X-Git-Url: https://git.saurik.com/apple/security.git/blobdiff_plain/80e2389990082500d76eb566d4946be3e786c3ef..d8f41ccd20de16f8ebe2ccc84d47bf1cb2b26bbb:/Security/libsecurity_smime/lib/cmsrecinfo.c?ds=inline

diff --git a/Security/libsecurity_smime/lib/cmsrecinfo.c b/Security/libsecurity_smime/lib/cmsrecinfo.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..dbecfbef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Security/libsecurity_smime/lib/cmsrecinfo.c
@@ -0,0 +1,704 @@
+/*
+ * The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public
+ * License Version 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file
+ * except in compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of
+ * the License at http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/
+ * 
+ * Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS
+ * IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or
+ * implied. See the License for the specific language governing
+ * rights and limitations under the License.
+ * 
+ * The Original Code is the Netscape security libraries.
+ * 
+ * The Initial Developer of the Original Code is Netscape
+ * Communications Corporation.  Portions created by Netscape are 
+ * Copyright (C) 1994-2000 Netscape Communications Corporation.  All
+ * Rights Reserved.
+ * 
+ * Contributor(s):
+ * 
+ * Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the
+ * terms of the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the
+ * "GPL"), in which case the provisions of the GPL are applicable 
+ * instead of those above.  If you wish to allow use of your 
+ * version of this file only under the terms of the GPL and not to
+ * allow others to use your version of this file under the MPL,
+ * indicate your decision by deleting the provisions above and
+ * replace them with the notice and other provisions required by
+ * the GPL.  If you do not delete the provisions above, a recipient
+ * may use your version of this file under either the MPL or the
+ * GPL.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * CMS recipientInfo methods.
+ */
+
+#include "cmslocal.h"
+
+#include "cert.h"
+#include "secitem.h"
+#include "secoid.h"
+
+#include <security_asn1/secasn1.h>
+#include <security_asn1/secerr.h>
+#include <Security/SecKeyPriv.h>
+#include <Security/SecCertificatePriv.h>
+#include <Security/SecCmsRecipientInfo.h>
+
+static Boolean
+nss_cmsrecipientinfo_usessubjectkeyid(SecCmsRecipientInfoRef ri)
+{
+    if (ri->recipientInfoType == SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKeyTrans) {
+	SecCmsRecipientIdentifier *rid;
+	rid = &ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.recipientIdentifier;
+	if (rid->identifierType == SecCmsRecipientIDSubjectKeyID) {
+	    return PR_TRUE;
+	}
+    }
+    return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+
+static SecCmsRecipientInfoRef
+nss_cmsrecipientinfo_create(SecCmsMessageRef cmsg, SecCmsRecipientIDSelector type,
+                            SecCertificateRef cert, SecPublicKeyRef pubKey, 
+                            CSSM_DATA_PTR subjKeyID)
+{
+    SecCmsRecipientInfoRef ri;
+    void *mark;
+    SECOidTag certalgtag;
+    OSStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+    SecCmsRecipientEncryptedKey *rek;
+    SecCmsOriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oiok;
+    unsigned long version;
+    CSSM_DATA_PTR dummy;
+    PLArenaPool *poolp;
+    const SECAlgorithmID *algid;
+    SecCmsRecipientIdentifier *rid;
+
+    poolp = cmsg->poolp;
+
+    mark = PORT_ArenaMark(poolp);
+
+    ri = (SecCmsRecipientInfoRef)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(poolp, sizeof(SecCmsRecipientInfo));
+    if (ri == NULL)
+	goto loser;
+
+    ri->cmsg = cmsg;
+    if (type == SecCmsRecipientIDIssuerSN)
+    {
+	ri->cert = CERT_DupCertificate(cert);
+	if (ri->cert == NULL)
+		goto loser;
+	rv = SecCertificateGetAlgorithmID(cert,&algid);
+    } else {
+	PORT_Assert(pubKey);
+	rv = SecKeyGetAlgorithmID(pubKey,&algid);
+    }
+
+    certalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(algid);
+
+    rid = &ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.recipientIdentifier;
+    switch (certalgtag) {
+    case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
+	ri->recipientInfoType = SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKeyTrans;
+	rid->identifierType = type;
+	if (type == SecCmsRecipientIDIssuerSN) {
+	    rid->id.issuerAndSN = CERT_GetCertIssuerAndSN(poolp, cert);
+	    if (rid->id.issuerAndSN == NULL) {
+	      break;
+	    }
+	} else if (type == SecCmsRecipientIDSubjectKeyID){
+	    SecCmsKeyTransRecipientInfoEx *riExtra;
+
+	    rid->id.subjectKeyID = PORT_ArenaNew(poolp, CSSM_DATA);
+	    if (rid->id.subjectKeyID == NULL) {
+		rv = SECFailure;
+		PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
+		break;
+	    } 
+	    SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, rid->id.subjectKeyID, subjKeyID);
+	    if (rid->id.subjectKeyID->Data == NULL) {
+		rv = SECFailure;
+		PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
+		break;
+	    }
+	    riExtra = &ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfoEx;
+	    riExtra->version = 0;
+	    riExtra->pubKey = SECKEY_CopyPublicKey(pubKey);
+	    if (riExtra->pubKey == NULL) {
+		rv = SECFailure;
+		PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
+		break;
+	    }
+	} else {
+	    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+	    rv = SECFailure;
+	}
+	break;
+    case SEC_OID_MISSI_KEA_DSS_OLD:
+    case SEC_OID_MISSI_KEA_DSS:
+    case SEC_OID_MISSI_KEA:
+        PORT_Assert(type != SecCmsRecipientIDSubjectKeyID);
+	if (type == SecCmsRecipientIDSubjectKeyID) {
+	    rv = SECFailure;
+	    break;
+	}
+	/* backward compatibility - this is not really a keytrans operation */
+	ri->recipientInfoType = SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKeyTrans;
+	/* hardcoded issuerSN choice for now */
+	ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.recipientIdentifier.identifierType = SecCmsRecipientIDIssuerSN;
+	ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.recipientIdentifier.id.issuerAndSN = CERT_GetCertIssuerAndSN(poolp, cert);
+	if (ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.recipientIdentifier.id.issuerAndSN == NULL) {
+	    rv = SECFailure;
+	    break;
+	}
+	break;
+    case SEC_OID_X942_DIFFIE_HELMAN_KEY: /* dh-public-number */
+        PORT_Assert(type != SecCmsRecipientIDSubjectKeyID);
+	if (type == SecCmsRecipientIDSubjectKeyID) {
+	    rv = SECFailure;
+	    break;
+	}
+	/* a key agreement op */
+	ri->recipientInfoType = SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKeyAgree;
+
+	if (ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.recipientIdentifier.id.issuerAndSN == NULL) {
+	    rv = SECFailure;
+	    break;
+	}
+	/* we do not support the case where multiple recipients 
+	 * share the same KeyAgreeRecipientInfo and have multiple RecipientEncryptedKeys
+	 * in this case, we would need to walk all the recipientInfos, take the
+	 * ones that do KeyAgreement algorithms and join them, algorithm by algorithm
+	 * Then, we'd generate ONE ukm and OriginatorIdentifierOrKey */
+
+	/* only epheremal-static Diffie-Hellman is supported for now
+	 * this is the only form of key agreement that provides potential anonymity
+	 * of the sender, plus we do not have to include certs in the message */
+
+	/* force single recipientEncryptedKey for now */
+	if ((rek = SecCmsRecipientEncryptedKeyCreate(poolp)) == NULL) {
+	    rv = SECFailure;
+	    break;
+	}
+
+	/* hardcoded IssuerSN choice for now */
+	rek->recipientIdentifier.identifierType = SecCmsKeyAgreeRecipientIDIssuerSN;
+	if ((rek->recipientIdentifier.id.issuerAndSN = CERT_GetCertIssuerAndSN(poolp, cert)) == NULL) {
+	    rv = SECFailure;
+	    break;
+	}
+
+	oiok = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.originatorIdentifierOrKey);
+
+	/* see RFC2630 12.3.1.1 */
+	oiok->identifierType = SecCmsOriginatorIDOrKeyOriginatorPublicKey;
+
+	rv = SecCmsArrayAdd(poolp, (void ***)&ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.recipientEncryptedKeys,
+				    (void *)rek);
+
+	break;
+	
+    case SEC_OID_EC_PUBLIC_KEY:	    
+	/* ephemeral-static ECDH - issuerAndSN, OriginatorPublicKey only */
+        PORT_Assert(type != SecCmsRecipientIDSubjectKeyID);
+	if (type == SecCmsRecipientIDSubjectKeyID) {
+	    rv = SECFailure;
+	    break;
+	}
+	/* a key agreement op */
+	ri->recipientInfoType = SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKeyAgree;
+	ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.recipientIdentifier.id.issuerAndSN = CERT_GetCertIssuerAndSN(poolp, cert);
+	if (ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.recipientIdentifier.id.issuerAndSN == NULL) {
+	    rv = SECFailure;
+	    break;
+	}
+	/* we do not support the case where multiple recipients 
+	 * share the same KeyAgreeRecipientInfo and have multiple RecipientEncryptedKeys
+	 * in this case, we would need to walk all the recipientInfos, take the
+	 * ones that do KeyAgreement algorithms and join them, algorithm by algorithm
+	 * Then, we'd generate ONE ukm and OriginatorIdentifierOrKey */
+
+	/* force single recipientEncryptedKey for now */
+	if ((rek = SecCmsRecipientEncryptedKeyCreate(poolp)) == NULL) {
+	    rv = SECFailure;
+	    break;
+	}
+
+	/* hardcoded IssuerSN choice for now */
+	rek->recipientIdentifier.identifierType = SecCmsKeyAgreeRecipientIDIssuerSN;
+	if ((rek->recipientIdentifier.id.issuerAndSN = CERT_GetCertIssuerAndSN(poolp, cert)) == NULL) {
+	    rv = SECFailure;
+	    break;
+	}
+
+	oiok = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.originatorIdentifierOrKey);
+
+	/* see RFC 3278 3.1.1 */
+	oiok->identifierType = SecCmsOriginatorIDOrKeyOriginatorPublicKey;
+
+	rv = SecCmsArrayAdd(poolp, (void ***)&ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.recipientEncryptedKeys,
+				    (void *)rek);
+
+	break;
+
+    default:
+	/* other algorithms not supported yet */
+	/* NOTE that we do not support any KEK algorithm */
+	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
+	rv = SECFailure;
+	break;
+    }
+
+    if (rv == SECFailure)
+	goto loser;
+
+    /* set version */
+    switch (ri->recipientInfoType) {
+    case SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKeyTrans:
+	if (ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.recipientIdentifier.identifierType == SecCmsRecipientIDIssuerSN)
+	    version = SEC_CMS_KEYTRANS_RECIPIENT_INFO_VERSION_ISSUERSN;
+	else
+	    version = SEC_CMS_KEYTRANS_RECIPIENT_INFO_VERSION_SUBJKEY;
+	dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeInteger(poolp, &(ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.version), version);
+	if (dummy == NULL)
+	    goto loser;
+	break;
+    case SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKeyAgree:
+	dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeInteger(poolp, &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.version),
+						SEC_CMS_KEYAGREE_RECIPIENT_INFO_VERSION);
+	if (dummy == NULL)
+	    goto loser;
+	break;
+    case SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKEK:
+	/* NOTE: this cannot happen as long as we do not support any KEK algorithm */
+	dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeInteger(poolp, &(ri->ri.kekRecipientInfo.version),
+						SEC_CMS_KEK_RECIPIENT_INFO_VERSION);
+	if (dummy == NULL)
+	    goto loser;
+	break;
+    
+    }
+
+    PORT_ArenaUnmark (poolp, mark);
+#if 0
+    if (freeSpki)
+      SECKEY_DestroySubjectPublicKeyInfo(freeSpki);
+#endif
+    return ri;
+
+loser:
+#if 0
+    if (freeSpki)
+      SECKEY_DestroySubjectPublicKeyInfo(freeSpki);
+#endif
+    PORT_ArenaRelease (poolp, mark);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SecCmsRecipientInfoCreate - create a recipientinfo
+ *
+ * we currently do not create KeyAgreement recipientinfos with multiple 
+ * recipientEncryptedKeys the certificate is supposed to have been 
+ * verified by the caller
+ */
+SecCmsRecipientInfoRef
+SecCmsRecipientInfoCreate(SecCmsMessageRef cmsg, SecCertificateRef cert)
+{
+    return nss_cmsrecipientinfo_create(cmsg, SecCmsRecipientIDIssuerSN, cert, 
+                                       NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+SecCmsRecipientInfoRef
+SecCmsRecipientInfoCreateWithSubjKeyID(SecCmsMessageRef cmsg, 
+                                     CSSM_DATA_PTR subjKeyID,
+                                     SecPublicKeyRef pubKey)
+{
+    return nss_cmsrecipientinfo_create(cmsg, SecCmsRecipientIDSubjectKeyID, 
+                                       NULL, pubKey, subjKeyID);
+}
+
+SecCmsRecipientInfoRef
+SecCmsRecipientInfoCreateWithSubjKeyIDFromCert(SecCmsMessageRef cmsg,
+                                             SecCertificateRef cert)
+{
+    SecPublicKeyRef pubKey = NULL;
+    CSSM_DATA subjKeyID = {0, NULL};
+    SecCmsRecipientInfoRef retVal = NULL;
+
+    if (!cmsg || !cert) {
+	return NULL;
+    }
+    pubKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert);
+    if (!pubKey) {
+	goto done;
+    }
+    if (CERT_FindSubjectKeyIDExtension(cert, &subjKeyID) != SECSuccess ||
+        subjKeyID.Data == NULL) {
+	goto done;
+    }
+    retVal = SecCmsRecipientInfoCreateWithSubjKeyID(cmsg, &subjKeyID, pubKey);
+done:
+    if (pubKey)
+	SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey);
+
+    if (subjKeyID.Data)
+	SECITEM_FreeItem(&subjKeyID, PR_FALSE);
+
+    return retVal;
+}
+
+void
+SecCmsRecipientInfoDestroy(SecCmsRecipientInfoRef ri)
+{
+    /* version was allocated on the pool, so no need to destroy it */
+    /* issuerAndSN was allocated on the pool, so no need to destroy it */
+    if (ri->cert != NULL)
+	CERT_DestroyCertificate(ri->cert);
+
+    if (nss_cmsrecipientinfo_usessubjectkeyid(ri)) {
+	SecCmsKeyTransRecipientInfoEx *extra;
+	extra = &ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfoEx;
+	if (extra->pubKey)
+	    SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(extra->pubKey);
+    }
+
+    /* recipientInfo structure itself was allocated on the pool, so no need to destroy it */
+    /* we're done. */
+}
+
+int
+SecCmsRecipientInfoGetVersion(SecCmsRecipientInfoRef ri)
+{
+    unsigned long version;
+    CSSM_DATA_PTR versionitem = NULL;
+
+    switch (ri->recipientInfoType) {
+    case SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKeyTrans:
+	/* ignore subIndex */
+	versionitem = &(ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.version);
+	break;
+    case SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKEK:
+	/* ignore subIndex */
+	versionitem = &(ri->ri.kekRecipientInfo.version);
+	break;
+    case SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKeyAgree:
+	versionitem = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.version);
+	break;
+    }
+
+    PORT_Assert(versionitem);
+    if (versionitem == NULL) 
+	return 0;
+
+    /* always take apart the CSSM_DATA */
+    if (SEC_ASN1DecodeInteger(versionitem, &version) != SECSuccess)
+	return 0;
+    else
+	return (int)version;
+}
+
+CSSM_DATA_PTR
+SecCmsRecipientInfoGetEncryptedKey(SecCmsRecipientInfoRef ri, int subIndex)
+{
+    CSSM_DATA_PTR enckey = NULL;
+
+    switch (ri->recipientInfoType) {
+    case SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKeyTrans:
+	/* ignore subIndex */
+	enckey = &(ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.encKey);
+	break;
+    case SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKEK:
+	/* ignore subIndex */
+	enckey = &(ri->ri.kekRecipientInfo.encKey);
+	break;
+    case SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKeyAgree:
+	enckey = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.recipientEncryptedKeys[subIndex]->encKey);
+	break;
+    }
+    return enckey;
+}
+
+
+SECOidTag
+SecCmsRecipientInfoGetKeyEncryptionAlgorithmTag(SecCmsRecipientInfoRef ri)
+{
+    SECOidTag encalgtag = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN; /* an invalid encryption alg */
+
+    switch (ri->recipientInfoType) {
+    case SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKeyTrans:
+	encalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg));
+	break;
+    case SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKeyAgree:
+	encalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg));
+	break;
+    case SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKEK:
+	encalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(ri->ri.kekRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg));
+	break;
+    }
+    return encalgtag;
+}
+
+OSStatus
+SecCmsRecipientInfoWrapBulkKey(SecCmsRecipientInfoRef ri, SecSymmetricKeyRef bulkkey, 
+                                 SECOidTag bulkalgtag)
+{
+    SecCertificateRef cert;
+    SECOidTag certalgtag;
+    OSStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+#if 0
+    CSSM_DATA_PTR params = NULL;
+#endif /* 0 */
+    SecCmsRecipientEncryptedKey *rek;
+    SecCmsOriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oiok;
+    const SECAlgorithmID *algid;
+    PLArenaPool *poolp;
+    SecCmsKeyTransRecipientInfoEx *extra = NULL;
+    Boolean usesSubjKeyID;
+    uint8 nullData[2] = {SEC_ASN1_NULL, 0};
+    SECItem nullItem;
+    SecCmsKeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari;
+    
+    poolp = ri->cmsg->poolp;
+    cert = ri->cert;
+    usesSubjKeyID = nss_cmsrecipientinfo_usessubjectkeyid(ri);
+    if (cert) {
+	rv = SecCertificateGetAlgorithmID(cert,&algid);
+	if (rv)
+	    return SECFailure;
+	certalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(algid);
+    } else if (usesSubjKeyID) {
+	extra = &ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfoEx;
+	/* sanity check */
+	PORT_Assert(extra->pubKey);
+	if (!extra->pubKey) {
+	    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+	    return SECFailure;
+	}
+	rv = SecKeyGetAlgorithmID(extra->pubKey,&algid);
+	if (rv)
+	    return SECFailure;
+	certalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(algid);
+    } else {
+	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+	return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /* XXX set ri->recipientInfoType to the proper value here */
+    /* or should we look if it's been set already ? */
+
+    certalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(algid);
+    switch (certalgtag) {
+    case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
+	/* wrap the symkey */
+	if (cert) {
+	    rv = SecCmsUtilEncryptSymKeyRSA(poolp, cert, bulkkey, 
+	                         &ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.encKey);
+ 	    if (rv != SECSuccess)
+		break;
+	} else if (usesSubjKeyID) {
+	    PORT_Assert(extra != NULL);
+	    rv = SecCmsUtilEncryptSymKeyRSAPubKey(poolp, extra->pubKey,
+	                         bulkkey, &ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.encKey);
+ 	    if (rv != SECSuccess)
+		break;
+	}
+
+	rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(poolp, &(ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg), certalgtag, NULL);
+	break;
+#if 0
+    case SEC_OID_MISSI_KEA_DSS_OLD:
+    case SEC_OID_MISSI_KEA_DSS:
+    case SEC_OID_MISSI_KEA:
+	rv = SecCmsUtilEncryptSymKeyMISSI(poolp, cert, bulkkey,
+					bulkalgtag,
+					&ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.encKey,
+					&params, ri->cmsg->pwfn_arg);
+	if (rv != SECSuccess)
+	    break;
+
+	/* here, we DO need to pass the params to the wrap function because, with
+	 * RSA, there is no funny stuff going on with generation of IV vectors or so */
+	rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(poolp, &(ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg), certalgtag, params);
+	break;
+    case SEC_OID_X942_DIFFIE_HELMAN_KEY: /* dh-public-number */
+	rek = ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.recipientEncryptedKeys[0];
+	if (rek == NULL) {
+	    rv = SECFailure;
+	    break;
+	}
+
+	oiok = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.originatorIdentifierOrKey);
+	PORT_Assert(oiok->identifierType == SecCmsOriginatorIDOrKeyOriginatorPublicKey);
+
+	/* see RFC2630 12.3.1.1 */
+	if (SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(poolp, &oiok->id.originatorPublicKey.algorithmIdentifier,
+				    SEC_OID_X942_DIFFIE_HELMAN_KEY, NULL) != SECSuccess) {
+	    rv = SECFailure;
+	    break;
+	}
+
+	/* this will generate a key pair, compute the shared secret, */
+	/* derive a key and ukm for the keyEncAlg out of it, encrypt the bulk key with */
+	/* the keyEncAlg, set encKey, keyEncAlg, publicKey etc. */
+	rv = SecCmsUtilEncryptSymKeyESDH(poolp, cert, bulkkey,
+					&rek->encKey,
+					&ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.ukm,
+					&ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg,
+					&oiok->id.originatorPublicKey.publicKey);
+
+	break;
+#endif /* 0 */
+
+    case SEC_OID_EC_PUBLIC_KEY:
+	/* These were set up in nss_cmsrecipientinfo_create() */
+	kari = &ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo;
+	rek = kari->recipientEncryptedKeys[0];
+	if (rek == NULL) {
+	    rv = SECFailure;
+	    break;
+	}
+
+	oiok = &(kari->originatorIdentifierOrKey);
+	PORT_Assert(oiok->identifierType == SecCmsOriginatorIDOrKeyOriginatorPublicKey);
+
+	/* 
+	 * RFC 3278 3.1.1 says this AlgId must contain NULL params which is contrary to 
+	 * any other use of the SEC_OID_EC_PUBLIC_KEY OID. So we provide one
+	 * explicitly instead of mucking up the login in SECOID_SetAlgorithmID().
+	 */
+	nullItem.Data = nullData;
+	nullItem.Length = 2;
+	if (SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(poolp, &oiok->id.originatorPublicKey.algorithmIdentifier,
+				    SEC_OID_EC_PUBLIC_KEY, &nullItem) != SECSuccess) {
+	    rv = SECFailure;
+	    break;
+	}
+
+	/* this will generate a key pair, compute the shared secret, */
+	/* derive a key and ukm for the keyEncAlg out of it, encrypt the bulk key with */
+	/* the keyEncAlg, set encKey, keyEncAlg, publicKey etc. */
+	rv = SecCmsUtilEncryptSymKeyECDH(poolp, cert, bulkkey,
+					&rek->encKey,
+					&kari->ukm,
+					&kari->keyEncAlg,
+					&oiok->id.originatorPublicKey.publicKey);
+	/* this is a BIT STRING */
+	oiok->id.originatorPublicKey.publicKey.Length <<= 3;
+	break;
+
+    default:
+	/* other algorithms not supported yet */
+	/* NOTE that we do not support any KEK algorithm */
+	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
+	rv = SECFailure;
+	break;
+    }
+#if 0
+    if (freeSpki)
+	SECKEY_DestroySubjectPublicKeyInfo(freeSpki);
+#endif
+
+    return rv;
+}
+
+#ifdef	NDEBUG
+#define dprintf(args...)
+#else
+#define dprintf(args...)    printf(args)
+#endif
+
+SecSymmetricKeyRef
+SecCmsRecipientInfoUnwrapBulkKey(SecCmsRecipientInfoRef ri, int subIndex, 
+	SecCertificateRef cert, SecPrivateKeyRef privkey, SECOidTag bulkalgtag)
+{
+    SecSymmetricKeyRef bulkkey = NULL;
+    SECAlgorithmID *encalg;
+    SECOidTag encalgtag;
+    CSSM_DATA_PTR enckey;
+    int error;
+
+    ri->cert = CERT_DupCertificate(cert);
+        	/* mark the recipientInfo so we can find it later */
+
+    switch (ri->recipientInfoType) {
+    case SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKeyTrans:
+	encalg = &(ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg);
+	encalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg));
+	enckey = &(ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.encKey); /* ignore subIndex */
+	switch (encalgtag) {
+	case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
+	    /* RSA encryption algorithm: */
+	    /* get the symmetric (bulk) key by unwrapping it using our private key */
+	    bulkkey = SecCmsUtilDecryptSymKeyRSA(privkey, enckey, bulkalgtag);
+	    break;
+#if 0
+	case SEC_OID_NETSCAPE_SMIME_KEA:
+	    /* FORTEZZA key exchange algorithm */
+	    /* the supplemental data is in the parameters of encalg */
+	    bulkkey = SecCmsUtilDecryptSymKeyMISSI(privkey, enckey, encalg, bulkalgtag, ri->cmsg->pwfn_arg);
+	    break;
+#endif /* 0 */
+	default:
+	    error = SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG;
+	    goto loser;
+	}
+	break;
+    case SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKeyAgree:
+	encalg = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg);
+	encalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg));
+	enckey = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.recipientEncryptedKeys[subIndex]->encKey);
+	switch (encalgtag) {
+	case SEC_OID_X942_DIFFIE_HELMAN_KEY:
+	    /* Diffie-Helman key exchange */
+	    /* XXX not yet implemented */
+	    /* XXX problem: SEC_OID_X942_DIFFIE_HELMAN_KEY points to a PKCS3 mechanism! */
+	    /* we support ephemeral-static DH only, so if the recipientinfo */
+	    /* has originator stuff in it, we punt (or do we? shouldn't be that hard...) */
+	    /* first, we derive the KEK (a symkey!) using a Derive operation, then we get the */
+	    /* content encryption key using a Unwrap op */
+	    /* the derive operation has to generate the key using the algorithm in RFC2631 */
+	    error = SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG;
+	    break;
+	case SEC_OID_DH_SINGLE_STD_SHA1KDF:
+	{  
+	    /* ephemeral-static ECDH */
+	    SecCmsKeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari = &ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo;
+	    SecCmsOriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oiok = &kari->originatorIdentifierOrKey;
+	    if(oiok->identifierType != SecCmsOriginatorIDOrKeyOriginatorPublicKey) {
+		dprintf("SEC_OID_EC_PUBLIC_KEY unwrap key: bad oiok.id\n");
+		goto loser;
+	    }
+	    SecCmsOriginatorPublicKey *opk = &oiok->id.originatorPublicKey;
+	    /* FIXME - verify opk->algorithmIdentifier here? */
+	    CSSM_DATA senderPubKey = opk->publicKey;
+	    /* Bit string, convert here */
+	    senderPubKey.Length = (senderPubKey.Length + 7) >> 3;
+	    CSSM_DATA_PTR ukm = &kari->ukm;
+	    bulkkey = SecCmsUtilDecryptSymKeyECDH(privkey, enckey, ukm, encalg, bulkalgtag, &senderPubKey);
+	    break;
+	}
+	default:
+	    error = SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG;
+	    goto loser;
+	}
+	break;
+    case SecCmsRecipientInfoIDKEK:
+	encalg = &(ri->ri.kekRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg);
+	encalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(ri->ri.kekRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg));
+	enckey = &(ri->ri.kekRecipientInfo.encKey);
+	/* not supported yet */
+	error = SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG;
+	goto loser;
+	break;
+    }
+    /* XXXX continue here */
+    return bulkkey;
+
+loser:
+    return NULL;
+}