From 952ee63b0af14a534c0aca00c11d1a99be6b22b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Kalnischkies Date: Fri, 18 Mar 2016 14:46:24 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] forbid insecure repositories by default expect in apt-get With this commit all APT-based clients default to refusing to work with unsigned or otherwise insufficently secured repositories. In terms of apt and apt-get this changes nothing, but it effects all tools using libapt like aptitude, synaptic or packagekit. The exception remains apt-get for stretch for now as this might break too many scripts/usecases too quickly. The documentation is updated and extended to reflect how to opt out or in on this behaviour change. Closes: 808367 --- apt-pkg/init.cc | 5 +--- apt-private/private-cmndline.cc | 25 +++++++++++++------ doc/apt-get.8.xml | 5 ++-- doc/apt-secure.8.xml | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- doc/apt.conf.5.xml | 29 ++++++++++------------ 5 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-) diff --git a/apt-pkg/init.cc b/apt-pkg/init.cc index a41d604d3..c77e8e2fe 100644 --- a/apt-pkg/init.cc +++ b/apt-pkg/init.cc @@ -86,10 +86,7 @@ bool pkgInitConfig(Configuration &Cnf) Cnf.Set("Dir::Ignore-Files-Silently::", "\\.distUpgrade$"); // Repository security - // FIXME: this is set to "true" for backward compatibility, once - // jessie is out we want to change this to "false" to - // improve security - Cnf.CndSet("Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories", true); + Cnf.CndSet("Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories", false); Cnf.CndSet("Acquire::AllowDowngradeToInsecureRepositories", false); // Default cdrom mount point diff --git a/apt-private/private-cmndline.cc b/apt-private/private-cmndline.cc index ba64c5b46..481c23c94 100644 --- a/apt-private/private-cmndline.cc +++ b/apt-private/private-cmndline.cc @@ -372,7 +372,6 @@ std::vector getCommandArgs(APT_CMD const Program, char const return Args; } /*}}}*/ -#undef CmdMatches #undef addArg static void ShowHelpListCommands(std::vector const &Cmds)/*{{{*/ { @@ -445,15 +444,22 @@ static void BinarySpecificConfiguration(char const * const Binary) /*{{{*/ _config->CndSet("Binary::apt::APT::Get::Upgrade-Allow-New", true); _config->CndSet("Binary::apt::APT::Cmd::Show-Update-Stats", true); _config->CndSet("Binary::apt::DPkg::Progress-Fancy", true); - _config->CndSet("Binary::apt::Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories", false); _config->CndSet("Binary::apt::APT::Keep-Downloaded-Packages", false); } + if (binary == "apt-config") + _config->CndSet("Binary::apt-get::Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories", true); _config->Set("Binary", binary); - std::string const conf = "Binary::" + binary; - _config->MoveSubTree(conf.c_str(), NULL); } /*}}}*/ +static void BinaryCommandSpecificConfiguration(char const * const Binary, char const * const Cmd)/*{{{*/ +{ + std::string const binary = flNotDir(Binary); + if (binary == "apt-get" && CmdMatches("update")) + _config->CndSet("Binary::apt-get::Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories", true); +} +#undef CmdMatches + /*}}}*/ std::vector ParseCommandLine(CommandLine &CmdL, APT_CMD const Binary,/*{{{*/ Configuration * const * const Cnf, pkgSystem ** const Sys, int const argc, const char *argv[], bool (*ShowHelp)(CommandLine &), std::vector (*GetCommands)(void)) @@ -481,11 +487,14 @@ std::vector ParseCommandLine(CommandLine &CmdL, APT_CMD c // Args running out of scope invalidates the pointer stored in CmdL, // but we don't use the pointer after this function, so we ignore // this problem for now and figure something out if we have to. - std::vector Args; + char const * CmdCalled = nullptr; if (Cmds.empty() == false && Cmds[0].Handler != nullptr) - Args = getCommandArgs(Binary, CommandLine::GetCommand(Cmds.data(), argc, argv)); - else - Args = getCommandArgs(Binary, nullptr); + CmdCalled = CommandLine::GetCommand(Cmds.data(), argc, argv); + if (CmdCalled != nullptr) + BinaryCommandSpecificConfiguration(argv[0], CmdCalled); + std::string const conf = "Binary::" + _config->Find("Binary"); + _config->MoveSubTree(conf.c_str(), nullptr); + auto Args = getCommandArgs(Binary, CmdCalled); CmdL = CommandLine(Args.data(), _config); if (CmdL.Parse(argc,argv) == false || diff --git a/doc/apt-get.8.xml b/doc/apt-get.8.xml index 20d761075..8fc6cc26d 100644 --- a/doc/apt-get.8.xml +++ b/doc/apt-get.8.xml @@ -563,8 +563,9 @@ Forbid the update command to acquire unverifiable - data from configured sources. Apt will fail at the update command - for repositories without valid cryptographically signatures. + data from configured sources. APT will fail at the update command + for repositories without valid cryptographically signatures. See + also &apt-secure; for details on the concept and the implications. Configuration Item: Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories. diff --git a/doc/apt-secure.8.xml b/doc/apt-secure.8.xml index 1cf6539c6..2c1c192d4 100644 --- a/doc/apt-secure.8.xml +++ b/doc/apt-secure.8.xml @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ &apt-email; &apt-product; - 2015-10-15T00:00:00Z + 2016-03-18T00:00:00Z @@ -48,22 +48,46 @@ Starting with version 0.6, APT contains code that does signature checking of the Release file for all repositories. This ensures that data like packages in the archive can't be modified by people who - have no access to the Release file signing key. + have no access to the Release file signing key. Starting with version 1.1 + APT requires repositories to provide recent authentication + information for unimpeded usage of the repository. If an archive has an unsigned Release file or no Release file at all - current APT versions will raise a warning in update - operations and front-ends like apt-get will require - explicit confirmation if an installation request includes a package from - such an unauthenticated archive. + current APT versions will refuse to download data from them by default + in update operations and even if forced to download + front-ends like &apt-get; will require explicit confirmation if an + installation request includes a package from such an unauthenticated + archive. - In the future APT will refuse to work with unauthenticated repositories by - default until support for them is removed entirely. Users have the option to - opt-in to this behavior already by setting the configuration option - to false. + As a temporary exception &apt-get; (not &apt;!) raises warnings only if it + encounters unauthenticated archives to give a slightly longer grace period + on this backward compatibility effecting change. This exception will be removed + in future releases and you can opt-out of this grace period by setting the + configuration option + to false or + on the command line. + + + + You can force all APT clients to raise only warnings by setting the + configuration option to + true. Note that this option will eventually be removed. + Users also have the option available to disable + even the warnings, but be sure to understand the implications as detailed in + &sources-list;. + + + + A repository which previously was authentication but would loose this state in + an update operation raises an error in all APT clients + irrespective of the option to allow or forbid usage of insecure repositories. + The error can be overcome by additionally setting + + to true. diff --git a/doc/apt.conf.5.xml b/doc/apt.conf.5.xml index d71f99c0a..015401605 100644 --- a/doc/apt.conf.5.xml +++ b/doc/apt.conf.5.xml @@ -650,27 +650,24 @@ APT::Compressor::rev { - Allow the update operation to load data files from - a repository without a trusted signature. If enabled this - option no data files will be loaded and the update - operation fails with a error for this source. The default - is false for backward compatibility. This will be changed - in the future. + Allow update operations to load data files from + repositories without sufficient security information. + The default value is "false". + Concept and implications of this are detailed in &apt-secure;. - Allow that a repository that was previously gpg signed to become - unsigned durign a update operation. When there is no valid signature - of a previously trusted repository apt will refuse the update. This - option can be used to override this protection. You almost certainly - never want to enable this. The default is false. - - Note that apt will still consider packages from this source - untrusted and warn about them if you try to install - them. - + Allow that a repository that was previously gpg signed to become + unsigned during an update operation. When there is no valid signature + for a previously trusted repository apt will refuse the update. This + option can be used to override this protection. You almost certainly + never want to enable this. The default is false. + + Note that apt will still consider packages from this source + untrusted and warns about them if you try to install them. + scope -- 2.45.2