--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003-2010,2012 Apple Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * @APPLE_LICENSE_HEADER_START@
+ *
+ * This file contains Original Code and/or Modifications of Original Code
+ * as defined in and that are subject to the Apple Public Source License
+ * Version 2.0 (the 'License'). You may not use this file except in
+ * compliance with the License. Please obtain a copy of the License at
+ * http://www.opensource.apple.com/apsl/ and read it before using this
+ * file.
+ *
+ * The Original Code and all software distributed under the License are
+ * distributed on an 'AS IS' basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AND APPLE HEREBY DISCLAIMS ALL SUCH WARRANTIES,
+ * INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, QUIET ENJOYMENT OR NON-INFRINGEMENT.
+ * Please see the License for the specific language governing rights and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ *
+ * @APPLE_LICENSE_HEADER_END@
+ *
+ * AuthorizationRule.cpp
+ * Security
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "AuthorizationRule.h"
+#include <Security/AuthorizationTags.h>
+#include <Security/AuthorizationTagsPriv.h>
+#include <Security/AuthorizationDB.h>
+#include <Security/AuthorizationPriv.h>
+#include <security_utilities/logging.h>
+#include <bsm/audit_uevents.h>
+#include "ccaudit_extensions.h"
+#include "authority.h"
+#include "server.h"
+#include "process.h"
+#include "agentquery.h"
+#include "AuthorizationMechEval.h"
+
+#include <asl.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <membership.h>
+
+extern "C" {
+#include <membershipPriv.h>
+}
+
+using namespace CommonCriteria::Securityd;
+
+//
+// Rule class
+//
+namespace Authorization {
+
+CFStringRef RuleImpl::kUserGroupID = CFSTR(kAuthorizationRuleParameterGroup);
+CFStringRef RuleImpl::kTimeoutID = CFSTR(kAuthorizationRuleParameterCredentialTimeout);
+CFStringRef RuleImpl::kSharedID = CFSTR(kAuthorizationRuleParameterCredentialShared);
+CFStringRef RuleImpl::kAllowRootID = CFSTR(kAuthorizationRuleParameterAllowRoot);
+CFStringRef RuleImpl::kMechanismsID = CFSTR(kAuthorizationRuleParameterMechanisms);
+CFStringRef RuleImpl::kSessionOwnerID = CFSTR(kAuthorizationRuleParameterCredentialSessionOwner);
+CFStringRef RuleImpl::kKofNID = CFSTR(kAuthorizationRuleParameterKofN);
+CFStringRef RuleImpl::kPromptID = CFSTR(kAuthorizationRuleParameterDefaultPrompt);
+CFStringRef RuleImpl::kButtonID = CFSTR(kAuthorizationRuleParameterDefaultButton);
+CFStringRef RuleImpl::kTriesID = CFSTR("tries"); // XXX/cs move to AuthorizationTagsPriv.h
+CFStringRef RuleImpl::kExtractPasswordID = CFSTR(kAuthorizationRuleParameterExtractPassword);
+
+CFStringRef RuleImpl::kRuleClassID = CFSTR(kAuthorizationRuleClass);
+CFStringRef RuleImpl::kRuleAllowID = CFSTR(kAuthorizationRuleClassAllow);
+CFStringRef RuleImpl::kRuleDenyID = CFSTR(kAuthorizationRuleClassDeny);
+CFStringRef RuleImpl::kRuleUserID = CFSTR(kAuthorizationRuleClassUser);
+CFStringRef RuleImpl::kRuleDelegateID = CFSTR(kAuthorizationRightRule);
+CFStringRef RuleImpl::kRuleMechanismsID = CFSTR(kAuthorizationRuleClassMechanisms);
+CFStringRef RuleImpl::kRuleAuthenticateUserID = CFSTR(kAuthorizationRuleParameterAuthenticateUser);
+
+
+string
+RuleImpl::Attribute::getString(CFDictionaryRef config, CFStringRef key, bool required = false, const char *defaultValue = "")
+{
+ CFTypeRef value = CFDictionaryGetValue(config, key);
+ if (value && (CFGetTypeID(value) == CFStringGetTypeID()))
+ {
+ CFStringRef stringValue = reinterpret_cast<CFStringRef>(value);
+ char buffer[512];
+ const char *ptr = CFStringGetCStringPtr(stringValue, kCFStringEncodingUTF8);
+ if (ptr == NULL)
+ {
+ if (CFStringGetCString(stringValue, buffer, sizeof(buffer), kCFStringEncodingUTF8))
+ ptr = buffer;
+ else
+ {
+ Syslog::alert("Could not convert CFString to C string");
+ MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return string(ptr);
+ }
+ else
+ if (!required)
+ return string(defaultValue);
+ else
+ {
+ Syslog::alert("Failed to get rule string");
+ MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal);
+ }
+}
+
+double
+RuleImpl::Attribute::getDouble(CFDictionaryRef config, CFStringRef key, bool required = false, double defaultValue = 0.0)
+{
+ double doubleValue = 0;
+
+ CFTypeRef value = CFDictionaryGetValue(config, key);
+ if (value && (CFGetTypeID(value) == CFNumberGetTypeID()))
+ {
+ CFNumberGetValue(reinterpret_cast<CFNumberRef>(value), kCFNumberDoubleType, &doubleValue);
+ }
+ else
+ if (!required)
+ return defaultValue;
+ else
+ {
+ Syslog::alert("Failed to get rule double value");
+ MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal);
+ }
+
+ return doubleValue;
+}
+
+bool
+RuleImpl::Attribute::getBool(CFDictionaryRef config, CFStringRef key, bool required = false, bool defaultValue = false)
+{
+ bool boolValue = false;
+ CFTypeRef value = CFDictionaryGetValue(config, key);
+
+ if (value && (CFGetTypeID(value) == CFBooleanGetTypeID()))
+ {
+ boolValue = CFBooleanGetValue(reinterpret_cast<CFBooleanRef>(value));
+ }
+ else
+ if (!required)
+ return defaultValue;
+ else
+ {
+ Syslog::alert("Failed to get rule bool value");
+ MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal);
+ }
+
+ return boolValue;
+}
+
+vector<string>
+RuleImpl::Attribute::getVector(CFDictionaryRef config, CFStringRef key, bool required = false)
+{
+ vector<string> valueArray;
+
+ CFTypeRef value = CFDictionaryGetValue(config, key);
+ if (value && (CFGetTypeID(value) == CFArrayGetTypeID()))
+ {
+ CFArrayRef evalArray = reinterpret_cast<CFArrayRef>(value);
+
+ CFIndex numItems = CFArrayGetCount(evalArray);
+ for (CFIndex index=0; index < numItems; index++)
+ {
+ CFTypeRef arrayValue = CFArrayGetValueAtIndex(evalArray, index);
+ if (arrayValue && (CFGetTypeID(arrayValue) == CFStringGetTypeID()))
+ {
+ CFStringRef stringValue = reinterpret_cast<CFStringRef>(arrayValue);
+ char buffer[512];
+ const char *ptr = CFStringGetCStringPtr(stringValue, kCFStringEncodingUTF8);
+ if (ptr == NULL)
+ {
+ if (CFStringGetCString(stringValue, buffer, sizeof(buffer), kCFStringEncodingUTF8))
+ ptr = buffer;
+ else
+ {
+ Syslog::alert("Failed to convert CFString to C string for item %u in array", index);
+ MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal);
+ }
+ }
+ valueArray.push_back(string(ptr));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ if (required)
+ {
+ Syslog::alert("Value for key either not present or not a CFArray");
+ MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal);
+ }
+
+ return valueArray;
+}
+
+
+bool RuleImpl::Attribute::getLocalizedText(CFDictionaryRef config, map<string,string> &localizedPrompts, CFStringRef dictKey, const char *descriptionKey)
+{
+ CFIndex numberOfPrompts = 0;
+ CFDictionaryRef promptsDict;
+ if (CFDictionaryContainsKey(config, dictKey))
+ {
+ promptsDict = reinterpret_cast<CFDictionaryRef>(CFDictionaryGetValue(config, dictKey));
+ if (promptsDict && (CFGetTypeID(promptsDict) == CFDictionaryGetTypeID()))
+ numberOfPrompts = CFDictionaryGetCount(promptsDict);
+ }
+ if (numberOfPrompts == 0)
+ return false;
+
+ const void *keys[numberOfPrompts+1];
+ const void *values[numberOfPrompts+1];
+ CFDictionaryGetKeysAndValues(promptsDict, &keys[0], &values[0]);
+
+ while (numberOfPrompts-- > 0)
+ {
+ CFStringRef keyRef = reinterpret_cast<CFStringRef>(keys[numberOfPrompts]);
+ CFStringRef valueRef = reinterpret_cast<CFStringRef>(values[numberOfPrompts]);
+ if (!keyRef || (CFGetTypeID(keyRef) != CFStringGetTypeID())) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!valueRef || (CFGetTypeID(valueRef) != CFStringGetTypeID())) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ string key = cfString(keyRef);
+ string value = cfString(valueRef);
+ localizedPrompts[descriptionKey + key] = value;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+
+// default rule
+RuleImpl::RuleImpl() :
+mType(kUser), mGroupName("admin"), mMaxCredentialAge(300.0), mShared(true), mAllowRoot(false), mSessionOwner(false), mTries(0), mAuthenticateUser(true), mExtractPassword(false)
+{
+ // XXX/cs read default descriptions from somewhere
+ // @@@ Default rule is shared admin group with 5 minute timeout
+}
+
+// return rule built from rule definition; throw if invalid.
+RuleImpl::RuleImpl(const string &inRightName, CFDictionaryRef cfRight, CFDictionaryRef cfRules) : mRightName(inRightName), mExtractPassword(false)
+{
+ // @@@ make sure cfRight is non mutable and never used that way
+
+ if (CFGetTypeID(cfRight) != CFDictionaryGetTypeID())
+ {
+ Syslog::alert("Invalid rights set");
+ MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal);
+ }
+
+ mTries = 0;
+
+ string classTag = Attribute::getString(cfRight, kRuleClassID, false, "");
+
+ if (classTag.length())
+ {
+ if (classTag == kAuthorizationRuleClassAllow)
+ {
+ secdebug("authrule", "%s : rule allow", inRightName.c_str());
+ mType = kAllow;
+ }
+ else if (classTag == kAuthorizationRuleClassDeny)
+ {
+ secdebug("authrule", "%s : rule deny", inRightName.c_str());
+ mType = kDeny;
+ }
+ else if (classTag == kAuthorizationRuleClassUser)
+ {
+ mType = kUser;
+ mGroupName = Attribute::getString(cfRight, kUserGroupID);
+ // grab other user-in-group attributes
+ mMaxCredentialAge = Attribute::getDouble(cfRight, kTimeoutID, false, DBL_MAX);
+ mShared = Attribute::getBool(cfRight, kSharedID);
+ mAllowRoot = Attribute::getBool(cfRight, kAllowRootID);
+ mSessionOwner = Attribute::getBool(cfRight, kSessionOwnerID);
+ // authorization tags can have eval now too
+ mEvalDef = Attribute::getVector(cfRight, kMechanismsID);
+ if (mEvalDef.size() == 0 && cfRules /*only rights default see appserver-admin*/)
+ {
+ CFDictionaryRef cfRuleDef = reinterpret_cast<CFDictionaryRef>(CFDictionaryGetValue(cfRules, CFSTR("authenticate")));
+ if (cfRuleDef && CFGetTypeID(cfRuleDef) == CFDictionaryGetTypeID())
+ mEvalDef = Attribute::getVector(cfRuleDef, kMechanismsID);
+ }
+ mTries = int(Attribute::getDouble(cfRight, kTriesID, false, double(kMaximumAuthorizationTries)));
+ mAuthenticateUser = Attribute::getBool(cfRight, kRuleAuthenticateUserID, false, true);
+ mExtractPassword = Attribute::getBool(cfRight, kExtractPasswordID, false, false);
+
+ secdebug("authrule", "%s : rule user in group \"%s\" timeout %g%s%s",
+ inRightName.c_str(),
+ mGroupName.c_str(), mMaxCredentialAge, mShared ? " shared" : "",
+ mAllowRoot ? " allow-root" : "");
+
+ }
+ else if (classTag == kAuthorizationRuleClassMechanisms)
+ {
+ secdebug("authrule", "%s : rule evaluate mechanisms", inRightName.c_str());
+ mType = kEvaluateMechanisms;
+ // mechanisms to evaluate
+ mEvalDef = Attribute::getVector(cfRight, kMechanismsID, true);
+ mTries = int(Attribute::getDouble(cfRight, kTriesID, false, 0.0)); // "forever"
+ mShared = Attribute::getBool(cfRight, kSharedID, false, true);
+ mExtractPassword = Attribute::getBool(cfRight, kExtractPasswordID, false, false);
+ }
+ else if (classTag == kAuthorizationRightRule)
+ {
+ assert(cfRules); // rules can't delegate to other rules
+ secdebug("authrule", "%s : rule delegate rule", inRightName.c_str());
+ mType = kRuleDelegation;
+
+ // string or
+ string ruleDefString = Attribute::getString(cfRight, kRuleDelegateID, false, "");
+ if (ruleDefString.length())
+ {
+ CFStringRef ruleDefRef = makeCFString(ruleDefString);
+ CFDictionaryRef cfRuleDef = reinterpret_cast<CFDictionaryRef>(CFDictionaryGetValue(cfRules, ruleDefRef));
+ if (ruleDefRef)
+ CFRelease(ruleDefRef);
+ if (!cfRuleDef || CFGetTypeID(cfRuleDef) != CFDictionaryGetTypeID())
+ {
+ Syslog::alert("'%s' does not name a built-in rule", ruleDefString.c_str());
+ MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal);
+ }
+ mRuleDef.push_back(Rule(ruleDefString, cfRuleDef, cfRules));
+ }
+ else // array
+ {
+ vector<string> ruleDef = Attribute::getVector(cfRight, kRuleDelegateID, true);
+ for (vector<string>::const_iterator it = ruleDef.begin(); it != ruleDef.end(); it++)
+ {
+ CFStringRef ruleNameRef = makeCFString(*it);
+ CFDictionaryRef cfRuleDef = reinterpret_cast<CFDictionaryRef>(CFDictionaryGetValue(cfRules, ruleNameRef));
+ if (ruleNameRef)
+ CFRelease(ruleNameRef);
+ if (!cfRuleDef || (CFGetTypeID(cfRuleDef) != CFDictionaryGetTypeID()))
+ {
+ Syslog::alert("Invalid rule '%s'in rule set", it->c_str());
+ MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal);
+ }
+ mRuleDef.push_back(Rule(*it, cfRuleDef, cfRules));
+ }
+ }
+
+ mKofN = int(Attribute::getDouble(cfRight, kKofNID, false, 0.0));
+ if (mKofN)
+ mType = kKofN;
+
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ secdebug("authrule", "%s : rule class '%s' unknown.", inRightName.c_str(), classTag.c_str());
+ Syslog::alert("%s : rule class '%s' unknown", inRightName.c_str(), classTag.c_str());
+ MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal);
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ // no class tag means, this is the abbreviated specification from the API
+ // it _must_ have a definition for "rule" which will be used as a delegate
+ // it may have a comment (not extracted here)
+ // it may have a default prompt, or a whole dictionary of languages (not extracted here)
+ mType = kRuleDelegation;
+ string ruleName = Attribute::getString(cfRight, kRuleDelegateID, true);
+ secdebug("authrule", "%s : rule delegate rule (1): %s", inRightName.c_str(), ruleName.c_str());
+ CFStringRef ruleNameRef = makeCFString(ruleName);
+ CFDictionaryRef cfRuleDef = reinterpret_cast<CFDictionaryRef>(CFDictionaryGetValue(cfRules, ruleNameRef));
+ if (ruleNameRef)
+ CFRelease(ruleNameRef);
+ if (!cfRuleDef || CFGetTypeID(cfRuleDef) != CFDictionaryGetTypeID())
+ {
+ Syslog::alert("Rule '%s' for right '%s' does not exist or is not properly formed", ruleName.c_str(), inRightName.c_str());
+ MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal);
+ }
+ mRuleDef.push_back(Rule(ruleName, cfRuleDef, cfRules));
+ }
+
+ Attribute::getLocalizedText(cfRight, mLocalizedPrompts, kPromptID, kAuthorizationRuleParameterDescription);
+ Attribute::getLocalizedText(cfRight, mLocalizedButtons, kButtonID, kAuthorizationRuleParameterButton);
+}
+
+/*
+RuleImpl::~Rule()
+{
+}
+*/
+
+void
+RuleImpl::setAgentHints(const AuthItemRef &inRight, const Rule &inTopLevelRule, AuthItemSet &environmentToClient, AuthorizationToken &auth) const
+{
+ string authorizeString(inRight->name());
+ environmentToClient.erase(AuthItemRef(AGENT_HINT_AUTHORIZE_RIGHT));
+ environmentToClient.insert(AuthItemRef(AGENT_HINT_AUTHORIZE_RIGHT, AuthValueOverlay(authorizeString)));
+
+ pid_t creatorPid = auth.creatorPid();
+ environmentToClient.erase(AuthItemRef(AGENT_HINT_CREATOR_PID));
+ environmentToClient.insert(AuthItemRef(AGENT_HINT_CREATOR_PID, AuthValueOverlay(sizeof(pid_t), &creatorPid)));
+
+ audit_token_t creatorAuditToken = auth.creatorAuditToken().auditToken();
+ environmentToClient.erase(AuthItemRef(AGENT_HINT_CREATOR_AUDIT_TOKEN));
+ environmentToClient.insert(AuthItemRef(AGENT_HINT_CREATOR_AUDIT_TOKEN, AuthValueOverlay(sizeof(audit_token_t), &creatorAuditToken)));
+
+ Process &thisProcess = Server::process();
+ string bundlePath;
+ if (SecStaticCodeRef clientCode = auth.creatorCode())
+ bundlePath = codePath(clientCode);
+ AuthItemSet processHints = SecurityAgent::Client::clientHints(
+ SecurityAgent::bundle, bundlePath, thisProcess.pid(), thisProcess.uid());
+ environmentToClient.erase(AuthItemRef(AGENT_HINT_CLIENT_TYPE));
+ environmentToClient.erase(AuthItemRef(AGENT_HINT_CLIENT_PATH));
+ environmentToClient.erase(AuthItemRef(AGENT_HINT_CLIENT_PID));
+ environmentToClient.erase(AuthItemRef(AGENT_HINT_CLIENT_UID));
+ environmentToClient.insert(processHints.begin(), processHints.end());
+
+ map<string,string> defaultPrompts = inTopLevelRule->localizedPrompts();
+ map<string,string> defaultButtons = inTopLevelRule->localizedButtons();
+
+ if (defaultPrompts.empty())
+ defaultPrompts = localizedPrompts();
+ if (defaultButtons.empty())
+ defaultButtons = localizedButtons();
+
+ if (!defaultPrompts.empty())
+ {
+ map<string,string>::const_iterator it;
+ for (it = defaultPrompts.begin(); it != defaultPrompts.end(); it++)
+ {
+ const string &key = it->first;
+ const string &value = it->second;
+ environmentToClient.insert(AuthItemRef(key.c_str(), AuthValueOverlay(value)));
+ }
+ }
+ if (!defaultButtons.empty())
+ {
+ map<string,string>::const_iterator it;
+ for (it = defaultButtons.begin(); it != defaultButtons.end(); it++)
+ {
+ const string &key = it->first;
+ const string &value = it->second;
+ environmentToClient.insert(AuthItemRef(key.c_str(), AuthValueOverlay(value)));
+ }
+ }
+
+ // add rulename as a hint
+ string ruleName = name();
+ environmentToClient.erase(AuthItemRef(AGENT_HINT_AUTHORIZE_RULE));
+ environmentToClient.insert(AuthItemRef(AGENT_HINT_AUTHORIZE_RULE, AuthValueOverlay(ruleName)));
+}
+
+// If a different evaluation for getting a credential is prescribed,
+// we'll run that and validate the credentials from there.
+// we fall back on a default configuration from the authenticate rule
+OSStatus
+RuleImpl::evaluateAuthentication(const AuthItemRef &inRight, const Rule &inRule,AuthItemSet &environmentToClient, AuthorizationFlags flags, CFAbsoluteTime now, const CredentialSet *inCredentials, CredentialSet &credentials, AuthorizationToken &auth, SecurityAgent::Reason &reason, bool savePassword) const
+{
+ OSStatus status = errAuthorizationDenied;
+
+ Credential hintCredential;
+ if (errAuthorizationSuccess == evaluateSessionOwner(inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, now, auth, hintCredential, reason)) {
+ if (hintCredential->name().length())
+ environmentToClient.insert(AuthItemRef(AGENT_HINT_SUGGESTED_USER, AuthValueOverlay(hintCredential->name())));
+ if (hintCredential->realname().length())
+ environmentToClient.insert(AuthItemRef(AGENT_HINT_SUGGESTED_USER_LONG, AuthValueOverlay(hintCredential->realname())));
+ }
+
+ if ((mType == kUser) && (mGroupName.length()))
+ environmentToClient.insert(AuthItemRef(AGENT_HINT_REQUIRE_USER_IN_GROUP, AuthValueOverlay(mGroupName)));
+
+ uint32 tries;
+ reason = SecurityAgent::noReason;
+
+ Process &cltProc = Server::process();
+ // Authorization preserves creator's UID in setuid processes
+ // (which is nice, but cltUid ends up being unused except by the debug
+ // message -- AgentMechanismEvaluator ignores it)
+ uid_t cltUid = (cltProc.uid() != 0) ? cltProc.uid() : auth.creatorUid();
+ secdebug("AuthEvalMech", "Mechanism invocation by process %d (UID %d)", cltProc.pid(), cltUid);
+
+ // For auditing within AuthorizationMechEval, pass the right name.
+ size_t rightNameSize = inRight->name() ? strlen(inRight->name()) : 0;
+ AuthorizationString rightName = inRight->name() ? inRight->name() : "";
+ // @@@ AuthValueRef's ctor ought to take a const void *
+ AuthValueRef rightValue(rightNameSize, const_cast<char *>(rightName));
+ AuthValueVector authValueVector;
+ authValueVector.push_back(rightValue);
+
+ RightAuthenticationLogger rightAuthLogger(auth.creatorAuditToken(), AUE_ssauthint);
+ rightAuthLogger.setRight(rightName);
+
+ // Just succeed for a continuously active session owner.
+ if (auth.session().originatorUid() == auth.creatorUid() && auth.session().attributes() & AU_SESSION_FLAG_HAS_AUTHENTICATED) {
+ secdebug("AuthEvalMech", "We are an active session owner.");
+ aslmsg m = asl_new(ASL_TYPE_MSG);
+ asl_set(m, "com.apple.message.domain", "com.apple.securityd.UserActivity");
+ asl_set(m, "com.apple.message.signature", "userIsActive");
+ asl_set(m, "com.apple.message.signature2", rightName);
+ asl_set(m, "com.apple.message.result", "failure");
+ asl_log(NULL, m, ASL_LEVEL_NOTICE, "We are an active session owner.");
+ asl_free(m);
+// Credential rightCredential(rightName, auth.creatorUid(), mShared);
+// credentials.erase(rightCredential); credentials.insert(rightCredential);
+// return errAuthorizationSuccess;
+ }
+ else {
+ secdebug("AuthEvalMech", "We are not an active session owner.");
+ aslmsg m = asl_new(ASL_TYPE_MSG);
+ asl_set(m, "com.apple.message.domain", "com.apple.securityd.UserActivity");
+ asl_set(m, "com.apple.message.signature", "userIsNotActive");
+ asl_set(m, "com.apple.message.signature2", rightName);
+ asl_set(m, "com.apple.message.result", "success");
+ asl_log(NULL, m, ASL_LEVEL_NOTICE, "We are not an active session owner.");
+ asl_free(m);
+ }
+
+ AgentMechanismEvaluator eval(cltUid, auth.session(), mEvalDef);
+
+ for (tries = 0; tries < mTries; tries++)
+ {
+ AuthItemRef retryHint(AGENT_HINT_RETRY_REASON, AuthValueOverlay(sizeof(reason), &reason));
+ environmentToClient.erase(retryHint); environmentToClient.insert(retryHint); // replace
+ AuthItemRef triesHint(AGENT_HINT_TRIES, AuthValueOverlay(sizeof(tries), &tries));
+ environmentToClient.erase(triesHint); environmentToClient.insert(triesHint); // replace
+
+ status = eval.run(authValueVector, environmentToClient, auth);
+
+ if ((status == errAuthorizationSuccess) ||
+ (status == errAuthorizationCanceled)) // @@@ can only pass back sideband through context
+ {
+ secdebug("AuthEvalMech", "storing new context for authorization");
+ auth.setInfoSet(eval.context(), savePassword);
+ }
+
+ // successfully ran mechanisms to obtain credential
+ if (status == errAuthorizationSuccess)
+ {
+ // deny is the default
+ status = errAuthorizationDenied;
+
+ CredentialSet newCredentials = makeCredentials(auth);
+ // clear context after extracting credentials
+ auth.scrubInfoSet(savePassword);
+
+ for (CredentialSet::const_iterator it = newCredentials.begin(); it != newCredentials.end(); ++it)
+ {
+ const Credential& newCredential = *it;
+
+ // @@@ we log the uid a process was running under when it created the authref, which is misleading in the case of loginwindow
+ if (newCredential->isValid()) {
+ Syslog::info("UID %u authenticated as user %s (UID %u) for right '%s'", auth.creatorUid(), newCredential->name().c_str(), newCredential->uid(), rightName);
+ rightAuthLogger.logSuccess(auth.creatorUid(), newCredential->uid(), newCredential->name().c_str());
+ } else {
+ // we can't be sure that the user actually exists so inhibit logging of uid
+ Syslog::error("UID %u failed to authenticate as user '%s' for right '%s'", auth.creatorUid(), newCredential->name().c_str(), rightName);
+ rightAuthLogger.logFailure(auth.creatorUid(), newCredential->name().c_str());
+ }
+
+ if (!newCredential->isValid())
+ {
+ reason = SecurityAgent::invalidPassphrase;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ // verify that this credential authorizes right
+ status = evaluateUserCredentialForRight(auth, inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, now, newCredential, true, reason);
+
+ if (status == errAuthorizationSuccess)
+ {
+ if (auth.operatesAsLeastPrivileged()) {
+ Credential rightCredential(rightName, mShared);
+ credentials.erase(rightCredential); credentials.insert(rightCredential);
+ if (mShared)
+ credentials.insert(Credential(rightName, false));
+ }
+
+ // whack an equivalent credential, so it gets updated to a later achieved credential which must have been more stringent
+ credentials.erase(newCredential); credentials.insert(newCredential);
+ // just got a new credential - if it's shared also add a non-shared one that to stick in the authorizationref local cache
+ if (mShared)
+ credentials.insert(Credential(newCredential->uid(), newCredential->name(), newCredential->realname(), false));
+
+ // use valid credential to set context info
+ // XXX/cs keeping this for now, such that the uid is passed back
+ auth.setCredentialInfo(newCredential, savePassword);
+ secdebug("SSevalMech", "added valid credential for user %s", newCredential->name().c_str());
+ // set the sessionHasAuthenticated
+ if (newCredential->uid() == auth.session().originatorUid()) {
+ secdebug("AuthEvalMech", "We authenticated as the session owner.\n");
+ SessionAttributeBits flags = auth.session().attributes();
+ flags |= AU_SESSION_FLAG_HAS_AUTHENTICATED;
+ auth.session().setAttributes(flags);
+ }
+
+ status = errAuthorizationSuccess;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (status == errAuthorizationSuccess)
+ break;
+ }
+ else
+ if ((status == errAuthorizationCanceled) || (status == errAuthorizationInternal))
+ {
+ auth.scrubInfoSet(false);
+ break;
+ }
+ else // last mechanism is now authentication - fail
+ if (status == errAuthorizationDenied)
+ reason = SecurityAgent::invalidPassphrase;
+ }
+
+ // If we fell out of the loop because of too many tries, notify user
+ if (tries == mTries)
+ {
+ reason = SecurityAgent::tooManyTries;
+ AuthItemRef retryHint (AGENT_HINT_RETRY_REASON, AuthValueOverlay(sizeof(reason), &reason));
+ environmentToClient.erase(retryHint); environmentToClient.insert(retryHint); // replace
+ AuthItemRef triesHint(AGENT_HINT_TRIES, AuthValueOverlay(sizeof(tries), &tries));
+ environmentToClient.erase(triesHint); environmentToClient.insert(triesHint); // replace
+ eval.run(AuthValueVector(), environmentToClient, auth);
+ // XXX/cs is this still necessary?
+ auth.scrubInfoSet(false);
+
+ rightAuthLogger.logFailure(NULL, CommonCriteria::errTooManyTries);
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+// create externally verified credentials on the basis of
+// mechanism-provided information
+CredentialSet
+RuleImpl::makeCredentials(const AuthorizationToken &auth) const
+{
+ // fetch context and construct a credential to be tested
+ const AuthItemSet &context = const_cast<AuthorizationToken &>(auth).infoSet();
+ CredentialSet newCredentials;
+
+ do {
+ AuthItemSet::const_iterator found = find_if(context.begin(), context.end(), FindAuthItemByRightName(kAuthorizationEnvironmentUsername) );
+ if (found == context.end())
+ break;
+ string username = (**found).stringValue();
+ secdebug("AuthEvalMech", "found username");
+
+ const uid_t *uid = NULL;
+ found = find_if(context.begin(), context.end(), FindAuthItemByRightName("uid") );
+ if (found != context.end())
+ {
+ uid = static_cast<const uid_t *>((**found).value().data);
+ secdebug("AuthEvalMech", "found uid");
+ }
+
+ if (username.length() && uid)
+ {
+ // credential is valid because mechanism says so
+ newCredentials.insert(Credential(*uid, username, "", mShared));
+ }
+ } while(0);
+
+ return newCredentials;
+}
+
+// evaluate whether a good credential of the current session owner would authorize a right
+OSStatus
+RuleImpl::evaluateSessionOwner(const AuthItemRef &inRight, const Rule &inRule, const AuthItemSet &environment, const CFAbsoluteTime now, const AuthorizationToken &auth, Credential &credential, SecurityAgent::Reason &reason) const
+{
+ // username hint is taken from the user who created the authorization, unless it's clearly ineligible
+ // @@@ we have no access to current requester uid here and the process uid is only taken when the authorization is created
+ // meaning that a process like loginwindow that drops privs later is screwed.
+
+ Credential sessionCredential;
+ uid_t uid = auth.session().originatorUid();
+ Server::active().longTermActivity();
+ struct passwd *pw = getpwuid(uid);
+ if (pw != NULL) {
+ // avoid hinting a locked account
+ if ( (pw->pw_passwd == NULL) ||
+ strcmp(pw->pw_passwd, "*") ) {
+ // Check if username will authorize the request and set username to
+ // be used as a hint to the user if so
+ secdebug("AuthEvalMech", "preflight credential from current user, result follows:");
+ sessionCredential = Credential(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gecos, mShared/*ignored*/);
+ } //fi
+ endpwent();
+ }
+ OSStatus status = evaluateUserCredentialForRight(auth, inRight, inRule, environment, now, sessionCredential, true, reason);
+ if (errAuthorizationSuccess == status)
+ credential = sessionCredential;
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+
+OSStatus
+RuleImpl::evaluateCredentialForRight(const AuthorizationToken &auth, const AuthItemRef &inRight, const Rule &inRule, const AuthItemSet &environment, CFAbsoluteTime now, const Credential &credential, bool ignoreShared, SecurityAgent::Reason &reason) const
+{
+ if (auth.operatesAsLeastPrivileged()) {
+ if (credential->isRight() && credential->isValid() && (inRight->name() == credential->name()))
+ {
+ if (!ignoreShared && !mShared && credential->isShared())
+ {
+ // @@@ no proper SA::Reason
+ reason = SecurityAgent::unknownReason;
+ secdebug("autheval", "shared credential cannot be used, denying right %s", inRight->name());
+ return errAuthorizationDenied;
+ } else {
+ return errAuthorizationSuccess;
+ }
+ } else {
+ // @@@ no proper SA::Reason
+ reason = SecurityAgent::unknownReason;
+ return errAuthorizationDenied;
+ }
+ } else
+ return evaluateUserCredentialForRight(auth, inRight, inRule, environment, now, credential, false, reason);
+}
+
+// Return errAuthorizationSuccess if this rule allows access based on the specified credential,
+// return errAuthorizationDenied otherwise.
+OSStatus
+RuleImpl::evaluateUserCredentialForRight(const AuthorizationToken &auth, const AuthItemRef &inRight, const Rule &inRule, const AuthItemSet &environment, CFAbsoluteTime now, const Credential &credential, bool ignoreShared, SecurityAgent::Reason &reason) const
+{
+ assert(mType == kUser);
+
+ // Ideally we'd set the AGENT_HINT_RETRY_REASON hint in this method, but
+ // evaluateAuthentication() overwrites it before
+ // AgentMechanismEvaluator::run(). That's what led to passing "reason"
+ // everywhere, from RuleImpl::evaluate() on down.
+
+ // Get the username from the credential
+ const char *user = credential->name().c_str();
+
+ // If the credential is not valid or its age is more than the allowed maximum age
+ // for a credential, deny.
+ if (!credential->isValid())
+ {
+ // @@@ it could be the username, not password, was invalid
+ reason = SecurityAgent::invalidPassphrase;
+ secdebug("autheval", "credential for user %s is invalid, denying right %s", user, inRight->name());
+ return errAuthorizationDenied;
+ }
+
+ if (now - credential->creationTime() > mMaxCredentialAge)
+ {
+ // @@@ no proper SA::Reason
+ reason = SecurityAgent::unknownReason;
+ secdebug("autheval", "credential for user %s has expired, denying right %s", user, inRight->name());
+ return errAuthorizationDenied;
+ }
+
+ if (!ignoreShared && !mShared && credential->isShared())
+ {
+ // @@@ no proper SA::Reason
+ reason = SecurityAgent::unknownReason;
+ secdebug("autheval", "shared credential for user %s cannot be used, denying right %s", user, inRight->name());
+ return errAuthorizationDenied;
+ }
+
+ // A root (uid == 0) user can do anything
+ if (credential->uid() == 0)
+ {
+ secdebug("autheval", "user %s has uid 0, granting right %s", user, inRight->name());
+ return errAuthorizationSuccess;
+ }
+
+ if (mSessionOwner)
+ {
+ Session &session = auth.session();
+ uid_t console_user = session.originatorUid();
+
+ if (credential->uid() == console_user)
+ {
+ secdebug("autheval", "user %s is session-owner(uid: %d), granting right %s", user, console_user, inRight->name());
+ return errAuthorizationSuccess;
+ }
+ // set "reason" in this case? not that a proper SA::Reason exists
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ // @@@ no proper SA::Reason
+ reason = SecurityAgent::unknownReason;
+ secdebug("autheval", "session-owner check failed.");
+ }
+
+ if (mGroupName.length())
+ {
+ const char *groupname = mGroupName.c_str();
+ Server::active().longTermActivity();
+
+ if (!groupname)
+ return errAuthorizationDenied;
+
+ do
+ {
+ uuid_t group_uuid, user_uuid;
+ int is_member;
+
+ // @@@ it'd be nice to have SA::Reason codes for the failures
+ // associated with the pre-check-membership mbr_*() functions,
+ // but userNotInGroup will do
+ if (mbr_group_name_to_uuid(groupname, group_uuid))
+ break;
+
+ if (mbr_uid_to_uuid(credential->uid(), user_uuid))
+ {
+ struct passwd *pwd;
+ if (NULL == (pwd = getpwnam(user)))
+ break;
+ if (mbr_uid_to_uuid(pwd->pw_uid, user_uuid))
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (mbr_check_membership(user_uuid, group_uuid, &is_member))
+ break;
+
+ if (is_member)
+ {
+ secdebug("autheval", "user %s is a member of group %s, granting right %s",
+ user, groupname, inRight->name());
+ return errAuthorizationSuccess;
+ }
+
+ }
+ while (0);
+
+ reason = SecurityAgent::userNotInGroup;
+ secdebug("autheval", "user %s is not a member of group %s, denying right %s",
+ user, groupname, inRight->name());
+ }
+ else if (mSessionOwner) // rule asks only if user is the session owner
+ {
+ reason = SecurityAgent::unacceptableUser;
+ }
+
+ return errAuthorizationDenied;
+}
+
+
+
+OSStatus
+RuleImpl::evaluateUser(const AuthItemRef &inRight, const Rule &inRule, AuthItemSet &environmentToClient, AuthorizationFlags flags, CFAbsoluteTime now, const CredentialSet *inCredentials, CredentialSet &credentials, AuthorizationToken &auth, SecurityAgent::Reason &reason, bool savePassword) const
+{
+ // If we got here, this is a kUser type rule, let's start looking for a
+ // credential that is satisfactory
+
+ // Zeroth -- Here is an extra special saucy ugly hack to allow authorizations
+ // created by a proccess running as root to automatically get a right.
+ if (mAllowRoot && auth.creatorUid() == 0)
+ {
+ SECURITYD_AUTH_USER_ALLOWROOT(&auth);
+
+ secdebug("autheval", "creator of authorization has uid == 0 granting right %s",
+ inRight->name());
+ return errAuthorizationSuccess;
+ }
+
+ // if we're not supposed to authenticate evaluate the session-owner against the group
+ if (!mAuthenticateUser)
+ {
+ Credential hintCredential;
+ OSStatus status = evaluateSessionOwner(inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, now, auth, hintCredential, reason);
+
+ if (!status)
+ {
+ SECURITYD_AUTH_USER_ALLOWSESSIONOWNER(&auth);
+ return errAuthorizationSuccess;
+ }
+
+ return errAuthorizationDenied;
+ }
+
+ // First -- go though the credentials we either already used or obtained during this authorize operation.
+ for (CredentialSet::const_iterator it = credentials.begin(); it != credentials.end(); ++it)
+ {
+ // Passed-in user credentials are allowed for least-privileged mode
+ if (auth.operatesAsLeastPrivileged() && !(*it)->isRight() && (*it)->isValid())
+ {
+ OSStatus status = evaluateUserCredentialForRight(auth, inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, now, *it, false, reason);
+ if (errAuthorizationSuccess == status) {
+ Credential rightCredential(inRight->name(), mShared);
+ credentials.erase(rightCredential); credentials.insert(rightCredential);
+ if (mShared)
+ credentials.insert(Credential(inRight->name(), false));
+ return status;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // if this is least privileged, this will function differently: match credential to requested right
+ OSStatus status = evaluateCredentialForRight(auth, inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, now, *it, false, reason);
+
+ if (status != errAuthorizationDenied) {
+ // add credential to authinfo
+ auth.setCredentialInfo(*it, savePassword);
+ return status;
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ // Second -- go though the credentials passed in to this authorize operation by the state management layer.
+ if (inCredentials)
+ {
+ for (CredentialSet::const_iterator it = inCredentials->begin(); it != inCredentials->end(); ++it)
+ {
+ // if this is least privileged, this will function differently: match credential to requested right
+ OSStatus status = evaluateCredentialForRight(auth, inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, now, *it, false, reason);
+
+ if (status == errAuthorizationSuccess)
+ {
+ // Add the credential we used to the output set.
+ // whack an equivalent credential, so it gets updated to a later achieved credential which must have been more stringent
+ credentials.erase(*it); credentials.insert(*it);
+ // add credential to authinfo
+ auth.setCredentialInfo(*it, savePassword);
+
+ return status;
+ }
+ else if (status != errAuthorizationDenied)
+ return status;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Finally -- We didn't find the credential in our passed in credential lists. Obtain a new credential if our flags let us do so.
+ if (!(flags & kAuthorizationFlagExtendRights))
+ return errAuthorizationDenied;
+
+ // authorizations that timeout immediately cannot be preauthorized
+ if ((flags & kAuthorizationFlagPreAuthorize) &&
+ (mMaxCredentialAge == 0.0))
+ {
+ inRight->setFlags(inRight->flags() | kAuthorizationFlagCanNotPreAuthorize);
+ return errAuthorizationSuccess;
+ }
+
+ if (!(flags & kAuthorizationFlagInteractionAllowed))
+ return errAuthorizationInteractionNotAllowed;
+
+ setAgentHints(inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, auth);
+
+ return evaluateAuthentication(inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, flags, now, inCredentials, credentials, auth, reason, savePassword);
+}
+
+OSStatus
+RuleImpl::evaluateMechanismOnly(const AuthItemRef &inRight, const Rule &inRule, AuthItemSet &environmentToClient, AuthorizationToken &auth, CredentialSet &outCredentials, bool savePassword) const
+{
+ uint32 tries = 0;
+ OSStatus status;
+
+ Process &cltProc = Server::process();
+ // Authorization preserves creator's UID in setuid processes
+ uid_t cltUid = (cltProc.uid() != 0) ? cltProc.uid() : auth.creatorUid();
+ secdebug("AuthEvalMech", "Mechanism invocation by process %d (UID %d)", cltProc.pid(), cltUid);
+
+ {
+ AgentMechanismEvaluator eval(cltUid, auth.session(), mEvalDef);
+ // For auditing within AuthorizationMechEval, pass the right name.
+ size_t rightNameSize = inRight->name() ? strlen(inRight->name()) : 0;
+ AuthorizationString rightName = inRight->name() ? inRight->name() : "";
+ // @@@ AuthValueRef's ctor ought to take a const void *
+ AuthValueRef rightValue(rightNameSize, const_cast<char *>(rightName));
+ AuthValueVector authValueVector;
+ authValueVector.push_back(rightValue);
+
+ do
+ {
+ setAgentHints(inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, auth);
+ AuthItemRef triesHint(AGENT_HINT_TRIES, AuthValueOverlay(sizeof(tries), &tries));
+ environmentToClient.erase(triesHint); environmentToClient.insert(triesHint); // replace
+
+ status = eval.run(authValueVector, environmentToClient, auth);
+ if ((status == errAuthorizationSuccess) ||
+ (status == errAuthorizationCanceled)) // @@@ can only pass back sideband through context
+ {
+ secdebug("AuthEvalMech", "storing new context for authorization");
+ auth.setInfoSet(eval.context(), savePassword);
+ if (status == errAuthorizationSuccess)
+ {
+ // (try to) attach the authorizing UID to the least-priv cred
+ if (auth.operatesAsLeastPrivileged())
+ {
+ outCredentials.insert(Credential(rightName, mShared));
+ if (mShared)
+ outCredentials.insert(Credential(rightName, false));
+
+ RightAuthenticationLogger logger(auth.creatorAuditToken(), AUE_ssauthint);
+ logger.setRight(rightName);
+
+ AuthItem *uidItem = eval.context().find(AGENT_CONTEXT_UID);
+ if (uidItem)
+ {
+ uid_t authorizedUid;
+ memcpy(&authorizedUid, uidItem->value().data, sizeof(authorizedUid));
+ secdebug("AuthEvalMech", "generating least-privilege cred for '%s' authorized by UID %u", inRight->name(), authorizedUid);
+ logger.logLeastPrivilege(authorizedUid, true);
+ }
+ else // cltUid is better than nothing
+ {
+ secdebug("AuthEvalMech", "generating least-privilege cred for '%s' with process- or auth-UID %u", inRight->name(), cltUid);
+ logger.logLeastPrivilege(cltUid, false);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (0 == strcmp(rightName, "system.login.console") && NULL == eval.context().find(AGENT_CONTEXT_AUTO_LOGIN)) {
+ secdebug("AuthEvalMech", "We logged in as the session owner.\n");
+ SessionAttributeBits flags = auth.session().attributes();
+ flags |= AU_SESSION_FLAG_HAS_AUTHENTICATED;
+ auth.session().setAttributes(flags);
+ }
+ CredentialSet newCredentials = makeCredentials(auth);
+ outCredentials.insert(newCredentials.begin(), newCredentials.end());
+ }
+ }
+
+ tries++;
+ }
+ while ((status == errAuthorizationDenied) // only if we have an expected failure we continue
+ && ((mTries == 0) // mTries == 0 means we try forever
+ || ((mTries > 0) // mTries > 0 means we try up to mTries times
+ && (tries < mTries))));
+ }
+
+ // HACK kill all hosts to free pages for low memory systems
+ // (XXX/gh there should be a #define for this right)
+ if (name() == "system.login.done")
+ {
+ // one case where we don't want to mark the agents as "busy"
+ QueryInvokeMechanism query(securityAgent, auth.session());
+ query.terminateAgent();
+ QueryInvokeMechanism query2(privilegedAuthHost, auth.session());
+ query2.terminateAgent();
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+OSStatus
+RuleImpl::evaluateRules(const AuthItemRef &inRight, const Rule &inRule, AuthItemSet &environmentToClient, AuthorizationFlags flags, CFAbsoluteTime now, const CredentialSet *inCredentials, CredentialSet &credentials, AuthorizationToken &auth, SecurityAgent::Reason &reason, bool savePassword) const
+{
+ // line up the rules to try
+ if (!mRuleDef.size())
+ return errAuthorizationSuccess;
+
+ uint32_t count = 0;
+ OSStatus status = errAuthorizationSuccess;
+ vector<Rule>::const_iterator it;
+
+ for (it = mRuleDef.begin();it != mRuleDef.end(); it++)
+ {
+ // are we at k yet?
+ if ((mType == kKofN) && (count == mKofN))
+ return errAuthorizationSuccess;
+
+ // get a rule and try it
+ status = (*it)->evaluate(inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, flags, now, inCredentials, credentials, auth, reason, savePassword);
+
+ // if status is cancel/internal error abort
+ if ((status == errAuthorizationCanceled) || (status == errAuthorizationInternal))
+ return status;
+
+ if (status != errAuthorizationSuccess)
+ {
+ // continue if we're only looking for k of n
+ if (mType == kKofN)
+ continue;
+
+ break;
+ }
+ else
+ count++;
+ }
+
+ if ((mType == kKofN) && (status == errAuthorizationSuccess) && (count < mKofN))
+ status = errAuthorizationDenied;
+
+ return status; // return the last failure
+}
+
+
+OSStatus
+RuleImpl::evaluate(const AuthItemRef &inRight, const Rule &inRule, AuthItemSet &environmentToClient, AuthorizationFlags flags, CFAbsoluteTime now, const CredentialSet *inCredentials, CredentialSet &credentials, AuthorizationToken &auth, SecurityAgent::Reason &reason, bool savePassword) const
+{
+ switch (mType)
+ {
+ case kAllow:
+ SECURITYD_AUTH_ALLOW(&auth, (char *)name().c_str());
+ return errAuthorizationSuccess;
+ case kDeny:
+ SECURITYD_AUTH_DENY(&auth, (char *)name().c_str());
+ return errAuthorizationDenied;
+ case kUser:
+ SECURITYD_AUTH_USER(&auth, (char *)name().c_str());
+ return evaluateUser(inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, flags, now, inCredentials, credentials, auth, reason, savePassword);
+ case kRuleDelegation:
+ SECURITYD_AUTH_RULES(&auth, (char *)name().c_str());
+ return evaluateRules(inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, flags, now, inCredentials, credentials, auth, reason, savePassword);
+ case kKofN:
+ SECURITYD_AUTH_KOFN(&auth, (char *)name().c_str());
+ return evaluateRules(inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, flags, now, inCredentials, credentials, auth, reason, savePassword);
+ case kEvaluateMechanisms:
+ SECURITYD_AUTH_MECHRULE(&auth, (char *)name().c_str());
+ // if we had a SecurityAgent::Reason code for "mechanism denied,"
+ // it would make sense to pass down "reason"
+ return evaluateMechanismOnly(inRight, inRule, environmentToClient, auth, credentials, savePassword);
+ default:
+ Syslog::alert("Unrecognized rule type %d", mType);
+ MacOSError::throwMe(errAuthorizationInternal); // invalid rule
+ }
+}
+
+Rule::Rule() : RefPointer<RuleImpl>(new RuleImpl()) {}
+Rule::Rule(const string &inRightName, CFDictionaryRef cfRight, CFDictionaryRef cfRules) : RefPointer<RuleImpl>(new RuleImpl(inRightName, cfRight, cfRules)) {}
+
+
+
+} // end namespace Authorization
projects / apple / security.git / blobdiff