *mb);
+ *mb = nmb;
+ }
+#endif
+ error = mbuf_prepend(mb, sizeof(uint32_t), MBUF_WAITOK);
+ if (error)
+ return (error);
+
+ data = mbuf_data(*mb);
+ *data = txdr_unsigned(value);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Prepend the sequence number to the xdr encode argumen or result
+ * Sequence number is prepended in its own mbuf.
+ *
+ * On successful return mbp_head will point to the old mbuf chain
+ * prepended with a new mbuf that has the sequence number.
+ */
+
+static errno_t
+rpc_gss_data_create(mbuf_t *mbp_head, uint32_t seqnum)
+{
+ int error;
+ mbuf_t mb;
+ struct nfsm_chain nmc;
+ struct nfsm_chain *nmcp = &nmc;
+ uint8_t *data;
+
+ error = mbuf_get(MBUF_WAITOK, MBUF_TYPE_DATA, &mb);
+ if (error)
+ return (error);
+ data = mbuf_data(mb);
+#if 0
+ /* Reserve space for prepending */
+ len = mbuf_maxlen(mb);
+ len = (len & ~0x3) - NFSX_UNSIGNED;
+ printf("%s: data = %p, len = %d\n", __func__, data, (int)len);
+ error = mbuf_setdata(mb, data + len, 0);
+ if (error || mbuf_trailingspace(mb))
+ printf("%s: data = %p trailingspace = %d error = %d\n", __func__, mbuf_data(mb), (int)mbuf_trailingspace(mb), error);
+#endif
+ /* Reserve 16 words for prepending */
+ error = mbuf_setdata(mb, data + 16*sizeof(uint32_t), 0);
+ nfsm_chain_init(nmcp, mb);
+ nfsm_chain_add_32(error, nmcp, seqnum);
+ nfsm_chain_build_done(error, nmcp);
+ if (error)
+ return (EINVAL);
+ mbuf_setnext(nmcp->nmc_mcur, *mbp_head);
+ *mbp_head = nmcp->nmc_mhead;
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create an rpc_gss_integ_data_t given an argument or result in mb_head.
+ * On successful return mb_head will point to the rpc_gss_integ_data_t of length len.
+ * Note mb_head will now point to a 4 byte sequence number. len does not include
+ * any extra xdr padding.
+ * Returns 0 on success, else an errno_t
+ */
+
+static errno_t
+rpc_gss_integ_data_create(gss_ctx_id_t ctx, mbuf_t *mb_head, uint32_t seqnum, uint32_t *len)
+{
+ uint32_t error;
+ uint32_t major;
+ uint32_t length;
+ gss_buffer_desc mic;
+ struct nfsm_chain nmc;
+
+ /* Length of the argument or result */
+ length = nfs_gss_mchain_length(*mb_head);
+ if (len)
+ *len = length;
+ error = rpc_gss_data_create(mb_head, seqnum);
+ if (error)
+ return (error);
+
+ /*
+ * length is the length of the rpc_gss_data
+ */
+ length += NFSX_UNSIGNED; /* Add the sequence number to the length */
+ major = gss_krb5_get_mic_mbuf(&error, ctx, 0, *mb_head, 0, length, &mic);
+ if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ printf("gss_krb5_get_mic_mbuf failed %d\n", error);
+ return (error);
+ }
+
+ error = rpc_gss_prepend_32(mb_head, length);
+ if (error)
+ return (error);
+
+ nfsm_chain_dissect_init(error, &nmc, *mb_head);
+ /* Append GSS mic token by advancing rpc_gss_data_t length + NFSX_UNSIGNED (size of the length field) */
+ nfsm_chain_adv(error, &nmc, length + NFSX_UNSIGNED);
+ nfsm_chain_finish_mbuf(error, &nmc); // Force the mic into its own sub chain.
+ nfsm_chain_add_32(error, &nmc, mic.length);
+ nfsm_chain_add_opaque(error, &nmc, mic.value, mic.length);
+ nfsm_chain_build_done(error, &nmc);
+ gss_release_buffer(NULL, &mic);
+
+// printmbuf("rpc_gss_integ_data_create done", *mb_head, 0, 0);
+ assert(nmc.nmc_mhead == *mb_head);
+
+ return (error);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create an rpc_gss_priv_data_t out of the supplied raw arguments or results in mb_head.
+ * On successful return mb_head will point to a wrap token of lenght len.
+ * Note len does not include any xdr padding
+ * Returns 0 on success, else an errno_t
+ */
+static errno_t
+rpc_gss_priv_data_create(gss_ctx_id_t ctx, mbuf_t *mb_head, uint32_t seqnum, uint32_t *len)
+{
+ uint32_t error;
+ uint32_t major;
+ struct nfsm_chain nmc;
+ uint32_t pad;
+ uint32_t length;
+
+ error = rpc_gss_data_create(mb_head, seqnum);
+ if (error)
+ return (error);
+
+ length = nfs_gss_mchain_length(*mb_head);
+ major = gss_krb5_wrap_mbuf(&error, ctx, 1, 0, mb_head, 0, length, NULL);
+ if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ return (error);
+
+ length = nfs_gss_mchain_length(*mb_head);
+ if (len)
+ *len = length;
+ pad = nfsm_pad(length);
+
+ /* Prepend the opaque length of rep rpc_gss_priv_data */
+ error = rpc_gss_prepend_32(mb_head, length);
+
+ if (error)
+ return (error);
+ if (pad) {
+ nfsm_chain_dissect_init(error, &nmc, *mb_head);
+ /* Advance the opauque size of length and length data */
+ nfsm_chain_adv(error, &nmc, NFSX_UNSIGNED + length);
+ nfsm_chain_finish_mbuf(error, &nmc);
+ nfsm_chain_add_opaque_nopad(error, &nmc, xdrpad, pad);
+ nfsm_chain_build_done(error, &nmc);
+ }
+
+ return (error);
+}
+
#if NFSCLIENT
+/*
+ * Restore the argument or result from an rpc_gss_integ_data mbuf chain
+ * We have a four byte seqence number, len arguments, and an opaque
+ * encoded mic, possibly followed by some pad bytes. The mic and possible
+ * pad bytes are on their own sub mbuf chains.
+ *
+ * On successful return mb_head is the chain of the xdr args or results sans
+ * the sequence number and mic and return 0. Otherwise return an errno.
+ *
+ */
+static errno_t
+rpc_gss_integ_data_restore(gss_ctx_id_t ctx __unused, mbuf_t *mb_head, size_t len)
+{
+ mbuf_t mb = *mb_head;
+ mbuf_t tail = NULL, next;
+
+ /* Chop of the opaque length and seq number */
+ mbuf_adj(mb, 2 * NFSX_UNSIGNED);
+
+ /* should only be one, ... but */
+ for (; mb; mb = next) {
+ next = mbuf_next(mb);
+ if (mbuf_len(mb) == 0)
+ mbuf_free(mb);
+ else
+ break;
+ }
+ *mb_head = mb;
+
+ for (; mb && len; mb = mbuf_next(mb)) {
+ tail = mb;
+ if (mbuf_len(mb) <= len)
+ len -= mbuf_len(mb);
+ else
+ return (EBADRPC);
+ }
+ /* drop the mic */
+ if (tail) {
+ mbuf_setnext(tail, NULL);
+ mbuf_freem(mb);
+ }
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Restore the argument or result rfom an rpc_gss_priv_data mbuf chain
+ * mb_head points to the wrap token of length len.
+ *
+ * On successful return mb_head is our original xdr arg or result an
+ * the return value is 0. Otherise return an errno
+ */
+static errno_t
+rpc_gss_priv_data_restore(gss_ctx_id_t ctx, mbuf_t *mb_head, size_t len)
+{
+ uint32_t major, error;
+ mbuf_t mb = *mb_head, next;
+ uint32_t plen;
+ size_t length;
+ gss_qop_t qop = GSS_C_QOP_REVERSE;
+
+ /* Chop of the opaque length */
+ mbuf_adj(mb, NFSX_UNSIGNED);
+ /* If we have padding, drop it */
+ plen = nfsm_pad(len);
+ if (plen) {
+ mbuf_t tail = NULL;
+
+ for(length = 0; length < len && mb; mb = mbuf_next(mb)) {
+ tail = mb;
+ length += mbuf_len(mb);
+ }
+ if ((length != len) || (mb == NULL) || (tail == NULL))
+ return (EBADRPC);
+
+ mbuf_freem(mb);
+ mbuf_setnext(tail, NULL);
+ }
+
+ major = gss_krb5_unwrap_mbuf(&error, ctx, mb_head, 0, len, NULL, &qop);
+ if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ printf("gss_krb5_unwrap_mbuf failed. major = %d minor = %d\n", (int)major, error);
+ return (error);
+ }
+ mb = *mb_head;
+
+ /* Drop the seqence number */
+ mbuf_adj(mb, NFSX_UNSIGNED);
+ assert(mbuf_len(mb) == 0);
+
+ /* Chop of any empty mbufs */
+ for (mb = *mb_head; mb; mb = next) {
+ next = mbuf_next(mb);
+ if (mbuf_len(mb) == 0)
+ mbuf_free(mb);
+ else
+ break;
+ }
+ *mb_head = mb;
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
/*
* Find the context for a particular user.
*
struct nfsreq treq;
int error = 0;
struct timeval now;
- gss_key_info *ki;
char CTXBUF[NFS_CTXBUFSZ];
bzero(&treq, sizeof (struct nfsreq));
cp->gss_clnt_flags |= GSS_CTX_DESTROY;
NFS_GSS_DBG("Context %s has expired but we still have %d references\n",
NFS_GSS_CTX(req, cp), cp->gss_clnt_refcnt);
- error = nfs_gss_clnt_ctx_copy(cp, &ncp, NULL);
+ error = nfs_gss_clnt_ctx_copy(cp, &ncp);
lck_mtx_unlock(cp->gss_clnt_mtx);
if (error) {
lck_mtx_unlock(&nmp->nm_lock);
cp = ncp;
break;
} else {
- /* cp->gss_clnt_kinfo should be NULL here */
- if (cp->gss_clnt_kinfo) {
- FREE(cp->gss_clnt_kinfo, M_TEMP);
- cp->gss_clnt_kinfo = NULL;
- }
if (cp->gss_clnt_nctime)
nmp->nm_ncentries--;
lck_mtx_unlock(cp->gss_clnt_mtx);
}
}
- MALLOC(ki, gss_key_info *, sizeof (gss_key_info), M_TEMP, M_WAITOK|M_ZERO);
- if (ki == NULL) {
- lck_mtx_unlock(&nmp->nm_lock);
- return (ENOMEM);
- }
-
NFS_GSS_DBG("Context %s%sfound in Neg Cache @ %ld\n",
NFS_GSS_CTX(req, cp),
cp == NULL ? " not " : "",
lck_mtx_unlock(&nmp->nm_lock);
return (ENOMEM);
}
- cp->gss_clnt_kinfo = ki;
cp->gss_clnt_cred = req->r_cred;
kauth_cred_ref(cp->gss_clnt_cred);
cp->gss_clnt_mtx = lck_mtx_alloc_init(nfs_gss_clnt_grp, LCK_ATTR_NULL);
nfs_gss_clnt_mnt_ref(nmp);
}
} else {
- cp->gss_clnt_kinfo = ki;
nfs_gss_clnt_ctx_clean(cp);
if (principal) {
/*
* to build the verifier which contains a signed checksum
* of the RPC header.
*/
+
int
nfs_gss_clnt_cred_put(struct nfsreq *req, struct nfsm_chain *nmc, mbuf_t args)
{
struct nfs_gss_clnt_ctx *cp;
uint32_t seqnum = 0;
- int error = 0;
- int slpflag, recordmark = 0;
- int start, len, offset = 0;
- int pad, toklen;
- struct nfsm_chain nmc_tmp;
+ uint32_t major;
+ uint32_t error = 0;
+ int slpflag, recordmark = 0, offset;
struct gss_seq *gsp;
- u_char tokbuf[KRB5_SZ_TOKMAX(MAX_DIGEST)];
- u_char cksum[MAX_DIGEST];
- gss_key_info *ki;
+ gss_buffer_desc mic;
slpflag = (PZERO-1);
if (req->r_nmp) {
}
lck_mtx_unlock(cp->gss_clnt_mtx);
- ki = cp->gss_clnt_kinfo;
if (cp->gss_clnt_flags & GSS_CTX_COMPLETE) {
/*
* Get a sequence number for this request.
offset = recordmark ? NFSX_UNSIGNED : 0; // record mark
nfsm_chain_build_done(error, nmc);
- nfs_gss_cksum_chain(ki, nmc, ALG_MIC(ki), offset, 0, cksum);
- toklen = nfs_gss_token_put(ki, ALG_MIC(ki), tokbuf, 1, 0, cksum);
+ major = gss_krb5_get_mic_mbuf((uint32_t *)&error, cp->gss_clnt_ctx_id, 0, nmc->nmc_mhead, offset, 0, &mic);
+ if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ printf ("gss_krb5_get_mic_buf failed %d\n", error);
+ return (error);
+ }
+
nfsm_chain_add_32(error, nmc, RPCSEC_GSS); // flavor
- nfsm_chain_add_32(error, nmc, toklen); // length
- nfsm_chain_add_opaque(error, nmc, tokbuf, toklen);
+ nfsm_chain_add_32(error, nmc, mic.length); // length
+ nfsm_chain_add_opaque(error, nmc, mic.value, mic.length);
+ (void)gss_release_buffer(NULL, &mic);
nfsm_chain_build_done(error, nmc);
if (error)
return (error);
*/
switch (cp->gss_clnt_service) {
case RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_NONE:
- nfs_gss_append_chain(nmc, args);
+ if (args)
+ nfs_gss_append_chain(nmc, args);
break;
case RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY:
- len = nfs_gss_mchain_length(args); // Find args length
- req->r_gss_arglen = len; // Stash the args len
- len += NFSX_UNSIGNED; // Add seqnum length
- nfsm_chain_add_32(error, nmc, len); // and insert it
- start = nfsm_chain_offset(nmc);
- nfsm_chain_add_32(error, nmc, seqnum); // Insert seqnum
- req->r_gss_argoff = nfsm_chain_offset(nmc); // Offset to args
- nfsm_chain_build_done(error, nmc);
+ /*
+ * r_gss_arglen is the length of args mbuf going into the routine.
+ * Its used to find the mic if we need to restore the args.
+ */
+ /* Note the mbufs that were used in r_mrest are being encapsulated in the rpc_gss_integ_data_t */
+ assert(req->r_mrest == args);
+ nfsm_chain_finish_mbuf(error, nmc);
if (error)
return (error);
- nfs_gss_append_chain(nmc, args); // Append the args mbufs
-
- /* Now compute a checksum over the seqnum + args */
- nfs_gss_cksum_chain(ki, nmc, ALG_MIC(ki), start, len, cksum);
-
- /* Insert it into a token and append to the request */
- toklen = nfs_gss_token_put(ki, ALG_MIC(ki), tokbuf, 1, 0, cksum);
- nfsm_chain_finish_mbuf(error, nmc); // force checksum into new mbuf
- nfsm_chain_add_32(error, nmc, toklen);
- nfsm_chain_add_opaque(error, nmc, tokbuf, toklen);
- nfsm_chain_build_done(error, nmc);
+ error = rpc_gss_integ_data_create(cp->gss_clnt_ctx_id, &args, seqnum, &req->r_gss_arglen);
+ if (error)
+ break;
+ req->r_mrest = args;
+ req->r_gss_argoff = nfsm_chain_offset(nmc);
+ nfs_gss_append_chain(nmc, args);
break;
case RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY:
- /* Prepend a new mbuf with the confounder & sequence number */
- nfsm_chain_build_alloc_init(error, &nmc_tmp, 3 * NFSX_UNSIGNED);
- nfsm_chain_add_32(error, &nmc_tmp, random()); // confounder bytes 1-4
- nfsm_chain_add_32(error, &nmc_tmp, random()); // confounder bytes 4-8
- nfsm_chain_add_32(error, &nmc_tmp, seqnum);
- nfsm_chain_build_done(error, &nmc_tmp);
- if (error)
- return (error);
- nfs_gss_append_chain(&nmc_tmp, args); // Append the args mbufs
-
- len = nfs_gss_mchain_length(args); // Find args length
- len += 3 * NFSX_UNSIGNED; // add confounder & seqnum
- req->r_gss_arglen = len; // Stash length
-
/*
- * Append a pad trailer - per RFC 1964 section 1.2.2.3
- * Since XDR data is always 32-bit aligned, it
- * needs to be padded either by 4 bytes or 8 bytes.
+ * r_gss_arglen is the length of the wrap token sans any padding length.
+ * Its used to find any XDR padding of the wrap token.
*/
- nfsm_chain_finish_mbuf(error, &nmc_tmp); // force padding into new mbuf
- if (len % 8 > 0) {
- nfsm_chain_add_32(error, &nmc_tmp, 0x04040404);
- len += NFSX_UNSIGNED;
- } else {
- nfsm_chain_add_32(error, &nmc_tmp, 0x08080808);
- nfsm_chain_add_32(error, &nmc_tmp, 0x08080808);
- len += 2 * NFSX_UNSIGNED;
- }
- nfsm_chain_build_done(error, &nmc_tmp);
-
- /* Now compute a checksum over the confounder + seqnum + args */
- nfs_gss_cksum_chain(ki, &nmc_tmp, ALG_WRAP(ki), 0, len, cksum);
-
- /* Insert it into a token */
- toklen = nfs_gss_token_put(ki, ALG_WRAP(ki), tokbuf, 1, len, cksum);
- nfsm_chain_add_32(error, nmc, toklen + len); // token + args length
- nfsm_chain_add_opaque_nopad(error, nmc, tokbuf, toklen);
- req->r_gss_argoff = nfsm_chain_offset(nmc); // Stash offset
- nfsm_chain_build_done(error, nmc);
+ /* Note the mbufs that were used in r_mrest are being encapsulated in the rpc_gss_priv_data_t */
+ assert(req->r_mrest == args);
+ nfsm_chain_finish_mbuf(error, nmc);
if (error)
return (error);
- nfs_gss_append_chain(nmc, nmc_tmp.nmc_mhead); // Append the args mbufs
-
- /* Finally, encrypt the args */
- nfs_gss_encrypt_chain(ki, &nmc_tmp, 0, len, DES_ENCRYPT);
-
- /* Add null XDR pad if the ASN.1 token misaligned the data */
- pad = nfsm_pad(toklen + len);
- if (pad > 0) {
- nfsm_chain_add_opaque_nopad(error, nmc, iv0, pad);
- nfsm_chain_build_done(error, nmc);
- }
+ error = rpc_gss_priv_data_create(cp->gss_clnt_ctx_id, &args, seqnum, &req->r_gss_arglen);
+ if (error)
+ break;
+ req->r_mrest = args;
+ req->r_gss_argoff = nfsm_chain_offset(nmc);
+ nfs_gss_append_chain(nmc, args);
break;
+ default:
+ return (EINVAL);
}
return (error);
uint32_t verflen,
uint32_t *accepted_statusp)
{
- u_char tokbuf[KRB5_SZ_TOKMAX(MAX_DIGEST)];
- u_char cksum1[MAX_DIGEST], cksum2[MAX_DIGEST];
+ gss_buffer_desc cksum;
uint32_t seqnum = 0;
+ uint32_t major;
struct nfs_gss_clnt_ctx *cp = req->r_gss_ctx;
struct nfsm_chain nmc_tmp;
struct gss_seq *gsp;
- uint32_t reslen, start, cksumlen, toklen;
+ uint32_t reslen, offset;
int error = 0;
- gss_key_info *ki = cp->gss_clnt_kinfo;
+ mbuf_t results_mbuf, prev_mbuf, pad_mbuf;
+ size_t ressize;
- reslen = cksumlen = 0;
+ reslen = 0;
*accepted_statusp = 0;
if (cp == NULL)
MALLOC(cp->gss_clnt_verf, u_char *, verflen, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK|M_ZERO);
if (cp->gss_clnt_verf == NULL)
return (ENOMEM);
+ cp->gss_clnt_verflen = verflen;
nfsm_chain_get_opaque(error, nmc, verflen, cp->gss_clnt_verf);
nfsm_chain_get_32(error, nmc, *accepted_statusp);
return (error);
}
- if (verflen != KRB5_SZ_TOKEN(ki->hash_len))
- return (NFSERR_EAUTH);
+ if (verflen > KRB5_MAX_MIC_SIZE)
+ return (EBADRPC);
+ cksum.length = verflen;
+ MALLOC(cksum.value, void *, verflen, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
/*
- * Get the 8 octet sequence number
- * checksum out of the verifier token.
+ * Get the gss mic
*/
- nfsm_chain_get_opaque(error, nmc, verflen, tokbuf);
- if (error)
- goto nfsmout;
- error = nfs_gss_token_get(ki, ALG_MIC(ki), tokbuf, 0, NULL, cksum1);
- if (error)
+ nfsm_chain_get_opaque(error, nmc, verflen, cksum.value);
+ if (error) {
+ FREE(cksum.value, M_TEMP);
goto nfsmout;
+ }
/*
* Search the request sequence numbers for this reply, starting
* the one in the verifier returned by the server.
*/
SLIST_FOREACH(gsp, &req->r_gss_seqlist, gss_seqnext) {
- nfs_gss_cksum_rep(ki, gsp->gss_seqnum, cksum2);
- if (bcmp(cksum1, cksum2, HASHLEN(ki)) == 0)
+ gss_buffer_desc seqnum_buf;
+ uint32_t network_seqnum = htonl(gsp->gss_seqnum);
+
+ seqnum_buf.length = sizeof(network_seqnum);
+ seqnum_buf.value = &network_seqnum;
+ major = gss_krb5_verify_mic(NULL, cp->gss_clnt_ctx_id, &seqnum_buf, &cksum, NULL);
+ if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
break;
}
+ FREE(cksum.value, M_TEMP);
if (gsp == NULL)
return (NFSERR_EAUTH);
break;
case RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY:
/*
- * Here's what we expect in the integrity results:
+ * Here's what we expect in the integrity results from RFC 2203:
*
* - length of seq num + results (4 bytes)
* - sequence number (4 bytes)
* - results (variable bytes)
- * - length of checksum token (37)
- * - checksum of seqnum + results (37 bytes)
+ * - length of checksum token
+ * - checksum of seqnum + results
*/
+
nfsm_chain_get_32(error, nmc, reslen); // length of results
if (reslen > NFS_MAXPACKET) {
error = EBADRPC;
goto nfsmout;
}
- /* Compute a checksum over the sequence number + results */
- start = nfsm_chain_offset(nmc);
- nfs_gss_cksum_chain(ki, nmc, ALG_MIC(ki), start, reslen, cksum1);
+ /* Advance and fetch the mic */
+ nmc_tmp = *nmc;
+ nfsm_chain_adv(error, &nmc_tmp, reslen); // skip over the results
+ nfsm_chain_get_32(error, &nmc_tmp, cksum.length);
+ MALLOC(cksum.value, void *, cksum.length, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
+ nfsm_chain_get_opaque(error, &nmc_tmp, cksum.length, cksum.value);
+ //XXX chop offf the cksum?
+
+ /* Call verify mic */
+ offset = nfsm_chain_offset(nmc);
+ major = gss_krb5_verify_mic_mbuf((uint32_t *)&error, cp->gss_clnt_ctx_id, nmc->nmc_mhead, offset, reslen, &cksum, NULL);
+ FREE(cksum.value, M_TEMP);
+ if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ printf("client results: gss_krb5_verify_mic_mbuf failed %d\n", error);
+ error = EBADRPC;
+ goto nfsmout;
+ }
/*
* Get the sequence number prepended to the results
- * and compare it against the list in the request.
+ * and compare it against the header.
*/
nfsm_chain_get_32(error, nmc, seqnum);
+ if (gsp->gss_seqnum != seqnum) {
+ error = EBADRPC;
+ goto nfsmout;
+ }
+#if 0
SLIST_FOREACH(gsp, &req->r_gss_seqlist, gss_seqnext) {
if (seqnum == gsp->gss_seqnum)
break;
error = EBADRPC;
goto nfsmout;
}
-
- /*
- * Advance to the end of the results and
- * fetch the checksum computed by the server.
- */
- nmc_tmp = *nmc;
- reslen -= NFSX_UNSIGNED; // already skipped seqnum
- nfsm_chain_adv(error, &nmc_tmp, reslen); // skip over the results
- nfsm_chain_get_32(error, &nmc_tmp, cksumlen); // length of checksum
- if (cksumlen != KRB5_SZ_TOKEN(ki->hash_len)) {
- error = EBADRPC;
- goto nfsmout;
- }
- nfsm_chain_get_opaque(error, &nmc_tmp, cksumlen, tokbuf);
- if (error)
- goto nfsmout;
- error = nfs_gss_token_get(ki, ALG_MIC(ki), tokbuf, 0, NULL, cksum2);
- if (error)
- goto nfsmout;
-
- /* Verify that the checksums are the same */
- if (bcmp(cksum1, cksum2, HASHLEN(ki)) != 0) {
- error = EBADRPC;
- goto nfsmout;
- }
+#endif
break;
case RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY:
/*
* Here's what we expect in the privacy results:
*
- * - length of confounder + seq num + token + results
- * - wrap token (37-40 bytes)
- * - confounder (8 bytes)
- * - sequence number (4 bytes)
- * - results (encrypted)
+ * opaque encodeing of the wrap token
+ * - length of wrap token
+ * - wrap token
*/
+ prev_mbuf = nmc->nmc_mcur;
nfsm_chain_get_32(error, nmc, reslen); // length of results
- if (reslen > NFS_MAXPACKET) {
+ if (reslen == 0 || reslen > NFS_MAXPACKET) {
error = EBADRPC;
goto nfsmout;
}
- /* Get the token that prepends the encrypted results */
- nfsm_chain_get_opaque(error, nmc, KRB5_SZ_TOKMAX(ki->hash_len), tokbuf);
- if (error)
- goto nfsmout;
- error = nfs_gss_token_get(ki, ALG_WRAP(ki), tokbuf, 0,
- &toklen, cksum1);
+ /* Get the wrap token (current mbuf in the chain starting at the current offset) */
+ offset = nmc->nmc_ptr - (caddr_t)mbuf_data(nmc->nmc_mcur);
+
+ /* split out the wrap token */
+ ressize = reslen;
+ error = gss_normalize_mbuf(nmc->nmc_mcur, offset, &ressize, &results_mbuf, &pad_mbuf, 0);
if (error)
goto nfsmout;
- nfsm_chain_reverse(nmc, nfsm_pad(toklen));
- reslen -= toklen; // size of confounder + seqnum + results
- /* decrypt the confounder + sequence number + results */
- start = nfsm_chain_offset(nmc);
- nfs_gss_encrypt_chain(ki, nmc, start, reslen, DES_DECRYPT);
-
- /* Compute a checksum over the confounder + sequence number + results */
- nfs_gss_cksum_chain(ki, nmc, ALG_WRAP(ki), start, reslen, cksum2);
+ if (pad_mbuf) {
+ assert(nfsm_pad(reslen) == mbuf_len(pad_mbuf));
+ mbuf_free(pad_mbuf);
+ }
- /* Verify that the checksums are the same */
- if (bcmp(cksum1, cksum2, HASHLEN(ki)) != 0) {
- error = EBADRPC;
+ major = gss_krb5_unwrap_mbuf((uint32_t *)&error, cp->gss_clnt_ctx_id, &results_mbuf, 0, ressize, NULL, NULL);
+ if (major) {
+ printf("%s unwraped failed %d\n", __func__, error);
goto nfsmout;
}
- nfsm_chain_adv(error, nmc, 8); // skip over the confounder
+ /* Now replace the wrapped arguments with the unwrapped ones */
+ mbuf_setnext(prev_mbuf, results_mbuf);
+ nmc->nmc_mcur = results_mbuf;
+ nmc->nmc_ptr = mbuf_data(results_mbuf);
+ nmc->nmc_left = mbuf_len(results_mbuf);
/*
* Get the sequence number prepended to the results
- * and compare it against the list in the request.
+ * and compare it against the header
*/
nfsm_chain_get_32(error, nmc, seqnum);
+ if (gsp->gss_seqnum != seqnum) {
+ printf("%s bad seqnum\n", __func__);
+ error = EBADRPC;
+ goto nfsmout;
+ }
+#if 0
SLIST_FOREACH(gsp, &req->r_gss_seqlist, gss_seqnext) {
if (seqnum == gsp->gss_seqnum)
break;
error = EBADRPC;
goto nfsmout;
}
-
+#endif
break;
}
nfsmout:
* An RPCSEC_GSS request with no integrity or privacy consists
* of just the header mbufs followed by the arg mbufs.
*
- * However, integrity or privacy both trailer mbufs to the args,
- * which means we have to do some work to restore the arg mbuf
- * chain to its previous state in case we need to retransmit.
+ * However, integrity or privacy the original mbufs have mbufs
+ * prepended and appended to, which means we have to do some work to
+ * restore the arg mbuf chain to its previous state in case we need to
+ * retransmit.
*
* The location and length of the args is marked by two fields
* in the request structure: r_gss_argoff and r_gss_arglen,
{
struct nfs_gss_clnt_ctx *cp = req->r_gss_ctx;
struct nfsm_chain mchain, *nmc = &mchain;
- int len, error = 0;
+ int error = 0, merr;
if (cp == NULL)
return (NFSERR_EAUTH);
if ((cp->gss_clnt_flags & GSS_CTX_COMPLETE) == 0)
return (ENEEDAUTH);
+ /* Nothing to restore for SVC_NONE */
+ if (cp->gss_clnt_service == RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_NONE)
+ return (0);
+
nfsm_chain_dissect_init(error, nmc, req->r_mhead); // start at RPC header
nfsm_chain_adv(error, nmc, req->r_gss_argoff); // advance to args
if (error)
return (error);
- switch (cp->gss_clnt_service) {
- case RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_NONE:
- /* nothing to do */
- break;
- case RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY:
- /*
- * All we have to do here is remove the appended checksum mbufs.
- * We know that the checksum starts in a new mbuf beyond the end
- * of the args.
- */
- nfsm_chain_adv(error, nmc, req->r_gss_arglen); // adv to last args mbuf
- if (error)
- return (error);
+ if (cp->gss_clnt_service == RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY)
+ error = rpc_gss_integ_data_restore(cp->gss_clnt_ctx_id, &req->r_mrest, req->r_gss_arglen);
+ else
+ error = rpc_gss_priv_data_restore(cp->gss_clnt_ctx_id, &req->r_mrest, req->r_gss_arglen);
- mbuf_freem(mbuf_next(nmc->nmc_mcur)); // free the cksum mbuf
- error = mbuf_setnext(nmc->nmc_mcur, NULL);
- break;
- case RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY:
- /*
- * The args are encrypted along with prepended confounders and seqnum.
- * First we decrypt, the confounder, seqnum and args then skip to the
- * final mbuf of the args.
- * The arglen includes 8 bytes of confounder and 4 bytes of seqnum.
- * Finally, we remove between 4 and 8 bytes of encryption padding
- * as well as any alignment padding in the trailing mbuf.
- */
- len = req->r_gss_arglen;
- len += len % 8 > 0 ? 4 : 8; // add DES padding length
- nfs_gss_encrypt_chain(cp->gss_clnt_kinfo, nmc,
- req->r_gss_argoff, len, DES_DECRYPT);
- nfsm_chain_adv(error, nmc, req->r_gss_arglen);
- if (error)
- return (error);
- mbuf_freem(mbuf_next(nmc->nmc_mcur)); // free the pad mbuf
- error = mbuf_setnext(nmc->nmc_mcur, NULL);
- break;
- }
+ merr = mbuf_setnext(nmc->nmc_mcur, req->r_mrest); /* Should always succeed */
+ assert (merr == 0);
- return (error);
+ return (error ? error : merr);
}
/*
nfs_gss_clnt_ctx_init(struct nfsreq *req, struct nfs_gss_clnt_ctx *cp)
{
struct nfsmount *nmp = req->r_nmp;
+ gss_buffer_desc cksum, window;
+ uint32_t network_seqnum;
int client_complete = 0;
int server_complete = 0;
- u_char cksum1[MAX_DIGEST], cksum2[MAX_DIGEST];
int error = 0;
- gss_key_info *ki = cp->gss_clnt_kinfo;
+ int retrycnt = 0;
+ uint32_t major;
/* Initialize a new client context */
req->r_auth == RPCAUTH_KRB5I ? RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY :
req->r_auth == RPCAUTH_KRB5P ? RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY : 0;
- cp->gss_clnt_gssd_flags = (nfs_single_des ? GSSD_NFS_1DES : 0);
/*
* Now loop around alternating gss_init_sec_context and
* gss_accept_sec_context upcalls to the gssd on the client
* and server side until the context is complete - or fails.
*/
for (;;) {
-
retry:
/* Upcall to the gss_init_sec_context in the gssd */
- error = nfs_gss_clnt_gssd_upcall(req, cp);
+ error = nfs_gss_clnt_gssd_upcall(req, cp, retrycnt);
if (error)
goto nfsmout;
if (cp->gss_clnt_major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
client_complete = 1;
+ NFS_GSS_DBG("Client complete\n");
if (server_complete)
break;
} else if (cp->gss_clnt_major != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
- error = NFSERR_EAUTH;
- goto nfsmout;
+ /*
+ * We may have gotten here because the accept sec context
+ * from the server failed and sent back a GSS token that
+ * encapsulates a kerberos error token per RFC 1964/4121
+ * with a status of GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED. That caused us
+ * to loop to the above up call and received the now
+ * decoded errors.
+ */
+ retrycnt++;
+ cp->gss_clnt_gssd_flags |= GSSD_RESTART;
+ NFS_GSS_DBG("Retrying major = %x minor = %d\n", cp->gss_clnt_major, (int)cp->gss_clnt_minor);
+ goto retry;
}
/*
*/
error = nfs_gss_clnt_ctx_callserver(req, cp);
if (error) {
- if (error == ENEEDAUTH && cp->gss_clnt_proc == RPCSEC_GSS_INIT &&
- (cp->gss_clnt_gssd_flags & (GSSD_RESTART | GSSD_NFS_1DES)) == 0) {
- NFS_GSS_DBG("Retrying with single DES for req %p\n", req);
- cp->gss_clnt_gssd_flags = (GSSD_RESTART | GSSD_NFS_1DES);
- if (cp->gss_clnt_token)
- FREE(cp->gss_clnt_token, M_TEMP);
- cp->gss_clnt_token = NULL;
- cp->gss_clnt_tokenlen = 0;
+ if (error == ENEEDAUTH &&
+ (cp->gss_clnt_proc == RPCSEC_GSS_INIT ||
+ cp->gss_clnt_proc == RPCSEC_GSS_CONTINUE_INIT)) {
+ /*
+ * We got here because the server had a problem
+ * trying to establish a context and sent that there
+ * was a context problem at the rpc sec layer. Perhaps
+ * gss_accept_sec_context succeeded in user space,
+ * but the kernel could not handle the etype
+ * to generate the mic for the verifier of the rpc_sec
+ * window size.
+ */
+ retrycnt++;
+ cp->gss_clnt_gssd_flags |= GSSD_RESTART;
+ NFS_GSS_DBG("Retrying major = %x minor = %d\n", cp->gss_clnt_major, (int)cp->gss_clnt_minor);
goto retry;
}
- // Reset flags, if error = ENEEDAUTH we will try 3des again
- cp->gss_clnt_gssd_flags = 0;
goto nfsmout;
}
if (cp->gss_clnt_major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ NFS_GSS_DBG("Server complete\n");
server_complete = 1;
if (client_complete)
break;
+ } else if (cp->gss_clnt_major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
+ cp->gss_clnt_proc = RPCSEC_GSS_CONTINUE_INIT;
+ } else {
+ /* Server didn't like us. Try something else */
+ retrycnt++;
+ cp->gss_clnt_gssd_flags |= GSSD_RESTART;
+ NFS_GSS_DBG("Retrying major = %x minor = %d\n", cp->gss_clnt_major, (int)cp->gss_clnt_minor);
}
- cp->gss_clnt_proc = RPCSEC_GSS_CONTINUE_INIT;
}
/*
lck_mtx_unlock(cp->gss_clnt_mtx);
cp->gss_clnt_proc = RPCSEC_GSS_DATA;
- /*
- * Compute checksum of the server's window
- */
- nfs_gss_cksum_rep(ki, cp->gss_clnt_seqwin, cksum1);
-
- /*
- * and see if it matches the one in the
- * verifier the server returned.
- */
- error = nfs_gss_token_get(ki, ALG_MIC(ki), cp->gss_clnt_verf, 0,
- NULL, cksum2);
+ network_seqnum = htonl(cp->gss_clnt_seqwin);
+ window.length = sizeof (cp->gss_clnt_seqwin);
+ window.value = &network_seqnum;
+ cksum.value = cp->gss_clnt_verf;
+ cksum.length = cp->gss_clnt_verflen;
+ major = gss_krb5_verify_mic((uint32_t *)&error, cp->gss_clnt_ctx_id, &window, &cksum, NULL);
+ cp->gss_clnt_verflen = 0;
FREE(cp->gss_clnt_verf, M_TEMP);
cp->gss_clnt_verf = NULL;
-
- if (error || bcmp(cksum1, cksum2, HASHLEN(ki)) != 0) {
+ if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ printf("%s: could not verify window\n", __func__);
error = NFSERR_EAUTH;
goto nfsmout;
}
nfsm_rndup((cp->gss_clnt_seqwin + 7) / 8), M_TEMP, M_WAITOK|M_ZERO);
if (cp->gss_clnt_seqbits == NULL)
error = NFSERR_EAUTH;
+
nfsmout:
/*
* If the error is ENEEDAUTH we're not done, so no need
* to wake up other threads again. This thread will retry in
* the find or renew routines.
*/
- if (error == ENEEDAUTH)
+ if (error == ENEEDAUTH) {
+ NFS_GSS_DBG("Returning ENEEDAUTH\n");
return (error);
+ }
/*
* If there's an error, just mark it as invalid.
}
lck_mtx_unlock(cp->gss_clnt_mtx);
+ NFS_GSS_DBG("Returning error = %d\n", error);
return (error);
}
* must have access to the user's credential cache.
*/
static int
-nfs_gss_clnt_gssd_upcall(struct nfsreq *req, struct nfs_gss_clnt_ctx *cp)
+nfs_gss_clnt_gssd_upcall(struct nfsreq *req, struct nfs_gss_clnt_ctx *cp, uint32_t retrycnt)
{
kern_return_t kr;
- gssd_byte_buffer okey = NULL;
- uint32_t skeylen = 0;
+ gssd_byte_buffer octx = NULL;
+ uint32_t lucidlen = 0;
+ void *lucid_ctx_buffer;
int retry_cnt = 0;
vm_map_copy_t itoken = NULL;
gssd_byte_buffer otoken = NULL;
vm_map_copy_t svcname = NULL;
char display_name[MAX_DISPLAY_STR] = "";
uint32_t ret_flags;
- uint32_t nfs_1des = (cp->gss_clnt_gssd_flags & GSSD_NFS_1DES);
- struct nfsmount *nmp;
+ struct nfsmount *nmp = req->r_nmp;
uint32_t major = cp->gss_clnt_major, minor = cp->gss_clnt_minor;
-
- /*
- * NFS currently only supports default principals or
- * principals based on the uid of the caller, unless
- * the principal to use for the mounting cred was specified
- * in the mount argmuments. If the realm to use was specified
- * then will send that up as the principal since the realm is
+ uint32_t selected = (uint32_t)-1;
+ struct nfs_etype etype;
+
+ if (nmp == NULL || vfs_isforce(nmp->nm_mountp) || (nmp->nm_state & (NFSSTA_FORCE | NFSSTA_DEAD)))
+ return (ENXIO);
+
+ if (cp->gss_clnt_gssd_flags & GSSD_RESTART) {
+ if (cp->gss_clnt_token)
+ FREE(cp->gss_clnt_token, M_TEMP);
+ cp->gss_clnt_token = NULL;
+ cp->gss_clnt_tokenlen = 0;
+ cp->gss_clnt_proc = RPCSEC_GSS_INIT;
+ }
+
+ NFS_GSS_DBG("Retrycnt = %d nm_etype.count = %d\n", retrycnt, nmp->nm_etype.count);
+ if (retrycnt >= nmp->nm_etype.count)
+ return (EACCES);
+
+ /* Copy the mount etypes to an order set of etypes to try */
+ etype = nmp->nm_etype;
+
+ /*
+ * If we've already selected an etype, lets put that first in our
+ * array of etypes to try, since overwhelmingly, that is likely
+ * to be the etype we want.
+ */
+ if (etype.selected < etype.count) {
+ etype.etypes[0] = nmp->nm_etype.etypes[etype.selected];
+ for (uint32_t i = 0; i < etype.selected; i++)
+ etype.etypes[i+1] = nmp->nm_etype.etypes[i];
+ for (uint32_t i = etype.selected + 1; i < etype.count; i++)
+ etype.etypes[i] = nmp->nm_etype.etypes[i];
+ }
+
+ /* Remove the ones we've already have tried */
+ for (uint32_t i = retrycnt; i < etype.count; i++)
+ etype.etypes[i - retrycnt] = etype.etypes[i];
+ etype.count = etype.count - retrycnt;
+
+ NFS_GSS_DBG("etype count = %d preferred etype = %d\n", etype.count, etype.etypes[0]);
+
+ /*
+ * NFS currently only supports default principals or
+ * principals based on the uid of the caller, unless
+ * the principal to use for the mounting cred was specified
+ * in the mount argmuments. If the realm to use was specified
+ * then will send that up as the principal since the realm is
* preceed by an "@" gssd that will try and select the default
* principal for that realm.
*/
- nmp = req->r_nmp;
- if (nmp == NULL || vfs_isforce(nmp->nm_mountp) || (nmp->nm_state & (NFSSTA_FORCE | NFSSTA_DEAD)))
- return (ENXIO);
-
if (cp->gss_clnt_principal && cp->gss_clnt_prinlen) {
principal = cp->gss_clnt_principal;
plen = cp->gss_clnt_prinlen;
if (cp->gss_clnt_tokenlen)
nfs_gss_mach_alloc_buffer(cp->gss_clnt_token, cp->gss_clnt_tokenlen, &itoken);
+ /* Always want to export the lucid context */
+ cp->gss_clnt_gssd_flags |= GSSD_LUCID_CONTEXT;
+
retry:
- kr = mach_gss_init_sec_context_v2(
+ kr = mach_gss_init_sec_context_v3(
cp->gss_clnt_mport,
GSSD_KRB5_MECH,
(gssd_byte_buffer) itoken, (mach_msg_type_number_t) cp->gss_clnt_tokenlen,
cp->gss_clnt_svcnt,
(gssd_byte_buffer)svcname, (mach_msg_type_number_t) cp->gss_clnt_svcnamlen,
GSSD_MUTUAL_FLAG,
+ (gssd_etype_list)etype.etypes, (mach_msg_type_number_t)etype.count,
&cp->gss_clnt_gssd_flags,
&cp->gss_clnt_context,
&cp->gss_clnt_cred_handle,
&ret_flags,
- &okey, (mach_msg_type_number_t *) &skeylen,
+ &octx, (mach_msg_type_number_t *) &lucidlen,
&otoken, &otokenlen,
cp->gss_clnt_display ? NULL : display_name,
&cp->gss_clnt_major,
&cp->gss_clnt_minor);
- /* Should be cleared and set in gssd ? */
+ /* Clear the RESTART flag */
cp->gss_clnt_gssd_flags &= ~GSSD_RESTART;
- cp->gss_clnt_gssd_flags |= nfs_1des;
+ if (cp->gss_clnt_major != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
+ /* We're done with the gssd handles */
+ cp->gss_clnt_context = 0;
+ cp->gss_clnt_cred_handle = 0;
+ }
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
printf("nfs_gss_clnt_gssd_upcall: mach_gss_init_sec_context failed: %x (%d)\n", kr, kr);
if (cp->gss_clnt_display == NULL && *display_name != '\0') {
int dlen = strnlen(display_name, MAX_DISPLAY_STR) + 1; /* Add extra byte to include '\0' */
-
+
if (dlen < MAX_DISPLAY_STR) {
MALLOC(cp->gss_clnt_display, char *, dlen, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
if (cp->gss_clnt_display == NULL)
*/
if (cp->gss_clnt_major != GSS_S_COMPLETE &&
cp->gss_clnt_major != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
+ NFS_GSS_DBG("Up call returned error\n");
nfs_gss_clnt_log_error(req, cp, major, minor);
}
- if (skeylen > 0) {
- if (skeylen != SKEYLEN && skeylen != SKEYLEN3) {
- printf("nfs_gss_clnt_gssd_upcall: bad key length (%d)\n", skeylen);
- vm_map_copy_discard((vm_map_copy_t) okey);
+ if (lucidlen > 0) {
+ if (lucidlen > MAX_LUCIDLEN) {
+ printf("nfs_gss_clnt_gssd_upcall: bad context length (%d)\n", lucidlen);
+ vm_map_copy_discard((vm_map_copy_t) octx);
vm_map_copy_discard((vm_map_copy_t) otoken);
goto out;
}
- error = nfs_gss_mach_vmcopyout((vm_map_copy_t) okey, skeylen,
- cp->gss_clnt_kinfo->skey);
+ MALLOC(lucid_ctx_buffer, void *, lucidlen, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
+ error = nfs_gss_mach_vmcopyout((vm_map_copy_t) octx, lucidlen, lucid_ctx_buffer);
if (error) {
vm_map_copy_discard((vm_map_copy_t) otoken);
goto out;
}
-
- error = gss_key_init(cp->gss_clnt_kinfo, skeylen);
- if (error)
+
+ if (cp->gss_clnt_ctx_id)
+ gss_krb5_destroy_context(cp->gss_clnt_ctx_id);
+ cp->gss_clnt_ctx_id = gss_krb5_make_context(lucid_ctx_buffer, lucidlen);
+ if (cp->gss_clnt_ctx_id == NULL) {
+ printf("Failed to make context from lucid_ctx_buffer\n");
goto out;
+ }
+ for (uint32_t i = 0; i < nmp->nm_etype.count; i++) {
+ if (nmp->nm_etype.etypes[i] == cp->gss_clnt_ctx_id->gss_cryptor.etype) {
+ selected = i;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
}
/* Free context token used as input */
}
error = nfs_gss_mach_vmcopyout((vm_map_copy_t) otoken, otokenlen, cp->gss_clnt_token);
if (error) {
+ printf("Could not copyout gss token\n");
FREE(cp->gss_clnt_token, M_TEMP);
cp->gss_clnt_token = NULL;
return (NFSERR_EAUTH);
cp->gss_clnt_tokenlen = otokenlen;
}
+ if (selected != (uint32_t)-1) {
+ nmp->nm_etype.selected = selected;
+ NFS_GSS_DBG("etype selected = %d\n", nmp->nm_etype.etypes[selected]);
+ }
+ NFS_GSS_DBG("Up call succeeded major = %d\n", cp->gss_clnt_major);
return (0);
out:
cp->gss_clnt_token = NULL;
cp->gss_clnt_tokenlen = 0;
+ NFS_GSS_DBG("Up call returned NFSERR_EAUTH");
return (NFSERR_EAUTH);
}
if (cp->gss_clnt_refcnt == 0) {
if ((cp->gss_clnt_flags & GSS_CTX_INVAL) &&
- cp->gss_clnt_kinfo) {
- FREE(cp->gss_clnt_kinfo, M_TEMP);
- cp->gss_clnt_kinfo = NULL;
+ cp->gss_clnt_ctx_id) {
+ gss_krb5_destroy_context(cp->gss_clnt_ctx_id);
+ cp->gss_clnt_ctx_id = NULL;
}
if (cp->gss_clnt_flags & GSS_CTX_DESTROY) {
destroy = 1;
struct timeval now;
int reaped = 0;
- NFS_GSS_DBG("Reaping contexts ncentries = %d\n", nmp->nm_ncentries);
/* Try and reap old, unreferenced, expired contexts */
+ microuptime(&now);
+
+ NFS_GSS_DBG("Reaping contexts ncentries = %d\n", nmp->nm_ncentries);
TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(cp, &nmp->nm_gsscl, gss_clnt_entries, tcp) {
int destroy = 0;
cp->gss_clnt_token = NULL;
}
cp->gss_clnt_tokenlen = 0;
- if (cp->gss_clnt_kinfo)
- bzero(cp->gss_clnt_kinfo, sizeof(gss_key_info));
+ /* XXX gss_clnt_ctx_id ??? */
/*
* Preserve:
* gss_clnt_gssd_flags
* context.
*/
static int
-nfs_gss_clnt_ctx_copy(struct nfs_gss_clnt_ctx *scp, struct nfs_gss_clnt_ctx **dcpp, gss_key_info *ki)
+nfs_gss_clnt_ctx_copy(struct nfs_gss_clnt_ctx *scp, struct nfs_gss_clnt_ctx **dcpp)
{
struct nfs_gss_clnt_ctx *dcp;
if (dcp == NULL)
return (ENOMEM);
bzero(dcp, sizeof (struct nfs_gss_clnt_ctx));
- if (ki == NULL) {
- MALLOC(dcp->gss_clnt_kinfo, gss_key_info *, sizeof (gss_key_info), M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
- if (dcp->gss_clnt_kinfo == NULL) {
- FREE(dcp, M_TEMP);
- return (ENOMEM);
- }
- } else {
- dcp->gss_clnt_kinfo = ki;
- }
- bzero(dcp->gss_clnt_kinfo, sizeof (gss_key_info));
dcp->gss_clnt_mtx = lck_mtx_alloc_init(nfs_gss_clnt_grp, LCK_ATTR_NULL);
dcp->gss_clnt_cred = scp->gss_clnt_cred;
kauth_cred_ref(dcp->gss_clnt_cred);
if (scp->gss_clnt_principal) {
MALLOC(dcp->gss_clnt_principal, uint8_t *, dcp->gss_clnt_prinlen, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
if (dcp->gss_clnt_principal == NULL) {
- FREE(dcp->gss_clnt_kinfo, M_TEMP);
FREE(dcp, M_TEMP);
return (ENOMEM);
}
/* Note we don't preserve the display name, that will be set by a successful up call */
dcp->gss_clnt_service = scp->gss_clnt_service;
dcp->gss_clnt_mport = host_copy_special_port(scp->gss_clnt_mport);
- /* gss_clnt_kinfo allocated above */
+ dcp->gss_clnt_ctx_id = NULL; /* Will be set from successful upcall */
dcp->gss_clnt_gssd_flags = scp->gss_clnt_gssd_flags;
dcp->gss_clnt_major = scp->gss_clnt_major;
dcp->gss_clnt_minor = scp->gss_clnt_minor;
FREE(cp->gss_clnt_display, M_TEMP);
cp->gss_clnt_display = NULL;
}
- if (cp->gss_clnt_kinfo) {
- FREE(cp->gss_clnt_kinfo, M_TEMP);
- cp->gss_clnt_kinfo = NULL;
+ if (cp->gss_clnt_ctx_id) {
+ gss_krb5_destroy_context(cp->gss_clnt_ctx_id);
+ cp->gss_clnt_ctx_id = NULL;
}
nfs_gss_clnt_ctx_clean(cp);
}
lck_mtx_unlock(cp->gss_clnt_mtx);
- error = nfs_gss_clnt_ctx_copy(cp, &ncp, NULL);
+ if (cp->gss_clnt_proc == RPCSEC_GSS_DESTROY)
+ return (EACCES); /* Destroying a context is best effort. Don't renew. */
+ /*
+ * If we're setting up a context let nfs_gss_clnt_ctx_init know this is not working
+ * and to try some other etype.
+ */
+ if (cp->gss_clnt_proc != RPCSEC_GSS_DATA)
+ return (ENEEDAUTH);
+ error = nfs_gss_clnt_ctx_copy(cp, &ncp);
NFS_GSS_DBG("Renewing context %s\n", NFS_GSS_CTX(req, ncp));
nfs_gss_clnt_ctx_unref(req);
if (error)
int error = 0;
struct nfs_gss_clnt_ctx *cp;
kauth_cred_t cred = vfs_context_ucred(ctx);
- const char *princ;
+ const char *princ = NULL;
char CTXBUF[NFS_CTXBUFSZ];
+ /* Make sure the the members of the struct user_nfs_gss_principal are initialized */
+ p->nametype = GSSD_STRING_NAME;
+ p->principal = USER_ADDR_NULL;
+ p->princlen = 0;
+ p->flags = 0;
+
req.r_nmp = nmp;
lck_mtx_lock(&nmp->nm_lock);
TAILQ_FOREACH(cp, &nmp->nm_gsscl, gss_clnt_entries) {
out:
if (cp == NULL) {
lck_mtx_unlock(&nmp->nm_lock);
- p->princlen = 0;
- p->principal = USER_ADDR_NULL;
- p->nametype = GSSD_STRING_NAME;
- p->flags |= NFS_IOC_NO_CRED_FLAG;
+ p->flags |= NFS_IOC_NO_CRED_FLAG; /* No credentials, valid or invalid on this mount */
NFS_GSS_DBG("No context found for session %d by uid %d\n",
kauth_cred_getasid(cred), kauth_cred_getuid(cred));
return (0);
}
- princ = cp->gss_clnt_principal ? (char *)cp->gss_clnt_principal : cp->gss_clnt_display;
- p->princlen = cp->gss_clnt_principal ? cp->gss_clnt_prinlen :
- (cp->gss_clnt_display ? strlen(cp->gss_clnt_display) : 0);
- p->nametype = cp->gss_clnt_prinnt;
+ /* Indicate if the cred is INVALID */
+ if (cp->gss_clnt_flags & GSS_CTX_INVAL)
+ p->flags |= NFS_IOC_INVALID_CRED_FLAG;
+
+ /* We have set a principal on the mount */
+ if (cp->gss_clnt_principal) {
+ princ = (char *)cp->gss_clnt_principal;
+ p->princlen = cp->gss_clnt_prinlen;
+ p->nametype = cp->gss_clnt_prinnt;
+ } else if (cp->gss_clnt_display) {
+ /* We have a successful use the the default credential */
+ princ = cp->gss_clnt_display;
+ p->princlen = strlen(cp->gss_clnt_display);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If neither of the above is true we have an invalid default credential
+ * So from above p->principal is USER_ADDR_NULL and princ is NULL
+ */
+
if (princ) {
char *pp;
MALLOC(pp, char *, p->princlen, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
- if (pp) {
- bcopy(princ, pp, p->princlen);
- p->principal = CAST_USER_ADDR_T(pp);
- }
- else
- error = ENOMEM;
+ bcopy(princ, pp, p->princlen);
+ p->principal = CAST_USER_ADDR_T(pp);
}
+
lck_mtx_unlock(&nmp->nm_lock);
req.r_gss_ctx = cp;
{
uint32_t vers, proc, seqnum, service;
uint32_t handle, handle_len;
+ uint32_t major;
struct nfs_gss_svc_ctx *cp = NULL;
- uint32_t flavor = 0, verflen = 0;
+ uint32_t flavor = 0, header_len;
int error = 0;
- uint32_t arglen, start, toklen, cksumlen;
- u_char tokbuf[KRB5_SZ_TOKMAX(MAX_DIGEST)];
- u_char cksum1[MAX_DIGEST], cksum2[MAX_DIGEST];
+ uint32_t arglen, start;
+ size_t argsize;
+ gss_buffer_desc cksum;
struct nfsm_chain nmc_tmp;
- gss_key_info *ki;
-
+ mbuf_t reply_mbuf, prev_mbuf, pad_mbuf;
+
vers = proc = seqnum = service = handle_len = 0;
- arglen = cksumlen = 0;
+ arglen = 0;
nfsm_chain_get_32(error, nmc, vers);
if (vers != RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_1) {
cp->gss_svc_mtx = lck_mtx_alloc_init(nfs_gss_svc_grp, LCK_ATTR_NULL);
cp->gss_svc_refcnt = 1;
} else {
-
/*
* Use the handle to find the context
*/
}
cp->gss_svc_proc = proc;
- ki = &cp->gss_svc_kinfo;
if (proc == RPCSEC_GSS_DATA || proc == RPCSEC_GSS_DESTROY) {
struct posix_cred temp_pcred;
goto nfsmout;
}
- /* Now compute the client's call header checksum */
- nfs_gss_cksum_chain(ki, nmc, ALG_MIC(ki), 0, 0, cksum1);
-
/*
* Validate the verifier.
* The verifier contains an encrypted checksum
* checksum and compare it with what came in
* the verifier.
*/
+ header_len = nfsm_chain_offset(nmc);
nfsm_chain_get_32(error, nmc, flavor);
- nfsm_chain_get_32(error, nmc, verflen);
+ nfsm_chain_get_32(error, nmc, cksum.length);
if (error)
goto nfsmout;
- if (flavor != RPCSEC_GSS || verflen != KRB5_SZ_TOKEN(ki->hash_len))
+ if (flavor != RPCSEC_GSS || cksum.length > KRB5_MAX_MIC_SIZE)
error = NFSERR_AUTHERR | AUTH_BADVERF;
- nfsm_chain_get_opaque(error, nmc, verflen, tokbuf);
- if (error)
- goto nfsmout;
-
- /* Get the checksum from the token inside the verifier */
- error = nfs_gss_token_get(ki, ALG_MIC(ki), tokbuf, 1,
- NULL, cksum2);
+ MALLOC(cksum.value, void *, cksum.length, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
+ nfsm_chain_get_opaque(error, nmc, cksum.length, cksum.value);
if (error)
goto nfsmout;
- if (bcmp(cksum1, cksum2, HASHLEN(ki)) != 0) {
+ /* Now verify the client's call header checksum */
+ major = gss_krb5_verify_mic_mbuf((uint32_t *)&error, cp->gss_svc_ctx_id, nmc->nmc_mhead, 0, header_len, &cksum, NULL);
+ (void)gss_release_buffer(NULL, &cksum);
+ if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ printf("Server header: gss_krb5_verify_mic_mbuf failed %d\n", error);
error = NFSERR_AUTHERR | RPCSEC_GSS_CTXPROBLEM;
goto nfsmout;
}
* - length of seq num + call args (4 bytes)
* - sequence number (4 bytes)
* - call args (variable bytes)
- * - length of checksum token (37)
- * - checksum of seqnum + call args (37 bytes)
+ * - length of checksum token
+ * - checksum of seqnum + call args
*/
nfsm_chain_get_32(error, nmc, arglen); // length of args
if (arglen > NFS_MAXPACKET) {
goto nfsmout;
}
- /* Compute the checksum over the call args */
+ nmc_tmp = *nmc;
+ nfsm_chain_adv(error, &nmc_tmp, arglen);
+ nfsm_chain_get_32(error, &nmc_tmp, cksum.length);
+ MALLOC(cksum.value, void *, cksum.length, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
+
+ if (cksum.value == NULL) {
+ error = EBADRPC;
+ goto nfsmout;
+ }
+ nfsm_chain_get_opaque(error, &nmc_tmp, cksum.length, cksum.value);
+
+ /* Verify the checksum over the call args */
start = nfsm_chain_offset(nmc);
- nfs_gss_cksum_chain(ki, nmc, ALG_MIC(ki), start, arglen, cksum1);
-
+
+ major = gss_krb5_verify_mic_mbuf((uint32_t *)&error, cp->gss_svc_ctx_id,
+ nmc->nmc_mhead, start, arglen, &cksum, NULL);
+ FREE(cksum.value, M_TEMP);
+ if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ printf("Server args: gss_krb5_verify_mic_mbuf failed %d\n", error);
+ error = EBADRPC;
+ goto nfsmout;
+ }
+
/*
* Get the sequence number prepended to the args
* and compare it against the one sent in the
error = EBADRPC; // returns as GARBAGEARGS
goto nfsmout;
}
-
- /*
- * Advance to the end of the args and
- * fetch the checksum computed by the client.
- */
- nmc_tmp = *nmc;
- arglen -= NFSX_UNSIGNED; // skipped seqnum
- nfsm_chain_adv(error, &nmc_tmp, arglen); // skip args
- nfsm_chain_get_32(error, &nmc_tmp, cksumlen); // length of checksum
- if (cksumlen != KRB5_SZ_TOKEN(ki->hash_len)) {
- error = EBADRPC;
- goto nfsmout;
- }
- nfsm_chain_get_opaque(error, &nmc_tmp, cksumlen, tokbuf);
- if (error)
- goto nfsmout;
- error = nfs_gss_token_get(ki, ALG_MIC(ki), tokbuf, 1,
- NULL, cksum2);
-
- /* Verify that the checksums are the same */
- if (error || bcmp(cksum1, cksum2, HASHLEN(ki)) != 0) {
- error = EBADRPC;
- goto nfsmout;
- }
break;
case RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY:
/*
* Here's what we expect in the privacy call args:
*
- * - length of confounder + seq num + token + call args
+ * - length of wrap token
* - wrap token (37-40 bytes)
- * - confounder (8 bytes)
- * - sequence number (4 bytes)
- * - call args (encrypted)
*/
+ prev_mbuf = nmc->nmc_mcur;
nfsm_chain_get_32(error, nmc, arglen); // length of args
if (arglen > NFS_MAXPACKET) {
error = EBADRPC;
goto nfsmout;
}
-
- /* Get the token that prepends the encrypted args */
- nfsm_chain_get_opaque(error, nmc, KRB5_SZ_TOKMAX(ki->hash_len), tokbuf);
- if (error)
- goto nfsmout;
- error = nfs_gss_token_get(ki, ALG_WRAP(ki), tokbuf, 1,
- &toklen, cksum1);
+
+ /* Get the wrap token (current mbuf in the chain starting at the current offset) */
+ start = nmc->nmc_ptr - (caddr_t)mbuf_data(nmc->nmc_mcur);
+
+ /* split out the wrap token */
+ argsize = arglen;
+ error = gss_normalize_mbuf(nmc->nmc_mcur, start, &argsize, &reply_mbuf, &pad_mbuf, 0);
if (error)
goto nfsmout;
- nfsm_chain_reverse(nmc, nfsm_pad(toklen));
-
- /* decrypt the 8 byte confounder + seqnum + args */
- start = nfsm_chain_offset(nmc);
- arglen -= toklen;
- nfs_gss_encrypt_chain(ki, nmc, start, arglen, DES_DECRYPT);
-
- /* Compute a checksum over the sequence number + results */
- nfs_gss_cksum_chain(ki, nmc, ALG_WRAP(ki), start, arglen, cksum2);
-
- /* Verify that the checksums are the same */
- if (bcmp(cksum1, cksum2, HASHLEN(ki)) != 0) {
- error = EBADRPC;
+
+ assert(argsize == arglen);
+ if (pad_mbuf) {
+ assert(nfsm_pad(arglen) == mbuf_len(pad_mbuf));
+ mbuf_free(pad_mbuf);
+ } else {
+ assert(nfsm_pad(arglen) == 0);
+ }
+
+ major = gss_krb5_unwrap_mbuf((uint32_t *)&error, cp->gss_svc_ctx_id, &reply_mbuf, 0, arglen, NULL, NULL);
+ if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ printf("%s: gss_krb5_unwrap_mbuf failes %d\n", __func__, error);
goto nfsmout;
}
+ /* Now replace the wrapped arguments with the unwrapped ones */
+ mbuf_setnext(prev_mbuf, reply_mbuf);
+ nmc->nmc_mcur = reply_mbuf;
+ nmc->nmc_ptr = mbuf_data(reply_mbuf);
+ nmc->nmc_left = mbuf_len(reply_mbuf);
+
+ /*
+ * - sequence number (4 bytes)
+ * - call args
+ */
+
+ // nfsm_chain_reverse(nmc, nfsm_pad(toklen));
+
/*
* Get the sequence number prepended to the args
* and compare it against the one sent in the
* call credential.
*/
- nfsm_chain_adv(error, nmc, 8); // skip over the confounder
nfsm_chain_get_32(error, nmc, seqnum);
if (seqnum != nd->nd_gss_seqnum) {
+ printf("%s: Sequence number mismatch seqnum = %d nd->nd_gss_seqnum = %d\n",
+ __func__, seqnum, nd->nd_gss_seqnum);
+ printmbuf("reply_mbuf", nmc->nmc_mhead, 0, 0);
+ printf("reply_mbuf %p nmc_head %p\n", reply_mbuf, nmc->nmc_mhead);
error = EBADRPC; // returns as GARBAGEARGS
goto nfsmout;
}
break;
}
} else {
+ uint32_t verflen;
/*
* If the proc is RPCSEC_GSS_INIT or RPCSEC_GSS_CONTINUE_INIT
* then we expect a null verifier.
{
struct nfs_gss_svc_ctx *cp;
int error = 0;
- u_char tokbuf[KRB5_SZ_TOKEN(MAX_DIGEST)];
- int toklen;
- u_char cksum[MAX_DIGEST];
- gss_key_info *ki;
-
+ gss_buffer_desc cksum, seqbuf;
+ uint32_t network_seqnum;
cp = nd->nd_gss_context;
- ki = &cp->gss_svc_kinfo;
-
+ uint32_t major;
+
if (cp->gss_svc_major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
/*
* If the context isn't yet complete
* then return the checksum of the context
* window size.
*/
+ seqbuf.length = NFSX_UNSIGNED;
if (cp->gss_svc_proc == RPCSEC_GSS_INIT ||
cp->gss_svc_proc == RPCSEC_GSS_CONTINUE_INIT)
- nfs_gss_cksum_rep(ki, cp->gss_svc_seqwin, cksum);
+ network_seqnum = htonl(cp->gss_svc_seqwin);
else
- nfs_gss_cksum_rep(ki, nd->nd_gss_seqnum, cksum);
+ network_seqnum = htonl(nd->nd_gss_seqnum);
+ seqbuf.value = &network_seqnum;
+
+ major = gss_krb5_get_mic((uint32_t *)&error, cp->gss_svc_ctx_id, 0, &seqbuf, &cksum);
+ if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ return (error);
+
/*
* Now wrap it in a token and add
* the verifier to the reply.
*/
- toklen = nfs_gss_token_put(ki, ALG_MIC(ki), tokbuf, 0, 0, cksum);
nfsm_chain_add_32(error, nmc, RPCSEC_GSS);
- nfsm_chain_add_32(error, nmc, toklen);
- nfsm_chain_add_opaque(error, nmc, tokbuf, toklen);
+ nfsm_chain_add_32(error, nmc, cksum.length);
+ nfsm_chain_add_opaque(error, nmc, cksum.value, cksum.length);
+ gss_release_buffer(NULL, &cksum);
return (error);
}
/* Nothing to do */
break;
case RPCAUTH_KRB5I:
- nd->nd_gss_mb = nmc->nmc_mcur; // record current mbuf
- nfsm_chain_finish_mbuf(error, nmc); // split the chain here
- nfsm_chain_add_32(error, nmc, nd->nd_gss_seqnum); // req sequence number
- break;
case RPCAUTH_KRB5P:
nd->nd_gss_mb = nmc->nmc_mcur; // record current mbuf
nfsm_chain_finish_mbuf(error, nmc); // split the chain here
- nfsm_chain_add_32(error, nmc, random()); // confounder bytes 1-4
- nfsm_chain_add_32(error, nmc, random()); // confounder bytes 5-8
- nfsm_chain_add_32(error, nmc, nd->nd_gss_seqnum); // req sequence number
break;
}
* The results are checksummed or encrypted for return to the client
*/
int
-nfs_gss_svc_protect_reply(struct nfsrv_descript *nd, mbuf_t mrep)
+nfs_gss_svc_protect_reply(struct nfsrv_descript *nd, mbuf_t mrep __unused)
{
struct nfs_gss_svc_ctx *cp = nd->nd_gss_context;
struct nfsm_chain nmrep_res, *nmc_res = &nmrep_res;
- struct nfsm_chain nmrep_pre, *nmc_pre = &nmrep_pre;
mbuf_t mb, results;
uint32_t reslen;
- u_char tokbuf[KRB5_SZ_TOKMAX(MAX_DIGEST)];
- int pad, toklen;
- u_char cksum[MAX_DIGEST];
int error = 0;
- gss_key_info *ki = &cp->gss_svc_kinfo;
- /*
+ /* XXX
* Using a reference to the mbuf where we previously split the reply
* mbuf chain, we split the mbuf chain argument into two mbuf chains,
* one that allows us to prepend a length field or token, (nmc_pre)
* checksum and/or encrypt. When we're done, we join the chains back
* together.
*/
- nfs_gss_nfsm_chain(nmc_res, mrep); // set up the results chain
+
mb = nd->nd_gss_mb; // the mbuf where we split
results = mbuf_next(mb); // first mbuf in the results
- reslen = nfs_gss_mchain_length(results); // length of results
error = mbuf_setnext(mb, NULL); // disconnect the chains
if (error)
return (error);
- nfs_gss_nfsm_chain(nmc_pre, mb); // set up the prepend chain
+ nfs_gss_nfsm_chain(nmc_res, mb); // set up the prepend chain
+ nfsm_chain_build_done(error, nmc_res);
+ if (error)
+ return (error);
if (nd->nd_sec == RPCAUTH_KRB5I) {
- nfsm_chain_add_32(error, nmc_pre, reslen);
- nfsm_chain_build_done(error, nmc_pre);
- if (error)
- return (error);
- nfs_gss_append_chain(nmc_pre, results); // Append the results mbufs
-
- /* Now compute the checksum over the results data */
- nfs_gss_cksum_mchain(ki, results, ALG_MIC(ki), 0, reslen, cksum);
-
- /* Put it into a token and append to the request */
- toklen = nfs_gss_token_put(ki, ALG_MIC(ki), tokbuf, 0, 0, cksum);
- nfsm_chain_add_32(error, nmc_res, toklen);
- nfsm_chain_add_opaque(error, nmc_res, tokbuf, toklen);
- nfsm_chain_build_done(error, nmc_res);
+ error = rpc_gss_integ_data_create(cp->gss_svc_ctx_id, &results, nd->nd_gss_seqnum, &reslen);
} else {
/* RPCAUTH_KRB5P */
- /*
- * Append a pad trailer - per RFC 1964 section 1.2.2.3
- * Since XDR data is always 32-bit aligned, it
- * needs to be padded either by 4 bytes or 8 bytes.
- */
- if (reslen % 8 > 0) {
- nfsm_chain_add_32(error, nmc_res, 0x04040404);
- reslen += NFSX_UNSIGNED;
- } else {
- nfsm_chain_add_32(error, nmc_res, 0x08080808);
- nfsm_chain_add_32(error, nmc_res, 0x08080808);
- reslen += 2 * NFSX_UNSIGNED;
- }
- nfsm_chain_build_done(error, nmc_res);
-
- /* Now compute the checksum over the results data */
- nfs_gss_cksum_mchain(ki, results, ALG_WRAP(ki), 0, reslen, cksum);
-
- /* Put it into a token and insert in the reply */
- toklen = nfs_gss_token_put(ki, ALG_WRAP(ki), tokbuf, 0, reslen, cksum);
- nfsm_chain_add_32(error, nmc_pre, toklen + reslen);
- nfsm_chain_add_opaque_nopad(error, nmc_pre, tokbuf, toklen);
- nfsm_chain_build_done(error, nmc_pre);
- if (error)
- return (error);
- nfs_gss_append_chain(nmc_pre, results); // Append the results mbufs
-
- /* Encrypt the confounder + seqnum + results */
- nfs_gss_encrypt_mchain(ki, results, 0, reslen, DES_ENCRYPT);
-
- /* Add null XDR pad if the ASN.1 token misaligned the data */
- pad = nfsm_pad(toklen + reslen);
- if (pad > 0) {
- nfsm_chain_add_opaque_nopad(error, nmc_pre, iv0, pad);
- nfsm_chain_build_done(error, nmc_pre);
- }
+ error = rpc_gss_priv_data_create(cp->gss_svc_ctx_id, &results, nd->nd_gss_seqnum, &reslen);
}
+ nfs_gss_append_chain(nmc_res, results); // Append the results mbufs
+ nfsm_chain_build_done(error, nmc_res);
return (error);
}
kern_return_t kr;
mach_port_t mp;
int retry_cnt = 0;
- gssd_byte_buffer okey = NULL;
- uint32_t skeylen = 0;
+ gssd_byte_buffer octx = NULL;
+ uint32_t lucidlen = 0;
+ void *lucid_ctx_buffer;
uint32_t ret_flags;
vm_map_copy_t itoken = NULL;
gssd_byte_buffer otoken = NULL;
nfs_gss_mach_alloc_buffer(cp->gss_svc_token, cp->gss_svc_tokenlen, &itoken);
retry:
+ printf("Calling mach_gss_accept_sec_context\n");
kr = mach_gss_accept_sec_context(
mp,
(gssd_byte_buffer) itoken, (mach_msg_type_number_t) cp->gss_svc_tokenlen,
&cp->gss_svc_uid,
cp->gss_svc_gids,
&cp->gss_svc_ngroups,
- &okey, (mach_msg_type_number_t *) &skeylen,
+ &octx, (mach_msg_type_number_t *) &lucidlen,
&otoken, &otokenlen,
&cp->gss_svc_major,
&cp->gss_svc_minor);
+ printf("mach_gss_accept_sec_context returned %d\n", kr);
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
printf("nfs_gss_svc_gssd_upcall failed: %x (%d)\n", kr, kr);
if (kr == MIG_SERVER_DIED && cp->gss_svc_context == 0 &&
host_release_special_port(mp);
- if (skeylen > 0) {
- if (skeylen != SKEYLEN && skeylen != SKEYLEN3) {
- printf("nfs_gss_svc_gssd_upcall: bad key length (%d)\n", skeylen);
- vm_map_copy_discard((vm_map_copy_t) okey);
+ if (lucidlen > 0) {
+ if (lucidlen > MAX_LUCIDLEN) {
+ printf("nfs_gss_svc_gssd_upcall: bad context length (%d)\n", lucidlen);
+ vm_map_copy_discard((vm_map_copy_t) octx);
vm_map_copy_discard((vm_map_copy_t) otoken);
goto out;
}
- error = nfs_gss_mach_vmcopyout((vm_map_copy_t) okey, skeylen, cp->gss_svc_kinfo.skey);
+ MALLOC(lucid_ctx_buffer, void *, lucidlen, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
+ error = nfs_gss_mach_vmcopyout((vm_map_copy_t) octx, lucidlen, lucid_ctx_buffer);
if (error) {
vm_map_copy_discard((vm_map_copy_t) otoken);
+ FREE(lucid_ctx_buffer, M_TEMP);
goto out;
}
- error = gss_key_init(&cp->gss_svc_kinfo, skeylen);
- if (error)
+ if (cp->gss_svc_ctx_id)
+ gss_krb5_destroy_context(cp->gss_svc_ctx_id);
+ cp->gss_svc_ctx_id = gss_krb5_make_context(lucid_ctx_buffer, lucidlen);
+ if (cp->gss_svc_ctx_id == NULL) {
+ printf("Failed to make context from lucid_ctx_buffer\n");
goto out;
-
+ }
}
/* Free context token used as input */
return (0);
}
-/*
- * Encode an ASN.1 token to be wrapped in an RPCSEC_GSS verifier.
- * Returns the size of the token, since it contains a variable
- * length DER encoded size field.
- */
-static int
-nfs_gss_token_put(
- gss_key_info *ki,
- u_char *alg,
- u_char *p,
- int initiator,
- int datalen,
- u_char *cksum)
-{
- static uint32_t seqnum = 0;
- u_char *psave = p;
- u_char plain[8];
- int toklen, i;
-
- /*
- * Fill in the token header: 2 octets.
- * This is 0x06 - an ASN.1 tag for APPLICATION, 0, SEQUENCE
- * followed by the length of the token: 35 + 0 octets for a
- * MIC token, or 35 + encrypted octets for a wrap token;
- */
- *p++ = 0x060;
- toklen = KRB5_SZ_MECH + KRB5_SZ_ALG + KRB5_SZ_SEQ + HASHLEN(ki);
- nfs_gss_der_length_put(&p, toklen + datalen);
-
- /*
- * Fill in the DER encoded mech OID for Kerberos v5.
- * This represents the Kerberos OID 1.2.840.113554.1.2.2
- * described in RFC 2623, section 4.2
- */
- bcopy(krb5_mech, p, sizeof(krb5_mech));
- p += sizeof(krb5_mech);
-
- /*
- * Now at the token described in RFC 1964, section 1.2.1
- * Fill in the token ID, integrity algorithm indicator,
- * for DES MAC MD5, and four filler octets.
- * The alg string encodes the bytes to represent either
- * a MIC token or a WRAP token for Kerberos.
- */
- bcopy(alg, p, KRB5_SZ_ALG);
- p += KRB5_SZ_ALG;
-
- /*
- * Now encode the sequence number according to
- * RFC 1964, section 1.2.1.2 which dictates 4 octets
- * of sequence number followed by 4 bytes of direction
- * indicator: 0x00 for initiator or 0xff for acceptor.
- * We DES CBC encrypt the sequence number using the first
- * 8 octets of the checksum field as an initialization
- * vector.
- * Note that this sequence number is not at all related
- * to the RPCSEC_GSS protocol sequence number. This
- * number is private to the ASN.1 token. The only
- * requirement is that it not be repeated in case the
- * server has replay detection on, which normally should
- * not be the case, since RFC 2203 section 5.2.3 says that
- * replay detection and sequence checking must be turned off.
- */
- seqnum++;
- for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
- plain[i] = (u_char) ((seqnum >> (i * 8)) & 0xff);
- for (i = 4; i < 8; i++)
- plain[i] = initiator ? 0x00 : 0xff;
- gss_des_crypt(ki, (des_cblock *) plain, (des_cblock *) p, 8,
- (des_cblock *) cksum, NULL, DES_ENCRYPT, KG_USAGE_SEQ);
- p += 8;
-
- /*
- * Finally, append the octets of the
- * checksum of the alg + plaintext data.
- * The plaintext could be an RPC call header,
- * the window value, or a sequence number.
- */
- bcopy(cksum, p, HASHLEN(ki));
- p += HASHLEN(ki);
-
- return (p - psave);
-}
-
-/*
- * Determine size of ASN.1 DER length
- */
-static int
-nfs_gss_der_length_size(int len)
-{
- return
- len < (1 << 7) ? 1 :
- len < (1 << 8) ? 2 :
- len < (1 << 16) ? 3 :
- len < (1 << 24) ? 4 : 5;
-}
-
-/*
- * Encode an ASN.1 DER length field
- */
-static void
-nfs_gss_der_length_put(u_char **pp, int len)
-{
- int sz = nfs_gss_der_length_size(len);
- u_char *p = *pp;
-
- if (sz == 1) {
- *p++ = (u_char) len;
- } else {
- *p++ = (u_char) ((sz-1) | 0x80);
- sz -= 1;
- while (sz--)
- *p++ = (u_char) ((len >> (sz * 8)) & 0xff);
- }
-
- *pp = p;
-}
-
-/*
- * Decode an ASN.1 DER length field
- */
-static int
-nfs_gss_der_length_get(u_char **pp)
-{
- u_char *p = *pp;
- uint32_t flen, len = 0;
-
- flen = *p & 0x7f;
-
- if ((*p++ & 0x80) == 0)
- len = flen;
- else {
- if (flen > sizeof(uint32_t))
- return (-1);
- while (flen--)
- len = (len << 8) + *p++;
- }
- *pp = p;
- return (len);
-}
-
-/*
- * Decode an ASN.1 token from an RPCSEC_GSS verifier.
- */
-static int
-nfs_gss_token_get(
- gss_key_info *ki,
- u_char *alg,
- u_char *p,
- int initiator,
- uint32_t *len,
- u_char *cksum)
-{
- u_char d, plain[8];
- u_char *psave = p;
- int seqnum, i;
-
- /*
- * Check that we have a valid token header
- */
- if (*p++ != 0x60)
- return (AUTH_BADCRED);
- (void) nfs_gss_der_length_get(&p); // ignore the size
-
- /*
- * Check that we have the DER encoded Kerberos v5 mech OID
- */
- if (bcmp(p, krb5_mech, sizeof(krb5_mech) != 0))
- return (AUTH_BADCRED);
- p += sizeof(krb5_mech);
-
- /*
- * Now check the token ID, DES MAC MD5 algorithm
- * indicator, and filler octets.
- */
- if (bcmp(p, alg, KRB5_SZ_ALG) != 0)
- return (AUTH_BADCRED);
- p += KRB5_SZ_ALG;
-
- /*
- * Now decrypt the sequence number.
- * Note that the gss decryption uses the first 8 octets
- * of the checksum field as an initialization vector (p + 8).
- * Per RFC 2203 section 5.2.2 we don't check the sequence number
- * in the ASN.1 token because the RPCSEC_GSS protocol has its
- * own sequence number described in section 5.3.3.1
- */
- seqnum = 0;
- gss_des_crypt(ki, (des_cblock *)p, (des_cblock *) plain, 8,
- (des_cblock *) (p + 8), NULL, DES_DECRYPT, KG_USAGE_SEQ);
- p += 8;
- for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
- seqnum |= plain[i] << (i * 8);
-
- /*
- * Make sure the direction
- * indicator octets are correct.
- */
- d = initiator ? 0x00 : 0xff;
- for (i = 4; i < 8; i++)
- if (plain[i] != d)
- return (AUTH_BADCRED);
-
- /*
- * Finally, get the checksum
- */
- bcopy(p, cksum, HASHLEN(ki));
- p += HASHLEN(ki);
-
- if (len != NULL)
- *len = p - psave;
-
- return (0);
-}
-
/*
* Return the number of bytes in an mbuf chain.
*/
}
-/*
- * Compute a checksum over an mbuf chain.
- * Start building an MD5 digest at the given offset and keep
- * going until the end of data in the current mbuf is reached.
- * Then convert the 16 byte MD5 digest to an 8 byte DES CBC
- * checksum.
- */
-static void
-nfs_gss_cksum_mchain(
- gss_key_info *ki,
- mbuf_t mhead,
- u_char *alg,
- int offset,
- int len,
- u_char *digest)
-{
- mbuf_t mb;
- u_char *ptr;
- int left, bytes;
- GSS_DIGEST_CTX context;
-
- gss_digest_Init(&context, ki);
-
- /*
- * Logically prepend the first 8 bytes of the algorithm
- * field as required by RFC 1964, section 1.2.1.1
- */
- gss_digest_Update(&context, alg, KRB5_SZ_ALG);
-
- /*
- * Move down the mbuf chain until we reach the given
- * byte offset, then start MD5 on the mbuf data until
- * we've done len bytes.
- */
-
- for (mb = mhead; mb && len > 0; mb = mbuf_next(mb)) {
- ptr = mbuf_data(mb);
- left = mbuf_len(mb);
- if (offset >= left) {
- /* Offset not yet reached */
- offset -= left;
- continue;
- }
- /* At or beyond offset - checksum data */
- ptr += offset;
- left -= offset;
- offset = 0;
-
- bytes = left < len ? left : len;
- if (bytes > 0)
- gss_digest_Update(&context, ptr, bytes);
- len -= bytes;
- }
-
- gss_digest_Final(&context, digest);
-}
-
-/*
- * Compute a checksum over an NFS mbuf chain.
- * Start building an MD5 digest at the given offset and keep
- * going until the end of data in the current mbuf is reached.
- * Then convert the 16 byte MD5 digest to an 8 byte DES CBC
- * checksum.
- */
-static void
-nfs_gss_cksum_chain(
- gss_key_info *ki,
- struct nfsm_chain *nmc,
- u_char *alg,
- int offset,
- int len,
- u_char *cksum)
-{
- /*
- * If the length parameter is zero, then we need
- * to use the length from the offset to the current
- * encode/decode offset.
- */
- if (len == 0)
- len = nfsm_chain_offset(nmc) - offset;
-
- return (nfs_gss_cksum_mchain(ki, nmc->nmc_mhead, alg, offset, len, cksum));
-}
-
-/*
- * Compute a checksum of the sequence number (or sequence window)
- * of an RPCSEC_GSS reply.
- */
-static void
-nfs_gss_cksum_rep(gss_key_info *ki, uint32_t seqnum, u_char *cksum)
-{
- GSS_DIGEST_CTX context;
- uint32_t val = htonl(seqnum);
-
- gss_digest_Init(&context, ki);
-
- /*
- * Logically prepend the first 8 bytes of the MIC
- * token as required by RFC 1964, section 1.2.1.1
- */
- gss_digest_Update(&context, ALG_MIC(ki), KRB5_SZ_ALG);
-
- /*
- * Compute the digest of the seqnum in network order
- */
- gss_digest_Update(&context, &val, 4);
- gss_digest_Final(&context, cksum);
-}
-
-/*
- * Encrypt or decrypt data in an mbuf chain with des-cbc.
- */
-static void
-nfs_gss_encrypt_mchain(
- gss_key_info *ki,
- mbuf_t mhead,
- int offset,
- int len,
- int encrypt)
-{
- mbuf_t mb, mbn;
- u_char *ptr, *nptr;
- u_char tmp[8], ivec[8];
- int left, left8, remain;
-
-
- bzero(ivec, 8);
-
- /*
- * Move down the mbuf chain until we reach the given
- * byte offset, then start encrypting the mbuf data until
- * we've done len bytes.
- */
-
- for (mb = mhead; mb && len > 0; mb = mbn) {
- mbn = mbuf_next(mb);
- ptr = mbuf_data(mb);
- left = mbuf_len(mb);
- if (offset >= left) {
- /* Offset not yet reached */
- offset -= left;
- continue;
- }
- /* At or beyond offset - encrypt data */
- ptr += offset;
- left -= offset;
- offset = 0;
-
- /*
- * DES or DES3 CBC has to encrypt 8 bytes at a time.
- * If the number of bytes to be encrypted in this
- * mbuf isn't some multiple of 8 bytes, encrypt all
- * the 8 byte blocks, then combine the remaining
- * bytes with enough from the next mbuf to make up
- * an 8 byte block and encrypt that block separately,
- * i.e. that block is split across two mbufs.
- */
- remain = left % 8;
- left8 = left - remain;
- left = left8 < len ? left8 : len;
- if (left > 0) {
- gss_des_crypt(ki, (des_cblock *) ptr, (des_cblock *) ptr,
- left, &ivec, &ivec, encrypt, KG_USAGE_SEAL);
- len -= left;
- }
-
- if (mbn && remain > 0) {
- nptr = mbuf_data(mbn);
- offset = 8 - remain;
- bcopy(ptr + left, tmp, remain); // grab from this mbuf
- bcopy(nptr, tmp + remain, offset); // grab from next mbuf
- gss_des_crypt(ki, (des_cblock *) tmp, (des_cblock *) tmp, 8,
- &ivec, &ivec, encrypt, KG_USAGE_SEAL);
- bcopy(tmp, ptr + left, remain); // return to this mbuf
- bcopy(tmp + remain, nptr, offset); // return to next mbuf
- len -= 8;
- }
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Encrypt or decrypt data in an NFS mbuf chain with des-cbc.
- */
-static void
-nfs_gss_encrypt_chain(
- gss_key_info *ki,
- struct nfsm_chain *nmc,
- int offset,
- int len,
- int encrypt)
-{
- /*
- * If the length parameter is zero, then we need
- * to use the length from the offset to the current
- * encode/decode offset.
- */
- if (len == 0)
- len = nfsm_chain_offset(nmc) - offset;
-
- return (nfs_gss_encrypt_mchain(ki, nmc->nmc_mhead, offset, len, encrypt));
-}
-
-/*
- * The routines that follow provide abstractions for doing digests and crypto.
- */
-
-static void
-gss_digest_Init(GSS_DIGEST_CTX *ctx, gss_key_info *ki)
-{
- ctx->type = ki->type;
- switch (ki->type) {
- case NFS_GSS_1DES: MD5_DESCBC_Init(&ctx->m_ctx, &ki->ks_u.des.gss_sched);
- break;
- case NFS_GSS_3DES: HMAC_SHA1_DES3KD_Init(&ctx->h_ctx, ki->ks_u.des3.ckey, 0);
- break;
- default:
- printf("gss_digest_Init: Unknown key info type %d\n", ki->type);
- }
-}
-
-static void
-gss_digest_Update(GSS_DIGEST_CTX *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
-{
- switch (ctx->type) {
- case NFS_GSS_1DES: MD5_DESCBC_Update(&ctx->m_ctx, data, len);
- break;
- case NFS_GSS_3DES: HMAC_SHA1_DES3KD_Update(&ctx->h_ctx, data, len);
- break;
- }
-}
-
-static void
-gss_digest_Final(GSS_DIGEST_CTX *ctx, void *digest)
-{
- switch (ctx->type) {
- case NFS_GSS_1DES: MD5_DESCBC_Final(digest, &ctx->m_ctx);
- break;
- case NFS_GSS_3DES: HMAC_SHA1_DES3KD_Final(digest, &ctx->h_ctx);
- break;
- }
-}
-
-static void
-gss_des_crypt(gss_key_info *ki, des_cblock *in, des_cblock *out,
- int32_t len, des_cblock *iv, des_cblock *retiv, int encrypt, int usage)
-{
- switch (ki->type) {
- case NFS_GSS_1DES:
- {
- des_cbc_key_schedule *sched = ((usage == KG_USAGE_SEAL) ?
- &ki->ks_u.des.gss_sched_Ke :
- &ki->ks_u.des.gss_sched);
- des_cbc_encrypt(in, out, len, sched, iv, retiv, encrypt);
- }
- break;
- case NFS_GSS_3DES:
-
- des3_cbc_encrypt(in, out, len, &ki->ks_u.des3.gss_sched, iv, retiv, encrypt);
- break;
- }
-}
-
-static int
-gss_key_init(gss_key_info *ki, uint32_t skeylen)
-{
- size_t i;
- int rc;
- des_cblock k[3];
-
- ki->keybytes = skeylen;
- switch (skeylen) {
- case sizeof(des_cblock):
- ki->type = NFS_GSS_1DES;
- ki->hash_len = MD5_DESCBC_DIGEST_LENGTH;
- ki->ks_u.des.key = (des_cblock *)ki->skey;
- rc = des_cbc_key_sched(ki->ks_u.des.key, &ki->ks_u.des.gss_sched);
- if (rc)
- return (rc);
- for (i = 0; i < ki->keybytes; i++)
- k[0][i] = 0xf0 ^ (*ki->ks_u.des.key)[i];
- rc = des_cbc_key_sched(&k[0], &ki->ks_u.des.gss_sched_Ke);
- break;
- case 3*sizeof(des_cblock):
- ki->type = NFS_GSS_3DES;
- ki->hash_len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
- ki->ks_u.des3.key = (des_cblock (*)[3])ki->skey;
- des3_derive_key(*ki->ks_u.des3.key, ki->ks_u.des3.ckey,
- KEY_USAGE_DES3_SIGN, KEY_USAGE_LEN);
- rc = des3_cbc_key_sched(*ki->ks_u.des3.key, &ki->ks_u.des3.gss_sched);
- if (rc)
- return (rc);
- break;
- default:
- printf("gss_key_init: Invalid key length %d\n", skeylen);
- rc = EINVAL;
- break;
- }
-
- return (rc);
-}
#if 0
#define DISPLAYLEN 16
projects / apple / xnu.git / blobdiff