xnu-7195.81.3.tar.gz

[apple/xnu.git] / bsd / kern / kern_prot.c

diff --git a/bsd/kern/kern_prot.c b/bsd/kern/kern_prot.c
index 5df82a23f0fecd9416231a961d737d78c7c0fcb0..d689b70d57533a8fb2aa594c69b82f37823c3fef 100644 (file)
--- a/bsd/kern/kern_prot.c
+++ b/bsd/kern/kern_prot.c
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
  * Copyright (c) 2000-2008 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_START@
  * Copyright (c) 2000-2008 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_START@

- * 
+ *

  * This file contains Original Code and/or Modifications of Original Code
  * as defined in and that are subject to the Apple Public Source License
  * Version 2.0 (the 'License'). You may not use this file except in
  * This file contains Original Code and/or Modifications of Original Code
  * as defined in and that are subject to the Apple Public Source License
  * Version 2.0 (the 'License'). You may not use this file except in


@@ -11,10 +11,10 @@
  * unlawful or unlicensed copies of an Apple operating system, or to
  * circumvent, violate, or enable the circumvention or violation of, any
  * terms of an Apple operating system software license agreement.
  * unlawful or unlicensed copies of an Apple operating system, or to
  * circumvent, violate, or enable the circumvention or violation of, any
  * terms of an Apple operating system software license agreement.

- * 
+ *

  * Please obtain a copy of the License at
  * http://www.opensource.apple.com/apsl/ and read it before using this file.
  * Please obtain a copy of the License at
  * http://www.opensource.apple.com/apsl/ and read it before using this file.

- * 
+ *

  * The Original Code and all software distributed under the License are
  * distributed on an 'AS IS' basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER
  * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AND APPLE HEREBY DISCLAIMS ALL SUCH WARRANTIES,
  * The Original Code and all software distributed under the License are
  * distributed on an 'AS IS' basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER
  * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AND APPLE HEREBY DISCLAIMS ALL SUCH WARRANTIES,


@@ -22,12 +22,12 @@
  * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, QUIET ENJOYMENT OR NON-INFRINGEMENT.
  * Please see the License for the specific language governing rights and
  * limitations under the License.
  * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, QUIET ENJOYMENT OR NON-INFRINGEMENT.
  * Please see the License for the specific language governing rights and
  * limitations under the License.

- * 
+ *

  * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_END@
  *
  *
  * Copyright (c) 1995 NeXT Computer, Inc. All Rights Reserved
  * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_END@
  *
  *
  * Copyright (c) 1995 NeXT Computer, Inc. All Rights Reserved

- * 
+ *

  *
  * Copyright (c) 1982, 1986, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993
  *     The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Copyright (c) 1982, 1986, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993
  *     The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.


@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
  *
  *     @(#)kern_prot.c 8.9 (Berkeley) 2/14/95
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
  *
  *     @(#)kern_prot.c 8.9 (Berkeley) 2/14/95

- * 
+ *

  *
  * NOTICE: This file was modified by McAfee Research in 2004 to introduce
  * support for mandatory and extensible security protections.  This notice
  *
  * NOTICE: This file was modified by McAfee Research in 2004 to introduce
  * support for mandatory and extensible security protections.  This notice


@@ -95,8 +95,7 @@
 #include <sys/timeb.h>
 #include <sys/times.h>
 #include <sys/malloc.h>
 #include <sys/timeb.h>
 #include <sys/times.h>
 #include <sys/malloc.h>

-
-#define chgproccnt_ok(p) 1
+#include <sys/persona.h>

 
 #include <security/audit/audit.h>
 
 
 #include <security/audit/audit.h>
 


@@ -110,7 +109,7 @@
 #include <mach/host_security.h>
 
 #include <kern/host.h>
 #include <mach/host_security.h>
 
 #include <kern/host.h>

-#include <kern/task.h>         /* for current_task() */
+#include <kern/task.h>          /* for current_task() */

 #include <kern/assert.h>
 
 
 #include <kern/assert.h>
 
 


@@ -125,13 +124,13 @@
  *             can be used if needed when debugging is active.
  */
 #if DEBUG_CRED
  *             can be used if needed when debugging is active.
  */
 #if DEBUG_CRED

-#define        DEBUG_CRED_ENTER                printf
-#define        DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE               printf
+#define DEBUG_CRED_ENTER                printf
+#define DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE               printf

 extern void kauth_cred_print(kauth_cred_t cred);
 extern void kauth_cred_print(kauth_cred_t cred);

-#else  /* !DEBUG_CRED */
-#define        DEBUG_CRED_ENTER(fmt, ...)      do {} while (0)
-#define        DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE(fmt, ...)     do {} while (0)
-#endif /* !DEBUG_CRED */
+#else   /* !DEBUG_CRED */
+#define DEBUG_CRED_ENTER(fmt, ...)      do {} while (0)
+#define DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE(fmt, ...)     do {} while (0)
+#endif  /* !DEBUG_CRED */

 
 #if DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG
 extern void task_importance_update_owner_info(task_t);
 
 #if DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG
 extern void task_importance_update_owner_info(task_t);


@@ -156,7 +155,7 @@ setprivexec(proc_t p, struct setprivexec_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
        AUDIT_ARG(value32, uap->flag);
        *retval = p->p_debugger;
        p->p_debugger = (uap->flag != 0);
        AUDIT_ARG(value32, uap->flag);
        *retval = p->p_debugger;
        p->p_debugger = (uap->flag != 0);

-       return(0);
+       return 0;

 }
 
 
 }
 
 


@@ -174,9 +173,8 @@ setprivexec(proc_t p, struct setprivexec_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
 int
 getpid(proc_t p, __unused struct getpid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
 {
 int
 getpid(proc_t p, __unused struct getpid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
 {

-

        *retval = p->p_pid;
        *retval = p->p_pid;

-       return (0);
+       return 0;

 }
 
 
 }
 
 


@@ -194,9 +192,8 @@ getpid(proc_t p, __unused struct getpid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
 int
 getppid(proc_t p, __unused struct getppid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
 {
 int
 getppid(proc_t p, __unused struct getppid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
 {

-

        *retval = p->p_ppid;
        *retval = p->p_ppid;

-       return (0);
+       return 0;

 }
 
 
 }
 
 


@@ -214,9 +211,8 @@ getppid(proc_t p, __unused struct getppid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
 int
 getpgrp(proc_t p, __unused struct getpgrp_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
 {
 int
 getpgrp(proc_t p, __unused struct getpgrp_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
 {

-

        *retval = p->p_pgrpid;
        *retval = p->p_pgrpid;

-       return (0);
+       return 0;

 }
 
 
 }
 
 


@@ -243,17 +239,20 @@ getpgid(proc_t p, struct getpgid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
        int refheld = 0;
 
        pt = p;
        int refheld = 0;
 
        pt = p;

-       if (uap->pid == 0)
+       if (uap->pid == 0) {

                goto found;
                goto found;

+       }

 
 

-       if ((pt = proc_find(uap->pid)) == 0)
-               return (ESRCH);
+       if ((pt = proc_find(uap->pid)) == 0) {
+               return ESRCH;
+       }

        refheld = 1;
 found:
        *retval = pt->p_pgrpid;
        refheld = 1;
 found:
        *retval = pt->p_pgrpid;

-       if (refheld != 0)
+       if (refheld != 0) {

                proc_rele(pt);
                proc_rele(pt);

-       return (0);
+       }
+       return 0;

 }
 
 
 }
 
 


@@ -281,20 +280,23 @@ getsid(proc_t p, struct getsid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
        struct session * sessp;
 
        pt = p;
        struct session * sessp;
 
        pt = p;

-       if (uap->pid == 0)
+       if (uap->pid == 0) {

                goto found;
                goto found;

+       }

 
 

-       if ((pt = proc_find(uap->pid)) == 0)
-               return (ESRCH);
+       if ((pt = proc_find(uap->pid)) == 0) {
+               return ESRCH;
+       }

        refheld = 1;
 found:
        sessp = proc_session(pt);
        *retval = sessp->s_sid;
        session_rele(sessp);
 
        refheld = 1;
 found:
        sessp = proc_session(pt);
        *retval = sessp->s_sid;
        session_rele(sessp);
 

-       if (refheld != 0)
+       if (refheld != 0) {

                proc_rele(pt);
                proc_rele(pt);

-       return (0);
+       }
+       return 0;

 }
 
 
 }
 
 


@@ -310,9 +312,8 @@ found:
 int
 getuid(__unused proc_t p, __unused struct getuid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
 {
 int
 getuid(__unused proc_t p, __unused struct getuid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
 {

-
-       *retval = kauth_getruid();
-       return (0);
+       *retval = kauth_getruid();
+       return 0;

 }
 
 
 }
 
 


@@ -328,9 +329,8 @@ getuid(__unused proc_t p, __unused struct getuid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
 int
 geteuid(__unused proc_t p, __unused struct geteuid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
 {
 int
 geteuid(__unused proc_t p, __unused struct geteuid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
 {

-
-       *retval = kauth_getuid();
-       return (0);
+       *retval = kauth_getuid();
+       return 0;

 }
 
 
 }
 
 


@@ -349,22 +349,25 @@ int
 gettid(__unused proc_t p, struct gettid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
 {
        struct uthread *uthread = get_bsdthread_info(current_thread());
 gettid(__unused proc_t p, struct gettid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
 {
        struct uthread *uthread = get_bsdthread_info(current_thread());

-       int     error;
+       int     error;

 
        /*
         * If this thread is not running with an override identity, we can't
         * return one to the caller, so return an error instead.
         */
 
        /*
         * If this thread is not running with an override identity, we can't
         * return one to the caller, so return an error instead.
         */

-       if (!(uthread->uu_flag & UT_SETUID))
-               return (ESRCH);
+       if (!(uthread->uu_flag & UT_SETUID)) {
+               return ESRCH;
+       }

 
 

-       if ((error = suword(uap->uidp, kauth_cred_getruid(uthread->uu_ucred))))
-               return (error);
-       if ((error = suword(uap->gidp, kauth_cred_getrgid(uthread->uu_ucred))))
-               return (error);
+       if ((error = suword(uap->uidp, kauth_cred_getruid(uthread->uu_ucred)))) {
+               return error;
+       }
+       if ((error = suword(uap->gidp, kauth_cred_getrgid(uthread->uu_ucred)))) {
+               return error;
+       }

 
        *retval = 0;
 
        *retval = 0;

-       return (0);
+       return 0;

 }
 
 
 }
 
 


@@ -380,9 +383,8 @@ gettid(__unused proc_t p, struct gettid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
 int
 getgid(__unused proc_t p, __unused struct getgid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
 {
 int
 getgid(__unused proc_t p, __unused struct getgid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
 {

-

        *retval = kauth_getrgid();
        *retval = kauth_getrgid();

-       return (0);
+       return 0;

 }
 
 
 }
 
 


@@ -404,9 +406,8 @@ getgid(__unused proc_t p, __unused struct getgid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
 int
 getegid(__unused proc_t p, __unused struct getegid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
 {
 int
 getegid(__unused proc_t p, __unused struct getegid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
 {

-

        *retval = kauth_getgid();
        *retval = kauth_getgid();

-       return (0);
+       return 0;

 }
 
 
 }
 
 


@@ -455,22 +456,22 @@ getgroups(__unused proc_t p, struct getgroups_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
        if ((ngrp = uap->gidsetsize) == 0) {
                *retval = pcred->cr_ngroups;
                kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
        if ((ngrp = uap->gidsetsize) == 0) {
                *retval = pcred->cr_ngroups;
                kauth_cred_unref(&cred);

-               return (0);
+               return 0;

        }
        if (ngrp < pcred->cr_ngroups) {
                kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
        }
        if (ngrp < pcred->cr_ngroups) {
                kauth_cred_unref(&cred);

-               return (EINVAL);
+               return EINVAL;

        }
        ngrp = pcred->cr_ngroups;
        if ((error = copyout((caddr_t)pcred->cr_groups,
        }
        ngrp = pcred->cr_ngroups;
        if ((error = copyout((caddr_t)pcred->cr_groups,

-                                       uap->gidset, 
-                                       ngrp * sizeof(gid_t)))) {
+           uap->gidset,
+           ngrp * sizeof(gid_t)))) {

                kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
                kauth_cred_unref(&cred);

-               return (error);
+               return error;

        }
        kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
        *retval = ngrp;
        }
        kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
        *retval = ngrp;

-       return (0);
+       return 0;

 }
 
 
 }
 
 


@@ -484,12 +485,12 @@ getgroups(__unused proc_t p, struct getgroups_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
 int
 getsgroups(__unused proc_t p, __unused struct getsgroups_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
 {
 int
 getsgroups(__unused proc_t p, __unused struct getsgroups_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
 {

-       return(ENOTSUP);
+       return ENOTSUP;

 }
 
 /*
  * Return the per-thread/per-process whiteout groups list.
 }
 
 /*
  * Return the per-thread/per-process whiteout groups list.

- * 
+ *

  * XXX implement getwgroups
  *
  */
  * XXX implement getwgroups
  *
  */


@@ -497,9 +498,30 @@ getsgroups(__unused proc_t p, __unused struct getsgroups_args *uap, __unused int
 int
 getwgroups(__unused proc_t p, __unused struct getwgroups_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
 {
 int
 getwgroups(__unused proc_t p, __unused struct getwgroups_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
 {

-       return(ENOTSUP);
+       return ENOTSUP;

 }
 
 }
 

+/*
+ * setsid_internal
+ *
+ * Description:        Core implementation of setsid().
+ */
+int
+setsid_internal(proc_t p)
+{
+       struct pgrp * pg = PGRP_NULL;
+
+       if (p->p_pgrpid == p->p_pid || (pg = pgfind(p->p_pid)) || p->p_lflag & P_LINVFORK) {
+               if (pg != PGRP_NULL) {
+                       pg_rele(pg);
+               }
+               return EPERM;
+       } else {
+               /* enter pgrp works with its own pgrp refcount */
+               (void)enterpgrp(p, p->p_pid, 1);
+               return 0;
+       }
+}

 
 /*
  * setsid
 
 /*
  * setsid


@@ -528,18 +550,11 @@ getwgroups(__unused proc_t p, __unused struct getwgroups_args *uap, __unused int
 int
 setsid(proc_t p, __unused struct setsid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
 {
 int
 setsid(proc_t p, __unused struct setsid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
 {

-       struct pgrp * pg = PGRP_NULL;
-
-       if (p->p_pgrpid == p->p_pid || (pg = pgfind(p->p_pid)) || p->p_lflag & P_LINVFORK) {
-               if (pg != PGRP_NULL)
-                       pg_rele(pg);
-               return (EPERM);
-       } else {
-               /* enter pgrp works with its own pgrp refcount */
-               (void)enterpgrp(p, p->p_pid, 1);
+       int rc = setsid_internal(p);
+       if (rc == 0) {

                *retval = p->p_pid;
                *retval = p->p_pid;

-               return (0);

        }
        }

+       return rc;

 }
 
 
 }
 
 


@@ -576,15 +591,15 @@ setsid(proc_t p, __unused struct setsid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
  *             is used as the target process group ID.
  *
  * Legacy:     This system call entry point is also used to implement the
  *             is used as the target process group ID.
  *
  * Legacy:     This system call entry point is also used to implement the

- *             legacy library routine setpgrp(), which under POSIX 
+ *             legacy library routine setpgrp(), which under POSIX

  *
  * XXX:                Belongs in kern_proc.c
  */
 int
  *
  * XXX:                Belongs in kern_proc.c
  */
 int

-setpgid(proc_t curp, register struct setpgid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
+setpgid(proc_t curp, struct setpgid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)

 {
 {

-       proc_t targp = PROC_NULL;       /* target process */
-       struct pgrp *pg = PGRP_NULL;    /* target pgrp */
+       proc_t targp = PROC_NULL;       /* target process */
+       struct pgrp *pg = PGRP_NULL;    /* target pgrp */

        int error = 0;
        int refheld = 0;
        int samesess = 0;
        int error = 0;
        int refheld = 0;
        int samesess = 0;


@@ -595,8 +610,9 @@ setpgid(proc_t curp, register struct setpgid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval
 
        if (uap->pid != 0 && uap->pid != curp->p_pid) {
                if ((targp = proc_find(uap->pid)) == 0 || !inferior(targp)) {
 
        if (uap->pid != 0 && uap->pid != curp->p_pid) {
                if ((targp = proc_find(uap->pid)) == 0 || !inferior(targp)) {

-                       if (targp != PROC_NULL)
+                       if (targp != PROC_NULL) {

                                refheld = 1;
                                refheld = 1;

+                       }

                        error = ESRCH;
                        goto out;
                }
                        error = ESRCH;
                        goto out;
                }


@@ -628,14 +644,14 @@ setpgid(proc_t curp, register struct setpgid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval
                error = EINVAL;
                goto out;
        }
                error = EINVAL;
                goto out;
        }

-       if (uap->pgid == 0)
+       if (uap->pgid == 0) {

                uap->pgid = targp->p_pid;
                uap->pgid = targp->p_pid;

-       else if (uap->pgid != targp->p_pid) {
-               if ((pg = pgfind(uap->pgid)) == 0){
+       } else if (uap->pgid != targp->p_pid) {
+               if ((pg = pgfind(uap->pgid)) == 0) {

                        error = EPERM;
                        goto out;
                }
                        error = EPERM;
                        goto out;
                }

-               samesess = (pg->pg_session != curp_sessp); 
+               samesess = (pg->pg_session != curp_sessp);

                pg_rele(pg);
                if (samesess != 0) {
                        error = EPERM;
                pg_rele(pg);
                if (samesess != 0) {
                        error = EPERM;


@@ -644,13 +660,16 @@ setpgid(proc_t curp, register struct setpgid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval
        }
        error = enterpgrp(targp, uap->pgid, 0);
 out:
        }
        error = enterpgrp(targp, uap->pgid, 0);
 out:

-       if (targp_sessp != SESSION_NULL)
+       if (targp_sessp != SESSION_NULL) {

                session_rele(targp_sessp);
                session_rele(targp_sessp);

-       if (curp_sessp != SESSION_NULL)
+       }
+       if (curp_sessp != SESSION_NULL) {

                session_rele(curp_sessp);
                session_rele(curp_sessp);

-       if (refheld != 0)
+       }
+       if (refheld != 0) {

                proc_rele(targp);
                proc_rele(targp);

-       return(error);
+       }
+       return error;

 }
 
 
 }
 
 


@@ -670,6 +689,12 @@ out:
  *             real, effective, or saved user or group IDs since beginning
  *             execution.
  */
  *             real, effective, or saved user or group IDs since beginning
  *             execution.
  */

+int
+proc_issetugid(proc_t p)
+{
+       return (p->p_flag & P_SUGID) ? 1 : 0;
+}
+

 int
 issetugid(proc_t p, __unused struct issetugid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
 {
 int
 issetugid(proc_t p, __unused struct issetugid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
 {


@@ -682,8 +707,8 @@ issetugid(proc_t p, __unused struct issetugid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
         * that libc *might* have put in their data segment.
         */
 
         * that libc *might* have put in their data segment.
         */
 

-       *retval = (p->p_flag & P_SUGID) ? 1 : 0;
-       return (0);
+       *retval = proc_issetugid(p);
+       return 0;

 }
 
 
 }
 
 


@@ -728,11 +753,11 @@ setuid(proc_t p, struct setuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
        AUDIT_ARG(uid, uid);
 
        for (;;) {
        AUDIT_ARG(uid, uid);
 
        for (;;) {

-               if (uid != my_pcred->cr_ruid &&         /* allow setuid(getuid()) */
-                   uid != my_pcred->cr_svuid &&        /* allow setuid(saved uid) */
+               if (uid != my_pcred->cr_ruid &&         /* allow setuid(getuid()) */
+                   uid != my_pcred->cr_svuid &&        /* allow setuid(saved uid) */

                    (error = suser(my_cred, &p->p_acflag))) {
                        kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
                    (error = suser(my_cred, &p->p_acflag))) {
                        kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);

-                       return (error);
+                       return error;

                }
 
                /*
                }
 
                /*


@@ -755,19 +780,19 @@ setuid(proc_t p, struct setuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                 * to something other than the default list for the user, as
                 * in entering a group or leaving an exclusion group).
                 */
                 * to something other than the default list for the user, as
                 * in entering a group or leaving an exclusion group).
                 */

-               if (!(my_pcred->cr_flags & CRF_NOMEMBERD))
+               if (!(my_pcred->cr_flags & CRF_NOMEMBERD)) {

                        gmuid = uid;
                        gmuid = uid;

+               }

 
 

-               /* 
+               /*

                 * Set the credential with new info.  If there is no change,
                 * we get back the same credential we passed in; if there is
                 * a change, we drop the reference on the credential we
                 * passed in.  The subsequent compare is safe, because it is
                 * a pointer compare rather than a contents compare.
                 * Set the credential with new info.  If there is no change,
                 * we get back the same credential we passed in; if there is
                 * a change, we drop the reference on the credential we
                 * passed in.  The subsequent compare is safe, because it is
                 * a pointer compare rather than a contents compare.

-                */
+                */

                my_new_cred = kauth_cred_setresuid(my_cred, ruid, uid, svuid, gmuid);
                if (my_cred != my_new_cred) {
                my_new_cred = kauth_cred_setresuid(my_cred, ruid, uid, svuid, gmuid);
                if (my_cred != my_new_cred) {

-

                        DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE("setuid CH(%d): %p/0x%08x -> %p/0x%08x\n", p->p_pid, my_cred, my_pcred->cr_flags, my_new_cred, posix_cred_get(my_new_cred)->cr_flags);
 
                        /*
                        DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE("setuid CH(%d): %p/0x%08x -> %p/0x%08x\n", p->p_pid, my_cred, my_pcred->cr_flags, my_new_cred, posix_cred_get(my_new_cred)->cr_flags);
 
                        /*


@@ -778,11 +803,11 @@ setuid(proc_t p, struct setuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                         * may be able to decrement the proc count of B before we can increment it. This results in a panic.
                         * Incrementing the proc count of the target ruid, B, before setting the process credentials prevents this race.
                         */
                         * may be able to decrement the proc count of B before we can increment it. This results in a panic.
                         * Incrementing the proc count of the target ruid, B, before setting the process credentials prevents this race.
                         */

-                       if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && chgproccnt_ok(p)) {
+                       if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && !proc_has_persona(p)) {

                                (void)chgproccnt(ruid, 1);
                        }
 
                                (void)chgproccnt(ruid, 1);
                        }
 

-                       proc_lock(p);
+                       proc_ucred_lock(p);

                        /*
                         * We need to protect for a race where another thread
                         * also changed the credential after we took our
                        /*
                         * We need to protect for a race where another thread
                         * also changed the credential after we took our


@@ -792,12 +817,12 @@ setuid(proc_t p, struct setuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                         * Note: the kauth_cred_setresuid has consumed a reference to my_cred, it p_ucred != my_cred, then my_cred must not be dereferenced!
                         */
                        if (p->p_ucred != my_cred) {
                         * Note: the kauth_cred_setresuid has consumed a reference to my_cred, it p_ucred != my_cred, then my_cred must not be dereferenced!
                         */
                        if (p->p_ucred != my_cred) {

-                               proc_unlock(p);
+                               proc_ucred_unlock(p);

                                /*
                                 * We didn't successfully switch to the new ruid, so decrement
                                 * the procs/uid count that we incremented above.
                                 */
                                /*
                                 * We didn't successfully switch to the new ruid, so decrement
                                 * the procs/uid count that we incremented above.
                                 */

-                               if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && chgproccnt_ok(p)) {
+                               if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && !proc_has_persona(p)) {

                                        (void)chgproccnt(ruid, -1);
                                }
                                kauth_cred_unref(&my_new_cred);
                                        (void)chgproccnt(ruid, -1);
                                }
                                kauth_cred_unref(&my_new_cred);


@@ -811,12 +836,12 @@ setuid(proc_t p, struct setuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                        PROC_UPDATE_CREDS_ONPROC(p);
 
                        OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);
                        PROC_UPDATE_CREDS_ONPROC(p);
 
                        OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);

-                       proc_unlock(p);
+                       proc_ucred_unlock(p);

                        /*
                         * If we've updated the ruid, decrement the count of procs running
                         * under the previous ruid
                         */
                        /*
                         * If we've updated the ruid, decrement the count of procs running
                         * under the previous ruid
                         */

-                       if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && chgproccnt_ok(p)) {
+                       if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && !proc_has_persona(p)) {

                                (void)chgproccnt(my_pcred->cr_ruid, -1);
                        }
                }
                                (void)chgproccnt(my_pcred->cr_ruid, -1);
                        }
                }


@@ -824,9 +849,9 @@ setuid(proc_t p, struct setuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
        }
        /* Drop old proc reference or our extra reference */
        kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
        }
        /* Drop old proc reference or our extra reference */
        kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);

-       
+

        set_security_token(p);
        set_security_token(p);

-       return (0);
+       return 0;

 }
 
 
 }
 
 


@@ -865,27 +890,25 @@ seteuid(proc_t p, struct seteuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
        my_pcred = posix_cred_get(my_cred);
 
        for (;;) {
        my_pcred = posix_cred_get(my_cred);
 
        for (;;) {

-

                if (euid != my_pcred->cr_ruid && euid != my_pcred->cr_svuid &&
                if (euid != my_pcred->cr_ruid && euid != my_pcred->cr_svuid &&

-                       (error = suser(my_cred, &p->p_acflag))) {
+                   (error = suser(my_cred, &p->p_acflag))) {

                        kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
                        kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);

-                       return (error);
+                       return error;

                }
 
                }
 

-               /* 
+               /*

                 * Set the credential with new info.  If there is no change,
                 * we get back the same credential we passed in; if there is
                 * a change, we drop the reference on the credential we
                 * passed in.  The subsequent compare is safe, because it is
                 * a pointer compare rather than a contents compare.
                 * Set the credential with new info.  If there is no change,
                 * we get back the same credential we passed in; if there is
                 * a change, we drop the reference on the credential we
                 * passed in.  The subsequent compare is safe, because it is
                 * a pointer compare rather than a contents compare.

-                */
+                */

                my_new_cred = kauth_cred_setresuid(my_cred, KAUTH_UID_NONE, euid, KAUTH_UID_NONE, my_pcred->cr_gmuid);
                my_new_cred = kauth_cred_setresuid(my_cred, KAUTH_UID_NONE, euid, KAUTH_UID_NONE, my_pcred->cr_gmuid);

-       
-               if (my_cred != my_new_cred) {

 
 

+               if (my_cred != my_new_cred) {

                        DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE("seteuid CH(%d): %p/0x%08x -> %p/0x%08x\n", p->p_pid, my_cred, my_pcred->cr_flags, my_new_cred, posix_cred_get(my_new_cred)->cr_flags);
 
                        DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE("seteuid CH(%d): %p/0x%08x -> %p/0x%08x\n", p->p_pid, my_cred, my_pcred->cr_flags, my_new_cred, posix_cred_get(my_new_cred)->cr_flags);
 

-                       proc_lock(p);
+                       proc_ucred_lock(p);

                        /*
                         * We need to protect for a race where another thread
                         * also changed the credential after we took our
                        /*
                         * We need to protect for a race where another thread
                         * also changed the credential after we took our


@@ -893,7 +916,7 @@ seteuid(proc_t p, struct seteuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                         * should restart this again with the new cred.
                         */
                        if (p->p_ucred != my_cred) {
                         * should restart this again with the new cred.
                         */
                        if (p->p_ucred != my_cred) {

-                               proc_unlock(p);
+                               proc_ucred_unlock(p);

                                kauth_cred_unref(&my_new_cred);
                                my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
                                my_pcred = posix_cred_get(my_cred);
                                kauth_cred_unref(&my_new_cred);
                                my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
                                my_pcred = posix_cred_get(my_cred);


@@ -904,7 +927,7 @@ seteuid(proc_t p, struct seteuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                        /* update cred on proc */
                        PROC_UPDATE_CREDS_ONPROC(p);
                        OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);
                        /* update cred on proc */
                        PROC_UPDATE_CREDS_ONPROC(p);
                        OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);

-                       proc_unlock(p);
+                       proc_ucred_unlock(p);

                }
                break;
        }
                }
                break;
        }


@@ -912,7 +935,7 @@ seteuid(proc_t p, struct seteuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
        kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
 
        set_security_token(p);
        kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
 
        set_security_token(p);

-       return (0);
+       return 0;

 }
 
 
 }
 
 


@@ -959,10 +982,12 @@ setreuid(proc_t p, struct setreuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
 
        ruid = uap->ruid;
        euid = uap->euid;
 
        ruid = uap->ruid;
        euid = uap->euid;

-       if (ruid == (uid_t)-1)
+       if (ruid == (uid_t)-1) {

                ruid = KAUTH_UID_NONE;
                ruid = KAUTH_UID_NONE;

-       if (euid == (uid_t)-1)
+       }
+       if (euid == (uid_t)-1) {

                euid = KAUTH_UID_NONE;
                euid = KAUTH_UID_NONE;

+       }

        AUDIT_ARG(euid, euid);
        AUDIT_ARG(ruid, ruid);
 
        AUDIT_ARG(euid, euid);
        AUDIT_ARG(ruid, ruid);
 


@@ -970,31 +995,30 @@ setreuid(proc_t p, struct setreuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
        my_pcred = posix_cred_get(my_cred);
 
        for (;;) {
        my_pcred = posix_cred_get(my_cred);
 
        for (;;) {

-
-               if (((ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE &&         /* allow no change of ruid */
-                     ruid != my_pcred->cr_ruid &&      /* allow ruid = ruid */
-                     ruid != my_pcred->cr_uid &&       /* allow ruid = euid */
-                     ruid != my_pcred->cr_svuid) ||    /* allow ruid = svuid */
-                    (euid != KAUTH_UID_NONE &&         /* allow no change of euid */
-                     euid != my_pcred->cr_uid &&       /* allow euid = euid */
-                     euid != my_pcred->cr_ruid &&      /* allow euid = ruid */
-                     euid != my_pcred->cr_svuid)) &&   /* allow euid = svuid */
+               if (((ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE &&         /* allow no change of ruid */
+                   ruid != my_pcred->cr_ruid &&        /* allow ruid = ruid */
+                   ruid != my_pcred->cr_uid &&         /* allow ruid = euid */
+                   ruid != my_pcred->cr_svuid) ||      /* allow ruid = svuid */
+                   (euid != KAUTH_UID_NONE &&          /* allow no change of euid */
+                   euid != my_pcred->cr_uid &&         /* allow euid = euid */
+                   euid != my_pcred->cr_ruid &&        /* allow euid = ruid */
+                   euid != my_pcred->cr_svuid)) &&     /* allow euid = svuid */

                    (error = suser(my_cred, &p->p_acflag))) { /* allow root user any */
                        kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
                    (error = suser(my_cred, &p->p_acflag))) { /* allow root user any */
                        kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);

-                       return (error);
+                       return error;

                }
 
                uid_t new_euid;
                uid_t svuid = KAUTH_UID_NONE;
 
                new_euid = my_pcred->cr_uid;
                }
 
                uid_t new_euid;
                uid_t svuid = KAUTH_UID_NONE;
 
                new_euid = my_pcred->cr_uid;

-               /* 
+               /*

                 * Set the credential with new info.  If there is no change,
                 * we get back the same credential we passed in; if there is
                 * a change, we drop the reference on the credential we
                 * passed in.  The subsequent compare is safe, because it is
                 * a pointer compare rather than a contents compare.
                 * Set the credential with new info.  If there is no change,
                 * we get back the same credential we passed in; if there is
                 * a change, we drop the reference on the credential we
                 * passed in.  The subsequent compare is safe, because it is
                 * a pointer compare rather than a contents compare.

-                */
+                */

                if (euid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && my_pcred->cr_uid != euid) {
                        /* changing the effective UID */
                        new_euid = euid;
                if (euid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && my_pcred->cr_uid != euid) {
                        /* changing the effective UID */
                        new_euid = euid;


@@ -1008,14 +1032,13 @@ setreuid(proc_t p, struct setreuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                 */
                if (my_pcred->cr_svuid != uap->ruid &&
                    my_pcred->cr_svuid != uap->euid) {
                 */
                if (my_pcred->cr_svuid != uap->ruid &&
                    my_pcred->cr_svuid != uap->euid) {

-                       svuid = new_euid;
+                       svuid = new_euid;

                        OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);
                }
 
                my_new_cred = kauth_cred_setresuid(my_cred, ruid, euid, svuid, my_pcred->cr_gmuid);
                        OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);
                }
 
                my_new_cred = kauth_cred_setresuid(my_cred, ruid, euid, svuid, my_pcred->cr_gmuid);

-       
-               if (my_cred != my_new_cred) {

 
 

+               if (my_cred != my_new_cred) {

                        DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE("setreuid CH(%d): %p/0x%08x -> %p/0x%08x\n", p->p_pid, my_cred, my_pcred->cr_flags, my_new_cred, posix_cred_get(my_new_cred)->cr_flags);
 
                        /*
                        DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE("setreuid CH(%d): %p/0x%08x -> %p/0x%08x\n", p->p_pid, my_cred, my_pcred->cr_flags, my_new_cred, posix_cred_get(my_new_cred)->cr_flags);
 
                        /*


@@ -1026,11 +1049,11 @@ setreuid(proc_t p, struct setreuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                         * may be able to decrement the proc count of B before we can increment it. This results in a panic.
                         * Incrementing the proc count of the target ruid, B, before setting the process credentials prevents this race.
                         */
                         * may be able to decrement the proc count of B before we can increment it. This results in a panic.
                         * Incrementing the proc count of the target ruid, B, before setting the process credentials prevents this race.
                         */

-                       if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && chgproccnt_ok(p)) {
+                       if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && !proc_has_persona(p)) {

                                (void)chgproccnt(ruid, 1);
                        }
 
                                (void)chgproccnt(ruid, 1);
                        }
 

-                       proc_lock(p);
+                       proc_ucred_lock(p);

                        /*
                         * We need to protect for a race where another thread
                         * also changed the credential after we took our
                        /*
                         * We need to protect for a race where another thread
                         * also changed the credential after we took our


@@ -1040,8 +1063,8 @@ setreuid(proc_t p, struct setreuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                         * Note: the kauth_cred_setresuid has consumed a reference to my_cred, it p_ucred != my_cred, then my_cred must not be dereferenced!
                         */
                        if (p->p_ucred != my_cred) {
                         * Note: the kauth_cred_setresuid has consumed a reference to my_cred, it p_ucred != my_cred, then my_cred must not be dereferenced!
                         */
                        if (p->p_ucred != my_cred) {

-                               proc_unlock(p);
-                               if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && chgproccnt_ok(p)) {
+                               proc_ucred_unlock(p);
+                               if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && !proc_has_persona(p)) {

                                        /*
                                         * We didn't successfully switch to the new ruid, so decrement
                                         * the procs/uid count that we incremented above.
                                        /*
                                         * We didn't successfully switch to the new ruid, so decrement
                                         * the procs/uid count that we incremented above.


@@ -1059,9 +1082,9 @@ setreuid(proc_t p, struct setreuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                        /* update cred on proc */
                        PROC_UPDATE_CREDS_ONPROC(p);
                        OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);
                        /* update cred on proc */
                        PROC_UPDATE_CREDS_ONPROC(p);
                        OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);

-                       proc_unlock(p);
+                       proc_ucred_unlock(p);

 
 

-                       if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && chgproccnt_ok(p)) {
+                       if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && !proc_has_persona(p)) {

                                /*
                                 * We switched to a new ruid, so decrement the count of procs running
                                 * under the previous ruid
                                /*
                                 * We switched to a new ruid, so decrement the count of procs running
                                 * under the previous ruid


@@ -1075,7 +1098,7 @@ setreuid(proc_t p, struct setreuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
        kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
 
        set_security_token(p);
        kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
 
        set_security_token(p);

-       return (0);
+       return 0;

 }
 
 
 }
 
 


@@ -1124,18 +1147,18 @@ setgid(proc_t p, struct setgid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
        my_pcred = posix_cred_get(my_cred);
 
        for (;;) {
        my_pcred = posix_cred_get(my_cred);
 
        for (;;) {

-               if (gid != my_pcred->cr_rgid &&         /* allow setgid(getgid()) */
-                   gid != my_pcred->cr_svgid &&        /* allow setgid(saved gid) */
+               if (gid != my_pcred->cr_rgid &&         /* allow setgid(getgid()) */
+                   gid != my_pcred->cr_svgid &&        /* allow setgid(saved gid) */

                    (error = suser(my_cred, &p->p_acflag))) {
                        kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
                    (error = suser(my_cred, &p->p_acflag))) {
                        kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);

-                       return (error);
+                       return error;

                }
 
                /*
                 * If we are privileged, then set the saved and real GID too;
                 * otherwise, just set the effective GID
                 */
                }
 
                /*
                 * If we are privileged, then set the saved and real GID too;
                 * otherwise, just set the effective GID
                 */

-               if (suser(my_cred,  &p->p_acflag) == 0) {
+               if (suser(my_cred, &p->p_acflag) == 0) {

                        svgid = gid;
                        rgid = gid;
                } else {
                        svgid = gid;
                        rgid = gid;
                } else {


@@ -1143,19 +1166,18 @@ setgid(proc_t p, struct setgid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                        rgid = KAUTH_GID_NONE;
                }
 
                        rgid = KAUTH_GID_NONE;
                }
 

-               /* 
+               /*

                 * Set the credential with new info.  If there is no change,
                 * we get back the same credential we passed in; if there is
                 * a change, we drop the reference on the credential we
                 * passed in.  The subsequent compare is safe, because it is
                 * a pointer compare rather than a contents compare.
                 * Set the credential with new info.  If there is no change,
                 * we get back the same credential we passed in; if there is
                 * a change, we drop the reference on the credential we
                 * passed in.  The subsequent compare is safe, because it is
                 * a pointer compare rather than a contents compare.

-                */
+                */

                my_new_cred = kauth_cred_setresgid(my_cred, rgid, gid, svgid);
                if (my_cred != my_new_cred) {
                my_new_cred = kauth_cred_setresgid(my_cred, rgid, gid, svgid);
                if (my_cred != my_new_cred) {

-

                        DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE("setgid(CH)%d: %p/0x%08x->%p/0x%08x\n", p->p_pid, my_cred, my_cred->cr_flags, my_new_cred, my_new_cred->cr_flags);
 
                        DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE("setgid(CH)%d: %p/0x%08x->%p/0x%08x\n", p->p_pid, my_cred, my_cred->cr_flags, my_new_cred, my_new_cred->cr_flags);
 

-                       proc_lock(p);
+                       proc_ucred_lock(p);

                        /*
                         * We need to protect for a race where another thread
                         * also changed the credential after we took our
                        /*
                         * We need to protect for a race where another thread
                         * also changed the credential after we took our


@@ -1163,7 +1185,7 @@ setgid(proc_t p, struct setgid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                         * should restart this again with the new cred.
                         */
                        if (p->p_ucred != my_cred) {
                         * should restart this again with the new cred.
                         */
                        if (p->p_ucred != my_cred) {

-                               proc_unlock(p);
+                               proc_ucred_unlock(p);

                                kauth_cred_unref(&my_new_cred);
                                /* try again */
                                my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
                                kauth_cred_unref(&my_new_cred);
                                /* try again */
                                my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);


@@ -1174,15 +1196,15 @@ setgid(proc_t p, struct setgid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                        /* update cred on proc */
                        PROC_UPDATE_CREDS_ONPROC(p);
                        OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);
                        /* update cred on proc */
                        PROC_UPDATE_CREDS_ONPROC(p);
                        OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);

-                       proc_unlock(p);
+                       proc_ucred_unlock(p);

                }
                break;
        }
        /* Drop old proc reference or our extra reference */
        kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
                }
                break;
        }
        /* Drop old proc reference or our extra reference */
        kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);

-       
+

        set_security_token(p);
        set_security_token(p);

-       return (0);
+       return 0;

 }
 
 
 }
 
 


@@ -1232,21 +1254,20 @@ setegid(proc_t p, struct setegid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                    egid != my_pcred->cr_svgid &&
                    (error = suser(my_cred, &p->p_acflag))) {
                        kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
                    egid != my_pcred->cr_svgid &&
                    (error = suser(my_cred, &p->p_acflag))) {
                        kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);

-                       return (error);
+                       return error;

                }
                }

-               /* 
+               /*

                 * Set the credential with new info.  If there is no change,
                 * we get back the same credential we passed in; if there is
                 * a change, we drop the reference on the credential we
                 * passed in.  The subsequent compare is safe, because it is
                 * a pointer compare rather than a contents compare.
                 * Set the credential with new info.  If there is no change,
                 * we get back the same credential we passed in; if there is
                 * a change, we drop the reference on the credential we
                 * passed in.  The subsequent compare is safe, because it is
                 * a pointer compare rather than a contents compare.

-                */
+                */

                my_new_cred = kauth_cred_setresgid(my_cred, KAUTH_GID_NONE, egid, KAUTH_GID_NONE);
                if (my_cred != my_new_cred) {
                my_new_cred = kauth_cred_setresgid(my_cred, KAUTH_GID_NONE, egid, KAUTH_GID_NONE);
                if (my_cred != my_new_cred) {

-

                        DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE("setegid(CH)%d: %p/0x%08x->%p/0x%08x\n", p->p_pid, my_cred, my_pcred->cr_flags, my_new_cred, posix_cred_get(my_new_cred)->cr_flags);
 
                        DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE("setegid(CH)%d: %p/0x%08x->%p/0x%08x\n", p->p_pid, my_cred, my_pcred->cr_flags, my_new_cred, posix_cred_get(my_new_cred)->cr_flags);
 

-                       proc_lock(p);
+                       proc_ucred_lock(p);

                        /*
                         * We need to protect for a race where another thread
                         * also changed the credential after we took our
                        /*
                         * We need to protect for a race where another thread
                         * also changed the credential after we took our


@@ -1254,7 +1275,7 @@ setegid(proc_t p, struct setegid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                         * should restart this again with the new cred.
                         */
                        if (p->p_ucred != my_cred) {
                         * should restart this again with the new cred.
                         */
                        if (p->p_ucred != my_cred) {

-                               proc_unlock(p);
+                               proc_ucred_unlock(p);

                                kauth_cred_unref(&my_new_cred);
                                /* try again */
                                my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
                                kauth_cred_unref(&my_new_cred);
                                /* try again */
                                my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);


@@ -1265,7 +1286,7 @@ setegid(proc_t p, struct setegid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                        /* update cred on proc */
                        PROC_UPDATE_CREDS_ONPROC(p);
                        OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);
                        /* update cred on proc */
                        PROC_UPDATE_CREDS_ONPROC(p);
                        OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);

-                       proc_unlock(p);
+                       proc_ucred_unlock(p);

                }
                break;
        }
                }
                break;
        }


@@ -1274,7 +1295,7 @@ setegid(proc_t p, struct setegid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
        kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
 
        set_security_token(p);
        kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
 
        set_security_token(p);

-       return (0);
+       return 0;

 }
 
 /*
 }
 
 /*


@@ -1327,10 +1348,12 @@ setregid(proc_t p, struct setregid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
        rgid = uap->rgid;
        egid = uap->egid;
 
        rgid = uap->rgid;
        egid = uap->egid;
 

-       if (rgid == (uid_t)-1)
+       if (rgid == (uid_t)-1) {

                rgid = KAUTH_GID_NONE;
                rgid = KAUTH_GID_NONE;

-       if (egid == (uid_t)-1)
+       }
+       if (egid == (uid_t)-1) {

                egid = KAUTH_GID_NONE;
                egid = KAUTH_GID_NONE;

+       }

        AUDIT_ARG(egid, egid);
        AUDIT_ARG(rgid, rgid);
 
        AUDIT_ARG(egid, egid);
        AUDIT_ARG(rgid, rgid);
 


@@ -1339,33 +1362,32 @@ setregid(proc_t p, struct setregid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
        my_pcred = posix_cred_get(my_cred);
 
        for (;;) {
        my_pcred = posix_cred_get(my_cred);
 
        for (;;) {

-
-               if (((rgid != KAUTH_UID_NONE &&         /* allow no change of rgid */
-                     rgid != my_pcred->cr_rgid &&      /* allow rgid = rgid */
-                     rgid != my_pcred->cr_gid &&       /* allow rgid = egid */
-                     rgid != my_pcred->cr_svgid) ||    /* allow rgid = svgid */
-                    (egid != KAUTH_UID_NONE &&         /* allow no change of egid */
-                     egid != my_pcred->cr_groups[0] && /* allow no change of egid */
-                     egid != my_pcred->cr_gid &&       /* allow egid = egid */
-                     egid != my_pcred->cr_rgid &&      /* allow egid = rgid */
-                     egid != my_pcred->cr_svgid)) &&   /* allow egid = svgid */
+               if (((rgid != KAUTH_UID_NONE &&         /* allow no change of rgid */
+                   rgid != my_pcred->cr_rgid &&        /* allow rgid = rgid */
+                   rgid != my_pcred->cr_gid &&         /* allow rgid = egid */
+                   rgid != my_pcred->cr_svgid) ||      /* allow rgid = svgid */
+                   (egid != KAUTH_UID_NONE &&          /* allow no change of egid */
+                   egid != my_pcred->cr_groups[0] &&   /* allow no change of egid */
+                   egid != my_pcred->cr_gid &&         /* allow egid = egid */
+                   egid != my_pcred->cr_rgid &&        /* allow egid = rgid */
+                   egid != my_pcred->cr_svgid)) &&     /* allow egid = svgid */

                    (error = suser(my_cred, &p->p_acflag))) { /* allow root user any */
                        kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
                    (error = suser(my_cred, &p->p_acflag))) { /* allow root user any */
                        kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);

-                       return (error);
+                       return error;

                }
 
                uid_t new_egid = my_pcred->cr_gid;
                uid_t new_rgid = my_pcred->cr_rgid;
                uid_t svgid = KAUTH_UID_NONE;
 
                }
 
                uid_t new_egid = my_pcred->cr_gid;
                uid_t new_rgid = my_pcred->cr_rgid;
                uid_t svgid = KAUTH_UID_NONE;
 

-               
-               /* 
+
+               /*

                 * Set the credential with new info.  If there is no change,
                 * we get back the same credential we passed in; if there is
                 * a change, we drop the reference on the credential we
                 * passed in.  The subsequent compare is safe, because it is
                 * a pointer compare rather than a contents compare.
                 * Set the credential with new info.  If there is no change,
                 * we get back the same credential we passed in; if there is
                 * a change, we drop the reference on the credential we
                 * passed in.  The subsequent compare is safe, because it is
                 * a pointer compare rather than a contents compare.

-                */
+                */

                if (egid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && my_pcred->cr_gid != egid) {
                        /* changing the effective GID */
                        new_egid = egid;
                if (egid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && my_pcred->cr_gid != egid) {
                        /* changing the effective GID */
                        new_egid = egid;


@@ -1384,23 +1406,22 @@ setregid(proc_t p, struct setregid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                 */
                if (my_pcred->cr_svgid != uap->rgid &&
                    my_pcred->cr_svgid != uap->egid) {
                 */
                if (my_pcred->cr_svgid != uap->rgid &&
                    my_pcred->cr_svgid != uap->egid) {

-                       svgid = new_egid;
+                       svgid = new_egid;

                        OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);
                }
 
                my_new_cred = kauth_cred_setresgid(my_cred, rgid, egid, svgid);
                if (my_cred != my_new_cred) {
                        OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);
                }
 
                my_new_cred = kauth_cred_setresgid(my_cred, rgid, egid, svgid);
                if (my_cred != my_new_cred) {

-

                        DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE("setregid(CH)%d: %p/0x%08x->%p/0x%08x\n", p->p_pid, my_cred, my_pcred->cr_flags, my_new_cred, posix_cred_get(my_new_cred)->cr_flags);
 
                        DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE("setregid(CH)%d: %p/0x%08x->%p/0x%08x\n", p->p_pid, my_cred, my_pcred->cr_flags, my_new_cred, posix_cred_get(my_new_cred)->cr_flags);
 

-                       proc_lock(p);
+                       proc_ucred_lock(p);

                        /* need to protect for a race where another thread
                         * also changed the credential after we took our
                         * reference.  If p_ucred has changed then we
                         * should restart this again with the new cred.
                         */
                        if (p->p_ucred != my_cred) {
                        /* need to protect for a race where another thread
                         * also changed the credential after we took our
                         * reference.  If p_ucred has changed then we
                         * should restart this again with the new cred.
                         */
                        if (p->p_ucred != my_cred) {

-                               proc_unlock(p);
+                               proc_ucred_unlock(p);

                                kauth_cred_unref(&my_new_cred);
                                /* try again */
                                my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
                                kauth_cred_unref(&my_new_cred);
                                /* try again */
                                my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);


@@ -1411,7 +1432,7 @@ setregid(proc_t p, struct setregid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                        /* update cred on proc */
                        PROC_UPDATE_CREDS_ONPROC(p);
                        OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag); /* XXX redundant? */
                        /* update cred on proc */
                        PROC_UPDATE_CREDS_ONPROC(p);
                        OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag); /* XXX redundant? */

-                       proc_unlock(p);
+                       proc_ucred_unlock(p);

                }
                break;
        }
                }
                break;
        }


@@ -1419,7 +1440,7 @@ setregid(proc_t p, struct setregid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
        kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
 
        set_security_token(p);
        kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
 
        set_security_token(p);

-       return (0);
+       return 0;

 }
 
 
 }
 
 


@@ -1444,14 +1465,15 @@ settid(proc_t p, struct settid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
        AUDIT_ARG(uid, uid);
        AUDIT_ARG(gid, gid);
 
        AUDIT_ARG(uid, uid);
        AUDIT_ARG(gid, gid);
 

-       if (proc_suser(p) != 0) 
-               return (EPERM);
-       
-       if (uid == KAUTH_UID_NONE) {
+       if (proc_suser(p) != 0) {
+               return EPERM;
+       }

 
 

+       if (uid == KAUTH_UID_NONE) {

                /* must already be assuming another identity in order to revert back */
                /* must already be assuming another identity in order to revert back */

-               if ((uthread->uu_flag & UT_SETUID) == 0)
-                       return (EPERM);
+               if ((uthread->uu_flag & UT_SETUID) == 0) {
+                       return EPERM;
+               }

 
                /* revert to delayed binding of process credential */
                uc = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
 
                /* revert to delayed binding of process credential */
                uc = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);


@@ -1463,7 +1485,7 @@ settid(proc_t p, struct settid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
 
                /* cannot already be assuming another identity */
                if ((uthread->uu_flag & UT_SETUID) != 0) {
 
                /* cannot already be assuming another identity */
                if ((uthread->uu_flag & UT_SETUID) != 0) {

-                       return (EPERM);
+                       return EPERM;

                }
 
                /*
                }
 
                /*


@@ -1473,11 +1495,12 @@ settid(proc_t p, struct settid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                 * current credential while we muck with it, so we can do
                 * the post-compare for changes by pointer.
                 */
                 * current credential while we muck with it, so we can do
                 * the post-compare for changes by pointer.
                 */

-               kauth_cred_ref(uthread->uu_ucred); 
+               kauth_cred_ref(uthread->uu_ucred);

                my_cred = uthread->uu_ucred;
                my_new_cred = kauth_cred_setuidgid(my_cred, uid, gid);
                my_cred = uthread->uu_ucred;
                my_new_cred = kauth_cred_setuidgid(my_cred, uid, gid);

-               if (my_cred != my_new_cred)
+               if (my_cred != my_new_cred) {

                        uthread->uu_ucred = my_new_cred;
                        uthread->uu_ucred = my_new_cred;

+               }

                uthread->uu_flag |= UT_SETUID;
 
                /* Drop old uthread reference or our extra reference */
                uthread->uu_flag |= UT_SETUID;
 
                /* Drop old uthread reference or our extra reference */


@@ -1489,7 +1512,7 @@ settid(proc_t p, struct settid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
         * XXX it is unclear whether P_SUGID should be st at this point;
         * XXX in theory, it is being deprecated.
         */
         * XXX it is unclear whether P_SUGID should be st at this point;
         * XXX in theory, it is being deprecated.
         */

-       return (0);
+       return 0;

 }
 
 
 }
 
 


@@ -1515,7 +1538,7 @@ settid_with_pid(proc_t p, struct settid_with_pid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *re
        AUDIT_ARG(value32, uap->assume);
 
        if (proc_suser(p) != 0) {
        AUDIT_ARG(value32, uap->assume);
 
        if (proc_suser(p) != 0) {

-               return (EPERM);
+               return EPERM;

        }
 
        /*
        }
 
        /*


@@ -1531,17 +1554,19 @@ settid_with_pid(proc_t p, struct settid_with_pid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *re
         */
        if (uap->assume != 0) {
                /* can't do this if we have already assumed an identity */
         */
        if (uap->assume != 0) {
                /* can't do this if we have already assumed an identity */

-               if ((uthread->uu_flag & UT_SETUID) != 0)
-                       return (EPERM);
-       
+               if ((uthread->uu_flag & UT_SETUID) != 0) {
+                       return EPERM;
+               }
+

                target_proc = proc_find(uap->pid);
                /* can't assume the identity of the kernel process */
                if (target_proc == NULL || target_proc == kernproc) {
                target_proc = proc_find(uap->pid);
                /* can't assume the identity of the kernel process */
                if (target_proc == NULL || target_proc == kernproc) {

-                       if (target_proc!= NULL)
+                       if (target_proc != NULL) {

                                proc_rele(target_proc);
                                proc_rele(target_proc);

-                       return (ESRCH);
+                       }
+                       return ESRCH;

                }
                }

-       
+

                /*
                 * Take a reference on the credential used in our target
                 * process then use it as the identity for our current
                /*
                 * Take a reference on the credential used in our target
                 * process then use it as the identity for our current


@@ -1554,39 +1579,41 @@ settid_with_pid(proc_t p, struct settid_with_pid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *re
                 * credential following our assumption of a per-thread one,
                 * since the credential cache will maintain a unique instance.
                 */
                 * credential following our assumption of a per-thread one,
                 * since the credential cache will maintain a unique instance.
                 */

-               kauth_cred_ref(uthread->uu_ucred); 
+               kauth_cred_ref(uthread->uu_ucred);

                my_cred = uthread->uu_ucred;
                my_target_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(target_proc);
                my_target_pcred = posix_cred_get(my_target_cred);
                my_new_cred = kauth_cred_setuidgid(my_cred, my_target_pcred->cr_uid, my_target_pcred->cr_gid);
                my_cred = uthread->uu_ucred;
                my_target_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(target_proc);
                my_target_pcred = posix_cred_get(my_target_cred);
                my_new_cred = kauth_cred_setuidgid(my_cred, my_target_pcred->cr_uid, my_target_pcred->cr_gid);

-               if (my_cred != my_new_cred)
+               if (my_cred != my_new_cred) {

                        uthread->uu_ucred = my_new_cred;
                        uthread->uu_ucred = my_new_cred;

-       
+               }
+

                uthread->uu_flag |= UT_SETUID;
                uthread->uu_flag |= UT_SETUID;

-               
+

                /* Drop old uthread reference or our extra reference */
                proc_rele(target_proc);
                kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
                kauth_cred_unref(&my_target_cred);
 
                /* Drop old uthread reference or our extra reference */
                proc_rele(target_proc);
                kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
                kauth_cred_unref(&my_target_cred);
 

-               return (0);
+               return 0;

        }
        }

-       
+

        /*
         * Otherwise, we are reverting back to normal mode of operation where
         * delayed binding of the process credential sets the credential in
         * the thread (uu_ucred)
         */
        /*
         * Otherwise, we are reverting back to normal mode of operation where
         * delayed binding of the process credential sets the credential in
         * the thread (uu_ucred)
         */

-       if ((uthread->uu_flag & UT_SETUID) == 0)
-               return (EPERM);
+       if ((uthread->uu_flag & UT_SETUID) == 0) {
+               return EPERM;
+       }

 
        /* revert to delayed binding of process credential */
        my_new_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
        kauth_cred_unref(&uthread->uu_ucred);
        uthread->uu_ucred = my_new_cred;
        uthread->uu_flag &= ~UT_SETUID;
 
        /* revert to delayed binding of process credential */
        my_new_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
        kauth_cred_unref(&uthread->uu_ucred);
        uthread->uu_ucred = my_new_cred;
        uthread->uu_flag &= ~UT_SETUID;

-       
-       return (0);
+
+       return 0;

 }
 
 
 }
 
 


@@ -1626,40 +1653,50 @@ settid_with_pid(proc_t p, struct settid_with_pid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *re
  *             flag the process as having set privilege since the last exec.
  */
 static int
  *             flag the process as having set privilege since the last exec.
  */
 static int

-setgroups1(proc_t p, u_int gidsetsize, user_addr_t gidset, uid_t gmuid, __unused int32_t *retval)
+setgroups1(proc_t p, u_int ngrp, user_addr_t gidset, uid_t gmuid, __unused int32_t *retval)

 {
 {

-       u_int ngrp;
-       gid_t   newgroups[NGROUPS] = { 0 };
-       int     error;
-       kauth_cred_t my_cred, my_new_cred;
-       struct uthread *uthread = get_bsdthread_info(current_thread());
+       gid_t   newgroups[NGROUPS] = { 0 };
+       int     error;

 
 

-       DEBUG_CRED_ENTER("setgroups1 (%d/%d): %d 0x%016x %d\n", p->p_pid, (p->p_pptr ? p->p_pptr->p_pid : 0), gidsetsize, gidset, gmuid);
+       DEBUG_CRED_ENTER("setgroups1 (%d/%d): %d 0x%016x %d\n", p->p_pid,
+           (p->p_pptr ? p->p_pptr->p_pid : 0), ngrp, gidset, gmuid);

 
 

-       ngrp = gidsetsize;
-       if (ngrp > NGROUPS)
-               return (EINVAL);
+       if (ngrp > NGROUPS) {
+               return EINVAL;
+       }

 
 

-       if ( ngrp < 1 ) {
-               ngrp = 1;
-       } else {
+       if (ngrp >= 1) {

                error = copyin(gidset,
                error = copyin(gidset,

-                       (caddr_t)newgroups, ngrp * sizeof(gid_t));
+                   (caddr_t)newgroups, ngrp * sizeof(gid_t));

                if (error) {
                if (error) {

-                       return (error);
+                       return error;

                }
        }
                }
        }

+       return setgroups_internal(p, ngrp, newgroups, gmuid);
+}
+
+int
+setgroups_internal(proc_t p, u_int ngrp, gid_t *newgroups, uid_t gmuid)
+{
+       struct uthread *uthread = get_bsdthread_info(current_thread());
+       kauth_cred_t my_cred, my_new_cred;
+       int     error;

 
        my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
        if ((error = suser(my_cred, &p->p_acflag))) {
                kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
 
        my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
        if ((error = suser(my_cred, &p->p_acflag))) {
                kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);

-               return (error);
+               return error;
+       }
+
+       if (ngrp < 1) {
+               ngrp = 1;
+               newgroups[0] = 0;

        }
 
        if ((uthread->uu_flag & UT_SETUID) != 0) {
 #if DEBUG_CRED
                int my_cred_flags = uthread->uu_ucred->cr_flags;
        }
 
        if ((uthread->uu_flag & UT_SETUID) != 0) {
 #if DEBUG_CRED
                int my_cred_flags = uthread->uu_ucred->cr_flags;

-#endif /* DEBUG_CRED */
+#endif  /* DEBUG_CRED */

                kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
 
                /*
                kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
 
                /*


@@ -1675,17 +1712,16 @@ setgroups1(proc_t p, u_int gidsetsize, user_addr_t gidset, uid_t gmuid, __unused
                uthread->uu_ucred = kauth_cred_setgroups(my_cred, &newgroups[0], ngrp, gmuid);
 #if DEBUG_CRED
                if (my_cred != uthread->uu_ucred) {
                uthread->uu_ucred = kauth_cred_setgroups(my_cred, &newgroups[0], ngrp, gmuid);
 #if DEBUG_CRED
                if (my_cred != uthread->uu_ucred) {

-                       DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE("setgroups1(CH)%d: %p/0x%08x->%p/0x%08x\n", p->p_pid, my_cred, my_cred_flags, uthread->uu_ucred , uthread->uu_ucred ->cr_flags);
+                       DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE("setgroups1(CH)%d: %p/0x%08x->%p/0x%08x\n", p->p_pid, my_cred, my_cred_flags, uthread->uu_ucred, uthread->uu_ucred->cr_flags);

                }
                }

-#endif /* DEBUG_CRED */
+#endif  /* DEBUG_CRED */

        } else {
        } else {

-

                /*
                 * get current credential and take a reference while we muck
                 * with it
                 */
                for (;;) {
                /*
                 * get current credential and take a reference while we muck
                 * with it
                 */
                for (;;) {

-                       /* 
+                       /*

                         * Set the credential with new info.  If there is no
                         * change, we get back the same credential we passed
                         * in; if there is a change, we drop the reference on
                         * Set the credential with new info.  If there is no
                         * change, we get back the same credential we passed
                         * in; if there is a change, we drop the reference on


@@ -1695,19 +1731,18 @@ setgroups1(proc_t p, u_int gidsetsize, user_addr_t gidset, uid_t gmuid, __unused
                         */
                        my_new_cred = kauth_cred_setgroups(my_cred, &newgroups[0], ngrp, gmuid);
                        if (my_cred != my_new_cred) {
                         */
                        my_new_cred = kauth_cred_setgroups(my_cred, &newgroups[0], ngrp, gmuid);
                        if (my_cred != my_new_cred) {

-

                                DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE("setgroups1(CH)%d: %p/0x%08x->%p/0x%08x\n", p->p_pid, my_cred, my_cred->cr_flags, my_new_cred, my_new_cred->cr_flags);
 
                                DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE("setgroups1(CH)%d: %p/0x%08x->%p/0x%08x\n", p->p_pid, my_cred, my_cred->cr_flags, my_new_cred, my_new_cred->cr_flags);
 

-                               proc_lock(p);
+                               proc_ucred_lock(p);

                                /*
                                 * We need to protect for a race where another
                                 * thread also changed the credential after we
                                /*
                                 * We need to protect for a race where another
                                 * thread also changed the credential after we

-                                * took our reference.  If p_ucred has 
+                                * took our reference.  If p_ucred has

                                 * changed then we should restart this again
                                 * with the new cred.
                                 */
                                if (p->p_ucred != my_cred) {
                                 * changed then we should restart this again
                                 * with the new cred.
                                 */
                                if (p->p_ucred != my_cred) {

-                                       proc_unlock(p);
+                                       proc_ucred_unlock(p);

                                        kauth_cred_unref(&my_new_cred);
                                        my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
                                        /* try again */
                                        kauth_cred_unref(&my_new_cred);
                                        my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
                                        /* try again */


@@ -1717,7 +1752,7 @@ setgroups1(proc_t p, u_int gidsetsize, user_addr_t gidset, uid_t gmuid, __unused
                                /* update cred on proc */
                                PROC_UPDATE_CREDS_ONPROC(p);
                                OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);
                                /* update cred on proc */
                                PROC_UPDATE_CREDS_ONPROC(p);
                                OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);

-                               proc_unlock(p);
+                               proc_ucred_unlock(p);

                        }
                        break;
                }
                        }
                        break;
                }


@@ -1729,7 +1764,7 @@ setgroups1(proc_t p, u_int gidsetsize, user_addr_t gidset, uid_t gmuid, __unused
                set_security_token(p);
        }
 
                set_security_token(p);
        }
 

-       return (0);
+       return 0;

 }
 
 
 }
 
 


@@ -1767,7 +1802,7 @@ initgroups(proc_t p, struct initgroups_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
 {
        DEBUG_CRED_ENTER("initgroups\n");
 
 {
        DEBUG_CRED_ENTER("initgroups\n");
 

-       return(setgroups1(p, uap->gidsetsize, uap->gidset, uap->gmuid, retval));
+       return setgroups1(p, uap->gidsetsize, uap->gidset, uap->gmuid, retval);

 }
 
 
 }
 
 


@@ -1801,13 +1836,13 @@ setgroups(proc_t p, struct setgroups_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
 {
        DEBUG_CRED_ENTER("setgroups\n");
 
 {
        DEBUG_CRED_ENTER("setgroups\n");
 

-       return(setgroups1(p, uap->gidsetsize, uap->gidset, KAUTH_UID_NONE, retval));
+       return setgroups1(p, uap->gidsetsize, uap->gidset, KAUTH_UID_NONE, retval);

 }
 
 
 /*
  * Set the per-thread/per-process supplementary groups list.
 }
 
 
 /*
  * Set the per-thread/per-process supplementary groups list.

- * 
+ *

  * XXX implement setsgroups
  *
  */
  * XXX implement setsgroups
  *
  */


@@ -1815,12 +1850,12 @@ setgroups(proc_t p, struct setgroups_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
 int
 setsgroups(__unused proc_t p, __unused struct setsgroups_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
 {
 int
 setsgroups(__unused proc_t p, __unused struct setsgroups_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
 {

-       return(ENOTSUP);
+       return ENOTSUP;

 }
 
 /*
  * Set the per-thread/per-process whiteout groups list.
 }
 
 /*
  * Set the per-thread/per-process whiteout groups list.

- * 
+ *

  * XXX implement setwgroups
  *
  */
  * XXX implement setwgroups
  *
  */


@@ -1828,7 +1863,7 @@ setsgroups(__unused proc_t p, __unused struct setsgroups_args *uap, __unused int
 int
 setwgroups(__unused proc_t p, __unused struct setwgroups_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
 {
 int
 setwgroups(__unused proc_t p, __unused struct setwgroups_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
 {

-       return(ENOTSUP);
+       return ENOTSUP;

 }
 
 
 }
 
 


@@ -1843,9 +1878,10 @@ groupmember(gid_t gid, kauth_cred_t cred)
 {
        int is_member;
 
 {
        int is_member;
 

-       if (kauth_cred_ismember_gid(cred, gid, &is_member) == 0 && is_member)
-               return (1);
-       return (0);
+       if (kauth_cred_ismember_gid(cred, gid, &is_member) == 0 && is_member) {
+               return 1;
+       }
+       return 0;

 }
 
 
 }
 
 


@@ -1867,15 +1903,17 @@ int
 suser(kauth_cred_t cred, u_short *acflag)
 {
 #if DIAGNOSTIC
 suser(kauth_cred_t cred, u_short *acflag)
 {
 #if DIAGNOSTIC

-       if (!IS_VALID_CRED(cred))
+       if (!IS_VALID_CRED(cred)) {

                panic("suser");
                panic("suser");

+       }

 #endif
        if (kauth_cred_getuid(cred) == 0) {
 #endif
        if (kauth_cred_getuid(cred) == 0) {

-               if (acflag)
+               if (acflag) {

                        *acflag |= ASU;
                        *acflag |= ASU;

-               return (0);
+               }
+               return 0;

        }
        }

-       return (EPERM);
+       return EPERM;

 }
 
 
 }
 
 


@@ -1905,26 +1943,39 @@ suser(kauth_cred_t cred, u_short *acflag)
 int
 getlogin(proc_t p, struct getlogin_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
 {
 int
 getlogin(proc_t p, struct getlogin_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
 {

-       char buffer[MAXLOGNAME+1];
+       char buffer[MAXLOGNAME + 1];

        struct session * sessp;
 
        struct session * sessp;
 

-       bzero(buffer, MAXLOGNAME+1);
+       bzero(buffer, MAXLOGNAME + 1);

 
        sessp = proc_session(p);
 
 
        sessp = proc_session(p);
 

-       if (uap->namelen > MAXLOGNAME)
+       if (uap->namelen > MAXLOGNAME) {

                uap->namelen = MAXLOGNAME;
                uap->namelen = MAXLOGNAME;

+       }

 
 

-       if(sessp != SESSION_NULL) {
+       if (sessp != SESSION_NULL) {

                session_lock(sessp);
                bcopy( sessp->s_login, buffer, uap->namelen);
                session_unlock(sessp);
        }
        session_rele(sessp);
 
                session_lock(sessp);
                bcopy( sessp->s_login, buffer, uap->namelen);
                session_unlock(sessp);
        }
        session_rele(sessp);
 

-       return (copyout((caddr_t)buffer, uap->namebuf, uap->namelen));
+       return copyout((caddr_t)buffer, uap->namebuf, uap->namelen);

 }
 
 }
 

+void
+setlogin_internal(proc_t p, const char login[static MAXLOGNAME])
+{
+       struct session *sessp = proc_session(p);
+
+       if (sessp != SESSION_NULL) {
+               session_lock(sessp);
+               bcopy(login, sessp->s_login, MAXLOGNAME);
+               session_unlock(sessp);
+               session_rele(sessp);
+       }
+}

 
 /*
  * setlogin
 
 /*
  * setlogin


@@ -1946,35 +1997,28 @@ int
 setlogin(proc_t p, struct setlogin_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
 {
        int error;
 setlogin(proc_t p, struct setlogin_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
 {
        int error;

-       size_t dummy=0;
-       char buffer[MAXLOGNAME+1];
-       struct session * sessp;
+       size_t dummy = 0;
+       char buffer[MAXLOGNAME + 1];

 
 

-       if ((error = proc_suser(p)))
-               return (error);
+       if ((error = proc_suser(p))) {
+               return error;
+       }

 
 

-       bzero(&buffer[0], MAXLOGNAME+1);
+       bzero(&buffer[0], MAXLOGNAME + 1);

 
 
        error = copyinstr(uap->namebuf,
            (caddr_t) &buffer[0],
            MAXLOGNAME - 1, (size_t *)&dummy);
 
 
 
        error = copyinstr(uap->namebuf,
            (caddr_t) &buffer[0],
            MAXLOGNAME - 1, (size_t *)&dummy);
 

-       sessp = proc_session(p);
-
-       if (sessp != SESSION_NULL) {
-               session_lock(sessp);
-               bcopy(buffer, sessp->s_login, MAXLOGNAME);
-               session_unlock(sessp);
-               session_rele(sessp);
-       }
-
+       setlogin_internal(p, buffer);

 
        if (!error) {
                AUDIT_ARG(text, buffer);
 
        if (!error) {
                AUDIT_ARG(text, buffer);

-        } else if (error == ENAMETOOLONG)
+       } else if (error == ENAMETOOLONG) {

                error = EINVAL;
                error = EINVAL;

-       return (error);
+       }
+       return error;

 }
 
 
 }
 
 


@@ -1986,11 +2030,47 @@ setlogin(proc_t p, struct setlogin_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
 int
 set_security_token(proc_t p)
 {
 int
 set_security_token(proc_t p)
 {

+       return set_security_token_task_internal(p, p->task);
+}
+
+static void
+proc_calc_audit_token(proc_t p, kauth_cred_t my_cred, audit_token_t *audit_token)
+{
+       posix_cred_t my_pcred = posix_cred_get(my_cred);
+
+       /*
+        * The current layout of the Mach audit token explicitly
+        * adds these fields.  But nobody should rely on such
+        * a literal representation.  Instead, the BSM library
+        * provides a function to convert an audit token into
+        * a BSM subject.  Use of that mechanism will isolate
+        * the user of the trailer from future representation
+        * changes.
+        */
+       audit_token->val[0] = my_cred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_auid;
+       audit_token->val[1] = my_pcred->cr_uid;
+       audit_token->val[2] = my_pcred->cr_gid;
+       audit_token->val[3] = my_pcred->cr_ruid;
+       audit_token->val[4] = my_pcred->cr_rgid;
+       audit_token->val[5] = p->p_pid;
+       audit_token->val[6] = my_cred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_asid;
+       audit_token->val[7] = p->p_idversion;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the secrity token of the task with current euid and eguid
+ * The function takes a proc and a task, where proc->task might point to a
+ * different task if called from exec.
+ */
+
+int
+set_security_token_task_internal(proc_t p, void *t)
+{
+       kauth_cred_t my_cred;

        security_token_t sec_token;
        audit_token_t    audit_token;
        security_token_t sec_token;
        audit_token_t    audit_token;

-       kauth_cred_t my_cred;
-       posix_cred_t my_pcred;

        host_priv_t host_priv;
        host_priv_t host_priv;

+       task_t task = t;

 
        /*
         * Don't allow a vfork child to override the parent's token settings
 
        /*
         * Don't allow a vfork child to override the parent's token settings


@@ -1998,15 +2078,17 @@ set_security_token(proc_t p)
         * suffer along using the parent's token until the exec().  It's all
         * undefined behavior anyway, right?
         */
         * suffer along using the parent's token until the exec().  It's all
         * undefined behavior anyway, right?
         */

-       if (p->task == current_task()) {
-               uthread_t        uthread;
+       if (task == current_task()) {
+               uthread_t        uthread;

                uthread = (uthread_t)get_bsdthread_info(current_thread());
                uthread = (uthread_t)get_bsdthread_info(current_thread());

-               if (uthread->uu_flag & UT_VFORK)
-                       return (1);
+               if (uthread->uu_flag & UT_VFORK) {
+                       return 1;
+               }

        }
        }

-               
+

        my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
        my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);

-       my_pcred = posix_cred_get(my_cred);
+
+       proc_calc_audit_token(p, my_cred, &audit_token);

 
        /* XXX mach_init doesn't have a p_ucred when it calls this function */
        if (IS_VALID_CRED(my_cred)) {
 
        /* XXX mach_init doesn't have a p_ucred when it calls this function */
        if (IS_VALID_CRED(my_cred)) {


@@ -2017,43 +2099,42 @@ set_security_token(proc_t p)
                sec_token.val[1] = 0;
        }
 
                sec_token.val[1] = 0;
        }
 

-       /*
-        * The current layout of the Mach audit token explicitly
-        * adds these fields.  But nobody should rely on such
-        * a literal representation.  Instead, the BSM library
-        * provides a function to convert an audit token into
-        * a BSM subject.  Use of that mechanism will isolate
-        * the user of the trailer from future representation
-        * changes.
-        */
-       audit_token.val[0] = my_cred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_auid;
-       audit_token.val[1] = my_pcred->cr_uid;
-       audit_token.val[2] = my_pcred->cr_gid;
-       audit_token.val[3] = my_pcred->cr_ruid;
-       audit_token.val[4] = my_pcred->cr_rgid;
-       audit_token.val[5] = p->p_pid;
-       audit_token.val[6] = my_cred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_asid;
-       audit_token.val[7] = p->p_idversion;
-

        host_priv = (sec_token.val[0]) ? HOST_PRIV_NULL : host_priv_self();
 #if CONFIG_MACF
        host_priv = (sec_token.val[0]) ? HOST_PRIV_NULL : host_priv_self();
 #if CONFIG_MACF

-       if (host_priv != HOST_PRIV_NULL && mac_system_check_host_priv(my_cred))
+       if (host_priv != HOST_PRIV_NULL && mac_system_check_host_priv(my_cred)) {

                host_priv = HOST_PRIV_NULL;
                host_priv = HOST_PRIV_NULL;

+       }

 #endif
        kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
 
 #if DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG
 #endif
        kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
 
 #if DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG

-       /* 
+       /*

         * Update the pid an proc name for importance base if any
         */
         * Update the pid an proc name for importance base if any
         */

-       task_importance_update_owner_info(p->task);
+       task_importance_update_owner_info(task);

 #endif
 
 #endif
 

-       return (host_security_set_task_token(host_security_self(),
-                                          p->task,
-                                          sec_token,
-                                          audit_token,
-                                          host_priv) != KERN_SUCCESS);
+       return host_security_set_task_token(host_security_self(),
+                  task,
+                  sec_token,
+                  audit_token,
+                  host_priv) != KERN_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+void
+proc_parent_audit_token(proc_t p, audit_token_t *token_out)
+{
+       proc_t parent;
+       kauth_cred_t my_cred;
+
+       proc_list_lock();
+
+       parent = p->p_pptr;
+       my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(parent);
+       proc_calc_audit_token(parent, my_cred, token_out);
+       kauth_cred_unref(&my_cred);
+
+       proc_list_unlock();

 }
 
 
 }
 
 


@@ -2063,8 +2144,9 @@ int
 get_audit_token_pid(audit_token_t *audit_token)
 {
        /* keep in-sync with set_security_token (above) */
 get_audit_token_pid(audit_token_t *audit_token)
 {
        /* keep in-sync with set_security_token (above) */

-       if (audit_token)
+       if (audit_token) {

                return (int)audit_token->val[5];
                return (int)audit_token->val[5];

+       }

        return -1;
 }
 
        return -1;
 }