X-Git-Url: https://git.saurik.com/apt.git/blobdiff_plain/d2793259e3dcf76e5c547a5eb72845211bc14905..c4d749b78a46e69887ec9662851f180e587f2d34:/doc/apt-secure.8.xml

diff --git a/doc/apt-secure.8.xml b/doc/apt-secure.8.xml
index c1d46cb45..981351615 100644
--- a/doc/apt-secure.8.xml
+++ b/doc/apt-secure.8.xml
@@ -1,18 +1,31 @@
 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="no"?>
-<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.2//EN"
-  "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.2/docbookx.dtd" [
+<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.5//EN"
+  "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.5/docbookx.dtd" [
 
 <!ENTITY % aptent SYSTEM "apt.ent">
 %aptent;
 
+<!ENTITY % aptverbatiment SYSTEM "apt-verbatim.ent">
+%aptverbatiment;
+
+<!ENTITY % aptvendor SYSTEM "apt-vendor.ent">
+%aptvendor;
 ]>
 
 <refentry>
- &apt-docinfo;
- 
+ <refentryinfo>
+   &apt-author.jgunthorpe;
+   &apt-author.team;
+   &apt-email;
+   &apt-product;
+   <!-- The last update date -->
+   <date>2012-06-09T00:00:00Z</date>
+ </refentryinfo>
+
  <refmeta>
    <refentrytitle>apt-secure</refentrytitle>
    <manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
+   <refmiscinfo class="manual">APT</refmiscinfo>
  </refmeta>
 
 <!-- NOTE: This manpage has been written based on the
@@ -46,11 +59,11 @@
    </para>
 
    <para>
-   If a package comes from a archive without a signature or with a
-   signature that apt does not have a key for that package is
-   considered untrusted and installing it will result in a big
+   If a package comes from a archive without a signature, or with a
+   signature that apt does not have a key for, that package is
+   considered untrusted, and installing it will result in a big
    warning. <command>apt-get</command> will currently only warn
-   for unsigned archives, future releases might force all sources
+   for unsigned archives; future releases might force all sources
    to be verified before downloading packages from them.
    </para>
 
@@ -64,11 +77,11 @@
 
    <para> 
    The chain of trust from an apt archive to the end user is made up of
-   different steps. <command>apt-secure</command> is the last step in
-   this chain, trusting an archive does not mean that the packages
-   that you trust it do not contain malicious code but means that you
-   trust the archive maintainer. Its the archive maintainer
-   responsibility to ensure that the archive integrity is correct.
+   several steps. <command>apt-secure</command> is the last step in
+   this chain; trusting an archive does not mean that you trust its
+   packages not to contain malicious code, but means that you
+   trust the archive maintainer. It's the archive maintainer's
+   responsibility to ensure that the archive's integrity is preserved.
    </para>
 
    <para>apt-secure does not review signatures at a
@@ -79,30 +92,29 @@
 
    <para>
    The chain of trust in Debian starts when a maintainer uploads a new
-   package or a new version of a package to the Debian archive. This
-   upload in order to become effective needs to be signed by a key of
-   a maintainer within the Debian maintainer's keyring (available in
-   the debian-keyring package). Maintainer's keys are signed by
+   package or a new version of a package to the Debian archive. In
+   order to become effective, this upload needs to be signed by a key
+   contained in the Debian Maintainers keyring (available in
+   the debian-keyring package). Maintainers' keys are signed by
    other maintainers following pre-established procedures to
    ensure the identity of the key holder.
    </para>
 
    <para>
    Once the uploaded package is verified and included in the archive,
-   the maintainer signature is stripped off, an MD5 sum of the package
-   is computed and put in the Packages file. The MD5 sum of all of the
-   packages files are then computed and put into the Release file. The
-   Release file is then signed by the archive key (which is created
-   once a year and distributed through the FTP server. This key is
-   also on the Debian keyring.
+   the maintainer signature is stripped off, and checksums of the package
+   are computed and put in the Packages file. The checksums of all of the
+   Packages files are then computed and put into the Release file. The
+   Release file is then signed by the archive key for this &keyring-distro; release,
+   and distributed alongside the packages and the Packages files on
+   &keyring-distro; mirrors. The keys are in the &keyring-distro; archive keyring
+   available in the &keyring-package; package.
    </para>
 
    <para>
-   Any end user can check the signature of the Release file, extract the MD5
-   sum of a package from it and compare it with the MD5 sum of the
-   package he downloaded. Prior to version 0.6 only the MD5 sum of the
-   downloaded Debian package was checked. Now both the MD5 sum and the
-   signature of the Release file are checked.
+   End users can check the signature of the Release file, extract a checksum
+   of a package from it and compare it with the checksum of the package
+   they downloaded by hand - or rely on APT doing this automatically.
    </para>
 
    <para>Notice that this is distinct from checking signatures on a
@@ -111,16 +123,16 @@
 
     <itemizedlist>
        <listitem><para><literal>Network "man in the middle"
-       attacks</literal>. Without signature checking, a malicious
-       agent can introduce himself in the package download process and
+       attacks</literal>. Without signature checking, malicious
+       agents can introduce themselves into the package download process and
        provide malicious software either by controlling a network
        element (router, switch, etc.) or by redirecting traffic to a
-       rogue server (through arp or DNS spoofing
+       rogue server (through ARP or DNS spoofing
        attacks).</para></listitem>
  
        <listitem><para><literal>Mirror network compromise</literal>.
         Without signature checking, a malicious agent can compromise a
-        mirror host and modify the files in it to propage malicious
+        mirror host and modify the files in it to propagate malicious
         software to all users downloading packages from that
         host.</para></listitem>
     </itemizedlist>
@@ -134,8 +146,8 @@
  <refsect1><title>User configuration</title>
    <para>
    <command>apt-key</command> is the program that manages the list
-   of keys used by apt. It can be used to add or remove keys although
-   an installation of this release will automatically provide the
+   of keys used by apt. It can be used to add or remove keys, although
+   an installation of this release will automatically contain the
    default Debian archive signing keys used in the Debian package
    repositories.
    </para>
@@ -144,8 +156,8 @@
    (you should make sure you are using a trusted communication channel
    when retrieving it), add it with <command>apt-key</command> and
    then run <command>apt-get update</command> so that apt can download
-   and verify the <filename>Release.gpg</filename> files from the archives you
-   have configured.
+   and verify the <filename>InRelease</filename> or <filename>Release.gpg</filename>
+   files from the archives you have configured.
    </para>
 </refsect1>
 
@@ -156,36 +168,37 @@
    </para>
 
      <itemizedlist>
-       <listitem><para><literal>Create a toplevel Release
-       file</literal>.  if it does not exist already. You can do this
+       <listitem><para><emphasis>Create a toplevel Release
+       file</emphasis>,  if it does not exist already. You can do this
        by running <command>apt-ftparchive release</command> 
-       (provided inftp apt-utils).</para></listitem>
+       (provided in apt-utils).</para></listitem>
    
-      <listitem><para><literal>Sign it</literal>. You can do this by running
+      <listitem><para><emphasis>Sign it</emphasis>. You can do this by running
+      <command>gpg --clearsign -o InRelease Release</command> and
       <command>gpg -abs -o Release.gpg Release</command>.</para></listitem>
 
-      <listitem><para><literal>Publish the key fingerprint</literal>,
+      <listitem><para><emphasis>Publish the key fingerprint</emphasis>,
       that way your users will know what key they need to import in
       order to authenticate the files in the
       archive.</para></listitem>
 
     </itemizedlist>
 
-    <para>Whenever the contents of the archive changes (new packages
+    <para>Whenever the contents of the archive change (new packages
     are added or removed) the archive maintainer has to follow the
-    first two steps previously outlined.</para>
+    first two steps outlined above.</para>
 
 </refsect1>
 
 <refsect1><title>See Also</title> 
 <para> 
-&apt-conf;, &apt-get;, &sources-list;, &apt-key;, &apt-archive;,
+&apt-conf;, &apt-get;, &sources-list;, &apt-key;, &apt-ftparchive;,
 &debsign; &debsig-verify;, &gpg;
 </para>
 
-<para>For more backgound information you might want to review the
+<para>For more background information you might want to review the
 <ulink
-url="http://www.debian.org/doc/manuals/securing-debian-howto/ch7.en.html">Debian
+url="http://www.debian.org/doc/manuals/securing-debian-howto/ch7">Debian
 Security Infrastructure</ulink> chapter of the Securing Debian Manual
 (available also in the harden-doc package) and the
 <ulink url="http://www.cryptnet.net/fdp/crypto/strong_distro.html"
@@ -196,5 +209,14 @@ Security Infrastructure</ulink> chapter of the Securing Debian Manual
  &manbugs;
  &manauthor;
 
+<refsect1><title>Manpage Authors</title> 
+
+<para>This man-page is based on the work of Javier Fernández-Sanguino
+Peña, Isaac Jones, Colin Walters, Florian Weimer and Michael Vogt.
+</para>
+
+</refsect1>
+ 
+
 </refentry>