xnu-3248.50.21.tar.gz

[apple/xnu.git] / bsd / kern / kern_prot.c

diff --git a/bsd/kern/kern_prot.c b/bsd/kern/kern_prot.c
index e90c68c55b80b7109f686800d1ca750f684c7ced..75980efdca6ae81e0809504b66e8472e746ba91a 100644 (file)
--- a/bsd/kern/kern_prot.c
+++ b/bsd/kern/kern_prot.c
@@ -95,8 +95,7 @@
 #include <sys/timeb.h>
 #include <sys/times.h>
 #include <sys/malloc.h>
-
-#define chgproccnt_ok(p) 1
+#include <sys/persona.h>
 
 #include <security/audit/audit.h>
 
@@ -778,7 +777,7 @@ setuid(proc_t p, struct setuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                         * may be able to decrement the proc count of B before we can increment it. This results in a panic.
                         * Incrementing the proc count of the target ruid, B, before setting the process credentials prevents this race.
                         */
-                       if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && chgproccnt_ok(p)) {
+                       if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && !proc_has_persona(p)) {
                                (void)chgproccnt(ruid, 1);
                        }
 
@@ -797,7 +796,7 @@ setuid(proc_t p, struct setuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                                 * We didn't successfully switch to the new ruid, so decrement
                                 * the procs/uid count that we incremented above.
                                 */
-                               if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && chgproccnt_ok(p)) {
+                               if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && !proc_has_persona(p)) {
                                        (void)chgproccnt(ruid, -1);
                                }
                                kauth_cred_unref(&my_new_cred);
@@ -816,7 +815,7 @@ setuid(proc_t p, struct setuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                         * If we've updated the ruid, decrement the count of procs running
                         * under the previous ruid
                         */
-                       if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && chgproccnt_ok(p)) {
+                       if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && !proc_has_persona(p)) {
                                (void)chgproccnt(my_pcred->cr_ruid, -1);
                        }
                }
@@ -1026,7 +1025,7 @@ setreuid(proc_t p, struct setreuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                         * may be able to decrement the proc count of B before we can increment it. This results in a panic.
                         * Incrementing the proc count of the target ruid, B, before setting the process credentials prevents this race.
                         */
-                       if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && chgproccnt_ok(p)) {
+                       if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && !proc_has_persona(p)) {
                                (void)chgproccnt(ruid, 1);
                        }
 
@@ -1041,7 +1040,7 @@ setreuid(proc_t p, struct setreuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                         */
                        if (p->p_ucred != my_cred) {
                                proc_ucred_unlock(p);
-                               if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && chgproccnt_ok(p)) {
+                               if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && !proc_has_persona(p)) {
                                        /*
                                         * We didn't successfully switch to the new ruid, so decrement
                                         * the procs/uid count that we incremented above.
@@ -1061,7 +1060,7 @@ setreuid(proc_t p, struct setreuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                        OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);
                        proc_ucred_unlock(p);
 
-                       if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && chgproccnt_ok(p)) {
+                       if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && !proc_has_persona(p)) {
                                /*
                                 * We switched to a new ruid, so decrement the count of procs running
                                 * under the previous ruid