| 1 | /* |
| 2 | * Copyright (c) 2008-2016 Apple Inc. All rights reserved. |
| 3 | * |
| 4 | * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_START@ |
| 5 | * |
| 6 | * This file contains Original Code and/or Modifications of Original Code |
| 7 | * as defined in and that are subject to the Apple Public Source License |
| 8 | * Version 2.0 (the 'License'). You may not use this file except in |
| 9 | * compliance with the License. The rights granted to you under the License |
| 10 | * may not be used to create, or enable the creation or redistribution of, |
| 11 | * unlawful or unlicensed copies of an Apple operating system, or to |
| 12 | * circumvent, violate, or enable the circumvention or violation of, any |
| 13 | * terms of an Apple operating system software license agreement. |
| 14 | * |
| 15 | * Please obtain a copy of the License at |
| 16 | * http://www.opensource.apple.com/apsl/ and read it before using this file. |
| 17 | * |
| 18 | * The Original Code and all software distributed under the License are |
| 19 | * distributed on an 'AS IS' basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER |
| 20 | * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AND APPLE HEREBY DISCLAIMS ALL SUCH WARRANTIES, |
| 21 | * INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, |
| 22 | * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, QUIET ENJOYMENT OR NON-INFRINGEMENT. |
| 23 | * Please see the License for the specific language governing rights and |
| 24 | * limitations under the License. |
| 25 | * |
| 26 | * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_END@ |
| 27 | */ |
| 28 | |
| 29 | /* $FreeBSD: src/sys/netinet6/ah_input.c,v 1.1.2.6 2002/04/28 05:40:26 suz Exp $ */ |
| 30 | /* $KAME: ah_input.c,v 1.67 2002/01/07 11:39:56 kjc Exp $ */ |
| 31 | |
| 32 | /* |
| 33 | * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project. |
| 34 | * All rights reserved. |
| 35 | * |
| 36 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| 37 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| 38 | * are met: |
| 39 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| 40 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| 41 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| 42 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| 43 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| 44 | * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors |
| 45 | * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software |
| 46 | * without specific prior written permission. |
| 47 | * |
| 48 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND |
| 49 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| 50 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| 51 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| 52 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| 53 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| 54 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| 55 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| 56 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| 57 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| 58 | * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| 59 | */ |
| 60 | |
| 61 | /* |
| 62 | * RFC1826/2402 authentication header. |
| 63 | */ |
| 64 | |
| 65 | #include <sys/param.h> |
| 66 | #include <sys/systm.h> |
| 67 | #include <sys/malloc.h> |
| 68 | #include <sys/mbuf.h> |
| 69 | #include <sys/mcache.h> |
| 70 | #include <sys/domain.h> |
| 71 | #include <sys/protosw.h> |
| 72 | #include <sys/socket.h> |
| 73 | #include <sys/errno.h> |
| 74 | #include <sys/time.h> |
| 75 | #include <sys/kernel.h> |
| 76 | #include <sys/syslog.h> |
| 77 | |
| 78 | #include <net/if.h> |
| 79 | #include <net/if_ipsec.h> |
| 80 | #include <net/route.h> |
| 81 | #include <kern/cpu_number.h> |
| 82 | #include <kern/locks.h> |
| 83 | |
| 84 | #include <netinet/in.h> |
| 85 | #include <netinet/in_systm.h> |
| 86 | #include <netinet/in_var.h> |
| 87 | #include <netinet/ip.h> |
| 88 | #include <netinet/ip_var.h> |
| 89 | #include <netinet/ip_ecn.h> |
| 90 | #include <netinet/in_pcb.h> |
| 91 | #if INET6 |
| 92 | #include <netinet6/ip6_ecn.h> |
| 93 | #endif |
| 94 | |
| 95 | #if INET6 |
| 96 | #include <netinet/ip6.h> |
| 97 | #include <netinet6/ip6_var.h> |
| 98 | #include <netinet6/in6_pcb.h> |
| 99 | #include <netinet/icmp6.h> |
| 100 | #include <netinet6/ip6protosw.h> |
| 101 | #endif |
| 102 | |
| 103 | #include <netinet6/ipsec.h> |
| 104 | #if INET6 |
| 105 | #include <netinet6/ipsec6.h> |
| 106 | #endif |
| 107 | #include <netinet6/ah.h> |
| 108 | #if INET6 |
| 109 | #include <netinet6/ah6.h> |
| 110 | #endif |
| 111 | #include <netkey/key.h> |
| 112 | #include <netkey/keydb.h> |
| 113 | #if IPSEC_DEBUG |
| 114 | #include <netkey/key_debug.h> |
| 115 | #else |
| 116 | #define KEYDEBUG(lev,arg) |
| 117 | #endif |
| 118 | |
| 119 | #include <net/kpi_protocol.h> |
| 120 | #include <netinet/kpi_ipfilter_var.h> |
| 121 | #include <mach/sdt.h> |
| 122 | |
| 123 | #include <net/net_osdep.h> |
| 124 | |
| 125 | #define IPLEN_FLIPPED |
| 126 | |
| 127 | #if INET |
| 128 | void |
| 129 | ah4_input(struct mbuf *m, int off) |
| 130 | { |
| 131 | struct ip *ip; |
| 132 | struct ah *ah; |
| 133 | u_int32_t spi; |
| 134 | const struct ah_algorithm *algo; |
| 135 | size_t siz; |
| 136 | size_t siz1; |
| 137 | u_char *cksum; |
| 138 | struct secasvar *sav = NULL; |
| 139 | u_int16_t nxt; |
| 140 | size_t hlen; |
| 141 | size_t stripsiz = 0; |
| 142 | sa_family_t ifamily; |
| 143 | |
| 144 | if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(struct newah)) { |
| 145 | m = m_pullup(m, off + sizeof(struct newah)); |
| 146 | if (!m) { |
| 147 | ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup;" |
| 148 | "dropping the packet for simplicity\n")); |
| 149 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsecstat.in_inval); |
| 150 | goto fail; |
| 151 | } |
| 152 | } |
| 153 | |
| 154 | /* Expect 32-bit aligned data pointer on strict-align platforms */ |
| 155 | MBUF_STRICT_DATA_ALIGNMENT_CHECK_32(m); |
| 156 | |
| 157 | ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); |
| 158 | ah = (struct ah *)(void *)(((caddr_t)ip) + off); |
| 159 | nxt = ah->ah_nxt; |
| 160 | #ifdef _IP_VHL |
| 161 | hlen = IP_VHL_HL(ip->ip_vhl) << 2; |
| 162 | #else |
| 163 | hlen = ip->ip_hl << 2; |
| 164 | #endif |
| 165 | |
| 166 | /* find the sassoc. */ |
| 167 | spi = ah->ah_spi; |
| 168 | |
| 169 | if ((sav = key_allocsa(AF_INET, |
| 170 | (caddr_t)&ip->ip_src, (caddr_t)&ip->ip_dst, |
| 171 | IPPROTO_AH, spi)) == 0) { |
| 172 | ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, |
| 173 | "IPv4 AH input: no key association found for spi %u\n", |
| 174 | (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi))); |
| 175 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsecstat.in_nosa); |
| 176 | goto fail; |
| 177 | } |
| 178 | KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, |
| 179 | printf("DP ah4_input called to allocate SA:0x%llx\n", |
| 180 | (uint64_t)VM_KERNEL_ADDRPERM(sav))); |
| 181 | if (sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_MATURE |
| 182 | && sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_DYING) { |
| 183 | ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, |
| 184 | "IPv4 AH input: non-mature/dying SA found for spi %u\n", |
| 185 | (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi))); |
| 186 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsecstat.in_badspi); |
| 187 | goto fail; |
| 188 | } |
| 189 | |
| 190 | algo = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth); |
| 191 | if (!algo) { |
| 192 | ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: " |
| 193 | "unsupported authentication algorithm for spi %u\n", |
| 194 | (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi))); |
| 195 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsecstat.in_badspi); |
| 196 | goto fail; |
| 197 | } |
| 198 | |
| 199 | siz = (*algo->sumsiz)(sav); |
| 200 | siz1 = ((siz + 3) & ~(4 - 1)); |
| 201 | |
| 202 | /* |
| 203 | * sanity checks for header, 1. |
| 204 | */ |
| 205 | { |
| 206 | int sizoff; |
| 207 | |
| 208 | sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4; |
| 209 | |
| 210 | /* |
| 211 | * Here, we do not do "siz1 == siz". This is because the way |
| 212 | * RFC240[34] section 2 is written. They do not require truncation |
| 213 | * to 96 bits. |
| 214 | * For example, Microsoft IPsec stack attaches 160 bits of |
| 215 | * authentication data for both hmac-md5 and hmac-sha1. For hmac-sha1, |
| 216 | * 32 bits of padding is attached. |
| 217 | * |
| 218 | * There are two downsides to this specification. |
| 219 | * They have no real harm, however, they leave us fuzzy feeling. |
| 220 | * - if we attach more than 96 bits of authentication data onto AH, |
| 221 | * we will never notice about possible modification by rogue |
| 222 | * intermediate nodes. |
| 223 | * Since extra bits in AH checksum is never used, this constitutes |
| 224 | * no real issue, however, it is wacky. |
| 225 | * - even if the peer attaches big authentication data, we will never |
| 226 | * notice the difference, since longer authentication data will just |
| 227 | * work. |
| 228 | * |
| 229 | * We may need some clarification in the spec. |
| 230 | */ |
| 231 | if (siz1 < siz) { |
| 232 | ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "sum length too short in IPv4 AH input " |
| 233 | "(%lu, should be at least %lu): %s\n", |
| 234 | (u_int32_t)siz1, (u_int32_t)siz, |
| 235 | ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi))); |
| 236 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsecstat.in_inval); |
| 237 | goto fail; |
| 238 | } |
| 239 | if ((ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff != siz1) { |
| 240 | ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "sum length mismatch in IPv4 AH input " |
| 241 | "(%d should be %lu): %s\n", |
| 242 | (ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff, (u_int32_t)siz1, |
| 243 | ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi))); |
| 244 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsecstat.in_inval); |
| 245 | goto fail; |
| 246 | } |
| 247 | |
| 248 | if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1) { |
| 249 | m = m_pullup(m, off + sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1); |
| 250 | if (!m) { |
| 251 | ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup\n")); |
| 252 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsecstat.in_inval); |
| 253 | goto fail; |
| 254 | } |
| 255 | /* Expect 32-bit aligned data ptr on strict-align platforms */ |
| 256 | MBUF_STRICT_DATA_ALIGNMENT_CHECK_32(m); |
| 257 | |
| 258 | ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); |
| 259 | ah = (struct ah *)(void *)(((caddr_t)ip) + off); |
| 260 | } |
| 261 | } |
| 262 | |
| 263 | /* |
| 264 | * check for sequence number. |
| 265 | */ |
| 266 | if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) { |
| 267 | if (ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav)) |
| 268 | ; /*okey*/ |
| 269 | else { |
| 270 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsecstat.in_ahreplay); |
| 271 | ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, |
| 272 | "replay packet in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n", |
| 273 | ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav))); |
| 274 | goto fail; |
| 275 | } |
| 276 | } |
| 277 | |
| 278 | /* |
| 279 | * alright, it seems sane. now we are going to check the |
| 280 | * cryptographic checksum. |
| 281 | */ |
| 282 | cksum = _MALLOC(siz1, M_TEMP, M_NOWAIT); |
| 283 | if (!cksum) { |
| 284 | ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: " |
| 285 | "couldn't alloc temporary region for cksum\n")); |
| 286 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsecstat.in_inval); |
| 287 | goto fail; |
| 288 | } |
| 289 | |
| 290 | /* |
| 291 | * some of IP header fields are flipped to the host endian. |
| 292 | * convert them back to network endian. VERY stupid. |
| 293 | */ |
| 294 | ip->ip_len = htons(ip->ip_len + hlen); |
| 295 | ip->ip_off = htons(ip->ip_off); |
| 296 | if (ah4_calccksum(m, (caddr_t)cksum, siz1, algo, sav)) { |
| 297 | FREE(cksum, M_TEMP); |
| 298 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsecstat.in_inval); |
| 299 | goto fail; |
| 300 | } |
| 301 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsecstat.in_ahhist[sav->alg_auth]); |
| 302 | /* |
| 303 | * flip them back. |
| 304 | */ |
| 305 | ip->ip_len = ntohs(ip->ip_len) - hlen; |
| 306 | ip->ip_off = ntohs(ip->ip_off); |
| 307 | |
| 308 | { |
| 309 | caddr_t sumpos = NULL; |
| 310 | |
| 311 | if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) { |
| 312 | /* RFC 1826 */ |
| 313 | sumpos = (caddr_t)(ah + 1); |
| 314 | } else { |
| 315 | /* RFC 2402 */ |
| 316 | sumpos = (caddr_t)(((struct newah *)ah) + 1); |
| 317 | } |
| 318 | |
| 319 | if (bcmp(sumpos, cksum, siz) != 0) { |
| 320 | ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, |
| 321 | "checksum mismatch in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n", |
| 322 | ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav))); |
| 323 | FREE(cksum, M_TEMP); |
| 324 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsecstat.in_ahauthfail); |
| 325 | goto fail; |
| 326 | } |
| 327 | } |
| 328 | |
| 329 | FREE(cksum, M_TEMP); |
| 330 | |
| 331 | m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR; |
| 332 | m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPDGM; |
| 333 | |
| 334 | #if 0 |
| 335 | /* |
| 336 | * looks okey, but we need more sanity check. |
| 337 | * XXX should elaborate. |
| 338 | */ |
| 339 | if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IPIP || ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IP) { |
| 340 | struct ip *nip; |
| 341 | size_t sizoff; |
| 342 | |
| 343 | sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4; |
| 344 | |
| 345 | if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1 + hlen) { |
| 346 | m = m_pullup(m, off + sizeof(struct ah) |
| 347 | + sizoff + siz1 + hlen); |
| 348 | if (!m) { |
| 349 | ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, |
| 350 | "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup\n")); |
| 351 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsecstat.in_inval); |
| 352 | goto fail; |
| 353 | } |
| 354 | } |
| 355 | |
| 356 | nip = (struct ip *)((u_char *)(ah + 1) + sizoff + siz1); |
| 357 | if (nip->ip_src.s_addr != ip->ip_src.s_addr |
| 358 | || nip->ip_dst.s_addr != ip->ip_dst.s_addr) { |
| 359 | m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR; |
| 360 | m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM; |
| 361 | } |
| 362 | } |
| 363 | #if INET6 |
| 364 | else if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IPV6) { |
| 365 | m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR; |
| 366 | m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM; |
| 367 | } |
| 368 | #endif /*INET6*/ |
| 369 | #endif /*0*/ |
| 370 | |
| 371 | if (m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPHDR |
| 372 | && m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPDGM) { |
| 373 | #if 0 |
| 374 | ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, |
| 375 | "IPv4 AH input: authentication succeess\n")); |
| 376 | #endif |
| 377 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsecstat.in_ahauthsucc); |
| 378 | } else { |
| 379 | ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, |
| 380 | "authentication failed in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n", |
| 381 | ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav))); |
| 382 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsecstat.in_ahauthfail); |
| 383 | goto fail; |
| 384 | } |
| 385 | |
| 386 | /* |
| 387 | * update sequence number. |
| 388 | */ |
| 389 | if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) { |
| 390 | if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav)) { |
| 391 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsecstat.in_ahreplay); |
| 392 | goto fail; |
| 393 | } |
| 394 | } |
| 395 | |
| 396 | /* was it transmitted over the IPsec tunnel SA? */ |
| 397 | if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) { |
| 398 | /* RFC 1826 */ |
| 399 | stripsiz = sizeof(struct ah) + siz1; |
| 400 | } else { |
| 401 | /* RFC 2402 */ |
| 402 | stripsiz = sizeof(struct newah) + siz1; |
| 403 | } |
| 404 | if (ipsec4_tunnel_validate(m, off + stripsiz, nxt, sav, &ifamily)) { |
| 405 | ifaddr_t ifa; |
| 406 | struct sockaddr_storage addr; |
| 407 | struct sockaddr_in *ipaddr; |
| 408 | |
| 409 | /* |
| 410 | * strip off all the headers that precedes AH. |
| 411 | * IP xx AH IP' payload -> IP' payload |
| 412 | * |
| 413 | * XXX more sanity checks |
| 414 | * XXX relationship with gif? |
| 415 | */ |
| 416 | u_int8_t tos, otos; |
| 417 | int sum; |
| 418 | |
| 419 | if (ifamily == AF_INET6) { |
| 420 | ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "ipsec tunnel protocol mismatch " |
| 421 | "in IPv4 AH input: %s\n", ipsec_logsastr(sav))); |
| 422 | goto fail; |
| 423 | } |
| 424 | tos = ip->ip_tos; |
| 425 | m_adj(m, off + stripsiz); |
| 426 | if (m->m_len < sizeof(*ip)) { |
| 427 | m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(*ip)); |
| 428 | if (!m) { |
| 429 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsecstat.in_inval); |
| 430 | goto fail; |
| 431 | } |
| 432 | } |
| 433 | ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); |
| 434 | otos = ip->ip_tos; |
| 435 | /* ECN consideration. */ |
| 436 | if (ip_ecn_egress(ip4_ipsec_ecn, &tos, &ip->ip_tos) == 0) { |
| 437 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsecstat.in_inval); |
| 438 | goto fail; |
| 439 | } |
| 440 | |
| 441 | if (otos != ip->ip_tos) { |
| 442 | sum = ~ntohs(ip->ip_sum) & 0xffff; |
| 443 | sum += (~otos & 0xffff) + ip->ip_tos; |
| 444 | sum = (sum >> 16) + (sum & 0xffff); |
| 445 | sum += (sum >> 16); /* add carry */ |
| 446 | ip->ip_sum = htons(~sum & 0xffff); |
| 447 | } |
| 448 | |
| 449 | if (!key_checktunnelsanity(sav, AF_INET, |
| 450 | (caddr_t)&ip->ip_src, (caddr_t)&ip->ip_dst)) { |
| 451 | ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "ipsec tunnel address mismatch " |
| 452 | "in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n", |
| 453 | ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav))); |
| 454 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsecstat.in_inval); |
| 455 | goto fail; |
| 456 | } |
| 457 | |
| 458 | #if 1 |
| 459 | /* |
| 460 | * Should the inner packet be considered authentic? |
| 461 | * My current answer is: NO. |
| 462 | * |
| 463 | * host1 -- gw1 === gw2 -- host2 |
| 464 | * In this case, gw2 can trust the authenticity of the |
| 465 | * outer packet, but NOT inner. Packet may be altered |
| 466 | * between host1 and gw1. |
| 467 | * |
| 468 | * host1 -- gw1 === host2 |
| 469 | * This case falls into the same scenario as above. |
| 470 | * |
| 471 | * host1 === host2 |
| 472 | * This case is the only case when we may be able to leave |
| 473 | * M_AUTHIPHDR and M_AUTHIPDGM set. |
| 474 | * However, if host1 is wrongly configured, and allows |
| 475 | * attacker to inject some packet with src=host1 and |
| 476 | * dst=host2, you are in risk. |
| 477 | */ |
| 478 | m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR; |
| 479 | m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM; |
| 480 | #endif |
| 481 | |
| 482 | key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m); |
| 483 | if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0 || |
| 484 | ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_IPV4, 0) != 0) { |
| 485 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsecstat.in_nomem); |
| 486 | goto fail; |
| 487 | } |
| 488 | |
| 489 | bzero(&addr, sizeof(addr)); |
| 490 | ipaddr = (__typeof__(ipaddr))&addr; |
| 491 | ipaddr->sin_family = AF_INET; |
| 492 | ipaddr->sin_len = sizeof(*ipaddr); |
| 493 | ipaddr->sin_addr = ip->ip_dst; |
| 494 | |
| 495 | // update the receiving interface address based on the inner address |
| 496 | ifa = ifa_ifwithaddr((struct sockaddr *)&addr); |
| 497 | if (ifa) { |
| 498 | m->m_pkthdr.rcvif = ifa->ifa_ifp; |
| 499 | IFA_REMREF(ifa); |
| 500 | } |
| 501 | |
| 502 | // Input via IPSec interface |
| 503 | if (sav->sah->ipsec_if != NULL) { |
| 504 | if (ipsec_inject_inbound_packet(sav->sah->ipsec_if, m) == 0) { |
| 505 | m = NULL; |
| 506 | goto done; |
| 507 | } else { |
| 508 | goto fail; |
| 509 | } |
| 510 | } |
| 511 | |
| 512 | if (proto_input(PF_INET, m) != 0) |
| 513 | goto fail; |
| 514 | nxt = IPPROTO_DONE; |
| 515 | } else { |
| 516 | /* |
| 517 | * strip off AH. |
| 518 | */ |
| 519 | |
| 520 | ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); |
| 521 | /* |
| 522 | * We do deep-copy since KAME requires that |
| 523 | * the packet is placed in a single external mbuf. |
| 524 | */ |
| 525 | ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip, (caddr_t)(((u_char *)ip) + stripsiz), off); |
| 526 | m->m_data += stripsiz; |
| 527 | m->m_len -= stripsiz; |
| 528 | m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz; |
| 529 | |
| 530 | if (m->m_len < sizeof(*ip)) { |
| 531 | m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(*ip)); |
| 532 | if (m == NULL) { |
| 533 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsecstat.in_inval); |
| 534 | goto fail; |
| 535 | } |
| 536 | } |
| 537 | ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); |
| 538 | #ifdef IPLEN_FLIPPED |
| 539 | ip->ip_len = ip->ip_len - stripsiz; |
| 540 | #else |
| 541 | ip->ip_len = htons(ntohs(ip->ip_len) - stripsiz); |
| 542 | #endif |
| 543 | ip->ip_p = nxt; |
| 544 | /* forget about IP hdr checksum, the check has already been passed */ |
| 545 | |
| 546 | key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m); |
| 547 | if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0) { |
| 548 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsecstat.in_nomem); |
| 549 | goto fail; |
| 550 | } |
| 551 | |
| 552 | DTRACE_IP6(receive, struct mbuf *, m, struct inpcb *, NULL, |
| 553 | struct ip *, ip, struct ifnet *, m->m_pkthdr.rcvif, |
| 554 | struct ip *, ip, struct ip6_hdr *, NULL); |
| 555 | |
| 556 | if (nxt != IPPROTO_DONE) { |
| 557 | // Input via IPSec interface |
| 558 | if (sav->sah->ipsec_if != NULL) { |
| 559 | ip->ip_len = htons(ip->ip_len + hlen); |
| 560 | ip->ip_off = htons(ip->ip_off); |
| 561 | ip->ip_sum = 0; |
| 562 | ip->ip_sum = ip_cksum_hdr_in(m, hlen); |
| 563 | if (ipsec_inject_inbound_packet(sav->sah->ipsec_if, m) == 0) { |
| 564 | m = NULL; |
| 565 | goto done; |
| 566 | } else { |
| 567 | goto fail; |
| 568 | } |
| 569 | } |
| 570 | |
| 571 | if ((ip_protox[nxt]->pr_flags & PR_LASTHDR) != 0 && |
| 572 | ipsec4_in_reject(m, NULL)) { |
| 573 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsecstat.in_polvio); |
| 574 | goto fail; |
| 575 | } |
| 576 | ip_proto_dispatch_in(m, off, nxt, 0); |
| 577 | } else |
| 578 | m_freem(m); |
| 579 | m = NULL; |
| 580 | } |
| 581 | done: |
| 582 | if (sav) { |
| 583 | KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, |
| 584 | printf("DP ah4_input call free SA:0x%llx\n", |
| 585 | (uint64_t)VM_KERNEL_ADDRPERM(sav))); |
| 586 | key_freesav(sav, KEY_SADB_UNLOCKED); |
| 587 | } |
| 588 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsecstat.in_success); |
| 589 | return; |
| 590 | |
| 591 | fail: |
| 592 | if (sav) { |
| 593 | KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, |
| 594 | printf("DP ah4_input call free SA:0x%llx\n", |
| 595 | (uint64_t)VM_KERNEL_ADDRPERM(sav))); |
| 596 | key_freesav(sav, KEY_SADB_UNLOCKED); |
| 597 | } |
| 598 | if (m) |
| 599 | m_freem(m); |
| 600 | return; |
| 601 | } |
| 602 | #endif /* INET */ |
| 603 | |
| 604 | #if INET6 |
| 605 | int |
| 606 | ah6_input(struct mbuf **mp, int *offp, int proto) |
| 607 | { |
| 608 | #pragma unused(proto) |
| 609 | struct mbuf *m = *mp; |
| 610 | int off = *offp; |
| 611 | struct ip6_hdr *ip6; |
| 612 | struct ah *ah; |
| 613 | u_int32_t spi; |
| 614 | const struct ah_algorithm *algo; |
| 615 | size_t siz; |
| 616 | size_t siz1; |
| 617 | u_char *cksum; |
| 618 | struct secasvar *sav = NULL; |
| 619 | u_int16_t nxt; |
| 620 | size_t stripsiz = 0; |
| 621 | sa_family_t ifamily; |
| 622 | |
| 623 | IP6_EXTHDR_CHECK(m, off, sizeof(struct ah), {return IPPROTO_DONE;}); |
| 624 | ah = (struct ah *)(void *)(mtod(m, caddr_t) + off); |
| 625 | /* Expect 32-bit aligned data pointer on strict-align platforms */ |
| 626 | MBUF_STRICT_DATA_ALIGNMENT_CHECK_32(m); |
| 627 | |
| 628 | ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); |
| 629 | nxt = ah->ah_nxt; |
| 630 | |
| 631 | /* find the sassoc. */ |
| 632 | spi = ah->ah_spi; |
| 633 | |
| 634 | if (ntohs(ip6->ip6_plen) == 0) { |
| 635 | ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "IPv6 AH input: " |
| 636 | "AH with IPv6 jumbogram is not supported.\n")); |
| 637 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsec6stat.in_inval); |
| 638 | goto fail; |
| 639 | } |
| 640 | |
| 641 | if ((sav = key_allocsa(AF_INET6, |
| 642 | (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_src, (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_dst, |
| 643 | IPPROTO_AH, spi)) == 0) { |
| 644 | ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, |
| 645 | "IPv6 AH input: no key association found for spi %u\n", |
| 646 | (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi))); |
| 647 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsec6stat.in_nosa); |
| 648 | goto fail; |
| 649 | } |
| 650 | KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, |
| 651 | printf("DP ah6_input called to allocate SA:0x%llx\n", |
| 652 | (uint64_t)VM_KERNEL_ADDRPERM(sav))); |
| 653 | if (sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_MATURE |
| 654 | && sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_DYING) { |
| 655 | ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, |
| 656 | "IPv6 AH input: non-mature/dying SA found for spi %u; ", |
| 657 | (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi))); |
| 658 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsec6stat.in_badspi); |
| 659 | goto fail; |
| 660 | } |
| 661 | |
| 662 | algo = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth); |
| 663 | if (!algo) { |
| 664 | ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv6 AH input: " |
| 665 | "unsupported authentication algorithm for spi %u\n", |
| 666 | (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi))); |
| 667 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsec6stat.in_badspi); |
| 668 | goto fail; |
| 669 | } |
| 670 | |
| 671 | siz = (*algo->sumsiz)(sav); |
| 672 | siz1 = ((siz + 3) & ~(4 - 1)); |
| 673 | |
| 674 | /* |
| 675 | * sanity checks for header, 1. |
| 676 | */ |
| 677 | { |
| 678 | int sizoff; |
| 679 | |
| 680 | sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4; |
| 681 | |
| 682 | /* |
| 683 | * Here, we do not do "siz1 == siz". See ah4_input() for complete |
| 684 | * description. |
| 685 | */ |
| 686 | if (siz1 < siz) { |
| 687 | ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "sum length too short in IPv6 AH input " |
| 688 | "(%lu, should be at least %lu): %s\n", |
| 689 | (u_int32_t)siz1, (u_int32_t)siz, |
| 690 | ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi))); |
| 691 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsec6stat.in_inval); |
| 692 | goto fail; |
| 693 | } |
| 694 | if ((ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff != siz1) { |
| 695 | ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "sum length mismatch in IPv6 AH input " |
| 696 | "(%d should be %lu): %s\n", |
| 697 | (ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff, (u_int32_t)siz1, |
| 698 | ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi))); |
| 699 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsec6stat.in_inval); |
| 700 | goto fail; |
| 701 | } |
| 702 | IP6_EXTHDR_CHECK(m, off, sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1, |
| 703 | {return IPPROTO_DONE;}); |
| 704 | } |
| 705 | |
| 706 | /* |
| 707 | * check for sequence number. |
| 708 | */ |
| 709 | if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) { |
| 710 | if (ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav)) |
| 711 | ; /*okey*/ |
| 712 | else { |
| 713 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsec6stat.in_ahreplay); |
| 714 | ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, |
| 715 | "replay packet in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n", |
| 716 | ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi), |
| 717 | ipsec_logsastr(sav))); |
| 718 | goto fail; |
| 719 | } |
| 720 | } |
| 721 | |
| 722 | /* |
| 723 | * alright, it seems sane. now we are going to check the |
| 724 | * cryptographic checksum. |
| 725 | */ |
| 726 | cksum = _MALLOC(siz1, M_TEMP, M_NOWAIT); |
| 727 | if (!cksum) { |
| 728 | ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv6 AH input: " |
| 729 | "couldn't alloc temporary region for cksum\n")); |
| 730 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsec6stat.in_inval); |
| 731 | goto fail; |
| 732 | } |
| 733 | |
| 734 | if (ah6_calccksum(m, (caddr_t)cksum, siz1, algo, sav)) { |
| 735 | FREE(cksum, M_TEMP); |
| 736 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsec6stat.in_inval); |
| 737 | goto fail; |
| 738 | } |
| 739 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsec6stat.in_ahhist[sav->alg_auth]); |
| 740 | |
| 741 | { |
| 742 | caddr_t sumpos = NULL; |
| 743 | |
| 744 | if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) { |
| 745 | /* RFC 1826 */ |
| 746 | sumpos = (caddr_t)(ah + 1); |
| 747 | } else { |
| 748 | /* RFC 2402 */ |
| 749 | sumpos = (caddr_t)(((struct newah *)ah) + 1); |
| 750 | } |
| 751 | |
| 752 | if (bcmp(sumpos, cksum, siz) != 0) { |
| 753 | ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, |
| 754 | "checksum mismatch in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n", |
| 755 | ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav))); |
| 756 | FREE(cksum, M_TEMP); |
| 757 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsec6stat.in_ahauthfail); |
| 758 | goto fail; |
| 759 | } |
| 760 | } |
| 761 | |
| 762 | FREE(cksum, M_TEMP); |
| 763 | |
| 764 | m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR; |
| 765 | m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPDGM; |
| 766 | |
| 767 | #if 0 |
| 768 | /* |
| 769 | * looks okey, but we need more sanity check. |
| 770 | * XXX should elaborate. |
| 771 | */ |
| 772 | if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IPV6) { |
| 773 | struct ip6_hdr *nip6; |
| 774 | size_t sizoff; |
| 775 | |
| 776 | sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4; |
| 777 | |
| 778 | IP6_EXTHDR_CHECK(m, off, sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1 |
| 779 | + sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), |
| 780 | {return IPPROTO_DONE;}); |
| 781 | |
| 782 | nip6 = (struct ip6_hdr *)((u_char *)(ah + 1) + sizoff + siz1); |
| 783 | if (!IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&nip6->ip6_src, &ip6->ip6_src) |
| 784 | || !IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&nip6->ip6_dst, &ip6->ip6_dst)) { |
| 785 | m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR; |
| 786 | m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM; |
| 787 | } |
| 788 | } else if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IPIP) { |
| 789 | m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR; |
| 790 | m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM; |
| 791 | } else if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IP) { |
| 792 | m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR; |
| 793 | m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM; |
| 794 | } |
| 795 | #endif |
| 796 | |
| 797 | if (m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPHDR |
| 798 | && m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPDGM) { |
| 799 | #if 0 |
| 800 | ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, |
| 801 | "IPv6 AH input: authentication succeess\n")); |
| 802 | #endif |
| 803 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsec6stat.in_ahauthsucc); |
| 804 | } else { |
| 805 | ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, |
| 806 | "authentication failed in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n", |
| 807 | ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav))); |
| 808 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsec6stat.in_ahauthfail); |
| 809 | goto fail; |
| 810 | } |
| 811 | |
| 812 | /* |
| 813 | * update sequence number. |
| 814 | */ |
| 815 | if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) { |
| 816 | if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav)) { |
| 817 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsec6stat.in_ahreplay); |
| 818 | goto fail; |
| 819 | } |
| 820 | } |
| 821 | |
| 822 | /* was it transmitted over the IPsec tunnel SA? */ |
| 823 | if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) { |
| 824 | /* RFC 1826 */ |
| 825 | stripsiz = sizeof(struct ah) + siz1; |
| 826 | } else { |
| 827 | /* RFC 2402 */ |
| 828 | stripsiz = sizeof(struct newah) + siz1; |
| 829 | } |
| 830 | if (ipsec6_tunnel_validate(m, off + stripsiz, nxt, sav, &ifamily)) { |
| 831 | ifaddr_t ifa; |
| 832 | struct sockaddr_storage addr; |
| 833 | struct sockaddr_in6 *ip6addr; |
| 834 | /* |
| 835 | * strip off all the headers that precedes AH. |
| 836 | * IP6 xx AH IP6' payload -> IP6' payload |
| 837 | * |
| 838 | * XXX more sanity checks |
| 839 | * XXX relationship with gif? |
| 840 | */ |
| 841 | u_int32_t flowinfo; /*net endian*/ |
| 842 | |
| 843 | if (ifamily == AF_INET) { |
| 844 | ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "ipsec tunnel protocol mismatch " |
| 845 | "in IPv6 AH input: %s\n", ipsec_logsastr(sav))); |
| 846 | goto fail; |
| 847 | } |
| 848 | |
| 849 | flowinfo = ip6->ip6_flow; |
| 850 | m_adj(m, off + stripsiz); |
| 851 | if (m->m_len < sizeof(*ip6)) { |
| 852 | /* |
| 853 | * m_pullup is prohibited in KAME IPv6 input processing |
| 854 | * but there's no other way! |
| 855 | */ |
| 856 | m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(*ip6)); |
| 857 | if (!m) { |
| 858 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsec6stat.in_inval); |
| 859 | goto fail; |
| 860 | } |
| 861 | } |
| 862 | ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); |
| 863 | /* ECN consideration. */ |
| 864 | if (ip6_ecn_egress(ip6_ipsec_ecn, &flowinfo, &ip6->ip6_flow) == 0) { |
| 865 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsec6stat.in_inval); |
| 866 | goto fail; |
| 867 | } |
| 868 | if (!key_checktunnelsanity(sav, AF_INET6, |
| 869 | (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_src, (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_dst)) { |
| 870 | ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "ipsec tunnel address mismatch " |
| 871 | "in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n", |
| 872 | ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi), |
| 873 | ipsec_logsastr(sav))); |
| 874 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsec6stat.in_inval); |
| 875 | goto fail; |
| 876 | } |
| 877 | |
| 878 | #if 1 |
| 879 | /* |
| 880 | * should the inner packet be considered authentic? |
| 881 | * see comment in ah4_input(). |
| 882 | */ |
| 883 | m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR; |
| 884 | m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM; |
| 885 | #endif |
| 886 | |
| 887 | key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m); |
| 888 | if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0 || |
| 889 | ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_IPV6, 0) != 0) { |
| 890 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsec6stat.in_nomem); |
| 891 | goto fail; |
| 892 | } |
| 893 | |
| 894 | bzero(&addr, sizeof(addr)); |
| 895 | ip6addr = (__typeof__(ip6addr))&addr; |
| 896 | ip6addr->sin6_family = AF_INET6; |
| 897 | ip6addr->sin6_len = sizeof(*ip6addr); |
| 898 | ip6addr->sin6_addr = ip6->ip6_dst; |
| 899 | |
| 900 | // update the receiving interface address based on the inner address |
| 901 | ifa = ifa_ifwithaddr((struct sockaddr *)&addr); |
| 902 | if (ifa) { |
| 903 | m->m_pkthdr.rcvif = ifa->ifa_ifp; |
| 904 | IFA_REMREF(ifa); |
| 905 | } |
| 906 | |
| 907 | // Input via IPSec interface |
| 908 | if (sav->sah->ipsec_if != NULL) { |
| 909 | if (ipsec_inject_inbound_packet(sav->sah->ipsec_if, m) == 0) { |
| 910 | m = NULL; |
| 911 | nxt = IPPROTO_DONE; |
| 912 | goto done; |
| 913 | } else { |
| 914 | goto fail; |
| 915 | } |
| 916 | } |
| 917 | |
| 918 | if (proto_input(PF_INET6, m) != 0) |
| 919 | goto fail; |
| 920 | nxt = IPPROTO_DONE; |
| 921 | } else { |
| 922 | /* |
| 923 | * strip off AH. |
| 924 | */ |
| 925 | char *prvnxtp; |
| 926 | |
| 927 | /* |
| 928 | * Copy the value of the next header field of AH to the |
| 929 | * next header field of the previous header. |
| 930 | * This is necessary because AH will be stripped off below. |
| 931 | */ |
| 932 | prvnxtp = ip6_get_prevhdr(m, off); /* XXX */ |
| 933 | *prvnxtp = nxt; |
| 934 | |
| 935 | ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); |
| 936 | /* |
| 937 | * We do deep-copy since KAME requires that |
| 938 | * the packet is placed in a single mbuf. |
| 939 | */ |
| 940 | ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip6, ((caddr_t)ip6) + stripsiz, off); |
| 941 | m->m_data += stripsiz; |
| 942 | m->m_len -= stripsiz; |
| 943 | m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz; |
| 944 | ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); |
| 945 | /* XXX jumbogram */ |
| 946 | ip6->ip6_plen = htons(ntohs(ip6->ip6_plen) - stripsiz); |
| 947 | |
| 948 | key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m); |
| 949 | if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0) { |
| 950 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsec6stat.in_nomem); |
| 951 | goto fail; |
| 952 | } |
| 953 | |
| 954 | // Input via IPSec interface |
| 955 | if (sav->sah->ipsec_if != NULL) { |
| 956 | if (ipsec_inject_inbound_packet(sav->sah->ipsec_if, m) == 0) { |
| 957 | m = NULL; |
| 958 | nxt = IPPROTO_DONE; |
| 959 | goto done; |
| 960 | } else { |
| 961 | goto fail; |
| 962 | } |
| 963 | } |
| 964 | } |
| 965 | |
| 966 | done: |
| 967 | *offp = off; |
| 968 | *mp = m; |
| 969 | if (sav) { |
| 970 | KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, |
| 971 | printf("DP ah6_input call free SA:0x%llx\n", |
| 972 | (uint64_t)VM_KERNEL_ADDRPERM(sav))); |
| 973 | key_freesav(sav, KEY_SADB_UNLOCKED); |
| 974 | } |
| 975 | IPSEC_STAT_INCREMENT(ipsec6stat.in_success); |
| 976 | return nxt; |
| 977 | |
| 978 | fail: |
| 979 | if (sav) { |
| 980 | KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, |
| 981 | printf("DP ah6_input call free SA:0x%llx\n", |
| 982 | (uint64_t)VM_KERNEL_ADDRPERM(sav))); |
| 983 | key_freesav(sav, KEY_SADB_UNLOCKED); |
| 984 | } |
| 985 | if (m) |
| 986 | m_freem(m); |
| 987 | return IPPROTO_DONE; |
| 988 | } |
| 989 | |
| 990 | void |
| 991 | ah6_ctlinput(int cmd, struct sockaddr *sa, void *d) |
| 992 | { |
| 993 | const struct newah *ahp; |
| 994 | struct newah ah; |
| 995 | struct secasvar *sav; |
| 996 | struct ip6_hdr *ip6; |
| 997 | struct mbuf *m; |
| 998 | struct ip6ctlparam *ip6cp = NULL; |
| 999 | int off = 0; |
| 1000 | struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6_src, *sa6_dst; |
| 1001 | |
| 1002 | if (sa->sa_family != AF_INET6 || |
| 1003 | sa->sa_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)) |
| 1004 | return; |
| 1005 | if ((unsigned)cmd >= PRC_NCMDS) |
| 1006 | return; |
| 1007 | |
| 1008 | /* if the parameter is from icmp6, decode it. */ |
| 1009 | if (d != NULL) { |
| 1010 | ip6cp = (struct ip6ctlparam *)d; |
| 1011 | m = ip6cp->ip6c_m; |
| 1012 | ip6 = ip6cp->ip6c_ip6; |
| 1013 | off = ip6cp->ip6c_off; |
| 1014 | } else { |
| 1015 | m = NULL; |
| 1016 | ip6 = NULL; |
| 1017 | } |
| 1018 | |
| 1019 | if (ip6) { |
| 1020 | /* |
| 1021 | * XXX: We assume that when ip6 is non NULL, |
| 1022 | * M and OFF are valid. |
| 1023 | */ |
| 1024 | |
| 1025 | /* check if we can safely examine src and dst ports */ |
| 1026 | if (m->m_pkthdr.len < off + sizeof(ah)) |
| 1027 | return; |
| 1028 | |
| 1029 | if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(ah)) { |
| 1030 | /* |
| 1031 | * this should be rare case, |
| 1032 | * so we compromise on this copy... |
| 1033 | */ |
| 1034 | m_copydata(m, off, sizeof(ah), (caddr_t)&ah); |
| 1035 | ahp = &ah; |
| 1036 | } else |
| 1037 | ahp = (struct newah *)(void *)(mtod(m, caddr_t) + off); |
| 1038 | |
| 1039 | if (cmd == PRC_MSGSIZE) { |
| 1040 | int valid = 0; |
| 1041 | |
| 1042 | /* |
| 1043 | * Check to see if we have a valid SA corresponding to |
| 1044 | * the address in the ICMP message payload. |
| 1045 | */ |
| 1046 | sa6_src = ip6cp->ip6c_src; |
| 1047 | sa6_dst = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)(void *)sa; |
| 1048 | sav = key_allocsa(AF_INET6, |
| 1049 | (caddr_t)&sa6_src->sin6_addr, |
| 1050 | (caddr_t)&sa6_dst->sin6_addr, |
| 1051 | IPPROTO_AH, ahp->ah_spi); |
| 1052 | if (sav) { |
| 1053 | if (sav->state == SADB_SASTATE_MATURE || |
| 1054 | sav->state == SADB_SASTATE_DYING) |
| 1055 | valid++; |
| 1056 | key_freesav(sav, KEY_SADB_UNLOCKED); |
| 1057 | } |
| 1058 | |
| 1059 | /* XXX Further validation? */ |
| 1060 | |
| 1061 | /* |
| 1062 | * Depending on the value of "valid" and routing table |
| 1063 | * size (mtudisc_{hi,lo}wat), we will: |
| 1064 | * - recalcurate the new MTU and create the |
| 1065 | * corresponding routing entry, or |
| 1066 | * - ignore the MTU change notification. |
| 1067 | */ |
| 1068 | icmp6_mtudisc_update((struct ip6ctlparam *)d, valid); |
| 1069 | } |
| 1070 | |
| 1071 | /* we normally notify single pcb here */ |
| 1072 | } else { |
| 1073 | /* we normally notify any pcb here */ |
| 1074 | } |
| 1075 | } |
| 1076 | #endif /* INET6 */ |