/*
- * Copyright (c) 2003-2004 Apple Computer, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2003-2004,2008-2009 Apple Inc. All Rights Reserved.
*
* @APPLE_LICENSE_HEADER_START@
*
#include <Security/AuthorizationDB.h>
#include <Security/AuthorizationPriv.h>
#include <security_utilities/logging.h>
-#include <security_utilities/ccaudit.h>
#include <bsm/audit_uevents.h>
+#include "ccaudit_extensions.h"
#include "authority.h"
#include "server.h"
#include "process.h"
#include "agentquery.h"
#include "AuthorizationMechEval.h"
+#include <asl.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <grp.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <membershipPriv.h>
}
+using namespace CommonCriteria::Securityd;
+
//
// Rule class
//
CFStringRef RuleImpl::kSessionOwnerID = CFSTR(kAuthorizationRuleParameterCredentialSessionOwner);
CFStringRef RuleImpl::kKofNID = CFSTR(kAuthorizationRuleParameterKofN);
CFStringRef RuleImpl::kPromptID = CFSTR(kAuthorizationRuleParameterDefaultPrompt);
+CFStringRef RuleImpl::kButtonID = CFSTR(kAuthorizationRuleParameterDefaultButton);
CFStringRef RuleImpl::kTriesID = CFSTR("tries"); // XXX/cs move to AuthorizationTagsPriv.h
+CFStringRef RuleImpl::kExtractPasswordID = CFSTR(kAuthorizationRuleParameterExtractPassword);
CFStringRef RuleImpl::kRuleClassID = CFSTR(kAuthorizationRuleClass);
CFStringRef RuleImpl::kRuleAllowID = CFSTR(kAuthorizationRuleClassAllow);
string
-RuleImpl::Attribute::getString(CFDictionaryRef config, CFStringRef key, bool required = false, char *defaultValue = "")
+RuleImpl::Attribute::getString(CFDictionaryRef config, CFStringRef key, bool required = false, const char *defaultValue = "")
{
CFTypeRef value = CFDictionaryGetValue(config, key);
if (value && (CFGetTypeID(value) == CFStringGetTypeID()))
if (CFStringGetCString(stringValue, buffer, sizeof(buffer), kCFStringEncodingUTF8))
ptr = buffer;
else
- MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal); // XXX/cs invalid rule
+ {
+ Syslog::alert("Could not convert CFString to C string");
+ MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal);
+ }
}
return string(ptr);
if (!required)
return string(defaultValue);
else
- MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal); // XXX/cs invalid rule
+ {
+ Syslog::alert("Failed to get rule string");
+ MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal);
+ }
}
double
if (!required)
return defaultValue;
else
- MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal); // XXX/cs invalid rule
+ {
+ Syslog::alert("Failed to get rule double value");
+ MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal);
+ }
return doubleValue;
}
if (!required)
return defaultValue;
else
- MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal); // XXX/cs invalid rule
+ {
+ Syslog::alert("Failed to get rule bool value");
+ MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal);
+ }
return boolValue;
}
{
CFArrayRef evalArray = reinterpret_cast<CFArrayRef>(value);
- for (int index=0; index < CFArrayGetCount(evalArray); index++)
+ CFIndex numItems = CFArrayGetCount(evalArray);
+ for (CFIndex index=0; index < numItems; index++)
{
CFTypeRef arrayValue = CFArrayGetValueAtIndex(evalArray, index);
if (arrayValue && (CFGetTypeID(arrayValue) == CFStringGetTypeID()))
if (CFStringGetCString(stringValue, buffer, sizeof(buffer), kCFStringEncodingUTF8))
ptr = buffer;
else
- MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal); // XXX/cs invalid rule
+ {
+ Syslog::alert("Failed to convert CFString to C string for item %u in array", index);
+ MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal);
+ }
}
valueArray.push_back(string(ptr));
}
}
else
if (required)
- MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal); // XXX/cs invalid rule
+ {
+ Syslog::alert("Value for key either not present or not a CFArray");
+ MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal);
+ }
return valueArray;
}
-bool RuleImpl::Attribute::getLocalizedPrompts(CFDictionaryRef config, map<string,string> &localizedPrompts)
+bool RuleImpl::Attribute::getLocalizedText(CFDictionaryRef config, map<string,string> &localizedPrompts, CFStringRef dictKey, const char *descriptionKey)
{
CFIndex numberOfPrompts = 0;
CFDictionaryRef promptsDict;
- if (CFDictionaryContainsKey(config, kPromptID))
+ if (CFDictionaryContainsKey(config, dictKey))
{
- promptsDict = reinterpret_cast<CFDictionaryRef>(CFDictionaryGetValue(config, kPromptID));
+ promptsDict = reinterpret_cast<CFDictionaryRef>(CFDictionaryGetValue(config, dictKey));
if (promptsDict && (CFGetTypeID(promptsDict) == CFDictionaryGetTypeID()))
numberOfPrompts = CFDictionaryGetCount(promptsDict);
}
{
CFStringRef keyRef = reinterpret_cast<CFStringRef>(keys[numberOfPrompts]);
CFStringRef valueRef = reinterpret_cast<CFStringRef>(values[numberOfPrompts]);
- if (!keyRef || (CFGetTypeID(keyRef) != CFStringGetTypeID()))
+ if (!keyRef || (CFGetTypeID(keyRef) != CFStringGetTypeID())) {
continue;
- if (!valueRef || (CFGetTypeID(valueRef) != CFStringGetTypeID()))
+ }
+ if (!valueRef || (CFGetTypeID(valueRef) != CFStringGetTypeID())) {
continue;
+ }
string key = cfString(keyRef);
string value = cfString(valueRef);
- localizedPrompts[kAuthorizationRuleParameterDescription+key] = value;
+ localizedPrompts[descriptionKey + key] = value;
}
return true;
// default rule
RuleImpl::RuleImpl() :
-mType(kUser), mGroupName("admin"), mMaxCredentialAge(300.0), mShared(true), mAllowRoot(false), mSessionOwner(false), mTries(0), mAuthenticateUser(true)
+mType(kUser), mGroupName("admin"), mMaxCredentialAge(300.0), mShared(true), mAllowRoot(false), mSessionOwner(false), mTries(0), mAuthenticateUser(true), mExtractPassword(false)
{
// XXX/cs read default descriptions from somewhere
// @@@ Default rule is shared admin group with 5 minute timeout
}
// return rule built from rule definition; throw if invalid.
-RuleImpl::RuleImpl(const string &inRightName, CFDictionaryRef cfRight, CFDictionaryRef cfRules) : mRightName(inRightName)
+RuleImpl::RuleImpl(const string &inRightName, CFDictionaryRef cfRight, CFDictionaryRef cfRules) : mRightName(inRightName), mExtractPassword(false)
{
// @@@ make sure cfRight is non mutable and never used that way
if (CFGetTypeID(cfRight) != CFDictionaryGetTypeID())
- MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal); // XXX/cs invalid rule
+ {
+ Syslog::alert("Invalid rights set");
+ MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal);
+ }
mTries = 0;
if (cfRuleDef && CFGetTypeID(cfRuleDef) == CFDictionaryGetTypeID())
mEvalDef = Attribute::getVector(cfRuleDef, kMechanismsID);
}
- mTries = int(Attribute::getDouble(cfRight, kTriesID, false, 3.0)); // XXX/cs double(kAuthorizationMaxTries)
+ mTries = int(Attribute::getDouble(cfRight, kTriesID, false, double(kMaximumAuthorizationTries)));
mAuthenticateUser = Attribute::getBool(cfRight, kRuleAuthenticateUserID, false, true);
+ mExtractPassword = Attribute::getBool(cfRight, kExtractPasswordID, false, false);
secdebug("authrule", "%s : rule user in group \"%s\" timeout %g%s%s",
inRightName.c_str(),
mEvalDef = Attribute::getVector(cfRight, kMechanismsID, true);
mTries = int(Attribute::getDouble(cfRight, kTriesID, false, 0.0)); // "forever"
mShared = Attribute::getBool(cfRight, kSharedID, false, true);
+ mExtractPassword = Attribute::getBool(cfRight, kExtractPasswordID, false, false);
}
else if (classTag == kAuthorizationRightRule)
{
if (ruleDefRef)
CFRelease(ruleDefRef);
if (!cfRuleDef || CFGetTypeID(cfRuleDef) != CFDictionaryGetTypeID())
- MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal); // XXX/cs invalid rule
+ {
+ Syslog::alert("'%s' does not name a built-in rule", ruleDefString.c_str());
+ MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal);
+ }
mRuleDef.push_back(Rule(ruleDefString, cfRuleDef, cfRules));
}
else // array
if (ruleNameRef)
CFRelease(ruleNameRef);
if (!cfRuleDef || (CFGetTypeID(cfRuleDef) != CFDictionaryGetTypeID()))
- MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal); // XXX/cs invalid rule
+ {
+ Syslog::alert("Invalid rule '%s'in rule set", it->c_str());
+ MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal);
+ }
mRuleDef.push_back(Rule(*it, cfRuleDef, cfRules));
}
}
}
else
{
- secdebug("authrule", "%s : rule class unknown %s.", inRightName.c_str(), classTag.c_str());
- MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal); // XXX/cs invalid rule
+ secdebug("authrule", "%s : rule class '%s' unknown.", inRightName.c_str(), classTag.c_str());
+ Syslog::alert("%s : rule class '%s' unknown", inRightName.c_str(), classTag.c_str());
+ MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal);
}
}
else
if (ruleNameRef)
CFRelease(ruleNameRef);
if (!cfRuleDef || CFGetTypeID(cfRuleDef) != CFDictionaryGetTypeID())
- MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal); // XXX/cs invalid rule
+ {
+ Syslog::alert("Rule '%s' for right '%s' does not exist or is not properly formed", ruleName.c_str(), inRightName.c_str());
+ MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal);
+ }
mRuleDef.push_back(Rule(ruleName, cfRuleDef, cfRules));
}
- Attribute::getLocalizedPrompts(cfRight, mLocalizedPrompts);
+ Attribute::getLocalizedText(cfRight, mLocalizedPrompts, kPromptID, kAuthorizationRuleParameterDescription);
+ Attribute::getLocalizedText(cfRight, mLocalizedButtons, kButtonID, kAuthorizationRuleParameterButton);
}
/*
environmentToClient.erase(AuthItemRef(AGENT_HINT_CREATOR_PID));
environmentToClient.insert(AuthItemRef(AGENT_HINT_CREATOR_PID, AuthValueOverlay(sizeof(pid_t), &creatorPid)));
+ audit_token_t creatorAuditToken = auth.creatorAuditToken().auditToken();
+ environmentToClient.erase(AuthItemRef(AGENT_HINT_CREATOR_AUDIT_TOKEN));
+ environmentToClient.insert(AuthItemRef(AGENT_HINT_CREATOR_AUDIT_TOKEN, AuthValueOverlay(sizeof(audit_token_t), &creatorAuditToken)));
+
Process &thisProcess = Server::process();
string bundlePath;
if (SecStaticCodeRef clientCode = auth.creatorCode())
environmentToClient.insert(processHints.begin(), processHints.end());
map<string,string> defaultPrompts = inTopLevelRule->localizedPrompts();
+ map<string,string> defaultButtons = inTopLevelRule->localizedButtons();
if (defaultPrompts.empty())
defaultPrompts = localizedPrompts();
+ if (defaultButtons.empty())
+ defaultButtons = localizedButtons();
if (!defaultPrompts.empty())
{
environmentToClient.insert(AuthItemRef(key.c_str(), AuthValueOverlay(value)));
}
}
+ if (!defaultButtons.empty())
+ {
+ map<string,string>::const_iterator it;
+ for (it = defaultButtons.begin(); it != defaultButtons.end(); it++)
+ {
+ const string &key = it->first;
+ const string &value = it->second;
+ environmentToClient.insert(AuthItemRef(key.c_str(), AuthValueOverlay(value)));
+ }
+ }
// add rulename as a hint
string ruleName = name();
// we'll run that and validate the credentials from there.
// we fall back on a default configuration from the authenticate rule
OSStatus
-RuleImpl::evaluateAuthentication(const AuthItemRef &inRight, const Rule &inRule,AuthItemSet &environmentToClient, AuthorizationFlags flags, CFAbsoluteTime now, const CredentialSet *inCredentials, CredentialSet &credentials, AuthorizationToken &auth) const
+RuleImpl::evaluateAuthentication(const AuthItemRef &inRight, const Rule &inRule,AuthItemSet &environmentToClient, AuthorizationFlags flags, CFAbsoluteTime now, const CredentialSet *inCredentials, CredentialSet &credentials, AuthorizationToken &auth, SecurityAgent::Reason &reason, bool savePassword) const
{
OSStatus status = errAuthorizationDenied;
Credential hintCredential;
- if (errAuthorizationSuccess == evaluateSessionOwner(inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, now, auth, hintCredential)) {
+ if (errAuthorizationSuccess == evaluateSessionOwner(inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, now, auth, hintCredential, reason)) {
if (hintCredential->name().length())
environmentToClient.insert(AuthItemRef(AGENT_HINT_SUGGESTED_USER, AuthValueOverlay(hintCredential->name())));
if (hintCredential->realname().length())
environmentToClient.insert(AuthItemRef(AGENT_HINT_REQUIRE_USER_IN_GROUP, AuthValueOverlay(mGroupName)));
uint32 tries;
- SecurityAgent::Reason reason = SecurityAgent::noReason;
+ reason = SecurityAgent::noReason;
Process &cltProc = Server::process();
// Authorization preserves creator's UID in setuid processes
+ // (which is nice, but cltUid ends up being unused except by the debug
+ // message -- AgentMechanismEvaluator ignores it)
uid_t cltUid = (cltProc.uid() != 0) ? cltProc.uid() : auth.creatorUid();
secdebug("AuthEvalMech", "Mechanism invocation by process %d (UID %d)", cltProc.pid(), cltUid);
+ // For auditing within AuthorizationMechEval, pass the right name.
+ size_t rightNameSize = inRight->name() ? strlen(inRight->name()) : 0;
+ AuthorizationString rightName = inRight->name() ? inRight->name() : "";
+ // @@@ AuthValueRef's ctor ought to take a const void *
+ AuthValueRef rightValue(rightNameSize, const_cast<char *>(rightName));
+ AuthValueVector authValueVector;
+ authValueVector.push_back(rightValue);
+
+ RightAuthenticationLogger rightAuthLogger(auth.creatorAuditToken(), AUE_ssauthint);
+ rightAuthLogger.setRight(rightName);
+
+ // Just succeed for a continuously active session owner.
+ if (auth.session().originatorUid() == auth.creatorUid() && auth.session().attributes() & AU_SESSION_FLAG_HAS_AUTHENTICATED) {
+ secdebug("AuthEvalMech", "We are an active session owner.");
+ aslmsg m = asl_new(ASL_TYPE_MSG);
+ asl_set(m, "com.apple.message.domain", "com.apple.securityd.UserActivity");
+ asl_set(m, "com.apple.message.signature", "userIsActive");
+ asl_set(m, "com.apple.message.signature2", rightName);
+ asl_set(m, "com.apple.message.result", "failure");
+ asl_log(NULL, m, ASL_LEVEL_NOTICE, "We are an active session owner.");
+ asl_free(m);
+// Credential rightCredential(rightName, auth.creatorUid(), mShared);
+// credentials.erase(rightCredential); credentials.insert(rightCredential);
+// return errAuthorizationSuccess;
+ }
+ else {
+ secdebug("AuthEvalMech", "We are not an active session owner.");
+ aslmsg m = asl_new(ASL_TYPE_MSG);
+ asl_set(m, "com.apple.message.domain", "com.apple.securityd.UserActivity");
+ asl_set(m, "com.apple.message.signature", "userIsNotActive");
+ asl_set(m, "com.apple.message.signature2", rightName);
+ asl_set(m, "com.apple.message.result", "success");
+ asl_log(NULL, m, ASL_LEVEL_NOTICE, "We are not an active session owner.");
+ asl_free(m);
+ }
+
AgentMechanismEvaluator eval(cltUid, auth.session(), mEvalDef);
for (tries = 0; tries < mTries; tries++)
AuthItemRef triesHint(AGENT_HINT_TRIES, AuthValueOverlay(sizeof(tries), &tries));
environmentToClient.erase(triesHint); environmentToClient.insert(triesHint); // replace
- status = eval.run(AuthValueVector(), environmentToClient, auth);
-
- if ((status == errAuthorizationSuccess) ||
- (status == errAuthorizationCanceled)) // @@@ can only pass back sideband through context
- {
- secdebug("AuthEvalMech", "storing new context for authorization");
- auth.setInfoSet(eval.context());
- }
-
- // successfully ran mechanisms to obtain credential
- if (status == errAuthorizationSuccess)
- {
- // deny is the default
- status = errAuthorizationDenied;
-
- CredentialSet newCredentials = makeCredentials(auth);
- // clear context after extracting credentials
- auth.scrubInfoSet();
-
- CommonCriteria::AuditRecord auditrec(auth.creatorAuditToken());
- for (CredentialSet::const_iterator it = newCredentials.begin(); it != newCredentials.end(); ++it)
- {
- const Credential& newCredential = *it;
-
- // @@@ we log the uid a process was running under when it created the authref, which is misleading in the case of loginwindow
- if (newCredential->isValid()) {
- Syslog::info("uid %lu succeeded authenticating as user %s (uid %lu) for right %s.", auth.creatorUid(), newCredential->name().c_str(), newCredential->uid(), inRight->name());
- auditrec.submit(AUE_ssauthint, CommonCriteria::errNone, inRight->name());
- } else {
- // we can't be sure that the user actually exists so inhibit logging of uid
- Syslog::error("uid %lu failed to authenticate as user %s for right %s.", auth.creatorUid(), newCredential->name().c_str(), inRight->name());
- auditrec.submit(AUE_ssauthint, CommonCriteria::errInvalidCredential, inRight->name());
- }
-
- if (!newCredential->isValid())
- {
- reason = SecurityAgent::invalidPassphrase; //invalidPassphrase;
- continue;
- }
-
- // verify that this credential authorizes right
- status = evaluateUserCredentialForRight(auth, inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, now, newCredential, true);
-
- if (status == errAuthorizationSuccess)
- {
- if (auth.operatesAsLeastPrivileged()) {
- Credential rightCredential(inRight->name(), mShared);
- credentials.erase(rightCredential); credentials.insert(rightCredential);
- if (mShared)
- credentials.insert(Credential(inRight->name(), false));
- } else {
- // whack an equivalent credential, so it gets updated to a later achieved credential which must have been more stringent
- credentials.erase(newCredential); credentials.insert(newCredential);
- // just got a new credential - if it's shared also add a non-shared one that to stick in the authorizationref local cache
- if (mShared)
- credentials.insert(Credential(newCredential->uid(), newCredential->name(), newCredential->realname(), false));
- }
-
- // use valid credential to set context info
- // XXX/cs keeping this for now, such that the uid is passed back
- auth.setCredentialInfo(newCredential);
- secdebug("SSevalMech", "added valid credential for user %s", newCredential->name().c_str());
- status = errAuthorizationSuccess;
- break;
- }
- else
- reason = SecurityAgent::userNotInGroup; //unacceptableUser; // userNotInGroup
- }
+ status = eval.run(authValueVector, environmentToClient, auth);
+
+ if ((status == errAuthorizationSuccess) ||
+ (status == errAuthorizationCanceled)) // @@@ can only pass back sideband through context
+ {
+ secdebug("AuthEvalMech", "storing new context for authorization");
+ auth.setInfoSet(eval.context(), savePassword);
+ }
+
+ // successfully ran mechanisms to obtain credential
+ if (status == errAuthorizationSuccess)
+ {
+ // deny is the default
+ status = errAuthorizationDenied;
+
+ CredentialSet newCredentials = makeCredentials(auth);
+ // clear context after extracting credentials
+ auth.scrubInfoSet(savePassword);
+
+ for (CredentialSet::const_iterator it = newCredentials.begin(); it != newCredentials.end(); ++it)
+ {
+ const Credential& newCredential = *it;
+
+ // @@@ we log the uid a process was running under when it created the authref, which is misleading in the case of loginwindow
+ if (newCredential->isValid()) {
+ Syslog::info("UID %u authenticated as user %s (UID %u) for right '%s'", auth.creatorUid(), newCredential->name().c_str(), newCredential->uid(), rightName);
+ rightAuthLogger.logSuccess(auth.creatorUid(), newCredential->uid(), newCredential->name().c_str());
+ } else {
+ // we can't be sure that the user actually exists so inhibit logging of uid
+ Syslog::error("UID %u failed to authenticate as user '%s' for right '%s'", auth.creatorUid(), newCredential->name().c_str(), rightName);
+ rightAuthLogger.logFailure(auth.creatorUid(), newCredential->name().c_str());
+ }
+
+ if (!newCredential->isValid())
+ {
+ reason = SecurityAgent::invalidPassphrase;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ // verify that this credential authorizes right
+ status = evaluateUserCredentialForRight(auth, inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, now, newCredential, true, reason);
+
+ if (status == errAuthorizationSuccess)
+ {
+ if (auth.operatesAsLeastPrivileged()) {
+ Credential rightCredential(rightName, mShared);
+ credentials.erase(rightCredential); credentials.insert(rightCredential);
+ if (mShared)
+ credentials.insert(Credential(rightName, false));
+ }
+
+ // whack an equivalent credential, so it gets updated to a later achieved credential which must have been more stringent
+ credentials.erase(newCredential); credentials.insert(newCredential);
+ // just got a new credential - if it's shared also add a non-shared one that to stick in the authorizationref local cache
+ if (mShared)
+ credentials.insert(Credential(newCredential->uid(), newCredential->name(), newCredential->realname(), false));
+
+ // use valid credential to set context info
+ // XXX/cs keeping this for now, such that the uid is passed back
+ auth.setCredentialInfo(newCredential, savePassword);
+ secdebug("SSevalMech", "added valid credential for user %s", newCredential->name().c_str());
+ // set the sessionHasAuthenticated
+ if (newCredential->uid() == auth.session().originatorUid()) {
+ secdebug("AuthEvalMech", "We authenticated as the session owner.\n");
+ SessionAttributeBits flags = auth.session().attributes();
+ flags |= AU_SESSION_FLAG_HAS_AUTHENTICATED;
+ auth.session().setAttributes(flags);
+ }
+
+ status = errAuthorizationSuccess;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
if (status == errAuthorizationSuccess)
break;
}
else
- if ((status == errAuthorizationCanceled) ||
- (status == errAuthorizationInternal))
+ if ((status == errAuthorizationCanceled) || (status == errAuthorizationInternal))
{
- auth.scrubInfoSet();
+ auth.scrubInfoSet(false);
break;
}
else // last mechanism is now authentication - fail
if (status == errAuthorizationDenied)
reason = SecurityAgent::invalidPassphrase;
-}
+ }
// If we fell out of the loop because of too many tries, notify user
if (tries == mTries)
environmentToClient.erase(retryHint); environmentToClient.insert(retryHint); // replace
AuthItemRef triesHint(AGENT_HINT_TRIES, AuthValueOverlay(sizeof(tries), &tries));
environmentToClient.erase(triesHint); environmentToClient.insert(triesHint); // replace
- eval.run(AuthValueVector(), environmentToClient, auth);
+ eval.run(AuthValueVector(), environmentToClient, auth);
// XXX/cs is this still necessary?
- auth.scrubInfoSet();
+ auth.scrubInfoSet(false);
- CommonCriteria::AuditRecord auditrec(auth.creatorAuditToken());
- auditrec.submit(AUE_ssauthorize, CommonCriteria::errTooManyTries, inRight->name());
+ rightAuthLogger.logFailure(NULL, CommonCriteria::errTooManyTries);
}
return status;
// evaluate whether a good credential of the current session owner would authorize a right
OSStatus
-RuleImpl::evaluateSessionOwner(const AuthItemRef &inRight, const Rule &inRule, const AuthItemSet &environment, const CFAbsoluteTime now, const AuthorizationToken &auth, Credential &credential) const
+RuleImpl::evaluateSessionOwner(const AuthItemRef &inRight, const Rule &inRule, const AuthItemSet &environment, const CFAbsoluteTime now, const AuthorizationToken &auth, Credential &credential, SecurityAgent::Reason &reason) const
{
// username hint is taken from the user who created the authorization, unless it's clearly ineligible
// @@@ we have no access to current requester uid here and the process uid is only taken when the authorization is created
// meaning that a process like loginwindow that drops privs later is screwed.
- uid_t uid;
- Session &session = auth.session();
Credential sessionCredential;
- if (session.haveOriginatorUid()) {
- // preflight session credential as if it were a fresh copy
- const Credential &cred = session.originatorCredential();
- sessionCredential = Credential(cred->uid(), cred->name(), cred->realname(), mShared/*ignored*/);
- } else {
- uid = auth.creatorUid();
- Server::active().longTermActivity();
- struct passwd *pw = getpwuid(uid);
- if (pw != NULL) {
- // avoid hinting a locked account
- if ( (pw->pw_passwd == NULL) ||
- strcmp(pw->pw_passwd, "*") ) {
- // Check if username will authorize the request and set username to
- // be used as a hint to the user if so
- secdebug("AuthEvalMech", "preflight credential from current user, result follows:");
- sessionCredential = Credential(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gecos, mShared/*ignored*/);
- } //fi
- endpwent();
- }
+ uid_t uid = auth.session().originatorUid();
+ Server::active().longTermActivity();
+ struct passwd *pw = getpwuid(uid);
+ if (pw != NULL) {
+ // avoid hinting a locked account
+ if ( (pw->pw_passwd == NULL) ||
+ strcmp(pw->pw_passwd, "*") ) {
+ // Check if username will authorize the request and set username to
+ // be used as a hint to the user if so
+ secdebug("AuthEvalMech", "preflight credential from current user, result follows:");
+ sessionCredential = Credential(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gecos, mShared/*ignored*/);
+ } //fi
+ endpwent();
}
- OSStatus status = evaluateUserCredentialForRight(auth, inRight, inRule, environment, now, sessionCredential, true);
+ OSStatus status = evaluateUserCredentialForRight(auth, inRight, inRule, environment, now, sessionCredential, true, reason);
if (errAuthorizationSuccess == status)
credential = sessionCredential;
OSStatus
-RuleImpl::evaluateCredentialForRight(const AuthorizationToken &auth, const AuthItemRef &inRight, const Rule &inRule, const AuthItemSet &environment, CFAbsoluteTime now, const Credential &credential, bool ignoreShared) const
+RuleImpl::evaluateCredentialForRight(const AuthorizationToken &auth, const AuthItemRef &inRight, const Rule &inRule, const AuthItemSet &environment, CFAbsoluteTime now, const Credential &credential, bool ignoreShared, SecurityAgent::Reason &reason) const
{
if (auth.operatesAsLeastPrivileged()) {
- if (credential->isRight() && credential->isValid() && (inRight->name() == credential->name()))
- return errAuthorizationSuccess;
- else
- return errAuthorizationDenied;
+ if (credential->isRight() && credential->isValid() && (inRight->name() == credential->name()))
+ {
+ if (!ignoreShared && !mShared && credential->isShared())
+ {
+ // @@@ no proper SA::Reason
+ reason = SecurityAgent::unknownReason;
+ secdebug("autheval", "shared credential cannot be used, denying right %s", inRight->name());
+ return errAuthorizationDenied;
+ } else {
+ return errAuthorizationSuccess;
+ }
+ } else {
+ // @@@ no proper SA::Reason
+ reason = SecurityAgent::unknownReason;
+ return errAuthorizationDenied;
+ }
} else
- return evaluateUserCredentialForRight(auth, inRight, inRule, environment, now, credential, false);
+ return evaluateUserCredentialForRight(auth, inRight, inRule, environment, now, credential, false, reason);
}
// Return errAuthorizationSuccess if this rule allows access based on the specified credential,
// return errAuthorizationDenied otherwise.
OSStatus
-RuleImpl::evaluateUserCredentialForRight(const AuthorizationToken &auth, const AuthItemRef &inRight, const Rule &inRule, const AuthItemSet &environment, CFAbsoluteTime now, const Credential &credential, bool ignoreShared) const
+RuleImpl::evaluateUserCredentialForRight(const AuthorizationToken &auth, const AuthItemRef &inRight, const Rule &inRule, const AuthItemSet &environment, CFAbsoluteTime now, const Credential &credential, bool ignoreShared, SecurityAgent::Reason &reason) const
{
assert(mType == kUser);
+ // Ideally we'd set the AGENT_HINT_RETRY_REASON hint in this method, but
+ // evaluateAuthentication() overwrites it before
+ // AgentMechanismEvaluator::run(). That's what led to passing "reason"
+ // everywhere, from RuleImpl::evaluate() on down.
+
// Get the username from the credential
const char *user = credential->name().c_str();
- // If the credential is not valid or it's age is more than the allowed maximum age
+ // If the credential is not valid or its age is more than the allowed maximum age
// for a credential, deny.
if (!credential->isValid())
{
+ // @@@ it could be the username, not password, was invalid
+ reason = SecurityAgent::invalidPassphrase;
secdebug("autheval", "credential for user %s is invalid, denying right %s", user, inRight->name());
return errAuthorizationDenied;
}
if (now - credential->creationTime() > mMaxCredentialAge)
{
+ // @@@ no proper SA::Reason
+ reason = SecurityAgent::unknownReason;
secdebug("autheval", "credential for user %s has expired, denying right %s", user, inRight->name());
return errAuthorizationDenied;
}
if (!ignoreShared && !mShared && credential->isShared())
{
+ // @@@ no proper SA::Reason
+ reason = SecurityAgent::unknownReason;
secdebug("autheval", "shared credential for user %s cannot be used, denying right %s", user, inRight->name());
return errAuthorizationDenied;
}
if (mSessionOwner)
{
Session &session = auth.session();
- if (session.haveOriginatorUid())
- {
- uid_t console_user = session.originatorUid();
+ uid_t console_user = session.originatorUid();
- if (credential->uid() == console_user)
- {
- secdebug("autheval", "user %s is session-owner(uid: %d), granting right %s", user, console_user, inRight->name());
- return errAuthorizationSuccess;
- }
+ if (credential->uid() == console_user)
+ {
+ secdebug("autheval", "user %s is session-owner(uid: %d), granting right %s", user, console_user, inRight->name());
+ return errAuthorizationSuccess;
}
- else
- secdebug("autheval", "session-owner check failed.");
+ // set "reason" in this case? not that a proper SA::Reason exists
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ // @@@ no proper SA::Reason
+ reason = SecurityAgent::unknownReason;
+ secdebug("autheval", "session-owner check failed.");
}
if (mGroupName.length())
{
uuid_t group_uuid, user_uuid;
int is_member;
-
+
+ // @@@ it'd be nice to have SA::Reason codes for the failures
+ // associated with the pre-check-membership mbr_*() functions,
+ // but userNotInGroup will do
if (mbr_group_name_to_uuid(groupname, group_uuid))
break;
if (mbr_uid_to_uuid(credential->uid(), user_uuid))
- break;
+ {
+ struct passwd *pwd;
+ if (NULL == (pwd = getpwnam(user)))
+ break;
+ if (mbr_uid_to_uuid(pwd->pw_uid, user_uuid))
+ break;
+ }
if (mbr_check_membership(user_uuid, group_uuid, &is_member))
break;
}
while (0);
-
+
+ reason = SecurityAgent::userNotInGroup;
secdebug("autheval", "user %s is not a member of group %s, denying right %s",
user, groupname, inRight->name());
}
+ else if (mSessionOwner) // rule asks only if user is the session owner
+ {
+ reason = SecurityAgent::unacceptableUser;
+ }
return errAuthorizationDenied;
}
OSStatus
-RuleImpl::evaluateUser(const AuthItemRef &inRight, const Rule &inRule, AuthItemSet &environmentToClient, AuthorizationFlags flags, CFAbsoluteTime now, const CredentialSet *inCredentials, CredentialSet &credentials, AuthorizationToken &auth) const
+RuleImpl::evaluateUser(const AuthItemRef &inRight, const Rule &inRule, AuthItemSet &environmentToClient, AuthorizationFlags flags, CFAbsoluteTime now, const CredentialSet *inCredentials, CredentialSet &credentials, AuthorizationToken &auth, SecurityAgent::Reason &reason, bool savePassword) const
{
- // If we got here, this is a kUser type rule, let's start looking for a
+ // If we got here, this is a kUser type rule, let's start looking for a
// credential that is satisfactory
// Zeroth -- Here is an extra special saucy ugly hack to allow authorizations
// created by a proccess running as root to automatically get a right.
if (mAllowRoot && auth.creatorUid() == 0)
{
+ SECURITYD_AUTH_USER_ALLOWROOT(&auth);
+
secdebug("autheval", "creator of authorization has uid == 0 granting right %s",
inRight->name());
return errAuthorizationSuccess;
if (!mAuthenticateUser)
{
Credential hintCredential;
- OSStatus status = evaluateSessionOwner(inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, now, auth, hintCredential);
+ OSStatus status = evaluateSessionOwner(inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, now, auth, hintCredential, reason);
if (!status)
+ {
+ SECURITYD_AUTH_USER_ALLOWSESSIONOWNER(&auth);
return errAuthorizationSuccess;
+ }
return errAuthorizationDenied;
}
// First -- go though the credentials we either already used or obtained during this authorize operation.
for (CredentialSet::const_iterator it = credentials.begin(); it != credentials.end(); ++it)
{
- // Passed in user credentials are allowed for least privileged mode
+ // Passed-in user credentials are allowed for least-privileged mode
if (auth.operatesAsLeastPrivileged() && !(*it)->isRight() && (*it)->isValid())
{
- OSStatus status = evaluateUserCredentialForRight(auth, inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, now, *it, false);
+ OSStatus status = evaluateUserCredentialForRight(auth, inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, now, *it, false, reason);
if (errAuthorizationSuccess == status) {
Credential rightCredential(inRight->name(), mShared);
credentials.erase(rightCredential); credentials.insert(rightCredential);
}
// if this is least privileged, this will function differently: match credential to requested right
- OSStatus status = evaluateCredentialForRight(auth, inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, now, *it, false);
+ OSStatus status = evaluateCredentialForRight(auth, inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, now, *it, false, reason);
if (status != errAuthorizationDenied) {
// add credential to authinfo
- auth.setCredentialInfo(*it);
+ auth.setCredentialInfo(*it, savePassword);
return status;
}
for (CredentialSet::const_iterator it = inCredentials->begin(); it != inCredentials->end(); ++it)
{
// if this is least privileged, this will function differently: match credential to requested right
- OSStatus status = evaluateCredentialForRight(auth, inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, now, *it, false);
+ OSStatus status = evaluateCredentialForRight(auth, inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, now, *it, false, reason);
if (status == errAuthorizationSuccess)
{
// whack an equivalent credential, so it gets updated to a later achieved credential which must have been more stringent
credentials.erase(*it); credentials.insert(*it);
// add credential to authinfo
- auth.setCredentialInfo(*it);
+ auth.setCredentialInfo(*it, savePassword);
return status;
}
setAgentHints(inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, auth);
- return evaluateAuthentication(inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, flags, now, inCredentials, credentials, auth);
+ return evaluateAuthentication(inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, flags, now, inCredentials, credentials, auth, reason, savePassword);
}
OSStatus
-RuleImpl::evaluateMechanismOnly(const AuthItemRef &inRight, const Rule &inRule, AuthItemSet &environmentToClient, AuthorizationToken &auth, CredentialSet &outCredentials) const
+RuleImpl::evaluateMechanismOnly(const AuthItemRef &inRight, const Rule &inRule, AuthItemSet &environmentToClient, AuthorizationToken &auth, CredentialSet &outCredentials, bool savePassword) const
{
uint32 tries = 0;
OSStatus status;
{
AgentMechanismEvaluator eval(cltUid, auth.session(), mEvalDef);
-
+ // For auditing within AuthorizationMechEval, pass the right name.
+ size_t rightNameSize = inRight->name() ? strlen(inRight->name()) : 0;
+ AuthorizationString rightName = inRight->name() ? inRight->name() : "";
+ // @@@ AuthValueRef's ctor ought to take a const void *
+ AuthValueRef rightValue(rightNameSize, const_cast<char *>(rightName));
+ AuthValueVector authValueVector;
+ authValueVector.push_back(rightValue);
+
do
{
setAgentHints(inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, auth);
AuthItemRef triesHint(AGENT_HINT_TRIES, AuthValueOverlay(sizeof(tries), &tries));
environmentToClient.erase(triesHint); environmentToClient.insert(triesHint); // replace
-
- status = eval.run(AuthValueVector(), environmentToClient, auth);
-
+
+ status = eval.run(authValueVector, environmentToClient, auth);
if ((status == errAuthorizationSuccess) ||
(status == errAuthorizationCanceled)) // @@@ can only pass back sideband through context
{
secdebug("AuthEvalMech", "storing new context for authorization");
- auth.setInfoSet(eval.context());
+ auth.setInfoSet(eval.context(), savePassword);
if (status == errAuthorizationSuccess)
{
+ // (try to) attach the authorizing UID to the least-priv cred
if (auth.operatesAsLeastPrivileged())
- outCredentials.insert(Credential(inRight->name(), mShared));
- else
- outCredentials = makeCredentials(auth);
+ {
+ outCredentials.insert(Credential(rightName, mShared));
+ if (mShared)
+ outCredentials.insert(Credential(rightName, false));
+
+ RightAuthenticationLogger logger(auth.creatorAuditToken(), AUE_ssauthint);
+ logger.setRight(rightName);
+
+ AuthItem *uidItem = eval.context().find(AGENT_CONTEXT_UID);
+ if (uidItem)
+ {
+ uid_t authorizedUid;
+ memcpy(&authorizedUid, uidItem->value().data, sizeof(authorizedUid));
+ secdebug("AuthEvalMech", "generating least-privilege cred for '%s' authorized by UID %u", inRight->name(), authorizedUid);
+ logger.logLeastPrivilege(authorizedUid, true);
+ }
+ else // cltUid is better than nothing
+ {
+ secdebug("AuthEvalMech", "generating least-privilege cred for '%s' with process- or auth-UID %u", inRight->name(), cltUid);
+ logger.logLeastPrivilege(cltUid, false);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (0 == strcmp(rightName, "system.login.console") && NULL == eval.context().find(AGENT_CONTEXT_AUTO_LOGIN)) {
+ secdebug("AuthEvalMech", "We logged in as the session owner.\n");
+ SessionAttributeBits flags = auth.session().attributes();
+ flags |= AU_SESSION_FLAG_HAS_AUTHENTICATED;
+ auth.session().setAttributes(flags);
+ }
+ CredentialSet newCredentials = makeCredentials(auth);
+ outCredentials.insert(newCredentials.begin(), newCredentials.end());
}
}
}
// HACK kill all hosts to free pages for low memory systems
+ // (XXX/gh there should be a #define for this right)
if (name() == "system.login.done")
{
+ // one case where we don't want to mark the agents as "busy"
QueryInvokeMechanism query(securityAgent, auth.session());
query.terminateAgent();
QueryInvokeMechanism query2(privilegedAuthHost, auth.session());
}
OSStatus
-RuleImpl::evaluateRules(const AuthItemRef &inRight, const Rule &inRule, AuthItemSet &environmentToClient, AuthorizationFlags flags, CFAbsoluteTime now, const CredentialSet *inCredentials, CredentialSet &credentials, AuthorizationToken &auth) const
+RuleImpl::evaluateRules(const AuthItemRef &inRight, const Rule &inRule, AuthItemSet &environmentToClient, AuthorizationFlags flags, CFAbsoluteTime now, const CredentialSet *inCredentials, CredentialSet &credentials, AuthorizationToken &auth, SecurityAgent::Reason &reason, bool savePassword) const
{
// line up the rules to try
if (!mRuleDef.size())
return errAuthorizationSuccess;
// get a rule and try it
- status = (*it)->evaluate(inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, flags, now, inCredentials, credentials, auth);
+ status = (*it)->evaluate(inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, flags, now, inCredentials, credentials, auth, reason, savePassword);
// if status is cancel/internal error abort
if ((status == errAuthorizationCanceled) || (status == errAuthorizationInternal))
else
count++;
}
+
+ if ((mType == kKofN) && (status == errAuthorizationSuccess) && (count < mKofN))
+ status = errAuthorizationDenied;
return status; // return the last failure
}
OSStatus
-RuleImpl::evaluate(const AuthItemRef &inRight, const Rule &inRule, AuthItemSet &environmentToClient, AuthorizationFlags flags, CFAbsoluteTime now, const CredentialSet *inCredentials, CredentialSet &credentials, AuthorizationToken &auth) const
+RuleImpl::evaluate(const AuthItemRef &inRight, const Rule &inRule, AuthItemSet &environmentToClient, AuthorizationFlags flags, CFAbsoluteTime now, const CredentialSet *inCredentials, CredentialSet &credentials, AuthorizationToken &auth, SecurityAgent::Reason &reason, bool savePassword) const
{
switch (mType)
{
case kAllow:
- secdebug("autheval", "rule is always allow");
+ SECURITYD_AUTH_ALLOW(&auth, (char *)name().c_str());
return errAuthorizationSuccess;
case kDeny:
- secdebug("autheval", "rule is always deny");
+ SECURITYD_AUTH_DENY(&auth, (char *)name().c_str());
return errAuthorizationDenied;
case kUser:
- secdebug("autheval", "rule is user");
- return evaluateUser(inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, flags, now, inCredentials, credentials, auth);
+ SECURITYD_AUTH_USER(&auth, (char *)name().c_str());
+ return evaluateUser(inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, flags, now, inCredentials, credentials, auth, reason, savePassword);
case kRuleDelegation:
- secdebug("autheval", "rule evaluates rules");
- return evaluateRules(inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, flags, now, inCredentials, credentials, auth);
+ SECURITYD_AUTH_RULES(&auth, (char *)name().c_str());
+ return evaluateRules(inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, flags, now, inCredentials, credentials, auth, reason, savePassword);
case kKofN:
- secdebug("autheval", "rule evaluates k-of-n rules");
- return evaluateRules(inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, flags, now, inCredentials, credentials, auth);
+ SECURITYD_AUTH_KOFN(&auth, (char *)name().c_str());
+ return evaluateRules(inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, flags, now, inCredentials, credentials, auth, reason, savePassword);
case kEvaluateMechanisms:
- secdebug("autheval", "rule evaluates mechanisms");
- return evaluateMechanismOnly(inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, auth, credentials);
+ SECURITYD_AUTH_MECHRULE(&auth, (char *)name().c_str());
+ // if we had a SecurityAgent::Reason code for "mechanism denied,"
+ // it would make sense to pass down "reason"
+ return evaluateMechanismOnly(inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, auth, credentials, savePassword);
default:
- MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal); // XXX/cs invalid rule
+ Syslog::alert("Unrecognized rule type %d", mType);
+ MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal); // invalid rule
}
}
projects / apple / securityd.git / blobdiff