X-Git-Url: https://git.saurik.com/apple/xnu.git/blobdiff_plain/6d2010ae8f7a6078e10b361c6962983bab233e0f..HEAD:/security/mac_process.c

diff --git a/security/mac_process.c b/security/mac_process.c
index 631b468a9..09aa47db2 100644
--- a/security/mac_process.c
+++ b/security/mac_process.c
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
  * Copyright (c) 2007-2010 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_START@
- * 
+ *
  * This file contains Original Code and/or Modifications of Original Code
  * as defined in and that are subject to the Apple Public Source License
  * Version 2.0 (the 'License'). You may not use this file except in
@@ -11,10 +11,10 @@
  * unlawful or unlicensed copies of an Apple operating system, or to
  * circumvent, violate, or enable the circumvention or violation of, any
  * terms of an Apple operating system software license agreement.
- * 
+ *
  * Please obtain a copy of the License at
  * http://www.opensource.apple.com/apsl/ and read it before using this file.
- * 
+ *
  * The Original Code and all software distributed under the License are
  * distributed on an 'AS IS' basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER
  * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AND APPLE HEREBY DISCLAIMS ALL SUCH WARRANTIES,
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
  * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, QUIET ENJOYMENT OR NON-INFRINGEMENT.
  * Please see the License for the specific language governing rights and
  * limitations under the License.
- * 
+ *
  * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_END@
  */
 
@@ -72,8 +72,13 @@
 #include <sys/proc_internal.h>
 #include <sys/kauth.h>
 #include <sys/imgact.h>
+#include <mach/mach_types.h>
+#include <kern/task.h>
+
+#include <os/hash.h>
 
 #include <security/mac_internal.h>
+#include <security/mac_mach_internal.h>
 
 #include <bsd/security/audit/audit.h>
 
@@ -83,10 +88,11 @@ mac_cred_label_alloc(void)
 	struct label *label;
 
 	label = mac_labelzone_alloc(MAC_WAITOK);
-	if (label == NULL)
-		return (NULL);
+	if (label == NULL) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
 	MAC_PERFORM(cred_label_init, label);
-	return (label);
+	return label;
 }
 
 void
@@ -102,6 +108,40 @@ mac_cred_label_free(struct label *label)
 	mac_labelzone_free(label);
 }
 
+bool
+mac_cred_label_is_equal(const struct label *a, const struct label *b)
+{
+	if (a->l_flags != b->l_flags) {
+		return false;
+	}
+	for (int slot = 0; slot < MAC_MAX_SLOTS; slot++) {
+		const void *pa = a->l_perpolicy[slot].l_ptr;
+		const void *pb = b->l_perpolicy[slot].l_ptr;
+
+		if (pa != pb) {
+			return false;
+		}
+	}
+	return true;
+}
+
+uint32_t
+mac_cred_label_hash_update(const struct label *a, uint32_t hash)
+{
+	hash = os_hash_jenkins_update(&a->l_flags,
+	    sizeof(a->l_flags), hash);
+#if __has_feature(ptrauth_calls)
+	for (int slot = 0; slot < MAC_MAX_SLOTS; slot++) {
+		const void *ptr = a->l_perpolicy[slot].l_ptr;
+		hash = os_hash_jenkins_update(&ptr, sizeof(ptr), hash);
+	}
+#else
+	hash = os_hash_jenkins_update(&a->l_perpolicy,
+	    sizeof(a->l_perpolicy), hash);
+#endif
+	return hash;
+}
+
 int
 mac_cred_label_externalize_audit(struct proc *p, struct mac *mac)
 {
@@ -114,13 +154,12 @@ mac_cred_label_externalize_audit(struct proc *p, struct mac *mac)
 	    mac->m_string, mac->m_buflen);
 
 	kauth_cred_unref(&cr);
-	return (error);
+	return error;
 }
 
 void
 mac_cred_label_destroy(kauth_cred_t cred)
 {
-
 	mac_cred_label_free(cred->cr_label);
 	cred->cr_label = NULL;
 }
@@ -133,7 +172,7 @@ mac_cred_label_externalize(struct label *label, char *elements,
 
 	error = MAC_EXTERNALIZE(cred, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen);
 
-	return (error);
+	return error;
 }
 
 int
@@ -143,7 +182,7 @@ mac_cred_label_internalize(struct label *label, char *string)
 
 	error = MAC_INTERNALIZE(cred, label, string);
 
-	return (error);
+	return error;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -157,7 +196,7 @@ mac_cred_label_associate_fork(kauth_cred_t cred, proc_t proc)
 {
 	MAC_PERFORM(cred_label_associate_fork, cred, proc);
 }
-	
+
 /*
  * Initialize MAC label for the first kernel process, from which other
  * kernel processes and threads are spawned.
@@ -165,7 +204,6 @@ mac_cred_label_associate_fork(kauth_cred_t cred, proc_t proc)
 void
 mac_cred_label_associate_kernel(kauth_cred_t cred)
 {
-
 	MAC_PERFORM(cred_label_associate_kernel, cred);
 }
 
@@ -176,7 +214,6 @@ mac_cred_label_associate_kernel(kauth_cred_t cred)
 void
 mac_cred_label_associate_user(kauth_cred_t cred)
 {
-
 	MAC_PERFORM(cred_label_associate_user, cred);
 }
 
@@ -188,7 +225,6 @@ mac_cred_label_associate_user(kauth_cred_t cred)
 void
 mac_cred_label_associate(struct ucred *parent_cred, struct ucred *child_cred)
 {
-
 	MAC_PERFORM(cred_label_associate, parent_cred, child_cred);
 }
 
@@ -201,8 +237,9 @@ mac_execve_enter(user_addr_t mac_p, struct image_params *imgp)
 	int error;
 	size_t ulen;
 
-	if (mac_p == USER_ADDR_NULL)
-		return (0);
+	if (mac_p == USER_ADDR_NULL) {
+		return 0;
+	}
 
 	if (IS_64BIT_PROCESS(current_proc())) {
 		struct user64_mac mac64;
@@ -215,18 +252,21 @@ mac_execve_enter(user_addr_t mac_p, struct image_params *imgp)
 		mac.m_buflen = mac32.m_buflen;
 		mac.m_string = mac32.m_string;
 	}
-	if (error)
-		return (error);
+	if (error) {
+		return error;
+	}
 
 	error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac);
-	if (error)
-		return (error);
+	if (error) {
+		return error;
+	}
 
 	execlabel = mac_cred_label_alloc();
 	MALLOC(buffer, char *, mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK);
 	error = copyinstr(CAST_USER_ADDR_T(mac.m_string), buffer, mac.m_buflen, &ulen);
-	if (error)
+	if (error) {
 		goto out;
+	}
 	AUDIT_ARG(mac_string, buffer);
 
 	error = mac_cred_label_internalize(execlabel, buffer);
@@ -237,7 +277,7 @@ out:
 	}
 	imgp->ip_execlabelp = execlabel;
 	FREE(buffer, M_MACTEMP);
-	return (error);
+	return error;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -265,12 +305,16 @@ mac_cred_check_label_update(kauth_cred_t cred, struct label *newlabel)
 {
 	int error;
 
-	if (!mac_proc_enforce)
-		return (0);
+#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
+	/* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
+	if (!mac_proc_enforce) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+#endif
 
 	MAC_CHECK(cred_check_label_update, cred, newlabel);
 
-	return (error);
+	return error;
 }
 
 int
@@ -278,44 +322,98 @@ mac_cred_check_visible(kauth_cred_t u1, kauth_cred_t u2)
 {
 	int error;
 
+#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
+	/* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
+	if (!mac_proc_enforce) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+#endif
 
+	MAC_CHECK(cred_check_visible, u1, u2);
 
-	if (!mac_proc_enforce)
-		return (0);
-
+	return error;
+}
 
+int
+mac_proc_check_debug(proc_ident_t tracing_ident, kauth_cred_t tracing_cred, proc_ident_t traced_ident)
+{
+	int error;
+	bool enforce;
+	proc_t tracingp;
 
-	MAC_CHECK(cred_check_visible, u1, u2);
+#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
+	/* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
+	if (!mac_proc_enforce) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+#endif
+	/*
+	 * Once all mac hooks adopt proc_ident_t, finding proc_t and releasing
+	 * it below should go to mac_proc_check_enforce().
+	 */
+	if ((tracingp = proc_find_ident(tracing_ident)) == PROC_NULL) {
+		return ESRCH;
+	}
+	enforce = mac_proc_check_enforce(tracingp);
+	proc_rele(tracingp);
 
+	if (!enforce) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+	MAC_CHECK(proc_check_debug, tracing_cred, traced_ident);
 
-	return (error);
+	return error;
 }
 
-/*                                                                                                    
- * called with process locked.                                                                        
- */
-void mac_proc_set_enforce(proc_t p, int enforce_flags)
+int
+mac_proc_check_dump_core(struct proc *proc)
 {
-        p->p_mac_enforce |= enforce_flags;
+	int error;
+
+#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
+	/* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
+	if (!mac_proc_enforce) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+#endif
+	if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(proc)) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	MAC_CHECK(proc_check_dump_core, proc);
+
+	return error;
 }
 
 int
-mac_proc_check_debug(proc_t curp, struct proc *proc)
+mac_proc_check_remote_thread_create(struct task *task, int flavor, thread_state_t new_state, mach_msg_type_number_t new_state_count)
 {
+	proc_t curp = current_proc();
+	proc_t proc;
 	kauth_cred_t cred;
 	int error;
 
+#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
+	/* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
+	if (!mac_proc_enforce) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+#endif
+	if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp)) {
+		return 0;
+	}
 
-
-	if (!mac_proc_enforce ||
-	    !mac_proc_check_enforce(curp, MAC_PROC_ENFORCE))
-		return (0);
+	proc = proc_find(task_pid(task));
+	if (proc == PROC_NULL) {
+		return ESRCH;
+	}
 
 	cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
-	MAC_CHECK(proc_check_debug, cred, proc);
+	MAC_CHECK(proc_check_remote_thread_create, cred, proc, flavor, new_state, new_state_count);
 	kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
+	proc_rele(proc);
 
-	return (error);
+	return error;
 }
 
 int
@@ -324,35 +422,78 @@ mac_proc_check_fork(proc_t curp)
 	kauth_cred_t cred;
 	int error;
 
-	if (!mac_proc_enforce ||
-	    !mac_proc_check_enforce(curp, MAC_PROC_ENFORCE))
-		return (0);
+#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
+	/* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
+	if (!mac_proc_enforce) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+#endif
+	if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp)) {
+		return 0;
+	}
 
 	cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
 	MAC_CHECK(proc_check_fork, cred, curp);
 	kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
 
-	return (error);
+	return error;
+}
+
+int
+mac_proc_check_get_task(struct ucred *cred, proc_ident_t pident, mach_task_flavor_t flavor)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	assert(flavor <= TASK_FLAVOR_NAME);
+
+	/* Also call the old hook for compatability, deprecating in rdar://66356944. */
+	if (flavor == TASK_FLAVOR_CONTROL) {
+		MAC_CHECK(proc_check_get_task, cred, pident);
+		if (error) {
+			return error;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (flavor == TASK_FLAVOR_NAME) {
+		MAC_CHECK(proc_check_get_task_name, cred, pident);
+		if (error) {
+			return error;
+		}
+	}
+
+	MAC_CHECK(proc_check_get_task_with_flavor, cred, pident, flavor);
+
+	return error;
 }
 
 int
-mac_proc_check_get_task_name(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *p)
+mac_proc_check_expose_task(struct ucred *cred, proc_ident_t pident, mach_task_flavor_t flavor)
 {
 	int error;
 
-	MAC_CHECK(proc_check_get_task_name, cred, p);
+	assert(flavor <= TASK_FLAVOR_NAME);
+
+	/* Also call the old hook for compatability, deprecating in rdar://66356944. */
+	if (flavor == TASK_FLAVOR_CONTROL) {
+		MAC_CHECK(proc_check_expose_task, cred, pident);
+		if (error) {
+			return error;
+		}
+	}
+
+	MAC_CHECK(proc_check_expose_task_with_flavor, cred, pident, flavor);
 
-	return (error);
+	return error;
 }
 
 int
-mac_proc_check_get_task(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *p)
+mac_proc_check_inherit_ipc_ports(struct proc *p, struct vnode *cur_vp, off_t cur_offset, struct vnode *img_vp, off_t img_offset, struct vnode *scriptvp)
 {
 	int error;
 
-	MAC_CHECK(proc_check_get_task, cred, p);
+	MAC_CHECK(proc_check_inherit_ipc_ports, p, cur_vp, cur_offset, img_vp, img_offset, scriptvp);
 
-	return (error);
+	return error;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -367,15 +508,21 @@ mac_proc_check_map_anon(proc_t proc, user_addr_t u_addr,
 	kauth_cred_t cred;
 	int error;
 
-	if (!mac_vm_enforce ||
-	    !mac_proc_check_enforce(proc, MAC_VM_ENFORCE))
-		return (0);
+#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
+	/* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
+	if (!mac_vm_enforce) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+#endif
+	if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(proc)) {
+		return 0;
+	}
 
 	cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(proc);
 	MAC_CHECK(proc_check_map_anon, proc, cred, u_addr, u_size, prot, flags, maxprot);
 	kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
 
-	return (error);
+	return error;
 }
 
 int
@@ -385,46 +532,67 @@ mac_proc_check_mprotect(proc_t proc,
 	kauth_cred_t cred;
 	int error;
 
-	if (!mac_vm_enforce ||
-	    !mac_proc_check_enforce(proc, MAC_VM_ENFORCE))
-		return (0);
+#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
+	/* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
+	if (!mac_vm_enforce) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+#endif
+	if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(proc)) {
+		return 0;
+	}
 
 	cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(proc);
 	MAC_CHECK(proc_check_mprotect, cred, proc, addr, size, prot);
 	kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
 
-	return (error);
+	return error;
 }
 
 int
 mac_proc_check_run_cs_invalid(proc_t proc)
 {
 	int error;
-	
-	if (!mac_vm_enforce) return (0);
-	
+
+#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
+	/* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
+	if (!mac_vm_enforce) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+#endif
+
 	MAC_CHECK(proc_check_run_cs_invalid, proc);
-	
-	return (error);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+void
+mac_proc_notify_cs_invalidated(proc_t proc)
+{
+	MAC_PERFORM(proc_notify_cs_invalidated, proc);
 }
-				   
+
 int
 mac_proc_check_sched(proc_t curp, struct proc *proc)
 {
 	kauth_cred_t cred;
 	int error;
 
-
-
-	if (!mac_proc_enforce ||
-	    !mac_proc_check_enforce(curp, MAC_PROC_ENFORCE))
-		return (0);
+#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
+	/* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
+	if (!mac_proc_enforce) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+#endif
+	if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp)) {
+		return 0;
+	}
 
 	cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
 	MAC_CHECK(proc_check_sched, cred, proc);
 	kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
 
-	return (error);
+	return error;
 }
 
 int
@@ -433,160 +601,183 @@ mac_proc_check_signal(proc_t curp, struct proc *proc, int signum)
 	kauth_cred_t cred;
 	int error;
 
-
-
-	if (!mac_proc_enforce ||
-	    !mac_proc_check_enforce(curp, MAC_PROC_ENFORCE))
-		return (0);
+#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
+	/* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
+	if (!mac_proc_enforce) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+#endif
+	if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp)) {
+		return 0;
+	}
 
 	cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
 	MAC_CHECK(proc_check_signal, cred, proc, signum);
 	kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
 
-	return (error);
+	return error;
 }
 
 int
-mac_proc_check_wait(proc_t curp, struct proc *proc)
+mac_proc_check_syscall_unix(proc_t curp, int scnum)
 {
-	kauth_cred_t cred;
 	int error;
 
+#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
+	/* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
+	if (!mac_proc_enforce) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+#endif
+	if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp)) {
+		return 0;
+	}
 
+	MAC_CHECK(proc_check_syscall_unix, curp, scnum);
 
-	if (!mac_proc_enforce ||
-	    !mac_proc_check_enforce(curp, MAC_PROC_ENFORCE))
-		return (0);
-
-	cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
-	MAC_CHECK(proc_check_wait, cred, proc);
-	kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
-
-	return (error);
-}
-
-#if CONFIG_LCTX
-/*
- * Login Context
- */
-
-int
-mac_proc_check_setlcid (struct proc *p0, struct proc *p,
-			pid_t pid, pid_t lcid)
-{
-	int error;
-
-	if (!mac_proc_enforce ||
-	    !mac_proc_check_enforce(p0, MAC_PROC_ENFORCE))
-		return (0);
-
-	MAC_CHECK(proc_check_setlcid, p0, p, pid, lcid);
-	return (error);
+	return error;
 }
 
 int
-mac_proc_check_getlcid (struct proc *p0, struct proc *p, pid_t pid)
+mac_proc_check_wait(proc_t curp, struct proc *proc)
 {
+	kauth_cred_t cred;
 	int error;
 
-	if (!mac_proc_enforce ||
-	    !mac_proc_check_enforce(p0, MAC_PROC_ENFORCE))
-		return (0);
-
-	MAC_CHECK(proc_check_getlcid, p0, p, pid);
-	return (error);
-}
+#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
+	/* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
+	if (!mac_proc_enforce) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+#endif
+	if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp)) {
+		return 0;
+	}
 
-void
-mac_lctx_notify_create (struct proc *p, struct lctx *l)
-{
-	MAC_PERFORM(lctx_notify_create, p, l);
-}
+	cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
+	MAC_CHECK(proc_check_wait, cred, proc);
+	kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
 
-void
-mac_lctx_notify_join (struct proc *p, struct lctx *l)
-{
-	MAC_PERFORM(lctx_notify_join, p, l);
+	return error;
 }
 
 void
-mac_lctx_notify_leave (struct proc *p, struct lctx *l)
+mac_proc_notify_exit(struct proc *proc)
 {
-	MAC_PERFORM(lctx_notify_leave, p, l);
+	MAC_PERFORM(proc_notify_exit, proc);
 }
 
-struct label *
-mac_lctx_label_alloc(void)
+int
+mac_proc_check_suspend_resume(proc_t proc, int sr)
 {
-	struct label *label;
+	kauth_cred_t cred;
+	int error;
 
-	label = mac_labelzone_alloc(MAC_WAITOK);
-	if (label == NULL)
-		return (NULL);
-	MAC_PERFORM(lctx_label_init, label);
-	return (label);
-}
+#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
+	/* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
+	if (!mac_proc_enforce) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+#endif
+	if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(current_proc())) {
+		return 0;
+	}
 
-void
-mac_lctx_label_free(struct label *label)
-{
+	cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(current_proc());
+	MAC_CHECK(proc_check_suspend_resume, cred, proc, sr);
+	kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
 
-	MAC_PERFORM(lctx_label_destroy, label);
-	mac_labelzone_free(label);
+	return error;
 }
 
 int
-mac_lctx_label_externalize(struct label *label, char *elements,
-    char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen)
+mac_proc_check_ledger(proc_t curp, proc_t proc, int ledger_op)
 {
-	int error;
+	kauth_cred_t cred;
+	int error = 0;
+
+#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
+	/* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
+	if (!mac_proc_enforce) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+#endif
+	if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp)) {
+		return 0;
+	}
 
-	error = MAC_EXTERNALIZE(lctx, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen);
+	cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
+	MAC_CHECK(proc_check_ledger, cred, proc, ledger_op);
+	kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
 
-	return (error);
+	return error;
 }
 
 int
-mac_lctx_label_internalize(struct label *label, char *string)
+mac_proc_check_proc_info(proc_t curp, proc_t target, int callnum, int flavor)
 {
-	int error;
-
-	error = MAC_INTERNALIZE(lctx, label, string);
+	kauth_cred_t cred;
+	int error = 0;
 
-	return (error);
-}
+#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
+	/* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
+	if (!mac_proc_enforce) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+#endif
+	if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp)) {
+		return 0;
+	}
 
-void
-mac_lctx_label_update(struct lctx *l, struct label *newlabel)
-{
+	cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
+	MAC_CHECK(proc_check_proc_info, cred, target, callnum, flavor);
+	kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
 
-	MAC_PERFORM(lctx_label_update, l, newlabel);
+	return error;
 }
 
 int
-mac_lctx_check_label_update(struct lctx *l, struct label *newlabel)
+mac_proc_check_get_cs_info(proc_t curp, proc_t target, unsigned int op)
 {
-	int error;
+	kauth_cred_t cred;
+	int error = 0;
 
-	MAC_CHECK(lctx_check_label_update, l, newlabel);
+#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
+	/* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
+	if (!mac_proc_enforce) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+#endif
+	if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp)) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
+	MAC_CHECK(proc_check_get_cs_info, cred, target, op);
+	kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
 
-	return (error);
+	return error;
 }
-#endif	/* LCTX */
 
 int
-mac_proc_check_suspend_resume(proc_t curp, int sr)
+mac_proc_check_set_cs_info(proc_t curp, proc_t target, unsigned int op)
 {
 	kauth_cred_t cred;
-	int error;
+	int error = 0;
 
-	if (!mac_proc_enforce ||
-	    !mac_proc_check_enforce(curp, MAC_PROC_ENFORCE))
-		return (0);
+#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
+	/* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
+	if (!mac_proc_enforce) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+#endif
+	if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp)) {
+		return 0;
+	}
 
 	cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
-	MAC_CHECK(proc_check_suspend_resume, cred, curp, sr);
+	MAC_CHECK(proc_check_set_cs_info, cred, target, op);
 	kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
 
-	return (error);
+	return error;
 }