/*-
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2009 Apple Inc.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2020 Apple Inc.
* Copyright (c) 2006-2007 Robert N. M. Watson
* All rights reserved.
*
#include <mach/audit_triggers_server.h>
#include <kern/host.h>
-#include <kern/kalloc.h>
#include <kern/zalloc.h>
#include <kern/sched_prim.h>
MALLOC_DEFINE(M_AUDITDATA, "audit_data", "Audit data storage");
MALLOC_DEFINE(M_AUDITPATH, "audit_path", "Audit path storage");
MALLOC_DEFINE(M_AUDITTEXT, "audit_text", "Audit text storage");
+KALLOC_HEAP_DEFINE(KHEAP_AUDIT, "Audit", KHEAP_ID_DEFAULT);
/*
* Audit control settings that are set/read by system calls and are hence
*
* Define the audit control flags.
*/
-int audit_enabled;
-int audit_suspended;
+int audit_enabled;
+int audit_suspended;
-int audit_syscalls;
-au_class_t audit_kevent_mask;
+int audit_syscalls;
+au_class_t audit_kevent_mask;
+
+/*
+ * The audit control mode is used to ensure configuration settings are only
+ * accepted from appropriate sources based on the current mode.
+ */
+au_ctlmode_t audit_ctl_mode;
+au_expire_after_t audit_expire_after;
/*
* Flags controlling behavior in low storage situations. Should we panic if
* a write fails? Should we fail stop if we're out of disk space?
*/
-int audit_panic_on_write_fail;
-int audit_fail_stop;
-int audit_argv;
-int audit_arge;
+int audit_panic_on_write_fail;
+int audit_fail_stop;
+int audit_argv;
+int audit_arge;
/*
* Are we currently "failing stop" due to out of disk space?
*/
-int audit_in_failure;
+int audit_in_failure;
/*
* Global audit statistics.
*/
-struct audit_fstat audit_fstat;
+struct audit_fstat audit_fstat;
/*
* Preselection mask for non-attributable events.
*/
-struct au_mask audit_nae_mask;
+struct au_mask audit_nae_mask;
/*
* Mutex to protect global variables shared between various threads and
* processes.
*/
-struct mtx audit_mtx;
+struct mtx audit_mtx;
/*
* Queue of audit records ready for delivery to disk. We insert new records
* needed to estimate the total size of the combined set of records
* outstanding in the system.
*/
-struct kaudit_queue audit_q;
-int audit_q_len;
-int audit_pre_q_len;
+struct kaudit_queue audit_q;
+int audit_q_len;
+int audit_pre_q_len;
/*
* Audit queue control settings (minimum free, low/high water marks, etc.)
*/
-struct au_qctrl audit_qctrl;
+struct au_qctrl audit_qctrl;
/*
* Condition variable to signal to the worker that it has work to do: either
* new records are in the queue, or a log replacement is taking place.
*/
-struct cv audit_worker_cv;
+struct cv audit_worker_cv;
/*
* Condition variable to signal when the worker is done draining the audit
* queue.
*/
-struct cv audit_drain_cv;
+struct cv audit_drain_cv;
/*
* Condition variable to flag when crossing the low watermark, meaning that
* threads blocked due to hitting the high watermark can wake up and continue
* to commit records.
*/
-struct cv audit_watermark_cv;
+struct cv audit_watermark_cv;
/*
* Condition variable for auditing threads wait on when in fail-stop mode.
* Threads wait on this CV forever (and ever), never seeing the light of day
* again.
*/
-static struct cv audit_fail_cv;
+static struct cv audit_fail_cv;
-static zone_t audit_record_zone;
+static ZONE_DECLARE(audit_record_zone, "audit_zone",
+ sizeof(struct kaudit_record), ZC_NONE);
/*
* Kernel audit information. This will store the current audit address
* audit records. This data is modified by the A_GET{SET}KAUDIT auditon(2)
* command.
*/
-static struct auditinfo_addr audit_kinfo;
-static struct rwlock audit_kinfo_lock;
+static struct auditinfo_addr audit_kinfo;
+static struct rwlock audit_kinfo_lock;
-#define KINFO_LOCK_INIT() rw_init(&audit_kinfo_lock, \
- "audit_kinfo_lock")
-#define KINFO_RLOCK() rw_rlock(&audit_kinfo_lock)
-#define KINFO_WLOCK() rw_wlock(&audit_kinfo_lock)
-#define KINFO_RUNLOCK() rw_runlock(&audit_kinfo_lock)
-#define KINFO_WUNLOCK() rw_wunlock(&audit_kinfo_lock)
+#define KINFO_LOCK_INIT() rw_init(&audit_kinfo_lock, \
+ "audit_kinfo_lock")
+#define KINFO_RLOCK() rw_rlock(&audit_kinfo_lock)
+#define KINFO_WLOCK() rw_wlock(&audit_kinfo_lock)
+#define KINFO_RUNLOCK() rw_runlock(&audit_kinfo_lock)
+#define KINFO_WUNLOCK() rw_wunlock(&audit_kinfo_lock)
void
audit_set_kinfo(struct auditinfo_addr *ak)
{
-
KASSERT(ak->ai_termid.at_type == AU_IPv4 ||
ak->ai_termid.at_type == AU_IPv6,
("audit_set_kinfo: invalid address type"));
void
audit_get_kinfo(struct auditinfo_addr *ak)
{
-
KASSERT(audit_kinfo.ai_termid.at_type == AU_IPv4 ||
audit_kinfo.ai_termid.at_type == AU_IPv6,
("audit_set_kinfo: invalid address type"));
cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
/*
- * Export the subject credential.
- */
+ * Export the subject credential.
+ */
cru2x(cred, &ar->k_ar.ar_subj_cred);
ar->k_ar.ar_subj_ruid = kauth_cred_getruid(cred);
ar->k_ar.ar_subj_rgid = kauth_cred_getrgid(cred);
ar->k_ar.ar_subj_auid = cred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_auid;
ar->k_ar.ar_subj_asid = cred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_asid;
bcopy(&cred->cr_audit.as_mask, &ar->k_ar.ar_subj_amask,
- sizeof(struct au_mask));
+ sizeof(struct au_mask));
bcopy(&cred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_termid,
&ar->k_ar.ar_subj_term_addr, sizeof(struct au_tid_addr));
kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
static void
audit_record_dtor(struct kaudit_record *ar)
{
-
- if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_upath1 != NULL)
+ if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_upath1 != NULL) {
free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_upath1, M_AUDITPATH);
- if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_upath2 != NULL)
+ }
+ if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_upath2 != NULL) {
free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_upath2, M_AUDITPATH);
- if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_kpath1 != NULL)
+ }
+ if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_kpath1 != NULL) {
free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_kpath1, M_AUDITPATH);
- if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_kpath2 != NULL)
+ }
+ if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_kpath2 != NULL) {
free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_kpath2, M_AUDITPATH);
- if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_text != NULL)
+ }
+ if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_text != NULL) {
free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_text, M_AUDITTEXT);
- if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_opaque != NULL)
+ }
+ if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_opaque != NULL) {
free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_opaque, M_AUDITDATA);
- if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_data != NULL)
+ }
+ if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_data != NULL) {
free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_data, M_AUDITDATA);
- if (ar->k_udata != NULL)
+ }
+ if (ar->k_udata != NULL) {
free(ar->k_udata, M_AUDITDATA);
- if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_argv != NULL)
+ }
+ if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_argv != NULL) {
free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_argv, M_AUDITTEXT);
- if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_envv != NULL)
+ }
+ if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_envv != NULL) {
free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_envv, M_AUDITTEXT);
+ }
+ audit_identity_info_destruct(&ar->k_ar.ar_arg_identity);
}
/*
void
audit_init(void)
{
-
audit_enabled = 0;
audit_syscalls = 0;
audit_kevent_mask = 0;
audit_in_failure = 0;
audit_argv = 0;
audit_arge = 0;
+ audit_ctl_mode = AUDIT_CTLMODE_NORMAL;
+ audit_expire_after.age = 0;
+ audit_expire_after.size = 0;
+ audit_expire_after.op_type = AUDIT_EXPIRE_OP_AND;
- audit_fstat.af_filesz = 0; /* '0' means unset, unbounded. */
+ audit_fstat.af_filesz = 0; /* '0' means unset, unbounded. */
audit_fstat.af_currsz = 0;
audit_nae_mask.am_success = 0;
audit_nae_mask.am_failure = 0;
audit_kinfo.ai_termid.at_type = AU_IPv4;
audit_kinfo.ai_termid.at_addr[0] = INADDR_ANY;
- _audit_lck_grp_init();
mtx_init(&audit_mtx, "audit_mtx", NULL, MTX_DEF);
KINFO_LOCK_INIT();
cv_init(&audit_worker_cv, "audit_worker_cv");
cv_init(&audit_watermark_cv, "audit_watermark_cv");
cv_init(&audit_fail_cv, "audit_fail_cv");
- audit_record_zone = zinit(sizeof(struct kaudit_record),
- AQ_HIWATER*sizeof(struct kaudit_record), 8192, "audit_zone");
-#if CONFIG_MACF
- audit_mac_init();
-#endif
/* Init audit session subsystem. */
audit_session_init();
void
audit_shutdown(void)
{
-
audit_rotate_vnode(NULL, NULL);
}
struct kaudit_record *
currecord(void)
{
-
- return (curthread()->uu_ar);
+ return curthread()->uu_ar;
}
/*
audit_override = (AUE_SESSION_START == event ||
AUE_SESSION_UPDATE == event || AUE_SESSION_END == event ||
AUE_SESSION_CLOSE == event);
-
+
mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
no_record = (audit_suspended || !audit_enabled);
mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
- if (!audit_override && no_record)
- return (NULL);
+ if (!audit_override && no_record) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
/*
* Initialize the audit record header.
* in the kernel.
*/
ar = zalloc(audit_record_zone);
- if (ar == NULL)
+ if (ar == NULL) {
return NULL;
+ }
audit_record_ctor(p, ar);
ar->k_ar.ar_event = event;
if (PROC_NULL != p) {
if (audit_mac_new(p, ar) != 0) {
zfree(audit_record_zone, ar);
- return (NULL);
+ return NULL;
}
- } else
+ } else {
ar->k_ar.ar_mac_records = NULL;
+ }
#endif
mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
audit_pre_q_len++;
mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
- return (ar);
+ return ar;
}
void
audit_free(struct kaudit_record *ar)
{
-
audit_record_dtor(ar);
#if CONFIG_MACF
- if (NULL != ar->k_ar.ar_mac_records)
+ if (NULL != ar->k_ar.ar_mac_records) {
audit_mac_free(ar);
+ }
#endif
zfree(audit_record_zone, ar);
}
struct au_mask *aumask;
int audit_override;
- if (ar == NULL)
+ if (ar == NULL) {
return;
+ }
/*
* Decide whether to commit the audit record by checking the error
* value from the system call and using the appropriate audit mask.
*/
- if (ar->k_ar.ar_subj_auid == AU_DEFAUDITID)
+ if (ar->k_ar.ar_subj_auid == AU_DEFAUDITID) {
aumask = &audit_nae_mask;
- else
+ } else {
aumask = &ar->k_ar.ar_subj_amask;
+ }
- if (error)
+ if (error) {
sorf = AU_PRS_FAILURE;
- else
+ } else {
sorf = AU_PRS_SUCCESS;
+ }
- switch(ar->k_ar.ar_event) {
+ switch (ar->k_ar.ar_event) {
case AUE_OPEN_RWTC:
/*
* The open syscall always writes a AUE_OPEN_RWTC event;
* and the error value.
*/
ar->k_ar.ar_event = audit_flags_and_error_to_openevent(
- ar->k_ar.ar_arg_fflags, error);
+ ar->k_ar.ar_arg_fflags, error);
break;
case AUE_OPEN_EXTENDED_RWTC:
* event based on the flags and the error value.
*/
ar->k_ar.ar_event = audit_flags_and_error_to_openextendedevent(
- ar->k_ar.ar_arg_fflags, error);
+ ar->k_ar.ar_arg_fflags, error);
break;
case AUE_OPENAT_RWTC:
* event based on the flags and the error value.
*/
ar->k_ar.ar_event = audit_flags_and_error_to_openatevent(
- ar->k_ar.ar_arg_fflags, error);
+ ar->k_ar.ar_arg_fflags, error);
break;
case AUE_OPENBYID_RWT:
* event based on the flags and the error value.
*/
ar->k_ar.ar_event = audit_flags_and_error_to_openbyidevent(
- ar->k_ar.ar_arg_fflags, error);
+ ar->k_ar.ar_arg_fflags, error);
break;
case AUE_SYSCTL:
ar->k_ar.ar_event = audit_ctlname_to_sysctlevent(
- ar->k_ar.ar_arg_ctlname, ar->k_ar.ar_valid_arg);
+ ar->k_ar.ar_arg_ctlname, ar->k_ar.ar_valid_arg);
break;
case AUE_AUDITON:
case AUE_FCNTL:
/* Convert some fcntl() commands to their own events. */
ar->k_ar.ar_event = audit_fcntl_command_event(
- ar->k_ar.ar_arg_cmd, ar->k_ar.ar_arg_fflags, error);
+ ar->k_ar.ar_arg_cmd, ar->k_ar.ar_arg_fflags, error);
break;
}
AUE_SESSION_CLOSE == event);
ar->k_ar_commit |= AR_COMMIT_KERNEL;
- if (au_preselect(event, class, aumask, sorf) != 0)
+ if (au_preselect(event, class, aumask, sorf) != 0) {
ar->k_ar_commit |= AR_PRESELECT_TRAIL;
+ }
if (audit_pipe_preselect(auid, event, class, sorf,
- ar->k_ar_commit & AR_PRESELECT_TRAIL) != 0)
+ ar->k_ar_commit & AR_PRESELECT_TRAIL) != 0) {
ar->k_ar_commit |= AR_PRESELECT_PIPE;
+ }
if ((ar->k_ar_commit & (AR_PRESELECT_TRAIL | AR_PRESELECT_PIPE |
AR_PRESELECT_USER_TRAIL | AR_PRESELECT_USER_PIPE |
AR_PRESELECT_FILTER)) == 0) {
* Constrain the number of committed audit records based on the
* configurable parameter.
*/
- while (audit_q_len >= audit_qctrl.aq_hiwater)
+ while (audit_q_len >= audit_qctrl.aq_hiwater) {
cv_wait(&audit_watermark_cv, &audit_mtx);
+ }
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&audit_q, ar, k_q);
audit_q_len++;
* the syscall table(s). This table is generated by makesyscalls.sh
* from syscalls.master and stored in audit_kevents.c.
*/
- if (code > NUM_SYSENT)
+ if (code >= nsysent) {
return;
+ }
event = sys_au_event[code];
- if (event == AUE_NULL)
+ if (event == AUE_NULL) {
return;
+ }
KASSERT(uthread->uu_ar == NULL,
("audit_syscall_enter: uthread->uu_ar != NULL"));
*/
cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(proc);
auid = cred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_auid;
- if (auid == AU_DEFAUDITID)
+ if (auid == AU_DEFAUDITID) {
aumask = &audit_nae_mask;
- else
+ } else {
aumask = &cred->cr_audit.as_mask;
+ }
/*
* Allocate an audit record, if preselection allows it, and store in
* Note: audit_mac_syscall_enter() may call audit_new() and allocate
* memory for the audit record (uu_ar).
*/
- if (audit_mac_syscall_enter(code, proc, uthread, cred, event) == 0)
+ if (audit_mac_syscall_enter(code, proc, uthread, cred, event) == 0) {
goto out;
+ }
#endif
if (au_preselect(event, class, aumask, AU_PRS_BOTH)) {
/*
cv_wait(&audit_fail_cv, &audit_mtx);
panic("audit_failing_stop: thread continued");
}
- if (uthread->uu_ar == NULL)
+ if (uthread->uu_ar == NULL) {
uthread->uu_ar = audit_new(event, proc, uthread);
+ }
} else if (audit_pipe_preselect(auid, event, class, AU_PRS_BOTH, 0)) {
- if (uthread->uu_ar == NULL)
+ if (uthread->uu_ar == NULL) {
uthread->uu_ar = audit_new(event, proc, uthread);
- }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * All audited events will contain an identity
+ *
+ * Note: Identity should be obtained prior to the syscall implementation
+ * being called to handle cases like execve(2) where the process changes
+ */
+ AUDIT_ARG(identity);
out:
kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
* If there was an error, the return value is set to -1, imitating
* the behavior of the cerror routine.
*/
- if (error)
+ if (error) {
retval = -1;
- else
+ } else {
retval = uthread->uu_rval[0];
+ }
#if CONFIG_MACF
- if (audit_mac_syscall_exit(code, uthread, error, retval) != 0)
+ if (audit_mac_syscall_exit(code, uthread, error, retval) != 0) {
goto out;
+ }
#endif
audit_commit(uthread->uu_ar, error, retval);
uthread->uu_ar = NULL;
}
+/*
+ * For system calls such as posix_spawn(2) the sub operations (i.e., file actions
+ * and port actions) need to be audited as their own events. Like with system
+ * calls we need to determine if the sub operation needs to be audited by
+ * examining preselection masks.
+ */
+void
+audit_subcall_enter(au_event_t event, proc_t proc, struct uthread *uthread)
+{
+ struct au_mask *aumask;
+ au_class_t class;
+ au_id_t auid;
+ kauth_cred_t cred;
+
+ /*
+ * Check which audit mask to use; either the kernel non-attributable
+ * event mask or the process audit mask.
+ */
+ cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(proc);
+ auid = cred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_auid;
+ if (auid == AU_DEFAUDITID) {
+ aumask = &audit_nae_mask;
+ } else {
+ aumask = &cred->cr_audit.as_mask;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Allocate an audit record, if preselection allows it, and store in
+ * the thread for later use.
+ */
+ class = au_event_class(event);
+
+ if (au_preselect(event, class, aumask, AU_PRS_BOTH)) {
+ /*
+ * If we're out of space and need to suspend unprivileged
+ * processes, do that here rather than trying to allocate
+ * another audit record.
+ *
+ * Note: we might wish to be able to continue here in the
+ * future, if the system recovers. That should be possible
+ * by means of checking the condition in a loop around
+ * cv_wait(). It might be desirable to reevaluate whether an
+ * audit record is still required for this event by
+ * re-calling au_preselect().
+ */
+ if (audit_in_failure &&
+ suser(cred, &proc->p_acflag) != 0) {
+ cv_wait(&audit_fail_cv, &audit_mtx);
+ panic("audit_failing_stop: thread continued");
+ }
+ if (uthread->uu_ar == NULL) {
+ uthread->uu_ar = audit_new(event, proc, uthread);
+ }
+ } else if (audit_pipe_preselect(auid, event, class, AU_PRS_BOTH, 0)) {
+ if (uthread->uu_ar == NULL) {
+ uthread->uu_ar = audit_new(event, proc, uthread);
+ }
+ }
+
+ kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
+}
+
+void
+audit_subcall_exit(int error, struct uthread *uthread)
+{
+ /* A subcall doesn't have a return value so always zero. */
+ audit_commit(uthread->uu_ar, error, 0 /* retval */);
+
+ uthread->uu_ar = NULL;
+}
+
/*
* Calls to set up and tear down audit structures used during Mach system
* calls.
au_class_t class;
au_id_t auid;
- if (event == AUE_NULL)
+ if (event == AUE_NULL) {
return;
+ }
uthread = curthread();
- if (uthread == NULL)
+ if (uthread == NULL) {
return;
+ }
proc = current_proc();
- if (proc == NULL)
+ if (proc == NULL) {
return;
+ }
KASSERT(uthread->uu_ar == NULL,
("audit_mach_syscall_enter: uthread->uu_ar != NULL"));
* Check which audit mask to use; either the kernel non-attributable
* event mask or the process audit mask.
*/
- if (auid == AU_DEFAUDITID)
+ if (auid == AU_DEFAUDITID) {
aumask = &audit_nae_mask;
- else
+ } else {
aumask = &cred->cr_audit.as_mask;
+ }
/*
* Allocate an audit record, if desired, and store in the BSD thread
* for later use.
*/
class = au_event_class(event);
- if (au_preselect(event, class, aumask, AU_PRS_BOTH))
+ if (au_preselect(event, class, aumask, AU_PRS_BOTH)) {
uthread->uu_ar = audit_new(event, proc, uthread);
- else if (audit_pipe_preselect(auid, event, class, AU_PRS_BOTH, 0))
+ } else if (audit_pipe_preselect(auid, event, class, AU_PRS_BOTH, 0)) {
uthread->uu_ar = audit_new(event, proc, uthread);
- else
+ } else {
uthread->uu_ar = NULL;
+ }
kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
}
int
kau_will_audit(void)
{
-
- return (audit_enabled && currecord() != NULL);
+ return audit_enabled && currecord() != NULL;
}
+#if CONFIG_COREDUMP
void
audit_proc_coredump(proc_t proc, char *path, int errcode)
{
*/
my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(proc);
auid = my_cred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_auid;
- if (auid == AU_DEFAUDITID)
+ if (auid == AU_DEFAUDITID) {
aumask = &audit_nae_mask;
- else
+ } else {
aumask = &my_cred->cr_audit.as_mask;
+ }
kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
/*
* It's possible for coredump(9) generation to fail. Make sure that
* we handle this case correctly for preselection.
*/
- if (errcode != 0)
+ if (errcode != 0) {
sorf = AU_PRS_FAILURE;
- else
+ } else {
sorf = AU_PRS_SUCCESS;
+ }
class = au_event_class(AUE_CORE);
if (au_preselect(AUE_CORE, class, aumask, sorf) == 0 &&
- audit_pipe_preselect(auid, AUE_CORE, class, sorf, 0) == 0)
+ audit_pipe_preselect(auid, AUE_CORE, class, sorf, 0) == 0) {
return;
+ }
/*
* If we are interested in seeing this audit record, allocate it.
* Where possible coredump records should contain a pathname and arg32
*/
uthread = curthread();
ar = audit_new(AUE_CORE, proc, uthread);
+ if (ar == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
if (path != NULL) {
pathp = &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_upath1;
*pathp = malloc(MAXPATHLEN, M_AUDITPATH, M_WAITOK);
if (audit_canon_path(vfs_context_cwd(vfs_context_current()), path,
- *pathp))
+ *pathp)) {
free(*pathp, M_AUDITPATH);
- else
+ } else {
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_UPATH1);
+ }
}
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_signum = proc->p_sigacts->ps_sig;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SIGNUM);
- if (errcode != 0)
+ if (errcode != 0) {
ret = 1;
+ }
audit_commit(ar, errcode, ret);
}
+#endif /* CONFIG_COREDUMP */
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
projects / apple / xnu.git / blobdiff