X-Git-Url: https://git.saurik.com/apple/xnu.git/blobdiff_plain/593a1d5fd87cdf5b46dd5fcb84467b432cea0f91..bca245acd4c03fd752d1a45f011ad495e60fe53d:/security/mac_process.c?ds=sidebyside diff --git a/security/mac_process.c b/security/mac_process.c index 4ed4d53b7..31d539af2 100644 --- a/security/mac_process.c +++ b/security/mac_process.c @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ /* - * Copyright (c) 2007 Apple Inc. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2010 Apple Inc. All rights reserved. * * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_START@ - * + * * This file contains Original Code and/or Modifications of Original Code * as defined in and that are subject to the Apple Public Source License * Version 2.0 (the 'License'). You may not use this file except in @@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ * unlawful or unlicensed copies of an Apple operating system, or to * circumvent, violate, or enable the circumvention or violation of, any * terms of an Apple operating system software license agreement. - * + * * Please obtain a copy of the License at * http://www.opensource.apple.com/apsl/ and read it before using this file. - * + * * The Original Code and all software distributed under the License are * distributed on an 'AS IS' basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AND APPLE HEREBY DISCLAIMS ALL SUCH WARRANTIES, @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, QUIET ENJOYMENT OR NON-INFRINGEMENT. * Please see the License for the specific language governing rights and * limitations under the License. - * + * * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_END@ */ @@ -72,10 +72,13 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include #include +#include -#include +#include struct label * mac_cred_label_alloc(void) @@ -83,10 +86,11 @@ mac_cred_label_alloc(void) struct label *label; label = mac_labelzone_alloc(MAC_WAITOK); - if (label == NULL) - return (NULL); + if (label == NULL) { + return NULL; + } MAC_PERFORM(cred_label_init, label); - return (label); + return label; } void @@ -102,6 +106,12 @@ mac_cred_label_free(struct label *label) mac_labelzone_free(label); } +int +mac_cred_label_compare(struct label *a, struct label *b) +{ + return bcmp(a, b, sizeof(*a)) == 0; +} + int mac_cred_label_externalize_audit(struct proc *p, struct mac *mac) { @@ -114,13 +124,12 @@ mac_cred_label_externalize_audit(struct proc *p, struct mac *mac) mac->m_string, mac->m_buflen); kauth_cred_unref(&cr); - return (error); + return error; } void mac_cred_label_destroy(kauth_cred_t cred) { - mac_cred_label_free(cred->cr_label); cred->cr_label = NULL; } @@ -133,7 +142,7 @@ mac_cred_label_externalize(struct label *label, char *elements, error = MAC_EXTERNALIZE(cred, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen); - return (error); + return error; } int @@ -143,7 +152,7 @@ mac_cred_label_internalize(struct label *label, char *string) error = MAC_INTERNALIZE(cred, label, string); - return (error); + return error; } /* @@ -157,7 +166,7 @@ mac_cred_label_associate_fork(kauth_cred_t cred, proc_t proc) { MAC_PERFORM(cred_label_associate_fork, cred, proc); } - + /* * Initialize MAC label for the first kernel process, from which other * kernel processes and threads are spawned. @@ -165,7 +174,6 @@ mac_cred_label_associate_fork(kauth_cred_t cred, proc_t proc) void mac_cred_label_associate_kernel(kauth_cred_t cred) { - MAC_PERFORM(cred_label_associate_kernel, cred); } @@ -176,7 +184,6 @@ mac_cred_label_associate_kernel(kauth_cred_t cred) void mac_cred_label_associate_user(kauth_cred_t cred) { - MAC_PERFORM(cred_label_associate_user, cred); } @@ -188,7 +195,6 @@ mac_cred_label_associate_user(kauth_cred_t cred) void mac_cred_label_associate(struct ucred *parent_cred, struct ucred *child_cred) { - MAC_PERFORM(cred_label_associate, parent_cred, child_cred); } @@ -201,29 +207,36 @@ mac_execve_enter(user_addr_t mac_p, struct image_params *imgp) int error; size_t ulen; - if (mac_p == USER_ADDR_NULL) - return (0); + if (mac_p == USER_ADDR_NULL) { + return 0; + } if (IS_64BIT_PROCESS(current_proc())) { - error = copyin(mac_p, &mac, sizeof(mac)); + struct user64_mac mac64; + error = copyin(mac_p, &mac64, sizeof(mac64)); + mac.m_buflen = mac64.m_buflen; + mac.m_string = mac64.m_string; } else { - struct mac mac32; + struct user32_mac mac32; error = copyin(mac_p, &mac32, sizeof(mac32)); mac.m_buflen = mac32.m_buflen; - mac.m_string = CAST_USER_ADDR_T(mac32.m_string); + mac.m_string = mac32.m_string; + } + if (error) { + return error; } - if (error) - return (error); error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac); - if (error) - return (error); + if (error) { + return error; + } execlabel = mac_cred_label_alloc(); MALLOC(buffer, char *, mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK); error = copyinstr(CAST_USER_ADDR_T(mac.m_string), buffer, mac.m_buflen, &ulen); - if (error) + if (error) { goto out; + } AUDIT_ARG(mac_string, buffer); error = mac_cred_label_internalize(execlabel, buffer); @@ -234,20 +247,24 @@ out: } imgp->ip_execlabelp = execlabel; FREE(buffer, M_MACTEMP); - return (error); + return error; } /* * When the subject's label changes, it may require revocation of privilege * to mapped objects. This can't be done on-the-fly later with a unified * buffer cache. + * + * XXX: CRF_MAC_ENFORCE should be in a kauth_cred_t field, rather + * XXX: than a posix_cred_t field. */ void mac_cred_label_update(kauth_cred_t cred, struct label *newlabel) { + posix_cred_t pcred = posix_cred_get(cred); /* force label to be part of "matching" for credential */ - cred->cr_flags |= CRF_MAC_ENFORCE; + pcred->cr_flags |= CRF_MAC_ENFORCE; /* inform the policies of the update */ MAC_PERFORM(cred_label_update, cred, newlabel); @@ -258,12 +275,16 @@ mac_cred_check_label_update(kauth_cred_t cred, struct label *newlabel) { int error; - if (!mac_proc_enforce) - return (0); +#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE + /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */ + if (!mac_proc_enforce) { + return 0; + } +#endif MAC_CHECK(cred_check_label_update, cred, newlabel); - return (error); + return error; } int @@ -271,25 +292,16 @@ mac_cred_check_visible(kauth_cred_t u1, kauth_cred_t u2) { int error; - - - if (!mac_proc_enforce) - return (0); - - +#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE + /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */ + if (!mac_proc_enforce) { + return 0; + } +#endif MAC_CHECK(cred_check_visible, u1, u2); - - return (error); -} - -/* - * called with process locked. - */ -void mac_proc_set_enforce(proc_t p, int enforce_flags) -{ - p->p_mac_enforce |= enforce_flags; + return error; } int @@ -298,17 +310,41 @@ mac_proc_check_debug(proc_t curp, struct proc *proc) kauth_cred_t cred; int error; - - - if (!mac_proc_enforce || - !mac_proc_check_enforce(curp, MAC_PROC_ENFORCE)) - return (0); +#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE + /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */ + if (!mac_proc_enforce) { + return 0; + } +#endif + if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp)) { + return 0; + } cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp); MAC_CHECK(proc_check_debug, cred, proc); kauth_cred_unref(&cred); - return (error); + return error; +} + +int +mac_proc_check_dump_core(struct proc *proc) +{ + int error; + +#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE + /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */ + if (!mac_proc_enforce) { + return 0; + } +#endif + if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(proc)) { + return 0; + } + + MAC_CHECK(proc_check_dump_core, proc); + + return error; } int @@ -317,15 +353,21 @@ mac_proc_check_fork(proc_t curp) kauth_cred_t cred; int error; - if (!mac_proc_enforce || - !mac_proc_check_enforce(curp, MAC_PROC_ENFORCE)) - return (0); +#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE + /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */ + if (!mac_proc_enforce) { + return 0; + } +#endif + if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp)) { + return 0; + } cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp); MAC_CHECK(proc_check_fork, cred, curp); kauth_cred_unref(&cred); - return (error); + return error; } int @@ -335,7 +377,7 @@ mac_proc_check_get_task_name(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *p) MAC_CHECK(proc_check_get_task_name, cred, p); - return (error); + return error; } int @@ -345,213 +387,305 @@ mac_proc_check_get_task(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *p) MAC_CHECK(proc_check_get_task, cred, p); - return (error); + return error; } int -mac_proc_check_mprotect(proc_t proc, - user_addr_t addr, user_size_t size, int prot) +mac_proc_check_expose_task(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *p) { - kauth_cred_t cred; int error; - if (!mac_vm_enforce || - !mac_proc_check_enforce(proc, MAC_VM_ENFORCE)) - return (0); + MAC_CHECK(proc_check_expose_task, cred, p); - cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(proc); - MAC_CHECK(proc_check_mprotect, cred, proc, addr, size, prot); - kauth_cred_unref(&cred); + return error; +} + +int +mac_proc_check_inherit_ipc_ports(struct proc *p, struct vnode *cur_vp, off_t cur_offset, struct vnode *img_vp, off_t img_offset, struct vnode *scriptvp) +{ + int error; + + MAC_CHECK(proc_check_inherit_ipc_ports, p, cur_vp, cur_offset, img_vp, img_offset, scriptvp); - return (error); + return error; } +/* + * The type of maxprot in proc_check_map_anon must be equivalent to vm_prot_t + * (defined in ). mac_policy.h does not include any header + * files, so cannot use the typedef itself. + */ int -mac_proc_check_map_prot_copy_allow(proc_t proc) +mac_proc_check_map_anon(proc_t proc, user_addr_t u_addr, + user_size_t u_size, int prot, int flags, int *maxprot) { kauth_cred_t cred; int error; - - if (!mac_vm_enforce) return (0); - + +#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE + /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */ + if (!mac_vm_enforce) { + return 0; + } +#endif + if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(proc)) { + return 0; + } + cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(proc); - MAC_CHECK(proc_check_map_prot_copy_allow, cred, proc); + MAC_CHECK(proc_check_map_anon, proc, cred, u_addr, u_size, prot, flags, maxprot); kauth_cred_unref(&cred); - - return (error); + + return error; } - + int -mac_proc_check_sched(proc_t curp, struct proc *proc) +mac_proc_check_mprotect(proc_t proc, + user_addr_t addr, user_size_t size, int prot) { kauth_cred_t cred; int error; +#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE + /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */ + if (!mac_vm_enforce) { + return 0; + } +#endif + if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(proc)) { + return 0; + } - - if (!mac_proc_enforce || - !mac_proc_check_enforce(curp, MAC_PROC_ENFORCE)) - return (0); - - cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp); - MAC_CHECK(proc_check_sched, cred, proc); + cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(proc); + MAC_CHECK(proc_check_mprotect, cred, proc, addr, size, prot); kauth_cred_unref(&cred); - return (error); + return error; } int -mac_proc_check_signal(proc_t curp, struct proc *proc, int signum) +mac_proc_check_run_cs_invalid(proc_t proc) { - kauth_cred_t cred; int error; +#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE + /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */ + if (!mac_vm_enforce) { + return 0; + } +#endif + MAC_CHECK(proc_check_run_cs_invalid, proc); - if (!mac_proc_enforce || - !mac_proc_check_enforce(curp, MAC_PROC_ENFORCE)) - return (0); - - cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp); - MAC_CHECK(proc_check_signal, cred, proc, signum); - kauth_cred_unref(&cred); - - return (error); + return error; } int -mac_proc_check_wait(proc_t curp, struct proc *proc) +mac_proc_check_sched(proc_t curp, struct proc *proc) { kauth_cred_t cred; int error; - - - if (!mac_proc_enforce || - !mac_proc_check_enforce(curp, MAC_PROC_ENFORCE)) - return (0); +#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE + /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */ + if (!mac_proc_enforce) { + return 0; + } +#endif + if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp)) { + return 0; + } cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp); - MAC_CHECK(proc_check_wait, cred, proc); + MAC_CHECK(proc_check_sched, cred, proc); kauth_cred_unref(&cred); - return (error); + return error; } -#if CONFIG_LCTX -/* - * Login Context - */ - int -mac_proc_check_setlcid (struct proc *p0, struct proc *p, - pid_t pid, pid_t lcid) +mac_proc_check_signal(proc_t curp, struct proc *proc, int signum) { + kauth_cred_t cred; int error; - if (!mac_proc_enforce || - !mac_proc_check_enforce(p0, MAC_PROC_ENFORCE)) - return (0); +#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE + /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */ + if (!mac_proc_enforce) { + return 0; + } +#endif + if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp)) { + return 0; + } - MAC_CHECK(proc_check_setlcid, p0, p, pid, lcid); - return (error); + cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp); + MAC_CHECK(proc_check_signal, cred, proc, signum); + kauth_cred_unref(&cred); + + return error; } int -mac_proc_check_getlcid (struct proc *p0, struct proc *p, pid_t pid) +mac_proc_check_syscall_unix(proc_t curp, int scnum) { int error; - if (!mac_proc_enforce || - !mac_proc_check_enforce(p0, MAC_PROC_ENFORCE)) - return (0); +#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE + /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */ + if (!mac_proc_enforce) { + return 0; + } +#endif + if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp)) { + return 0; + } - MAC_CHECK(proc_check_getlcid, p0, p, pid); - return (error); -} + MAC_CHECK(proc_check_syscall_unix, curp, scnum); -void -mac_lctx_notify_create (struct proc *p, struct lctx *l) -{ - MAC_PERFORM(lctx_notify_create, p, l); + return error; } -void -mac_lctx_notify_join (struct proc *p, struct lctx *l) +int +mac_proc_check_wait(proc_t curp, struct proc *proc) { - MAC_PERFORM(lctx_notify_join, p, l); -} + kauth_cred_t cred; + int error; -void -mac_lctx_notify_leave (struct proc *p, struct lctx *l) -{ - MAC_PERFORM(lctx_notify_leave, p, l); -} +#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE + /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */ + if (!mac_proc_enforce) { + return 0; + } +#endif + if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp)) { + return 0; + } -struct label * -mac_lctx_label_alloc(void) -{ - struct label *label; + cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp); + MAC_CHECK(proc_check_wait, cred, proc); + kauth_cred_unref(&cred); - label = mac_labelzone_alloc(MAC_WAITOK); - if (label == NULL) - return (NULL); - MAC_PERFORM(lctx_label_init, label); - return (label); + return error; } void -mac_lctx_label_free(struct label *label) +mac_proc_notify_exit(struct proc *proc) { - - MAC_PERFORM(lctx_label_destroy, label); - mac_labelzone_free(label); + MAC_PERFORM(proc_notify_exit, proc); } int -mac_lctx_label_externalize(struct label *label, char *elements, - char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen) +mac_proc_check_suspend_resume(proc_t curp, int sr) { + kauth_cred_t cred; int error; - error = MAC_EXTERNALIZE(lctx, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen); +#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE + /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */ + if (!mac_proc_enforce) { + return 0; + } +#endif + if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp)) { + return 0; + } + + cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp); + MAC_CHECK(proc_check_suspend_resume, cred, curp, sr); + kauth_cred_unref(&cred); - return (error); + return error; } int -mac_lctx_label_internalize(struct label *label, char *string) +mac_proc_check_ledger(proc_t curp, proc_t proc, int ledger_op) { - int error; + kauth_cred_t cred; + int error = 0; + +#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE + /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */ + if (!mac_proc_enforce) { + return 0; + } +#endif + if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp)) { + return 0; + } - error = MAC_INTERNALIZE(lctx, label, string); + cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp); + MAC_CHECK(proc_check_ledger, cred, proc, ledger_op); + kauth_cred_unref(&cred); - return (error); + return error; } -void -mac_lctx_label_update(struct lctx *l, struct label *newlabel) +int +mac_proc_check_proc_info(proc_t curp, proc_t target, int callnum, int flavor) { + kauth_cred_t cred; + int error = 0; - MAC_PERFORM(lctx_label_update, l, newlabel); +#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE + /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */ + if (!mac_proc_enforce) { + return 0; + } +#endif + if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp)) { + return 0; + } + + cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp); + MAC_CHECK(proc_check_proc_info, cred, target, callnum, flavor); + kauth_cred_unref(&cred); + + return error; } int -mac_lctx_check_label_update(struct lctx *l, struct label *newlabel) +mac_proc_check_get_cs_info(proc_t curp, proc_t target, unsigned int op) { - int error; + kauth_cred_t cred; + int error = 0; - MAC_CHECK(lctx_check_label_update, l, newlabel); +#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE + /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */ + if (!mac_proc_enforce) { + return 0; + } +#endif + if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp)) { + return 0; + } - return (error); -} -#endif /* LCTX */ + cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp); + MAC_CHECK(proc_check_get_cs_info, cred, target, op); + kauth_cred_unref(&cred); + return error; +} -void -mac_thread_userret(int code, int error, struct thread *thread) +int +mac_proc_check_set_cs_info(proc_t curp, proc_t target, unsigned int op) { + kauth_cred_t cred; + int error = 0; + +#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE + /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */ + if (!mac_proc_enforce) { + return 0; + } +#endif + if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp)) { + return 0; + } + + cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp); + MAC_CHECK(proc_check_set_cs_info, cred, target, op); + kauth_cred_unref(&cred); - if (mac_late) - MAC_PERFORM(thread_userret, code, error, thread); + return error; }