X-Git-Url: https://git.saurik.com/apt.git/blobdiff_plain/e27a1f01f90f5eae73f66f25b316ee8859f72105..1afd369d00f2f9272462ffc6c6e24f293a81459e:/doc/apt-secure.8.xml?ds=inline
diff --git a/doc/apt-secure.8.xml b/doc/apt-secure.8.xml
index 7a3b51fa9..8cdfe3ab6 100644
--- a/doc/apt-secure.8.xml
+++ b/doc/apt-secure.8.xml
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-
%aptent;
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
&apt-email;
&apt-product;
- 2012-05-21T00:00:00Z
+ 2012-06-09T00:00:00Z
@@ -57,11 +57,11 @@
- If a package comes from a archive without a signature or with a
- signature that apt does not have a key for that package is
- considered untrusted and installing it will result in a big
+ If a package comes from a archive without a signature, or with a
+ signature that apt does not have a key for, that package is
+ considered untrusted, and installing it will result in a big
warning. apt-get will currently only warn
- for unsigned archives, future releases might force all sources
+ for unsigned archives; future releases might force all sources
to be verified before downloading packages from them.
@@ -75,11 +75,11 @@
The chain of trust from an apt archive to the end user is made up of
- different steps. apt-secure is the last step in
- this chain, trusting an archive does not mean that the packages
- that you trust it do not contain malicious code but means that you
- trust the archive maintainer. It's the archive maintainer
- responsibility to ensure that the archive integrity is correct.
+ several steps. apt-secure is the last step in
+ this chain; trusting an archive does not mean that you trust its
+ packages not to contain malicious code, but means that you
+ trust the archive maintainer. It's the archive maintainer's
+ responsibility to ensure that the archive's integrity is preserved.
apt-secure does not review signatures at a
@@ -90,30 +90,29 @@
The chain of trust in Debian starts when a maintainer uploads a new
- package or a new version of a package to the Debian archive. This
- upload in order to become effective needs to be signed by a key of
- a maintainer within the Debian maintainer's keyring (available in
- the debian-keyring package). Maintainer's keys are signed by
+ package or a new version of a package to the Debian archive. In
+ order to become effective, this upload needs to be signed by a key
+ contained in the Debian Maintainers keyring (available in
+ the debian-keyring package). Maintainers' keys are signed by
other maintainers following pre-established procedures to
ensure the identity of the key holder.
Once the uploaded package is verified and included in the archive,
- the maintainer signature is stripped off, an MD5 sum of the package
- is computed and put in the Packages file. The MD5 sum of all of the
- packages files are then computed and put into the Release file. The
- Release file is then signed by the archive key (which is created
- once a year) and distributed through the FTP server. This key is
- also on the Debian keyring.
+ the maintainer signature is stripped off, and checksums of the package
+ are computed and put in the Packages file. The checksums of all of the
+ Packages files are then computed and put into the Release file. The
+ Release file is then signed by the archive key for this Debian release,
+ and distributed alongside the packages and the Packages files on
+ Debian mirrors. The keys are in the Debian archive keyring available in
+ the debian-archive-keyring package.
- Any end user can check the signature of the Release file, extract the MD5
- sum of a package from it and compare it with the MD5 sum of the
- package he downloaded. Prior to version 0.6 only the MD5 sum of the
- downloaded Debian package was checked. Now both the MD5 sum and the
- signature of the Release file are checked.
+ End users can check the signature of the Release file, extract a checksum
+ of a package from it and compare it with the checksum of the package
+ they downloaded by hand - or rely on APT doing this automatically.
Notice that this is distinct from checking signatures on a
@@ -122,11 +121,11 @@
Network "man in the middle"
- attacks. Without signature checking, a malicious
- agent can introduce himself in the package download process and
+ attacks. Without signature checking, malicious
+ agents can introduce themselves into the package download process and
provide malicious software either by controlling a network
element (router, switch, etc.) or by redirecting traffic to a
- rogue server (through arp or DNS spoofing
+ rogue server (through ARP or DNS spoofing
attacks).
Mirror network compromise.
@@ -145,8 +144,8 @@
User configuration
apt-key is the program that manages the list
- of keys used by apt. It can be used to add or remove keys although
- an installation of this release will automatically provide the
+ of keys used by apt. It can be used to add or remove keys, although
+ an installation of this release will automatically contain the
default Debian archive signing keys used in the Debian package
repositories.
@@ -183,9 +182,9 @@
- Whenever the contents of the archive changes (new packages
+ Whenever the contents of the archive change (new packages
are added or removed) the archive maintainer has to follow the
- first two steps previously outlined.
+ first two steps outlined above.