]> git.saurik.com Git - apple/xnu.git/blobdiff - bsd/kern/kern_prot.c
xnu-4903.231.4.tar.gz
[apple/xnu.git] / bsd / kern / kern_prot.c
index 23c602e8bb05d6cafe2590240b9592d914b6122b..36beb273735e442be113b9625ba29f5e9051053c 100644 (file)
 #include <sys/timeb.h>
 #include <sys/times.h>
 #include <sys/malloc.h>
+#include <sys/persona.h>
 
 #include <security/audit/audit.h>
 
-#if CONFIG_LCTX
-#include <sys/lctx.h>
-#endif
-
 #if CONFIG_MACF
 #include <security/mac_framework.h>
 #endif
@@ -583,7 +580,7 @@ setsid(proc_t p, __unused struct setsid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
  * XXX:                Belongs in kern_proc.c
  */
 int
-setpgid(proc_t curp, register struct setpgid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
+setpgid(proc_t curp, struct setpgid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
 {
        proc_t targp = PROC_NULL;       /* target process */
        struct pgrp *pg = PGRP_NULL;    /* target pgrp */
@@ -672,6 +669,12 @@ out:
  *             real, effective, or saved user or group IDs since beginning
  *             execution.
  */
+int
+proc_issetugid (proc_t p)
+{
+       return (p->p_flag & P_SUGID) ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
 int
 issetugid(proc_t p, __unused struct issetugid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
 {
@@ -684,7 +687,7 @@ issetugid(proc_t p, __unused struct issetugid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
         * that libc *might* have put in their data segment.
         */
 
-       *retval = (p->p_flag & P_SUGID) ? 1 : 0;
+       *retval = proc_issetugid(p);
        return (0);
 }
 
@@ -780,11 +783,11 @@ setuid(proc_t p, struct setuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                         * may be able to decrement the proc count of B before we can increment it. This results in a panic.
                         * Incrementing the proc count of the target ruid, B, before setting the process credentials prevents this race.
                         */
-                       if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE) {
+                       if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && !proc_has_persona(p)) {
                                (void)chgproccnt(ruid, 1);
                        }
 
-                       proc_lock(p);
+                       proc_ucred_lock(p);
                        /*
                         * We need to protect for a race where another thread
                         * also changed the credential after we took our
@@ -794,12 +797,12 @@ setuid(proc_t p, struct setuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                         * Note: the kauth_cred_setresuid has consumed a reference to my_cred, it p_ucred != my_cred, then my_cred must not be dereferenced!
                         */
                        if (p->p_ucred != my_cred) {
-                               proc_unlock(p);
+                               proc_ucred_unlock(p);
                                /*
                                 * We didn't successfully switch to the new ruid, so decrement
                                 * the procs/uid count that we incremented above.
                                 */
-                               if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE) {
+                               if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && !proc_has_persona(p)) {
                                        (void)chgproccnt(ruid, -1);
                                }
                                kauth_cred_unref(&my_new_cred);
@@ -813,12 +816,12 @@ setuid(proc_t p, struct setuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                        PROC_UPDATE_CREDS_ONPROC(p);
 
                        OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);
-                       proc_unlock(p);
+                       proc_ucred_unlock(p);
                        /*
                         * If we've updated the ruid, decrement the count of procs running
                         * under the previous ruid
                         */
-                       if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE) {
+                       if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && !proc_has_persona(p)) {
                                (void)chgproccnt(my_pcred->cr_ruid, -1);
                        }
                }
@@ -887,7 +890,7 @@ seteuid(proc_t p, struct seteuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
 
                        DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE("seteuid CH(%d): %p/0x%08x -> %p/0x%08x\n", p->p_pid, my_cred, my_pcred->cr_flags, my_new_cred, posix_cred_get(my_new_cred)->cr_flags);
 
-                       proc_lock(p);
+                       proc_ucred_lock(p);
                        /*
                         * We need to protect for a race where another thread
                         * also changed the credential after we took our
@@ -895,7 +898,7 @@ seteuid(proc_t p, struct seteuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                         * should restart this again with the new cred.
                         */
                        if (p->p_ucred != my_cred) {
-                               proc_unlock(p);
+                               proc_ucred_unlock(p);
                                kauth_cred_unref(&my_new_cred);
                                my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
                                my_pcred = posix_cred_get(my_cred);
@@ -906,7 +909,7 @@ seteuid(proc_t p, struct seteuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                        /* update cred on proc */
                        PROC_UPDATE_CREDS_ONPROC(p);
                        OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);
-                       proc_unlock(p);
+                       proc_ucred_unlock(p);
                }
                break;
        }
@@ -1028,11 +1031,11 @@ setreuid(proc_t p, struct setreuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                         * may be able to decrement the proc count of B before we can increment it. This results in a panic.
                         * Incrementing the proc count of the target ruid, B, before setting the process credentials prevents this race.
                         */
-                       if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE) {
+                       if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && !proc_has_persona(p)) {
                                (void)chgproccnt(ruid, 1);
                        }
 
-                       proc_lock(p);
+                       proc_ucred_lock(p);
                        /*
                         * We need to protect for a race where another thread
                         * also changed the credential after we took our
@@ -1042,8 +1045,8 @@ setreuid(proc_t p, struct setreuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                         * Note: the kauth_cred_setresuid has consumed a reference to my_cred, it p_ucred != my_cred, then my_cred must not be dereferenced!
                         */
                        if (p->p_ucred != my_cred) {
-                               proc_unlock(p);
-                               if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE) {
+                               proc_ucred_unlock(p);
+                               if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && !proc_has_persona(p)) {
                                        /*
                                         * We didn't successfully switch to the new ruid, so decrement
                                         * the procs/uid count that we incremented above.
@@ -1061,9 +1064,9 @@ setreuid(proc_t p, struct setreuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                        /* update cred on proc */
                        PROC_UPDATE_CREDS_ONPROC(p);
                        OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);
-                       proc_unlock(p);
+                       proc_ucred_unlock(p);
 
-                       if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE) {
+                       if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && !proc_has_persona(p)) {
                                /*
                                 * We switched to a new ruid, so decrement the count of procs running
                                 * under the previous ruid
@@ -1157,7 +1160,7 @@ setgid(proc_t p, struct setgid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
 
                        DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE("setgid(CH)%d: %p/0x%08x->%p/0x%08x\n", p->p_pid, my_cred, my_cred->cr_flags, my_new_cred, my_new_cred->cr_flags);
 
-                       proc_lock(p);
+                       proc_ucred_lock(p);
                        /*
                         * We need to protect for a race where another thread
                         * also changed the credential after we took our
@@ -1165,7 +1168,7 @@ setgid(proc_t p, struct setgid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                         * should restart this again with the new cred.
                         */
                        if (p->p_ucred != my_cred) {
-                               proc_unlock(p);
+                               proc_ucred_unlock(p);
                                kauth_cred_unref(&my_new_cred);
                                /* try again */
                                my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
@@ -1176,7 +1179,7 @@ setgid(proc_t p, struct setgid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                        /* update cred on proc */
                        PROC_UPDATE_CREDS_ONPROC(p);
                        OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);
-                       proc_unlock(p);
+                       proc_ucred_unlock(p);
                }
                break;
        }
@@ -1248,7 +1251,7 @@ setegid(proc_t p, struct setegid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
 
                        DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE("setegid(CH)%d: %p/0x%08x->%p/0x%08x\n", p->p_pid, my_cred, my_pcred->cr_flags, my_new_cred, posix_cred_get(my_new_cred)->cr_flags);
 
-                       proc_lock(p);
+                       proc_ucred_lock(p);
                        /*
                         * We need to protect for a race where another thread
                         * also changed the credential after we took our
@@ -1256,7 +1259,7 @@ setegid(proc_t p, struct setegid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                         * should restart this again with the new cred.
                         */
                        if (p->p_ucred != my_cred) {
-                               proc_unlock(p);
+                               proc_ucred_unlock(p);
                                kauth_cred_unref(&my_new_cred);
                                /* try again */
                                my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
@@ -1267,7 +1270,7 @@ setegid(proc_t p, struct setegid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                        /* update cred on proc */
                        PROC_UPDATE_CREDS_ONPROC(p);
                        OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);
-                       proc_unlock(p);
+                       proc_ucred_unlock(p);
                }
                break;
        }
@@ -1395,14 +1398,14 @@ setregid(proc_t p, struct setregid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
 
                        DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE("setregid(CH)%d: %p/0x%08x->%p/0x%08x\n", p->p_pid, my_cred, my_pcred->cr_flags, my_new_cred, posix_cred_get(my_new_cred)->cr_flags);
 
-                       proc_lock(p);
+                       proc_ucred_lock(p);
                        /* need to protect for a race where another thread
                         * also changed the credential after we took our
                         * reference.  If p_ucred has changed then we
                         * should restart this again with the new cred.
                         */
                        if (p->p_ucred != my_cred) {
-                               proc_unlock(p);
+                               proc_ucred_unlock(p);
                                kauth_cred_unref(&my_new_cred);
                                /* try again */
                                my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
@@ -1413,7 +1416,7 @@ setregid(proc_t p, struct setregid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
                        /* update cred on proc */
                        PROC_UPDATE_CREDS_ONPROC(p);
                        OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag); /* XXX redundant? */
-                       proc_unlock(p);
+                       proc_ucred_unlock(p);
                }
                break;
        }
@@ -1700,7 +1703,7 @@ setgroups1(proc_t p, u_int gidsetsize, user_addr_t gidset, uid_t gmuid, __unused
 
                                DEBUG_CRED_CHANGE("setgroups1(CH)%d: %p/0x%08x->%p/0x%08x\n", p->p_pid, my_cred, my_cred->cr_flags, my_new_cred, my_new_cred->cr_flags);
 
-                               proc_lock(p);
+                               proc_ucred_lock(p);
                                /*
                                 * We need to protect for a race where another
                                 * thread also changed the credential after we
@@ -1709,7 +1712,7 @@ setgroups1(proc_t p, u_int gidsetsize, user_addr_t gidset, uid_t gmuid, __unused
                                 * with the new cred.
                                 */
                                if (p->p_ucred != my_cred) {
-                                       proc_unlock(p);
+                                       proc_ucred_unlock(p);
                                        kauth_cred_unref(&my_new_cred);
                                        my_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
                                        /* try again */
@@ -1719,7 +1722,7 @@ setgroups1(proc_t p, u_int gidsetsize, user_addr_t gidset, uid_t gmuid, __unused
                                /* update cred on proc */
                                PROC_UPDATE_CREDS_ONPROC(p);
                                OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);
-                               proc_unlock(p);
+                               proc_ucred_unlock(p);
                        }
                        break;
                }
@@ -1987,12 +1990,25 @@ setlogin(proc_t p, struct setlogin_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
  */
 int
 set_security_token(proc_t p)
+{
+       return set_security_token_task_internal(p, p->task);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the secrity token of the task with current euid and eguid
+ * The function takes a proc and a task, where proc->task might point to a
+ * different task if called from exec.
+ */
+
+int
+set_security_token_task_internal(proc_t p, void *t)
 {
        security_token_t sec_token;
        audit_token_t    audit_token;
        kauth_cred_t my_cred;
        posix_cred_t my_pcred;
        host_priv_t host_priv;
+       task_t task = t;
 
        /*
         * Don't allow a vfork child to override the parent's token settings
@@ -2000,7 +2016,7 @@ set_security_token(proc_t p)
         * suffer along using the parent's token until the exec().  It's all
         * undefined behavior anyway, right?
         */
-       if (p->task == current_task()) {
+       if (task == current_task()) {
                uthread_t        uthread;
                uthread = (uthread_t)get_bsdthread_info(current_thread());
                if (uthread->uu_flag & UT_VFORK)
@@ -2048,17 +2064,29 @@ set_security_token(proc_t p)
        /* 
         * Update the pid an proc name for importance base if any
         */
-       task_importance_update_owner_info(p->task);
+       task_importance_update_owner_info(task);
 #endif
 
        return (host_security_set_task_token(host_security_self(),
-                                          p->task,
+                                          task,
                                           sec_token,
                                           audit_token,
                                           host_priv) != KERN_SUCCESS);
 }
 
 
+int get_audit_token_pid(audit_token_t *audit_token);
+
+int
+get_audit_token_pid(audit_token_t *audit_token)
+{
+       /* keep in-sync with set_security_token (above) */
+       if (audit_token)
+               return (int)audit_token->val[5];
+       return -1;
+}
+
+
 /*
  * Fill in a struct xucred based on a kauth_cred_t.
  */
@@ -2074,170 +2102,3 @@ cru2x(kauth_cred_t cr, struct xucred *xcr)
        xcr->cr_ngroups = pcr->cr_ngroups;
        bcopy(pcr->cr_groups, xcr->cr_groups, sizeof(xcr->cr_groups));
 }
-
-#if CONFIG_LCTX
-
-/*
- * Set Login Context ID
- */
-/*
- * MPSAFE - assignment of (visible) process to context protected by ALLLCTX_LOCK,
- *         LCTX by its own locks.
- */
-int
-setlcid(proc_t p0, struct setlcid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
-{
-       proc_t p;
-       struct lctx *l;
-       int error = 0;
-       int refheld = 0;
-
-       AUDIT_ARG(pid, uap->pid);
-       AUDIT_ARG(value32, uap->lcid);
-       if (uap->pid == LCID_PROC_SELF) {       /* Create/Join/Leave */
-               p = p0;
-       } else {                                /* Adopt/Orphan */
-               p = proc_find(uap->pid);
-               if (p == NULL)
-                       return (ESRCH);
-               refheld = 1;
-       }
-
-#if CONFIG_MACF
-       error = mac_proc_check_setlcid(p0, p, uap->pid, uap->lcid);
-       if (error)
-               goto out;
-#endif
-
-       switch (uap->lcid) {
-       /* Leave/Orphan */
-       case LCID_REMOVE:
-
-               /* Only root may Leave/Orphan. */
-               if (!kauth_cred_issuser(kauth_cred_get())) {
-                       error = EPERM;
-                       goto out;
-               }
-
-               /* Process not in login context. */
-               if (p->p_lctx == NULL) {
-                       error = ENOATTR;
-                       goto out;
-               }
-
-               l = NULL;
-
-               break;
-
-       /* Create */
-       case LCID_CREATE:
-
-               /* Create only valid for self! */
-               if (uap->pid != LCID_PROC_SELF) {
-                       error = EPERM;
-                       goto out;
-               }
-
-               /* Already in a login context. */
-               if (p->p_lctx != NULL) {
-                       error = EPERM;
-                       goto out;
-               }
-
-               l = lccreate();
-               if (l == NULL) {
-                       error = ENOMEM;
-                       goto out;
-               }
-
-               LCTX_LOCK(l);
-
-               break;
-
-       /* Join/Adopt */
-       default:
-
-               /* Only root may Join/Adopt. */
-               if (!kauth_cred_issuser(kauth_cred_get())) {
-                       error = EPERM;
-                       goto out;
-               }
-
-               l = lcfind(uap->lcid);
-               if (l == NULL) {
-                       error = ENOATTR;
-                       goto out;
-               }
-
-               break;
-       }
-
-       ALLLCTX_LOCK;
-       leavelctx(p);
-       enterlctx(p, l, (uap->lcid == LCID_CREATE) ? 1 : 0);
-       ALLLCTX_UNLOCK;
-
-out:
-       if (refheld != 0)
-               proc_rele(p);
-       return (error);
-}
-
-/*
- * Get Login Context ID
- */
-/*
- * MPSAFE - membership of (visible) process in a login context
- *         protected by the all-context lock.
- */
-int
-getlcid(proc_t p0, struct getlcid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
-{
-       proc_t p;
-       int error = 0;
-       int refheld = 0;
-
-       AUDIT_ARG(pid, uap->pid);
-       if (uap->pid == LCID_PROC_SELF) {
-               p = p0;
-       } else {
-               p = proc_find(uap->pid);
-               if (p == NULL)
-                       return (ESRCH);
-               refheld = 1;
-       }
-
-#if CONFIG_MACF
-       error = mac_proc_check_getlcid(p0, p, uap->pid);
-       if (error)
-               goto out;
-#endif
-       ALLLCTX_LOCK;
-       if (p->p_lctx == NULL) {
-               error = ENOATTR;
-               ALLLCTX_UNLOCK;
-               goto out;
-       }
-       *retval = p->p_lctx->lc_id;
-       ALLLCTX_UNLOCK;
- out:
-       if (refheld != 0)
-               proc_rele(p);
-
-       return (error);
-}
-#else  /* LCTX */
-int
-setlcid(proc_t p0, struct setlcid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
-{
-
-       return (ENOSYS);
-}
-
-int
-getlcid(proc_t p0, struct getlcid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
-{
-
-       return (ENOSYS);
-}
-#endif /* !LCTX */