#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/ipc.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h> /* mode constants */
#include <sys/ucred.h>
#include <sys/kauth.h>
/*
* Check for ipc permission
- *
- * XXX: Should pass proc argument so that we can pass
- * XXX: proc->p_acflag to suser()
*/
+
/*
+ * ipc_perm
+ *
+ * perm->mode mode of the object
+ * mode mode bits we want to test
+ *
* Returns: 0 Success
* EPERM
* EACCES
+ *
+ * Notes: The IPC_M bit is special, in that it may only be granted to
+ * root, the creating user, or the owning user.
+ *
+ * This code does not use posix_cred_access() because of the
+ * need to check both creator and owner separately when we are
+ * considering a rights grant. Because of this, we need to do
+ * two evaluations when the values are inequal, which can lead
+ * us to defeat the callout avoidance optimization. So we do
+ * the work here, inline. This is less than optimal for any
+ * future work involving opacity of of POSIX credentials.
+ *
+ * Setting up the mode_owner / mode_group / mode_world implicitly
+ * masks the IPC_M bit off. This is intentional.
+ *
+ * See the posix_cred_access() implementation for algorithm
+ * information.
*/
int
-ipcperm(kauth_cred_t cred, struct ipc_perm *perm, int mode)
+ipcperm(kauth_cred_t cred, struct ipc_perm *perm, int mode_req)
{
+ uid_t uid = kauth_cred_getuid(cred); /* avoid multiple calls */
+ int want_mod_controlinfo = (mode_req & IPC_M);
+ int is_member;
+ mode_t mode_owner = (perm->mode & S_IRWXU);
+ mode_t mode_group = (perm->mode & S_IRWXG) << 3;
+ mode_t mode_world = (perm->mode & S_IRWXO) << 6;
+ /* Grant all rights to super user */
if (!suser(cred, (u_short *)NULL))
return (0);
- /* Check for user match. */
- if (kauth_cred_getuid(cred) != perm->cuid && kauth_cred_getuid(cred) != perm->uid) {
- int is_member;
+ /* Grant or deny rights based on ownership */
+ if (uid == perm->cuid || uid == perm->uid) {
+ if (want_mod_controlinfo)
+ return (0);
- if (mode & IPC_M)
+ return ((mode_req & mode_owner) == mode_req ? 0 : EACCES);
+ } else {
+ /* everyone else who wants to modify control info is denied */
+ if (want_mod_controlinfo)
return (EPERM);
- /* Check for group match. */
- mode >>= 3;
- if ((kauth_cred_ismember_gid(cred, perm->gid, &is_member) || !is_member) &&
- (kauth_cred_ismember_gid(cred, perm->cgid, &is_member) || !is_member)) {
- /* Check for `other' match. */
- mode >>= 3;
- }
}
- if (mode & IPC_M)
+ /*
+ * Combined group and world rights check, if no owner rights; positive
+ * asssertion of gid/cgid equality avoids an extra callout in the
+ * common case.
+ */
+ if ((mode_req & mode_group & mode_world) == mode_req) {
return (0);
-
- return ((mode & perm->mode) == mode ? 0 : EACCES);
+ } else {
+ if ((mode_req & mode_group) != mode_req) {
+ if ((!kauth_cred_ismember_gid(cred, perm->gid, &is_member) && is_member) &&
+ ((perm->gid == perm->cgid) ||
+ (!kauth_cred_ismember_gid(cred, perm->cgid, &is_member) && is_member))) {
+ return (EACCES);
+ } else {
+ if ((mode_req & mode_world) != mode_req) {
+ return (EACCES);
+ } else {
+ return (0);
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ if ((!kauth_cred_ismember_gid(cred, perm->gid, &is_member) && is_member) ||
+ ((perm->gid != perm->cgid) &&
+ (!kauth_cred_ismember_gid(cred, perm->cgid, &is_member) && is_member))) {
+ return (0);
+ } else {
+ if ((mode_req & mode_world) != mode_req) {
+ return (EACCES);
+ } else {
+ return (0);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
}