Security-57740.1.18.tar.gz

[apple/security.git] / libsecurity_smime / lib / cmsrecinfo.c

diff --git a/libsecurity_smime/lib/cmsrecinfo.c b/libsecurity_smime/lib/cmsrecinfo.c
index f43e9bf5f919fadb94f67b70b39108ee90b6ca97..eabd5db32aa0c9f65faa456d6af0a9677e1d9bc3 100644 (file)
--- a/libsecurity_smime/lib/cmsrecinfo.c
+++ b/libsecurity_smime/lib/cmsrecinfo.c
@@ -221,6 +221,48 @@ nss_cmsrecipientinfo_create(SecCmsEnvelopedDataRef envd, SecCmsRecipientIDSelect
                                    (void *)rek);
 
        break;
+    case SEC_OID_EC_PUBLIC_KEY:
+        /* ephemeral-static ECDH - issuerAndSN, OriginatorPublicKey only */
+        PORT_Assert(type != SecCmsRecipientIDSubjectKeyID);
+        if (type == SecCmsRecipientIDSubjectKeyID) {
+            rv = SECFailure;
+            break;
+        }
+        /* a key agreement op */
+        ri->recipientInfoType = SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKeyAgree;
+        ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.recipientIdentifier.id.issuerAndSN = CERT_GetCertIssuerAndSN(poolp, cert);
+        if (ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.recipientIdentifier.id.issuerAndSN == NULL) {
+            rv = SECFailure;
+            break;
+        }
+        /* we do not support the case where multiple recipients
+         * share the same KeyAgreeRecipientInfo and have multiple RecipientEncryptedKeys
+         * in this case, we would need to walk all the recipientInfos, take the
+         * ones that do KeyAgreement algorithms and join them, algorithm by algorithm
+         * Then, we'd generate ONE ukm and OriginatorIdentifierOrKey */
+
+        /* force single recipientEncryptedKey for now */
+        if ((rek = SecCmsRecipientEncryptedKeyCreate(poolp)) == NULL) {
+            rv = SECFailure;
+            break;
+        }
+
+        /* hardcoded IssuerSN choice for now */
+        rek->recipientIdentifier.identifierType = SecCmsKeyAgreeRecipientIDIssuerSN;
+        if ((rek->recipientIdentifier.id.issuerAndSN = CERT_GetCertIssuerAndSN(poolp, cert)) == NULL) {
+            rv = SECFailure;
+            break;
+        }
+
+        oiok = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.originatorIdentifierOrKey);
+
+        /* see RFC 3278 3.1.1 */
+        oiok->identifierType = SecCmsOriginatorIDOrKeyOriginatorPublicKey;
+
+        rv = SecCmsArrayAdd(poolp, (void ***)&ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.recipientEncryptedKeys,
+                            (void *)rek);
+
+        break;
     default:
        /* other algorithms not supported yet */
        /* NOTE that we do not support any KEK algorithm */
@@ -467,14 +509,17 @@ SecCmsRecipientInfoWrapBulkKey(SecCmsRecipientInfoRef ri, SecSymmetricKeyRef bul
     OSStatus rv = SECSuccess;
 #if 0
     SecAsn1Item * params = NULL;
+#endif /* 0 */
     SecCmsRecipientEncryptedKey *rek;
     SecCmsOriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oiok;
-#endif /* 0 */
     const SECAlgorithmID *algid;
     SECAlgorithmID freeAlgID;
     PLArenaPool *poolp;
     SecCmsKeyTransRecipientInfoEx *extra = NULL;
     Boolean usesSubjKeyID;
+    uint8_t nullData[2] = {SEC_ASN1_NULL, 0};
+    SECItem nullItem;
+    SecCmsKeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari;
 
     poolp = ri->envelopedData->contentInfo.cmsg->poolp;
     cert = ri->cert;
@@ -576,6 +621,39 @@ SecCmsRecipientInfoWrapBulkKey(SecCmsRecipientInfoRef ri, SecSymmetricKeyRef bul
 
        break;
 #endif /* 0 */
+    case SEC_OID_EC_PUBLIC_KEY:
+        /* These were set up in nss_cmsrecipientinfo_create() */
+        kari = &ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo;
+        rek = kari->recipientEncryptedKeys[0];
+        if (rek == NULL) {
+            rv = SECFailure;
+            break;
+        }
+
+        oiok = &(kari->originatorIdentifierOrKey);
+        PORT_Assert(oiok->identifierType == SecCmsOriginatorIDOrKeyOriginatorPublicKey);
+
+        /*
+         * RFC 3278 3.1.1 says this AlgId must contain NULL params which is contrary to
+         * any other use of the SEC_OID_EC_PUBLIC_KEY OID. So we provide one
+         * explicitly instead of mucking up the login in SECOID_SetAlgorithmID().
+         */
+        nullItem.Data = nullData;
+        nullItem.Length = 2;
+        if (SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(poolp, &oiok->id.originatorPublicKey.algorithmIdentifier,
+                                  SEC_OID_EC_PUBLIC_KEY, &nullItem) != SECSuccess) {
+            rv = SECFailure;
+            break;
+        }
+        /* this will generate a key pair, compute the shared secret, */
+        /* derive a key and ukm for the keyEncAlg out of it, encrypt the bulk key with */
+        /* the keyEncAlg, set encKey, keyEncAlg, publicKey etc. */
+        rv = SecCmsUtilEncryptSymKeyECDH(poolp, cert, bulkkey,
+                                         &rek->encKey,
+                                         &kari->ukm,
+                                         &kari->keyEncAlg,
+                                         &oiok->id.originatorPublicKey.publicKey);
+        break;
     default:
        /* other algorithms not supported yet */
        /* NOTE that we do not support any KEK algorithm */
@@ -591,6 +669,12 @@ SecCmsRecipientInfoWrapBulkKey(SecCmsRecipientInfoRef ri, SecSymmetricKeyRef bul
     return rv;
 }
 
+#ifdef NDEBUG
+#define dprintf(args...)
+#else
+#define dprintf(args...)    fprintf(stderr, args)
+#endif
+
 SecSymmetricKeyRef
 SecCmsRecipientInfoUnwrapBulkKey(SecCmsRecipientInfoRef ri, int subIndex, 
        SecCertificateRef cert, SecPrivateKeyRef privkey, SECOidTag bulkalgtag)
@@ -643,6 +727,22 @@ SecCmsRecipientInfoUnwrapBulkKey(SecCmsRecipientInfoRef ri, int subIndex,
            /* the derive operation has to generate the key using the algorithm in RFC2631 */
            error = SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG;
            break;
+        case SEC_OID_DH_SINGLE_STD_SHA1KDF:
+        {
+            /* ephemeral-static ECDH */
+            SecCmsKeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari = &ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo;
+            SecCmsOriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oiok = &kari->originatorIdentifierOrKey;
+            if(oiok->identifierType != SecCmsOriginatorIDOrKeyOriginatorPublicKey) {
+                dprintf("SEC_OID_EC_PUBLIC_KEY unwrap key: bad oiok.id\n");
+                goto loser;
+            }
+            SecCmsOriginatorPublicKey *opk = &oiok->id.originatorPublicKey;
+            /* FIXME - verify opk->algorithmIdentifier here? */
+            SecAsn1Item senderPubKey = opk->publicKey;
+            SecAsn1Item *ukm = &kari->ukm;
+            bulkkey = SecCmsUtilDecryptSymKeyECDH(privkey, enckey, ukm, encalg, bulkalgtag, &senderPubKey);
+            break;
+        }
        default:
            error = SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG;
            goto loser;