X-Git-Url: https://git.saurik.com/apple/xnu.git/blobdiff_plain/4bd07ac2140668789aa3ee8ec4dde4a3e0a3bba5..a39ff7e25e19b3a8c3020042a3872ca9ec9659f1:/bsd/kern/kern_prot.c

diff --git a/bsd/kern/kern_prot.c b/bsd/kern/kern_prot.c
index e90c68c55..9d825afcb 100644
--- a/bsd/kern/kern_prot.c
+++ b/bsd/kern/kern_prot.c
@@ -95,8 +95,7 @@
 #include <sys/timeb.h>
 #include <sys/times.h>
 #include <sys/malloc.h>
-
-#define chgproccnt_ok(p) 1
+#include <sys/persona.h>
 
 #include <security/audit/audit.h>
 
@@ -581,7 +580,7 @@ setsid(proc_t p, __unused struct setsid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
  * XXX:		Belongs in kern_proc.c
  */
 int
-setpgid(proc_t curp, register struct setpgid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
+setpgid(proc_t curp, struct setpgid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
 {
 	proc_t targp = PROC_NULL;	/* target process */
 	struct pgrp *pg = PGRP_NULL;	/* target pgrp */
@@ -778,7 +777,7 @@ setuid(proc_t p, struct setuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
 			 * may be able to decrement the proc count of B before we can increment it. This results in a panic.
 			 * Incrementing the proc count of the target ruid, B, before setting the process credentials prevents this race.
 			 */
-			if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && chgproccnt_ok(p)) {
+			if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && !proc_has_persona(p)) {
 				(void)chgproccnt(ruid, 1);
 			}
 
@@ -797,7 +796,7 @@ setuid(proc_t p, struct setuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
 				 * We didn't successfully switch to the new ruid, so decrement
 				 * the procs/uid count that we incremented above.
 				 */
-				if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && chgproccnt_ok(p)) {
+				if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && !proc_has_persona(p)) {
 					(void)chgproccnt(ruid, -1);
 				}
 				kauth_cred_unref(&my_new_cred);
@@ -816,7 +815,7 @@ setuid(proc_t p, struct setuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
 			 * If we've updated the ruid, decrement the count of procs running
 			 * under the previous ruid
 			 */
-			if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && chgproccnt_ok(p)) {
+			if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && !proc_has_persona(p)) {
 				(void)chgproccnt(my_pcred->cr_ruid, -1);
 			}
 		}
@@ -1026,7 +1025,7 @@ setreuid(proc_t p, struct setreuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
 			 * may be able to decrement the proc count of B before we can increment it. This results in a panic.
 			 * Incrementing the proc count of the target ruid, B, before setting the process credentials prevents this race.
 			 */
-			if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && chgproccnt_ok(p)) {
+			if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && !proc_has_persona(p)) {
 				(void)chgproccnt(ruid, 1);
 			}
 
@@ -1041,7 +1040,7 @@ setreuid(proc_t p, struct setreuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
 			 */
 			if (p->p_ucred != my_cred) {
 				proc_ucred_unlock(p);
-				if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && chgproccnt_ok(p)) {
+				if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && !proc_has_persona(p)) {
 					/*
 					 * We didn't successfully switch to the new ruid, so decrement
 					 * the procs/uid count that we incremented above.
@@ -1061,7 +1060,7 @@ setreuid(proc_t p, struct setreuid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
 			OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);
 			proc_ucred_unlock(p);
 
-			if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && chgproccnt_ok(p)) {
+			if (ruid != KAUTH_UID_NONE && !proc_has_persona(p)) {
 				/*
 				 * We switched to a new ruid, so decrement the count of procs running
 				 * under the previous ruid
@@ -1985,12 +1984,25 @@ setlogin(proc_t p, struct setlogin_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
  */
 int
 set_security_token(proc_t p)
+{
+	return set_security_token_task_internal(p, p->task);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the secrity token of the task with current euid and eguid
+ * The function takes a proc and a task, where proc->task might point to a
+ * different task if called from exec.
+ */
+
+int
+set_security_token_task_internal(proc_t p, void *t)
 {
 	security_token_t sec_token;
 	audit_token_t    audit_token;
 	kauth_cred_t my_cred;
 	posix_cred_t my_pcred;
 	host_priv_t host_priv;
+	task_t task = t;
 
 	/*
 	 * Don't allow a vfork child to override the parent's token settings
@@ -1998,7 +2010,7 @@ set_security_token(proc_t p)
 	 * suffer along using the parent's token until the exec().  It's all
 	 * undefined behavior anyway, right?
 	 */
-	if (p->task == current_task()) {
+	if (task == current_task()) {
 		uthread_t	 uthread;
 		uthread = (uthread_t)get_bsdthread_info(current_thread());
 		if (uthread->uu_flag & UT_VFORK)
@@ -2046,11 +2058,11 @@ set_security_token(proc_t p)
 	/* 
 	 * Update the pid an proc name for importance base if any
 	 */
-	task_importance_update_owner_info(p->task);
+	task_importance_update_owner_info(task);
 #endif
 
 	return (host_security_set_task_token(host_security_self(),
-					   p->task,
+					   task,
 					   sec_token,
 					   audit_token,
 					   host_priv) != KERN_SUCCESS);