xnu-4903.241.1.tar.gz

[apple/xnu.git] / bsd / kern / kern_guarded.c

/*
 * Copyright (c) 2018 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
 *
 * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_START@
 * 
 * This file contains Original Code and/or Modifications of Original Code
 * as defined in and that are subject to the Apple Public Source License
 * Version 2.0 (the 'License'). You may not use this file except in
 * compliance with the License. The rights granted to you under the License
 * may not be used to create, or enable the creation or redistribution of,
 * unlawful or unlicensed copies of an Apple operating system, or to
 * circumvent, violate, or enable the circumvention or violation of, any
 * terms of an Apple operating system software license agreement.
 * 
 * Please obtain a copy of the License at
 * http://www.opensource.apple.com/apsl/ and read it before using this file.
 * 
 * The Original Code and all software distributed under the License are
 * distributed on an 'AS IS' basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER
 * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AND APPLE HEREBY DISCLAIMS ALL SUCH WARRANTIES,
 * INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
 * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, QUIET ENJOYMENT OR NON-INFRINGEMENT.
 * Please see the License for the specific language governing rights and
 * limitations under the License.
 * 
 * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_END@
 */

#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/filedesc.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/file_internal.h>
#include <kern/exc_guard.h>
#include <sys/guarded.h>
#include <kern/kalloc.h>
#include <sys/sysproto.h>
#include <sys/vnode.h>
#include <sys/vnode_internal.h>
#include <sys/uio_internal.h>
#include <sys/ubc_internal.h>
#include <vfs/vfs_support.h>
#include <security/audit/audit.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/kauth.h>
#include <sys/kdebug.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <vm/vm_protos.h>
#include <libkern/section_keywords.h>
#if CONFIG_MACF && CONFIG_VNGUARD
#include <security/mac.h>
#include <security/mac_framework.h>
#include <security/mac_policy.h>
#include <pexpert/pexpert.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <sys/reason.h>
#endif


#define f_flag f_fglob->fg_flag
#define f_type f_fglob->fg_ops->fo_type
extern int dofilewrite(vfs_context_t ctx, struct fileproc *fp,
			 user_addr_t bufp, user_size_t nbyte, off_t offset, 
			 int flags, user_ssize_t *retval );
extern int wr_uio(struct proc *p, struct fileproc *fp, uio_t uio, user_ssize_t *retval);

/*
 * Experimental guarded file descriptor support.
 */

kern_return_t task_exception_notify(exception_type_t exception,
        mach_exception_data_type_t code, mach_exception_data_type_t subcode);
kern_return_t task_violated_guard(mach_exception_code_t, mach_exception_subcode_t, void *);

/*
 * Most fd's have an underlying fileproc struct; but some may be
 * guarded_fileproc structs which implement guarded fds.  The latter
 * struct (below) embeds the former.
 *
 * The two types should be distinguished by the "type" portion of f_flags.
 * There's also a magic number to help catch misuse and bugs.
 *
 * This is a bit unpleasant, but results from the desire to allow
 * alternate file behaviours for a few file descriptors without
 * growing the fileproc data structure.
 */

struct guarded_fileproc {
	struct fileproc gf_fileproc;
	u_int		gf_magic;
	u_int		gf_attrs;
	guardid_t	gf_guard;
};

const size_t sizeof_guarded_fileproc = sizeof (struct guarded_fileproc);

#define FP_TO_GFP(fp)	((struct guarded_fileproc *)(fp))
#define	GFP_TO_FP(gfp)	(&(gfp)->gf_fileproc)

#define GUARDED_FILEPROC_MAGIC	0x29083

struct gfp_crarg {
	guardid_t gca_guard;
	u_int gca_attrs;
};

static struct fileproc *
guarded_fileproc_alloc_init(void *crarg)
{
	struct gfp_crarg *aarg = crarg;
	struct guarded_fileproc *gfp;

	if ((gfp = kalloc(sizeof (*gfp))) == NULL)
		return (NULL);

	bzero(gfp, sizeof (*gfp));
	gfp->gf_fileproc.f_flags = FTYPE_GUARDED;
	gfp->gf_magic = GUARDED_FILEPROC_MAGIC;
	gfp->gf_guard = aarg->gca_guard;
	gfp->gf_attrs = aarg->gca_attrs;

	return (GFP_TO_FP(gfp));
}

void
guarded_fileproc_free(struct fileproc *fp)
{
	struct guarded_fileproc *gfp = FP_TO_GFP(fp);

	if (FILEPROC_TYPE(fp) != FTYPE_GUARDED ||
	    GUARDED_FILEPROC_MAGIC != gfp->gf_magic)
		panic("%s: corrupt fp %p flags %x", __func__, fp, fp->f_flags);

	kfree(gfp, sizeof (*gfp));
}

static int
fp_lookup_guarded(proc_t p, int fd, guardid_t guard,
    struct guarded_fileproc **gfpp, int locked)
{
	struct fileproc *fp;
	int error;

	if ((error = fp_lookup(p, fd, &fp, locked)) != 0)
		return (error);
	if (FILEPROC_TYPE(fp) != FTYPE_GUARDED) {
		(void) fp_drop(p, fd, fp, locked);
		return (EINVAL);
	}
	struct guarded_fileproc *gfp = FP_TO_GFP(fp);

	if (GUARDED_FILEPROC_MAGIC != gfp->gf_magic)
		panic("%s: corrupt fp %p", __func__, fp);

	if (guard != gfp->gf_guard) {
		(void) fp_drop(p, fd, fp, locked);
		return (EPERM);	/* *not* a mismatch exception */
	}
	if (gfpp)
		*gfpp = gfp;
	return (0);
}

/*
 * Expected use pattern:
 *
 * if (FP_ISGUARDED(fp, GUARD_CLOSE)) {
 * 	error = fp_guard_exception(p, fd, fp, kGUARD_EXC_CLOSE);
 *      proc_fdunlock(p);
 *      return (error);
 * }
 */

int
fp_isguarded(struct fileproc *fp, u_int attrs)
{
	if (FILEPROC_TYPE(fp) == FTYPE_GUARDED) {
		struct guarded_fileproc *gfp = FP_TO_GFP(fp);

		if (GUARDED_FILEPROC_MAGIC != gfp->gf_magic)
			panic("%s: corrupt gfp %p flags %x",
			    __func__, gfp, fp->f_flags);
		return ((attrs & gfp->gf_attrs) == attrs);
	}
	return (0);
}

extern char *proc_name_address(void *p);

int
fp_guard_exception(proc_t p, int fd, struct fileproc *fp, u_int flavor)
{
	if (FILEPROC_TYPE(fp) != FTYPE_GUARDED)
		panic("%s corrupt fp %p flags %x", __func__, fp, fp->f_flags);

	struct guarded_fileproc *gfp = FP_TO_GFP(fp);
	/* all gfd fields protected via proc_fdlock() */
	proc_fdlock_assert(p, LCK_MTX_ASSERT_OWNED);

	mach_exception_code_t code = 0;
	EXC_GUARD_ENCODE_TYPE(code, GUARD_TYPE_FD);
	EXC_GUARD_ENCODE_FLAVOR(code, flavor);
	EXC_GUARD_ENCODE_TARGET(code, fd);
	mach_exception_subcode_t subcode = gfp->gf_guard;

	thread_t t = current_thread();
	thread_guard_violation(t, code, subcode);
	return (EPERM);
}

/*
 * (Invoked before returning to userland from the syscall handler.)
 */
void
fd_guard_ast(
	thread_t __unused t,
	mach_exception_code_t code,
	mach_exception_subcode_t subcode)
{
	task_exception_notify(EXC_GUARD, code, subcode);
	proc_t p = current_proc();
	psignal(p, SIGKILL);
}

/*
 * Experimental guarded file descriptor SPIs
 */

/*
 * int guarded_open_np(const char *pathname, int flags,
 *     const guardid_t *guard, u_int guardflags, ...);
 *
 * In this initial implementation, GUARD_DUP must be specified.
 * GUARD_CLOSE, GUARD_SOCKET_IPC and GUARD_FILEPORT are optional.
 *
 * If GUARD_DUP wasn't specified, then we'd have to do the (extra) work
 * to allow dup-ing a descriptor to inherit the guard onto the new
 * descriptor.  (Perhaps GUARD_DUP behaviours should just always be true
 * for a guarded fd?  Or, more sanely, all the dup operations should
 * just always propagate the guard?)
 *
 * Guarded descriptors are always close-on-exec, and GUARD_CLOSE
 * requires close-on-fork; O_CLOEXEC must be set in flags.
 * This setting is immutable; attempts to clear the flag will
 * cause a guard exception.
 *
 * XXX	It's somewhat broken that change_fdguard_np() can completely
 *	remove the guard and thus revoke down the immutability
 *	promises above.  Ick.
 */
int
guarded_open_np(proc_t p, struct guarded_open_np_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
{
	if ((uap->flags & O_CLOEXEC) == 0)
		return (EINVAL);

#define GUARD_REQUIRED (GUARD_DUP)
#define GUARD_ALL      (GUARD_REQUIRED |	\
			(GUARD_CLOSE | GUARD_SOCKET_IPC | GUARD_FILEPORT | GUARD_WRITE))

	if (((uap->guardflags & GUARD_REQUIRED) != GUARD_REQUIRED) ||
	    ((uap->guardflags & ~GUARD_ALL) != 0))
		return (EINVAL);

	int error;
	struct gfp_crarg crarg = {
		.gca_attrs = uap->guardflags
	};

	if ((error = copyin(uap->guard,
	    &(crarg.gca_guard), sizeof (crarg.gca_guard))) != 0)
		return (error);

	/*
	 * Disallow certain guard values -- is zero enough?
	 */
	if (crarg.gca_guard == 0)
		return (EINVAL);

	struct filedesc *fdp = p->p_fd;
	struct vnode_attr va;
	struct nameidata nd;
	vfs_context_t ctx = vfs_context_current();
	int cmode;

	VATTR_INIT(&va);
	cmode = ((uap->mode & ~fdp->fd_cmask) & ALLPERMS) & ~S_ISTXT;
	VATTR_SET(&va, va_mode, cmode & ACCESSPERMS);

	NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, OP_OPEN, FOLLOW | AUDITVNPATH1, UIO_USERSPACE,
	       uap->path, ctx);

	return (open1(ctx, &nd, uap->flags | O_CLOFORK, &va,
	    guarded_fileproc_alloc_init, &crarg, retval));
}

/*
 * int guarded_open_dprotected_np(const char *pathname, int flags,
 *     const guardid_t *guard, u_int guardflags, int dpclass, int dpflags, ...);
 *
 * This SPI is extension of guarded_open_np() to include dataprotection class on creation
 * in "dpclass" and dataprotection flags 'dpflags'. Otherwise behaviors are same as in
 * guarded_open_np()
 */
int
guarded_open_dprotected_np(proc_t p, struct guarded_open_dprotected_np_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
{
	if ((uap->flags & O_CLOEXEC) == 0)
		return (EINVAL);

	if (((uap->guardflags & GUARD_REQUIRED) != GUARD_REQUIRED) ||
	    ((uap->guardflags & ~GUARD_ALL) != 0))
		return (EINVAL);

	int error;
	struct gfp_crarg crarg = {
		.gca_attrs = uap->guardflags
	};

	if ((error = copyin(uap->guard,
	    &(crarg.gca_guard), sizeof (crarg.gca_guard))) != 0)
		return (error);

	/*
	 * Disallow certain guard values -- is zero enough?
	 */
	if (crarg.gca_guard == 0)
		return (EINVAL);

	struct filedesc *fdp = p->p_fd;
	struct vnode_attr va;
	struct nameidata nd;
	vfs_context_t ctx = vfs_context_current();
	int cmode;

	VATTR_INIT(&va);
	cmode = ((uap->mode & ~fdp->fd_cmask) & ALLPERMS) & ~S_ISTXT;
	VATTR_SET(&va, va_mode, cmode & ACCESSPERMS);

	NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, OP_OPEN, FOLLOW | AUDITVNPATH1, UIO_USERSPACE,
	       uap->path, ctx);

	/* 
	 * Initialize the extra fields in vnode_attr to pass down dataprotection 
	 * extra fields.
	 * 1. target cprotect class.
	 * 2. set a flag to mark it as requiring open-raw-encrypted semantics. 
	 */ 
	if (uap->flags & O_CREAT) {	
		VATTR_SET(&va, va_dataprotect_class, uap->dpclass);
	}
	
	if (uap->dpflags & (O_DP_GETRAWENCRYPTED|O_DP_GETRAWUNENCRYPTED)) {
		if ( uap->flags & (O_RDWR | O_WRONLY)) {
			/* Not allowed to write raw encrypted bytes */
			return EINVAL;		
		}			
		if (uap->dpflags & O_DP_GETRAWENCRYPTED) {
		    VATTR_SET(&va, va_dataprotect_flags, VA_DP_RAWENCRYPTED);
		}
		if (uap->dpflags & O_DP_GETRAWUNENCRYPTED) {
		    VATTR_SET(&va, va_dataprotect_flags, VA_DP_RAWUNENCRYPTED);
		}
	}

	return (open1(ctx, &nd, uap->flags | O_CLOFORK, &va,
	    guarded_fileproc_alloc_init, &crarg, retval));
}

/*
 * int guarded_kqueue_np(const guardid_t *guard, u_int guardflags);
 *
 * Create a guarded kqueue descriptor with guardid and guardflags.
 *
 * Same restrictions on guardflags as for guarded_open_np().
 * All kqueues are -always- close-on-exec and close-on-fork by themselves
 * and are not sendable.
 */
int
guarded_kqueue_np(proc_t p, struct guarded_kqueue_np_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
{
	if (((uap->guardflags & GUARD_REQUIRED) != GUARD_REQUIRED) ||
	    ((uap->guardflags & ~GUARD_ALL) != 0))
		return (EINVAL);

	int error;
	struct gfp_crarg crarg = {
		.gca_attrs = uap->guardflags
	};

	if ((error = copyin(uap->guard,
	    &(crarg.gca_guard), sizeof (crarg.gca_guard))) != 0)
		return (error);

	if (crarg.gca_guard == 0)
		return (EINVAL);

	return (kqueue_body(p, guarded_fileproc_alloc_init, &crarg, retval));
}

/*
 * int guarded_close_np(int fd, const guardid_t *guard);
 */
int
guarded_close_np(proc_t p, struct guarded_close_np_args *uap,
    __unused int32_t *retval)
{
	struct guarded_fileproc *gfp;
	int fd = uap->fd;
	int error;
	guardid_t uguard;

	AUDIT_SYSCLOSE(p, fd);

	if ((error = copyin(uap->guard, &uguard, sizeof (uguard))) != 0)
		return (error);

	proc_fdlock(p);
	if ((error = fp_lookup_guarded(p, fd, uguard, &gfp, 1)) != 0) {
		proc_fdunlock(p);
		return (error);
	}
	error = close_internal_locked(p, fd, GFP_TO_FP(gfp), 0);
	proc_fdunlock(p);
	return (error);
}

/*
 * int
 * change_fdguard_np(int fd, const guardid_t *guard, u_int guardflags,
 *    const guardid_t *nguard, u_int nguardflags, int *fdflagsp);
 *
 * Given a file descriptor, atomically exchange <guard, guardflags> for
 * a new guard <nguard, nguardflags>, returning the previous fd
 * flags (see fcntl:F_SETFD) in *fdflagsp.
 *
 * This syscall can be used to either (a) add a new guard to an existing
 * unguarded file descriptor (b) remove the old guard from an existing
 * guarded file descriptor or (c) change the guard (guardid and/or
 * guardflags) on a guarded file descriptor.
 *
 * If 'guard' is NULL, fd must be unguarded at entry. If the call completes
 * successfully the fd will be guarded with <nguard, nguardflags>.
 *
 * Guarding a file descriptor has some side-effects on the "fdflags"
 * associated with the descriptor - in particular FD_CLOEXEC is
 * forced ON unconditionally, and FD_CLOFORK is forced ON by GUARD_CLOSE.
 * Callers who wish to subsequently restore the state of the fd should save
 * the value of *fdflagsp after a successful invocation.
 *
 * If 'nguard' is NULL, fd must be guarded at entry, <guard, guardflags>
 * must match with what's already guarding the descriptor, and the
 * result will be to completely remove the guard.  Note also that the
 * fdflags are copied to the descriptor from the incoming *fdflagsp argument. 
 *
 * If the descriptor is guarded, and neither 'guard' nor 'nguard' is NULL
 * and <guard, guardflags> matches what's already guarding the descriptor,
 * then <nguard, nguardflags> becomes the new guard.  In this case, even if
 * the GUARD_CLOSE flag is being cleared, it is still possible to continue
 * to keep FD_CLOFORK on the descriptor by passing FD_CLOFORK via fdflagsp.
 *
 * (File descriptors whose underlying fileglobs are marked FG_CONFINED are
 * still close-on-fork, regardless of the setting of FD_CLOFORK.)
 *
 * Example 1: Guard an unguarded descriptor during a set of operations,
 * then restore the original state of the descriptor.
 *
 * int sav_flags = 0;
 * change_fdguard_np(fd, NULL, 0, &myguard, GUARD_CLOSE, &sav_flags);
 * // do things with now guarded 'fd'
 * change_fdguard_np(fd, &myguard, GUARD_CLOSE, NULL, 0, &sav_flags);
 * // fd now unguarded.
 *
 * Example 2: Change the guard of a guarded descriptor during a set of
 * operations, then restore the original state of the descriptor.
 *
 * int sav_flags = (gdflags & GUARD_CLOSE) ? FD_CLOFORK : 0;
 * change_fdguard_np(fd, &gd, gdflags, &myguard, GUARD_CLOSE, &sav_flags);
 * // do things with 'fd' with a different guard
 * change_fdguard_np(fd, &myg, GUARD_CLOSE, &gd, gdflags, &sav_flags);
 * // back to original guarded state
 *
 * XXX	This SPI is too much of a chainsaw and should be revised.
 */

int
change_fdguard_np(proc_t p, struct change_fdguard_np_args *uap,
    __unused int32_t *retval)
{
	struct fileproc *fp;
	int fd = uap->fd;
	int error;
	guardid_t oldg = 0, newg = 0;
	int nfdflags = 0;

	if (0 != uap->guard &&
	    0 != (error = copyin(uap->guard, &oldg, sizeof (oldg))))
		return (error); /* can't copyin current guard */

	if (0 != uap->nguard &&
	    0 != (error = copyin(uap->nguard, &newg, sizeof (newg))))
		return (error); /* can't copyin new guard */

	if (0 != uap->fdflagsp &&
	    0 != (error = copyin(uap->fdflagsp, &nfdflags, sizeof (nfdflags))))
		return (error); /* can't copyin new fdflags */
	    
	proc_fdlock(p);
restart:
	if ((error = fp_lookup(p, fd, &fp, 1)) != 0) {
		proc_fdunlock(p);
		return (error);
	}

	if (0 != uap->fdflagsp) {
		int ofdflags = FDFLAGS_GET(p, fd);
		int ofl = ((ofdflags & UF_EXCLOSE) ? FD_CLOEXEC : 0) |
			((ofdflags & UF_FORKCLOSE) ? FD_CLOFORK : 0);
		proc_fdunlock(p);
		if (0 != (error = copyout(&ofl, uap->fdflagsp, sizeof (ofl)))) {
			proc_fdlock(p);
			goto dropout; /* can't copyout old fdflags */
		}
		proc_fdlock(p);
	}

	if (FILEPROC_TYPE(fp) == FTYPE_GUARDED) {
		if (0 == uap->guard || 0 == uap->guardflags)
			error = EINVAL; /* missing guard! */
		else if (0 == oldg)
			error = EPERM; /* guardids cannot be zero */
	} else {
		if (0 != uap->guard || 0 != uap->guardflags)
			error = EINVAL; /* guard provided, but none needed! */
	}

	if (0 != error)
		goto dropout;

	if (0 != uap->nguard) {
		/*
		 * There's a new guard in town.
		 */
		if (0 == newg)
			error = EINVAL; /* guards cannot contain zero */
		else if (((uap->nguardflags & GUARD_REQUIRED) != GUARD_REQUIRED) ||
		    ((uap->nguardflags & ~GUARD_ALL) != 0))
			error = EINVAL; /* must have valid attributes too */
		if (0 != error)
			goto dropout;

		if (FILEPROC_TYPE(fp) == FTYPE_GUARDED) {
			/*
			 * Replace old guard with new guard
			 */
			struct guarded_fileproc *gfp = FP_TO_GFP(fp);

			if (GUARDED_FILEPROC_MAGIC != gfp->gf_magic)
				panic("%s: corrupt gfp %p flags %x",
				      __func__, gfp, fp->f_flags);

			if (oldg == gfp->gf_guard &&
			    uap->guardflags == gfp->gf_attrs) {
				/*
				 * Must match existing guard + attributes
				 * before we'll swap them to new ones, managing
				 * fdflags "side-effects" as we go.   Note that
				 * userland can request FD_CLOFORK semantics.
				 */
				if (gfp->gf_attrs & GUARD_CLOSE)
					FDFLAGS_CLR(p, fd, UF_FORKCLOSE);
				gfp->gf_guard = newg;
				gfp->gf_attrs = uap->nguardflags;
				if (gfp->gf_attrs & GUARD_CLOSE)
					FDFLAGS_SET(p, fd, UF_FORKCLOSE);
				FDFLAGS_SET(p, fd,
				    (nfdflags & FD_CLOFORK) ? UF_FORKCLOSE : 0);
				/* FG_CONFINED enforced regardless */
			} else {
				error = EPERM;
			}
			goto dropout;
		} else {
			/*
			 * Add a guard to a previously unguarded descriptor
			 */
			switch (FILEGLOB_DTYPE(fp->f_fglob)) {
			case DTYPE_VNODE:
			case DTYPE_PIPE:
			case DTYPE_SOCKET:
			case DTYPE_KQUEUE:
			case DTYPE_NETPOLICY:
				break;
			default:
				error = ENOTSUP;
				goto dropout;
			}

			proc_fdunlock(p);

			struct gfp_crarg crarg = {
				.gca_guard = newg,
				.gca_attrs = uap->nguardflags
			};
			struct fileproc *nfp =
				guarded_fileproc_alloc_init(&crarg);
			struct guarded_fileproc *gfp;

			proc_fdlock(p);

			switch (error = fp_tryswap(p, fd, nfp)) {
			case 0: /* guarded-ness comes with side-effects */
				gfp = FP_TO_GFP(nfp);
				if (gfp->gf_attrs & GUARD_CLOSE)
					FDFLAGS_SET(p, fd, UF_FORKCLOSE);
				FDFLAGS_SET(p, fd, UF_EXCLOSE);
				(void) fp_drop(p, fd, nfp, 1);
				fileproc_free(fp);
				break;
			case EKEEPLOOKING: /* f_iocount indicates a collision */
				(void) fp_drop(p, fd, fp, 1);
				fileproc_free(nfp);
				goto restart;
			default:
				(void) fp_drop(p, fd, fp, 1);
				fileproc_free(nfp);
				break;
			}
			proc_fdunlock(p);
			return (error);
		}
	} else {
		/*
		 * No new guard.
		 */
		if (FILEPROC_TYPE(fp) == FTYPE_GUARDED) {
			/*
			 * Remove the guard altogether.
			 */
			struct guarded_fileproc *gfp = FP_TO_GFP(fp);

			if (0 != uap->nguardflags) {
				error = EINVAL;
				goto dropout;
			}

			if (GUARDED_FILEPROC_MAGIC != gfp->gf_magic)
				panic("%s: corrupt gfp %p flags %x",
				      __func__, gfp, fp->f_flags);

			if (oldg != gfp->gf_guard ||
			    uap->guardflags != gfp->gf_attrs) {
				error = EPERM;
				goto dropout;
			}

			proc_fdunlock(p);
			struct fileproc *nfp = fileproc_alloc_init(NULL);
			proc_fdlock(p);

			switch (error = fp_tryswap(p, fd, nfp)) {
			case 0: /* undo side-effects of guarded-ness */
				FDFLAGS_CLR(p, fd, UF_FORKCLOSE | UF_EXCLOSE);
				FDFLAGS_SET(p, fd,
				    (nfdflags & FD_CLOFORK) ? UF_FORKCLOSE : 0);
				/* FG_CONFINED enforced regardless */
				FDFLAGS_SET(p, fd,
				    (nfdflags & FD_CLOEXEC) ? UF_EXCLOSE : 0);
				(void) fp_drop(p, fd, nfp, 1);
				fileproc_free(fp);
				break;
			case EKEEPLOOKING: /* f_iocount indicates collision */
				(void) fp_drop(p, fd, fp, 1);
				fileproc_free(nfp);
				goto restart;
			default:
				(void) fp_drop(p, fd, fp, 1);
				fileproc_free(nfp);
				break;
			}
			proc_fdunlock(p);
			return (error);
		} else {
			/*
			 * Not already guarded, and no new guard?
			 */
			error = EINVAL;
		}
	}

dropout:
	(void) fp_drop(p, fd, fp, 1);
	proc_fdunlock(p);
	return (error);
}

/*
 * user_ssize_t guarded_write_np(int fd, const guardid_t *guard,
 *                          user_addr_t cbuf, user_ssize_t nbyte);
 *
 * Initial implementation of guarded writes.
 */
int
guarded_write_np(struct proc *p, struct guarded_write_np_args *uap, user_ssize_t *retval)
{
	int error;      
	int fd = uap->fd;
	guardid_t uguard;
	struct fileproc *fp;
	struct guarded_fileproc *gfp;
	bool wrote_some = false;

	AUDIT_ARG(fd, fd);

	if ((error = copyin(uap->guard, &uguard, sizeof (uguard))) != 0)
		return (error);

	error = fp_lookup_guarded(p, fd, uguard, &gfp, 0);
	if (error)
		return(error);

	fp = GFP_TO_FP(gfp);
	if ((fp->f_flag & FWRITE) == 0) {
		error = EBADF;
	} else {

		struct vfs_context context = *(vfs_context_current());
		context.vc_ucred = fp->f_fglob->fg_cred;

		error = dofilewrite(&context, fp, uap->cbuf, uap->nbyte,
			(off_t)-1, 0, retval);
		wrote_some = *retval > 0;
	}
	if (wrote_some)
	        fp_drop_written(p, fd, fp);
	else
	        fp_drop(p, fd, fp, 0);
	return(error);
}

/*
 * user_ssize_t guarded_pwrite_np(int fd, const guardid_t *guard,
 *                        user_addr_t buf, user_size_t nbyte, off_t offset);
 *
 * Initial implementation of guarded pwrites.
 */
 int
 guarded_pwrite_np(struct proc *p, struct guarded_pwrite_np_args *uap, user_ssize_t *retval)
 {
	struct fileproc *fp;
	int error; 
	int fd = uap->fd;
	vnode_t vp  = (vnode_t)0;
	guardid_t uguard;
	struct guarded_fileproc *gfp;
	bool wrote_some = false;

	AUDIT_ARG(fd, fd);

	if ((error = copyin(uap->guard, &uguard, sizeof (uguard))) != 0)
		return (error);

	error = fp_lookup_guarded(p, fd, uguard, &gfp, 0);
	if (error)
		return(error);

	fp = GFP_TO_FP(gfp);
	if ((fp->f_flag & FWRITE) == 0) {
		error = EBADF;
	} else {
		struct vfs_context context = *vfs_context_current();
		context.vc_ucred = fp->f_fglob->fg_cred;

		if (fp->f_type != DTYPE_VNODE) {
			error = ESPIPE;
			goto errout;
		}
		vp = (vnode_t)fp->f_fglob->fg_data;
		if (vnode_isfifo(vp)) {
			error = ESPIPE;
			goto errout;
		} 
		if ((vp->v_flag & VISTTY)) {
			error = ENXIO;
			goto errout;
		}
		if (uap->offset == (off_t)-1) {
			error = EINVAL;
			goto errout;
		}

		error = dofilewrite(&context, fp, uap->buf, uap->nbyte,
			uap->offset, FOF_OFFSET, retval);
		wrote_some = *retval > 0;
	}
errout:
	if (wrote_some)
	        fp_drop_written(p, fd, fp);
	else
	        fp_drop(p, fd, fp, 0);

	KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT((BSDDBG_CODE(DBG_BSD_SC_EXTENDED_INFO, SYS_guarded_pwrite_np) | DBG_FUNC_NONE),
	      uap->fd, uap->nbyte, (unsigned int)((uap->offset >> 32)), (unsigned int)(uap->offset), 0);
	
        return(error);
}

/*
 * user_ssize_t guarded_writev_np(int fd, const guardid_t *guard,
 *                                   struct iovec *iovp, u_int iovcnt);
 *
 * Initial implementation of guarded writev.
 *
 */
int
guarded_writev_np(struct proc *p, struct guarded_writev_np_args *uap, user_ssize_t *retval)
{
	uio_t auio = NULL;
	int error;
	struct fileproc *fp;
	struct user_iovec *iovp;
	guardid_t uguard;
	struct guarded_fileproc *gfp;
	bool wrote_some = false;

	AUDIT_ARG(fd, uap->fd);

	/* Verify range bedfore calling uio_create() */
	if (uap->iovcnt <= 0 || uap->iovcnt > UIO_MAXIOV)
		return (EINVAL);

	/* allocate a uio large enough to hold the number of iovecs passed */
	auio = uio_create(uap->iovcnt, 0,
				  (IS_64BIT_PROCESS(p) ? UIO_USERSPACE64 : UIO_USERSPACE32),
				  UIO_WRITE);
				  
	/* get location of iovecs within the uio.  then copyin the iovecs from
	 * user space.
	 */
	iovp = uio_iovsaddr(auio);
	if (iovp == NULL) {
		error = ENOMEM;
		goto ExitThisRoutine;
	}
	error = copyin_user_iovec_array(uap->iovp,
		IS_64BIT_PROCESS(p) ? UIO_USERSPACE64 : UIO_USERSPACE32,
		uap->iovcnt, iovp);
	if (error) {
		goto ExitThisRoutine;
	}
	
	/* finalize uio_t for use and do the IO 
	 */
	error = uio_calculateresid(auio);
	if (error) {
		goto ExitThisRoutine;
	}

	if ((error = copyin(uap->guard, &uguard, sizeof (uguard))) != 0)
		goto ExitThisRoutine;

	error = fp_lookup_guarded(p, uap->fd, uguard, &gfp, 0);
	if (error)
		goto ExitThisRoutine;

	fp = GFP_TO_FP(gfp);
	if ((fp->f_flag & FWRITE) == 0) {
		error = EBADF;
	} else {
		error = wr_uio(p, fp, auio, retval);
		wrote_some = *retval > 0;
	}
	
	if (wrote_some)
	        fp_drop_written(p, uap->fd, fp);
	else
	        fp_drop(p, uap->fd, fp, 0);
ExitThisRoutine:
	if (auio != NULL) {
		uio_free(auio);
	}
	return (error);
}

/*
 * int falloc_guarded(struct proc *p, struct fileproc **fp, int *fd,
 *     vfs_context_t ctx, const guardid_t *guard, u_int attrs);
 *
 * This SPI is the guarded variant of falloc().  It borrows the same
 * restrictions as those used by the rest of the guarded_* routines.
 */
int
falloc_guarded(struct proc *p, struct fileproc **fp, int *fd,
    vfs_context_t ctx, const guardid_t *guard, u_int attrs)
{
	struct gfp_crarg crarg;

	if (((attrs & GUARD_REQUIRED) != GUARD_REQUIRED) ||
	    ((attrs & ~GUARD_ALL) != 0) || (*guard == 0))
		return (EINVAL);

	bzero(&crarg, sizeof (crarg));
	crarg.gca_guard = *guard;
	crarg.gca_attrs = attrs;

	return (falloc_withalloc(p, fp, fd, ctx, guarded_fileproc_alloc_init,
	    &crarg));
}

#if CONFIG_MACF && CONFIG_VNGUARD

/*
 * Guarded vnodes
 *
 * Uses MAC hooks to guard operations on vnodes in the system. Given an fd,
 * add data to the label on the fileglob and the vnode it points at.
 * The data contains a pointer to the fileglob, the set of attributes to
 * guard, a guard value for uniquification, and the pid of the process
 * who set the guard up in the first place.
 *
 * The fd must have been opened read/write, and the underlying
 * fileglob is FG_CONFINED so that there's no ambiguity about the
 * owning process.
 *
 * When there's a callback for a vnode operation of interest (rename, unlink,
 * etc.) check to see if the guard permits that operation, and if not
 * take an action e.g. log a message or generate a crash report.
 *
 * The label is removed from the vnode and the fileglob when the fileglob
 * is closed.
 *
 * The initial action to be taken can be specified by a boot arg (vnguard=0x42)
 * and change via the "kern.vnguard.flags" sysctl.
 */

struct vng_owner;

struct vng_info { /* lives on the vnode label */
	guardid_t vgi_guard;
	unsigned vgi_attrs;
	TAILQ_HEAD(, vng_owner) vgi_owners;
};

struct vng_owner { /* lives on the fileglob label */
	proc_t vgo_p;
	struct fileglob *vgo_fg;
	struct vng_info *vgo_vgi;
	TAILQ_ENTRY(vng_owner) vgo_link;
};

static struct vng_info *
new_vgi(unsigned attrs, guardid_t guard)
{
	struct vng_info *vgi = kalloc(sizeof (*vgi));
	vgi->vgi_guard = guard;
	vgi->vgi_attrs = attrs;
	TAILQ_INIT(&vgi->vgi_owners);
	return vgi;
}

static struct vng_owner *
new_vgo(proc_t p, struct fileglob *fg)
{
	struct vng_owner *vgo = kalloc(sizeof (*vgo));
	memset(vgo, 0, sizeof (*vgo));
	vgo->vgo_p = p;
	vgo->vgo_fg = fg;
	return vgo;
}

static void
vgi_add_vgo(struct vng_info *vgi, struct vng_owner *vgo)
{
	vgo->vgo_vgi = vgi;
	TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(&vgi->vgi_owners, vgo, vgo_link);
}

static boolean_t
vgi_remove_vgo(struct vng_info *vgi, struct vng_owner *vgo)
{
	TAILQ_REMOVE(&vgi->vgi_owners, vgo, vgo_link);
	vgo->vgo_vgi = NULL;
	return TAILQ_EMPTY(&vgi->vgi_owners);
}

static void
free_vgi(struct vng_info *vgi)
{
	assert(TAILQ_EMPTY(&vgi->vgi_owners));
#if DEVELOP || DEBUG
	memset(vgi, 0xbeadfade, sizeof (*vgi));
#endif
	kfree(vgi, sizeof (*vgi));
}

static void
free_vgo(struct vng_owner *vgo)
{
#if DEVELOP || DEBUG
	memset(vgo, 0x2bedf1d0, sizeof (*vgo));
#endif
	kfree(vgo, sizeof (*vgo));
}

static int label_slot;
static lck_rw_t llock;
static lck_grp_t *llock_grp;

static __inline void *
vng_lbl_get(struct label *label)
{
	lck_rw_assert(&llock, LCK_RW_ASSERT_HELD);
	void *data;
	if (NULL == label)
		data = NULL;
	else
		data = (void *)mac_label_get(label, label_slot);
	return data;
}

static __inline struct vng_info *
vng_lbl_get_withattr(struct label *label, unsigned attrmask)
{
	struct vng_info *vgi = vng_lbl_get(label);
	assert(NULL == vgi || (vgi->vgi_attrs & ~VNG_ALL) == 0);
	if (NULL != vgi && 0 == (vgi->vgi_attrs & attrmask))
		vgi = NULL;
	return vgi;
}

static __inline void
vng_lbl_set(struct label *label, void *data)
{
	assert(NULL != label);
	lck_rw_assert(&llock, LCK_RW_ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE);
	mac_label_set(label, label_slot, (intptr_t)data);
}

static int
vnguard_sysc_setguard(proc_t p, const struct vnguard_set *vns)
{
	const int fd = vns->vns_fd;

	if ((vns->vns_attrs & ~VNG_ALL) != 0 ||
	    0 == vns->vns_attrs || 0 == vns->vns_guard)
		return EINVAL;

	int error;
	struct fileproc *fp;
	if (0 != (error = fp_lookup(p, fd, &fp, 0)))
		return error;
	do {
		/*
		 * To avoid trivial DoS, insist that the caller
		 * has read/write access to the file.
		 */
		if ((FREAD|FWRITE) != (fp->f_flag & (FREAD|FWRITE))) {
			error = EBADF;
			break;
		}
		struct fileglob *fg = fp->f_fglob;
		if (FILEGLOB_DTYPE(fg) != DTYPE_VNODE) {
			error = EBADF;
			break;
		}
		/*
		 * Confinement means there's only one fd pointing at
		 * this fileglob, and will always be associated with
		 * this pid.
		 */
		if (0 == (FG_CONFINED & fg->fg_lflags)) {
			error = EBADF;
			break;
		}
		struct vnode *vp = fg->fg_data;
		if (!vnode_isreg(vp) || NULL == vp->v_mount) {
			error = EBADF;
			break;
		}
		error = vnode_getwithref(vp);
		if (0 != error) {
			fp_drop(p, fd, fp, 0);
			break;
		}
		/* Ensure the target vnode -has- a label */
		struct vfs_context *ctx = vfs_context_current();
		mac_vnode_label_update(ctx, vp, NULL);

		struct vng_info *nvgi = new_vgi(vns->vns_attrs, vns->vns_guard);
		struct vng_owner *nvgo = new_vgo(p, fg);

		lck_rw_lock_exclusive(&llock);

		do {
			/*
			 * A vnode guard is associated with one or more
			 * fileglobs in one or more processes.
			 */
			struct vng_info *vgi = vng_lbl_get(vp->v_label);
			struct vng_owner *vgo = vng_lbl_get(fg->fg_label);

			if (NULL == vgi) {
				/* vnode unguarded, add the first guard */
				if (NULL != vgo)
					panic("vnguard label on fileglob "
					      "but not vnode");
				/* add a kusecount so we can unlabel later */
				error = vnode_ref_ext(vp, O_EVTONLY, 0);
				if (0 == error) {
					/* add the guard */
					vgi_add_vgo(nvgi, nvgo);
					vng_lbl_set(vp->v_label, nvgi);
					vng_lbl_set(fg->fg_label, nvgo);
				} else {
					free_vgo(nvgo);
					free_vgi(nvgi);
				}
			} else {
				/* vnode already guarded */
				free_vgi(nvgi);
				if (vgi->vgi_guard != vns->vns_guard)
					error = EPERM; /* guard mismatch */
				else if (vgi->vgi_attrs != vns->vns_attrs)
					error = EACCES; /* attr mismatch */
				if (0 != error || NULL != vgo) {
					free_vgo(nvgo);
					break;
				}
				/* record shared ownership */
				vgi_add_vgo(vgi, nvgo);
				vng_lbl_set(fg->fg_label, nvgo);
			}
		} while (0);

		lck_rw_unlock_exclusive(&llock);
		vnode_put(vp);
	} while (0);

	fp_drop(p, fd, fp, 0);
	return error;
}

static int
vng_policy_syscall(proc_t p, int cmd, user_addr_t arg)
{
	int error = EINVAL;

	switch (cmd) {
	case VNG_SYSC_PING:
		if (0 == arg)
			error = 0;
		break;
	case VNG_SYSC_SET_GUARD: {
		struct vnguard_set vns;
		error = copyin(arg, (void *)&vns, sizeof (vns));
		if (error)
			break;
		error = vnguard_sysc_setguard(p, &vns);
		break;
	}
	default:
		break;
	}
	return (error);
}

/*
 * This is called just before the fileglob disappears in fg_free().
 * Take the exclusive lock: no other thread can add or remove
 * a vng_info to any vnode in the system.
 */
static void
vng_file_label_destroy(struct label *label)
{
	lck_rw_lock_exclusive(&llock);
	struct vng_owner *lvgo = vng_lbl_get(label);
	if (lvgo) {
		vng_lbl_set(label, 0);
		struct vng_info *vgi = lvgo->vgo_vgi;
		assert(vgi);
		if (vgi_remove_vgo(vgi, lvgo)) {
			/* that was the last reference */
			vgi->vgi_attrs = 0;
			struct fileglob *fg = lvgo->vgo_fg;
			assert(fg);
			if (DTYPE_VNODE == FILEGLOB_DTYPE(fg)) {
				struct vnode *vp = fg->fg_data;
				int error = vnode_getwithref(vp);
				if (0 == error) {
					vng_lbl_set(vp->v_label, 0);
					lck_rw_unlock_exclusive(&llock);
					/* may trigger VNOP_INACTIVE */
					vnode_rele_ext(vp, O_EVTONLY, 0);
					vnode_put(vp);
					free_vgi(vgi);
					free_vgo(lvgo);
					return;
				}
			}
		}
		free_vgo(lvgo);
	}
	lck_rw_unlock_exclusive(&llock);
}

static os_reason_t
vng_reason_from_pathname(const char *path, uint32_t pathlen)
{
	os_reason_t r = os_reason_create(OS_REASON_GUARD, GUARD_REASON_VNODE);
	if (NULL == r)
		return (r);
	/*
	 * If the pathname is very long, just keep the trailing part
	 */
	const uint32_t pathmax = 3 * EXIT_REASON_USER_DESC_MAX_LEN / 4;
	if (pathlen > pathmax) {
		path += (pathlen - pathmax);
		pathlen = pathmax;
	}
	uint32_t rsize = kcdata_estimate_required_buffer_size(1, pathlen);
	if (0 == os_reason_alloc_buffer(r, rsize)) {
		struct kcdata_descriptor *kcd = &r->osr_kcd_descriptor;
		mach_vm_address_t addr;
		if (kcdata_get_memory_addr(kcd,
		    EXIT_REASON_USER_DESC, pathlen, &addr) == KERN_SUCCESS) {
			kcdata_memcpy(kcd, addr, path, pathlen);
			return (r);
		}
	}
	os_reason_free(r);
	return (OS_REASON_NULL);
}

static int vng_policy_flags;

static int
vng_guard_violation(const struct vng_info *vgi,
    unsigned opval, vnode_t vp)
{
	int retval = 0;

	if (vng_policy_flags & kVNG_POLICY_EPERM) {
		/* deny the operation */
		retval = EPERM;
	}

	if (vng_policy_flags & (kVNG_POLICY_LOGMSG|kVNG_POLICY_UPRINTMSG)) {
		/* log a message */
		const char *op;
		switch (opval) {
		case VNG_RENAME_FROM:
			op = "rename-from";
			break;
		case VNG_RENAME_TO:
			op = "rename-to";
			break;
		case VNG_UNLINK:
			op = "unlink";
			break;
		case VNG_LINK:
			op = "link";
			break;
		case VNG_EXCHDATA:
			op = "exchdata";
			break;
		case VNG_WRITE_OTHER:
			op = "write";
			break;
		case VNG_TRUNC_OTHER:
			op = "truncate";
			break;
		default:
			op = "(unknown)";
			break;
		}

		const char *nm = vnode_getname(vp);
		proc_t p = current_proc();
		const struct vng_owner *vgo;
		TAILQ_FOREACH(vgo, &vgi->vgi_owners, vgo_link) {
			const char fmt[] =
			    "%s[%d]: %s%s: '%s' guarded by %s[%d] (0x%llx)\n";

			if (vng_policy_flags & kVNG_POLICY_LOGMSG) {
				printf(fmt,
				    proc_name_address(p), proc_pid(p), op,
				    0 != retval ? " denied" : "",
				    NULL != nm ? nm : "(unknown)",
				    proc_name_address(vgo->vgo_p),
				    proc_pid(vgo->vgo_p), vgi->vgi_guard);
			}
			if (vng_policy_flags & kVNG_POLICY_UPRINTMSG) {
				uprintf(fmt,
				    proc_name_address(p), proc_pid(p), op,
				    0 != retval ? " denied" : "",
				    NULL != nm ? nm : "(unknown)",
				    proc_name_address(vgo->vgo_p),
				    proc_pid(vgo->vgo_p), vgi->vgi_guard);
			}
		}
		if (NULL != nm)
			vnode_putname(nm);
	}

	if (vng_policy_flags & (kVNG_POLICY_EXC|kVNG_POLICY_EXC_CORPSE)) {
		/* EXC_GUARD exception */
		const struct vng_owner *vgo = TAILQ_FIRST(&vgi->vgi_owners);
		pid_t pid = vgo ? proc_pid(vgo->vgo_p) : 0;
		mach_exception_code_t code;
		mach_exception_subcode_t subcode;

		code = 0;
		EXC_GUARD_ENCODE_TYPE(code, GUARD_TYPE_VN);
		EXC_GUARD_ENCODE_FLAVOR(code, opval);
		EXC_GUARD_ENCODE_TARGET(code, pid);
		subcode = vgi->vgi_guard;

		if (vng_policy_flags & kVNG_POLICY_EXC_CORPSE) {
			char *path;
			int len = MAXPATHLEN;
			MALLOC(path, char *, len, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
			os_reason_t r = NULL;
			if (NULL != path) {
				vn_getpath(vp, path, &len);
				if (*path && len)
					r = vng_reason_from_pathname(path, len);
			}
			task_violated_guard(code, subcode, r); /* not fatal */
			if (NULL != r)
				os_reason_free(r);
			if (NULL != path)
				FREE(path, M_TEMP);
		} else {
			thread_t t = current_thread();
			thread_guard_violation(t, code, subcode);
		}
	} else if (vng_policy_flags & kVNG_POLICY_SIGKILL) {
		proc_t p = current_proc();
		psignal(p, SIGKILL);
	}

	return (retval);
}

/*
 * A fatal vnode guard was tripped on this thread.
 *
 * (Invoked before returning to userland from the syscall handler.)
 */
void
vn_guard_ast(thread_t __unused t,
    mach_exception_data_type_t code, mach_exception_data_type_t subcode)
{
	task_exception_notify(EXC_GUARD, code, subcode);
	proc_t p = current_proc();
	psignal(p, SIGKILL);
}

/*
 * vnode callbacks
 */

static int
vng_vnode_check_rename(kauth_cred_t __unused cred,
    struct vnode *__unused dvp, struct label *__unused dlabel,
    struct vnode *vp, struct label *label,
    struct componentname *__unused cnp,
    struct vnode *__unused tdvp, struct label *__unused tdlabel,
    struct vnode *tvp, struct label *tlabel,
    struct componentname *__unused tcnp)
{
	int error = 0;
	if (NULL != label || NULL != tlabel) {
		lck_rw_lock_shared(&llock);
		const struct vng_info *vgi =
		    vng_lbl_get_withattr(label, VNG_RENAME_FROM);
		if (NULL != vgi)
			error = vng_guard_violation(vgi, VNG_RENAME_FROM, vp);
		if (0 == error) {
			vgi = vng_lbl_get_withattr(tlabel, VNG_RENAME_TO);
			if (NULL != vgi)
				error = vng_guard_violation(vgi,
				    VNG_RENAME_TO, tvp);
		}
		lck_rw_unlock_shared(&llock);
	}
	return (error);
}

static int
vng_vnode_check_link(kauth_cred_t __unused cred,
    struct vnode *__unused dvp, struct label *__unused dlabel,
    struct vnode *vp, struct label *label, struct componentname *__unused cnp)
{
	int error = 0;
	if (NULL != label) {
		lck_rw_lock_shared(&llock);
		const struct vng_info *vgi =
			vng_lbl_get_withattr(label, VNG_LINK);
		if (vgi)
			error = vng_guard_violation(vgi, VNG_LINK, vp);
		lck_rw_unlock_shared(&llock);
	}
	return (error);
}

static int
vng_vnode_check_unlink(kauth_cred_t __unused cred,
    struct vnode *__unused dvp, struct label *__unused dlabel,
    struct vnode *vp, struct label *label, struct componentname *__unused cnp)
{
	int error = 0;
	if (NULL != label) {
		lck_rw_lock_shared(&llock);
		const struct vng_info *vgi =
		    vng_lbl_get_withattr(label, VNG_UNLINK);
		if (vgi)
			error = vng_guard_violation(vgi, VNG_UNLINK, vp);
		lck_rw_unlock_shared(&llock);
	}
	return (error);
}

/*
 * Only check violations for writes performed by "other processes"
 */
static int
vng_vnode_check_write(kauth_cred_t __unused actv_cred,
    kauth_cred_t __unused file_cred, struct vnode *vp, struct label *label)
{
	int error = 0;
	if (NULL != label) {
		lck_rw_lock_shared(&llock);
		const struct vng_info *vgi =
		    vng_lbl_get_withattr(label, VNG_WRITE_OTHER);
		if (vgi) {
			proc_t p = current_proc();
			const struct vng_owner *vgo;
			TAILQ_FOREACH(vgo, &vgi->vgi_owners, vgo_link) {
				if (vgo->vgo_p == p)
					goto done;
			}
			error = vng_guard_violation(vgi, VNG_WRITE_OTHER, vp);
		}
	done:
		lck_rw_unlock_shared(&llock);
	}
	return (error);
}

/*
 * Only check violations for truncates performed by "other processes"
 */
static int
vng_vnode_check_truncate(kauth_cred_t __unused actv_cred,
    kauth_cred_t __unused file_cred, struct vnode *vp,
    struct label *label)
{
	int error = 0;
	if (NULL != label) {
		lck_rw_lock_shared(&llock);
		const struct vng_info *vgi =
		    vng_lbl_get_withattr(label, VNG_TRUNC_OTHER);
		if (vgi) {
			proc_t p = current_proc();
			const struct vng_owner *vgo;
			TAILQ_FOREACH(vgo, &vgi->vgi_owners, vgo_link) {
				if (vgo->vgo_p == p)
					goto done;
			}
			error = vng_guard_violation(vgi, VNG_TRUNC_OTHER, vp);
		}
	done:
		lck_rw_unlock_shared(&llock);
	}
	return error;
}

static int
vng_vnode_check_exchangedata(kauth_cred_t __unused cred,
    struct vnode *fvp, struct label *flabel,
    struct vnode *svp, struct label *slabel)
{
	int error = 0;
	if (NULL != flabel || NULL != slabel) {
		lck_rw_lock_shared(&llock);
		const struct vng_info *vgi =
			vng_lbl_get_withattr(flabel, VNG_EXCHDATA);
		if (NULL != vgi)
			error = vng_guard_violation(vgi, VNG_EXCHDATA, fvp);
		if (0 == error) {
			vgi = vng_lbl_get_withattr(slabel, VNG_EXCHDATA);
			if (NULL != vgi)
				error = vng_guard_violation(vgi,
				    VNG_EXCHDATA, svp);
		}
		lck_rw_unlock_shared(&llock);
	}
	return (error);
}

/* Intercept open-time truncations (by "other") of a guarded vnode */

static int
vng_vnode_check_open(kauth_cred_t cred,
    struct vnode *vp, struct label *label, int acc_mode)
{
	if (0 == (acc_mode & O_TRUNC))
		return (0);
	return (vng_vnode_check_truncate(cred, NULL, vp, label));
}

/*
 * Configuration gorp
 */

static void
vng_init(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc)
{
	llock_grp = lck_grp_alloc_init(mpc->mpc_name, LCK_GRP_ATTR_NULL);
	lck_rw_init(&llock, llock_grp, LCK_ATTR_NULL);
}

SECURITY_READ_ONLY_EARLY(static struct mac_policy_ops) vng_policy_ops = {
	.mpo_file_label_destroy = vng_file_label_destroy,

	.mpo_vnode_check_link = vng_vnode_check_link,
	.mpo_vnode_check_unlink = vng_vnode_check_unlink,
	.mpo_vnode_check_rename = vng_vnode_check_rename,
	.mpo_vnode_check_write = vng_vnode_check_write,
	.mpo_vnode_check_truncate = vng_vnode_check_truncate,
	.mpo_vnode_check_exchangedata = vng_vnode_check_exchangedata,
	.mpo_vnode_check_open = vng_vnode_check_open,

	.mpo_policy_syscall = vng_policy_syscall,
	.mpo_policy_init = vng_init,
};

static const char *vng_labelnames[] = {
	"vnguard",
};

#define ACOUNT(arr) ((unsigned)(sizeof (arr) / sizeof (arr[0])))

SECURITY_READ_ONLY_LATE(static struct mac_policy_conf) vng_policy_conf = {
	.mpc_name = VNG_POLICY_NAME,
	.mpc_fullname = "Guarded vnode policy",
	.mpc_field_off = &label_slot,
	.mpc_labelnames = vng_labelnames,
	.mpc_labelname_count = ACOUNT(vng_labelnames),
	.mpc_ops = &vng_policy_ops,
	.mpc_loadtime_flags = 0,
	.mpc_runtime_flags = 0
};

static mac_policy_handle_t vng_policy_handle;

void
vnguard_policy_init(void)
{
	if (0 == PE_i_can_has_debugger(NULL))
		return;
	vng_policy_flags = kVNG_POLICY_LOGMSG |
		kVNG_POLICY_EXC_CORPSE | kVNG_POLICY_UPRINTMSG;
	PE_parse_boot_argn("vnguard", &vng_policy_flags, sizeof (vng_policy_flags));
	if (vng_policy_flags)
		mac_policy_register(&vng_policy_conf, &vng_policy_handle, NULL);
}

#if DEBUG || DEVELOPMENT
#include <sys/sysctl.h>

SYSCTL_DECL(_kern_vnguard);
SYSCTL_NODE(_kern, OID_AUTO, vnguard, CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_LOCKED, 0, "vnguard");
SYSCTL_INT(_kern_vnguard, OID_AUTO, flags, CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_LOCKED,
	   &vng_policy_flags, 0, "vnguard policy flags");
#endif

#endif /* CONFIG_MACF && CONFIG_VNGUARD */